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This dissertation puts forward a new and broader understanding of the factors that 
contributed to greater economic opportunity and declining poverty rates during the Great 
Society years and beyond through a study of the nation‟s first rural Community Action 
Agency (CAA) to receive federal funds as a part of President Lyndon Johnson‟s War on 
Poverty. Craven Operation Progress, Inc. (COP), located in mostly rural Eastern North 
Carolina, also was one of the eleven sites funded by the private non-profit North Carolina 
Fund, whose antipoverty programs both predated and served as models for the national 
War on Poverty. Aside from just the timing and source of its funding, the experiences of 
COP reveal a refreshingly different and far more encompassing story than has been told. 
In addition to focusing primarily on the fight to eradicate poverty in America‟s largest 
urban centers (many of which, like Mayor Daley‟s Chicago, were exceptional cases), 
scholarship on the War on Poverty has generally assumed that middle-class whites on 
CAA boards were either uninterested or unable to truly meet the needs of the poor, 
biracial agreement and cooperation was essentially impossible, and that confrontation and 
direct protest led by the poor and their liberal advocates was the primary and the most 
consistently effective means behind social change. “Coastal Progress: Eastern North 
Carolina‟s War on Poverty, 1963-1972” challenges these assumptions.  
With few exceptions, scholars have not looked beyond episodic conflicts and 
controversies to assess the wide-ranging interactions between whites and non-whites and 
between the poor and non-poor in their evaluations of CAAs. The research conducted for 
this study, which relies heavily on several untapped primary sources including 1960s and 
1970s-era oral interviews of antipoverty workers and local citizens, records from the U.S. 
Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), and written communications between 
COP and the North Carolina Fund as well as the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), 
confirms that moderate local leadership in combination with a biracial commitment to 
manpower and economic development were key to the creation of economic 
opportunities for poor people in Eastern North Carolina and also to making those 
opportunities accessible to the poor, blacks in particular.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1965, Eastern North Carolinians were not accustomed to attracting national 
news. Of course, the town of New Bern had drawn statewide recognition six years earlier 
after the successful restoration of Tryon Palace, the home of one of North Carolina‟s last 
Royal Governors. Yet, in general, most inhabitants of the eastern portion of the state 
continued to live in the environment of relative solitude and obscurity that they had 
enjoyed since the eighteenth century when the state‟s capital moved west to Raleigh.
1
 
Thus the pride and awe that swept Craven County when national reporters from Look 
magazine arrived to investigate antipoverty efforts being undertaken by the Volunteers In 
Service To America (VISTA) workers in the area was not entirely surprising.
2
  
Just a few months prior, in November 1964, Craven Operation Progress, Inc. 
(COP)—later renamed Coastal Progress—had become the nation‟s first rural Community 
Action Agency (CAA) to receive federal funds as part of President Lyndon Johnson‟s  
 
                                                 
1
 The city of New Bern, situated at the confluence of the Trent and Neuse Rivers, once served as the state 
capital from 1746 until the end of American Revolution. Founded in 1710 by Swiss merchants, it is the 
second oldest town in the state and today is the county seat of Craven County. 
 
2
 Jack Star, “The Domestic Peace Corps Tackles Poverty,” Look, April 20, 1965, p. 100-103.  
 
2 
 
War on Poverty.
1
 Headquartered in New Bern, COP served the coastal counties of Jones 
and Pamlico, as well as Craven.
2
 The comprehensiveness of its programs soon earned the 
praise of Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) director Sargent Shriver who hailed 
Craven Operation Progress as a model for all other antipoverty agencies.  
In September 1965, the COP Board of Directors was invited to attend a national 
news conference in Washington, D.C. convened by Shriver to publicize the progress of 
America‟s rural CAAs. Board members were not just impressed with the positive 
reception they received, many of them were taken aback by how much the press already 
knew about their antipoverty initiatives. Board member Frank Efird was surprised by a 
Chicago Tribune reporter‟s familiarity with the strawberry marketing program the board 
had recently helped to develop to encourage crop diversification among tobacco farmers. 
According to black board member Catherine Berry, “You would have thought that the 
reporters were from Craven County.” “They seemed to know so much about us,” she 
said.
3
 Jim Hearn, the first executive director of Craven Operation Progress, took the 
attention in stride: “Thus far, Craven has been a leader not only in the South, but in the 
whole nation. The eyes of the nation are, indeed, on Craven County.”
4
 
                                                 
1
 Not only was COP the first rural CAA, it was also one of the first six CAAs in the nation to receive 
federal funds. 
 
2
 In the beginning, Craven Operation Progress also provided limited program assistance to sections of 
Lenoir, Carteret, and Onslow counties. By 1965, both Onslow and Carteret counties had established their 
own CAAs.  
 
3
 COP Board meeting minutes, September 22, 1965, folder 4974, North Carolina Fund Records (#4710), 
Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Hereinafter 
cited as NCFR.  
 
4
 Jim Hearn, “Background History of Craven Operation Progress, Inc.,” folder 4967, NCFR.  
3 
 
 
Figure 1. Sargent Shriver of the Office of Economic Opportunity signs a renewal grant for Craven 
Operation Progress at a press conference held in Washington, D.C. in September 1965; the six people 
seated to the left of Shriver are members of the Craven Operation Progress Board of Directors: (l-r) 
Catherine Berry, Executive Director Jim Hearn, Robert M. Whitehead, Constance Rabin, Frank Efird, and 
D. Livingstone Stallings. Photograph by Billy E. Barnes, courtesy of the North Carolina Collection, Wilson 
Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Billy E. Barnes Collection.  
 
 
This statement was not merely wishful thinking on Hearn‟s part. Imbedded in 
President Johnson‟s declaration of “an unconditional war on poverty” on January 8,  
1964, was a forthright faith among Democrats, both liberal and moderate, that the federal 
government possessed an unlimited ability to cure and even prevent the most pressing 
forms of need in America: unemployment, improper housing, malnourishment, 
inadequate access to health services, lack of education, and lack of job training.
5
 
                                                 
5
 “The Poor Amidst Prosperity,” Time, October 1, 1965. In the words of Time magazine writers, 
“Underlying the antipoverty campaign is the uniquely American belief—surprisingly often correct—that 
evangelism, money and organization can lick just about anything, including conditions that the world has 
always considered inevitable.” See Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation 
and Decline of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 38-39.  
 
4 
 
Moreover, as a chief executive of a nation experiencing unprecedented economic growth 
and material abundance, Johnson was well aware that the War on Poverty would have to 
be sold to middle-class Americans as a way of benefitting all, not just the poor. Indeed, 
poverty in the United States had been on an especially marked decline since World War 
II. In his first State of the Union address, Johnson challenged the nation to recognize that 
even though “our gross national product reached the $600 billion level—$100 billion 
higher than when we took office,” with federal programs to bring the poor out of idleness 
“it easily could and it should be still $30 billion higher today than it is.”
6
 As Johnson saw 
it, poverty was primarily a problem of male unemployment due to a lack of education 
and/or skills. With the traditional male-breadwinner family structure in mind, Johnson 
was confident that his War on Poverty programs could help elevate the family wage, 
especially within the black community where male unemployment was most stark. In the 
words of public policy historian Guian A. McKee, a “gendered sensibility” undergirded 
Johnson‟s War on Poverty in the beginning. Job training and educational opportunities, 
then, were less geared toward gainfully employing women, particularly those with 
children under eighteen, outside the home. But since approximately 39 percent of 
working-age U.S. women participated in the labor force in 1964, Johnson‟s preference in 
                                                 
6
 Text of President B. Lyndon Johnson‟s Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 
January 8, 1964 [As delivered in person before a joint session], Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and 
Museum website, accessed July 2, 2010, 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/640108.asp.  
 
5 
 
raising men‟s employment likely fit in with what most Americans believed would most 
effectively improve the nation‟s productivity and, thereby, reduce its rate of poverty.
7
  
In addition to the fanfare surrounding the War on Poverty, a good public relations 
campaign was absolutely essential if these high hopes and lofty goals were to be fulfilled. 
Not only an uninterrupted flow of revenues to support the multi-million dollar 
antipoverty programs created under the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 but 
also Johnson‟s own credibility were on the line. In order to maintain the approval of 
Congress and the majority of American taxpayers, the White House and the OEO were 
heavily involved in sharing any evidence of success through as many national outlets as 
possible. In the words of public policy historian Alice O‟Connor, “Nothing seemed too 
small or too preliminary to report.”
8
 Portraying the Community Action Program (CAP)—
whose requirement for the “maximum feasible participation” of the poor and racial 
minorities in poverty programs made them some of the most controversial features of the 
War on Poverty—as appealing and worthwhile undertakings was especially important. 
                                                 
7
 Guian A. McKee, „This Government Is with Us‟: Lyndon Johnson and the Grassroots War on Poverty” in 
The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 1964-1980, eds. Annelise Orleck and Lisa Gayle 
Hazirjian (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 38-40; Marisa Chappell, The War on Welfare: 
Family, Poverty, and Politics in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 
10-11; Mitra Toosi, “A century of change: The U.S. labor force, 1950-2050,” Monthly Labor Review (May 
2002): 22, accessed June 27, 2012, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/05/art2full.pdf. A male-dominated 
labor forced also existed in Craven County during the mid-1960s. In 1965, of the 1,845 new applications 
filed with the New Bern Employment Security (ESC) Office, only 257 (less than 14 percent of the total) 
were filed by female residents. Expectations for mothers‟ work outside the home, in particular, were not 
especially widespread at the time. See Table XVII, Bureau of Employment Security Research, 1965  
Annual Report, Employment Security Local Office Operations (Raleigh, NC: Employment Security 
Commission of North Carolina, 1966).  
 
8
 Alice O‟Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century 
U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 169.  
 
6 
 
COP‟s pioneering vision and the early promise that it would reduce the sources of 
poverty in rural Eastern North Carolina showed both real and potential critics the goals of 
the War on Poverty might just be attainable.  
While COP made headlines in the earliest days of the War on Poverty, its 
relevance on the national stage swiftly dwindled amid the eruption of riots among blacks 
in inner cities across the North and West in the summer of 1965. As the Johnson 
administration shifted the bulk of its attention and funds to the grievances of the black 
urban poor, the majority of rural CAAs were forced to take a back seat to the social and 
political turmoil of cities such as Newark, New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles. In 1967 
the President‟s National Advisory Committee on Rural Poverty published a report, 
appropriately entitled The People Left Behind, to address the “futility of attempts to solve 
the urban problem without comparable efforts to solve the rural problem.”
9
 
Since then, histories of the War on Poverty have generally placed the greatest 
amount of importance upon the Johnson‟s administration‟s efforts to eradicate urban 
poverty. Indeed, an overwhelming number of War on Poverty studies have been focused 
upon CAAs in America‟s largest urban centers, many of which, like Mayor Richard 
Daley‟s Chicago, were arguably exceptional cases.
10
 Without a doubt, scholars can find 
                                                 
9
 The People Left Behind: A Report by the President’s National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), vii. In the preface of the report, the authors 
affirmed that “most of the antipoverty effort has been aimed at urban poverty” despite the fact that “the 
problem of poverty in rural areas is so acute as to require immediate and special attention.”  
 
10
 One major difference between Chicago‟s CAA and others across the country was that it was controlled 
and administered by politicians within city hall, namely Mayor Daley himself. According to Sargent 
Shriver, 74 percent of CAAs were instead “independent organizations” controlled not by local politicians 
but by private citizens such as ministers, social workers, educators, businessmen, and health providers.  
7 
 
an abundance of sources and drama in locales such as Chicago and Los Angeles. 
However, this urban dominance in the historiography has resulted in a narrow  
conception of 1960s community action in terms of both definition and outcome.
11
 As 
Allen J. Matusow observed a little more than a quarter-century ago “the best- 
documented cases come from the biggest cities, which had special problems and were 
probably not representative.”
12
 
Not only are accounts of how the War on Poverty worked on the local level 
lacking in current historical scholarship, there is a particular dearth of discussion of the 
effects of antipoverty programs in predominately rural areas. Such discussion is both 
relevant and necessary in light of the fact that in the 1960s, 30 percent of the nation‟s 
population lived in rural areas—as did almost half of the nation‟s thirty million poor; 
moreover, poverty was frequently most dire among rural residents.
13
 Until the widely 
                                                                                                                                                 
See David Zarefsky, President Johnson’s War on Poverty: Rhetoric and History (Tuscaloosa: University  
of Alabama Press, 1986), 128, 139. 
 
11
 Examples include Robert Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East L.A. (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2008); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for 
Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Matthew Countryman, Up South: Civil 
Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); J. David 
Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the 
War on Poverty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); and Thomas F. Jackson, “The State, the 
Movement and the Urban Poor: The War on Poverty and Political Mobilization in the 1960s,” in The 
“Underclass” Debate: Views from History, ed. Michael B. Katz, (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1993), 403-
439. 
 
12
 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 
1984), 255.  
 
13
 U.S. Census Bureau, Table 4. Population: 1790-1990, United States Urban and Rural, U.S. Census 
Bureau, accessed March 15, 2010, http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-4.pdf. 
The President‟s National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty approximated the number of the rural 
poor at 14 million in 1967.  
 
8 
 
anticipated publication of To Right These Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and the 
Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s America by Robert R. Korstad and James 
L. Leloudis in 2010, few historical works have given adequate coverage to the rural 
battleground of the War on Poverty since Polly Greenberg‟s examination into 
Mississippi‟s Child Development Group, first published in 1969. The most notable 
exceptions have appeared in the last five years and include Susan Youngblood  
Ashmore‟s trailblazing study of the “Black Belt” region of Alabama, and Thomas 
Kiffmeyer‟s captivating research into the experiences of student volunteers in the 
Appalachian Mountain region of Kentucky, both published in 2008.
14
 Yet, while each of 
these works provide important details about how the commitment to action among local 
people was able to advance antipoverty agendas in even the most desperate and 
seemingly impenetrable of environments, the question of how and why both antipoverty 
programs and racial equality dramatically advanced during the era of Johnson‟s Great 
Society in the most rural section of the country, the South, remains largely unaddressed.  
In addition to presenting a challenge to the dominance of urban studies within the 
historiography of the Great Society era, this study of the War on Poverty as enacted in 
                                                 
14
 Susan Youngblood Ashmore, Carry It On: The War on Poverty and The Civil Rights Movement in 
Alabama, 1964-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); Polly Greenberg, The Devil Has 
Slippery Shoes: A Biased Biography of the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM), A Story of 
Maximum Feasible Poor Parent Participation (Washington, D.C.: Youth Policy Institute, 1969), Thomas 
Kiffmeyer, Reformers to Radicals: The Appalachian Volunteers and the War on Poverty (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 2008); and Robert R. Korstad and James L. Leloudis, To Right These 
Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s America (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). Although Korstad and Leloudis highlight the conditions of 
rural CAAs in both the Appalachian Mountains and the northeast region of North Carolina, little attention 
is paid by this work to the area served by Craven Operation Progress, one of the first of the North Carolina 
Fund‟s eleven sites to be identified.  
 
9 
 
Eastern North Carolina gives more attention to underappreciated factors that both led to 
greater economic opportunities and undermined such efforts. Until very recently, most 
scholars who have studied the War on Poverty have deemed President Johnson‟s federal 
antipoverty initiative a failure because it ultimately did not do enough: it relegated too 
much control to city and county leaders, it was diverted by the Vietnam War, it left in 
place many “structural problems” that fostered poverty, it was fought on the cheap, or, as 
former Johnson cabinet member Daniel P. Moynihan argued, it was fraught with internal 
divisions among government officials over strategy.
15
 A newer generation of scholars, 
however, has begun to assess the War on Poverty as at least partially victorious.  
Co-edited by historians Annelise Orleck and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian and published 
in 2011, The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History best reflects this new trend of 
scholars who are seeking to dispel what they consider the most sizeable and enduring 
myth of the War on Poverty: that it was a total failure. A collection of sixteen studies, 
which includes contributions from several up-and-coming scholars such as Wesley G. 
Phelps and Karen M. Tani, The War on Poverty takes a fresh look at the Great Society 
years and beyond. For one, these scholars generally find that many of the antipoverty 
programs funded via federal dollars were crucial in reducing poverty rates in the nation 
through the 1970s and, moreover, that the War on Poverty helped to ameliorate the 
difficulties and discomforts of poverty by expanding the nation‟s social safety net for 
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millions of the low-income through programs that still exist to this day (namely 
Medicare/Medicaid, food stamps, and Head Start). In concurrence with co-editor 
Orleck‟s introductory assessment of the War on Poverty, each scholar also shares the 
view that antipoverty successes were chiefly wrought not by federal bureaucrats or local 
elective officials and black and white middle-class locals who sat on community action 
boards but by “poor people mobilizing in the name of participatory democracy and 
greater community control.” Taking a grassroots or “bottom-up” focus, each scholar 
chronicles instead how communities of poor persons ranging from rural whites in 
Appalachia, Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, and blacks in the southern Delta to migrant 
Mexican farmworkers in Wisconsin and Chinese immigrants in New York “transformed 
themselves into effective political actors who insisted on being heard.”
 16
 Yet while one 
of the major strengths of the volume is the degree of attention paid to dismantling popular 
stereotypes of the poor as lazy and/or apathetic non-actors this attribute is also, at the 
same time, one of its limitations. With few exceptions, the ways that local public officials 
and members of the black and white middle-class also meaningfully contributed to the 
War on Poverty is missing from the story. While scholars who have written on the  
subject in the last five years have added immensely to our knowledge of the range of 
achievements of the War on Poverty, they have tended to limit their narratives to the 
growth of the poor‟s political participation despite inconclusive evidence that a direct  
                                                 
16
 Orleck and Hazirjian, The War on Poverty, 2.  
 
11 
 
link existed between political participation and individual economic advancement.
17
 
Regretfully, historians have yet to fully credit the change that happened outside poor 
people‟s mobilization or in areas, such as Craven County, where such mobilization was 
seen on a relatively small scale.  
Another aspect of the War on Poverty that is generally underappreciated by 
scholars, a major exception being Christina Greene, is the interracial collaborations and 
associations that developed during the Great Society years, especially within the South.
18
 
One reason for this neglect is a common conclusion among scholars that middle-class and 
upper-class whites were generally uninterested in empowering the poor, specifically the 
black poor, in order to maintain their own status and self-advancement.
19
 As Orleck 
recently argued, setbacks during the War on Poverty were most frequently the fault of 
“local authorities—mayors, city council members, governors, police chiefs—[who] had 
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no intention of relinquishing their power over the poor or their control over the 
distribution of federal dollars.”
20
 More local studies such as this one, however, can reveal 
that there were a significant number of whites in the power structure who did not fight 
tooth and nail against the goals of the antipoverty programs but who, out of a genuine 
desire to improve the living conditions in the local communities in which they lived, 
actually helped to keep such programs alive during the late 1960s in the face of mounting 
conservative criticism.
21
 Of course, this dissertation does not seek to downplay or 
disprove arguments from conclusions drawn from scholars‟ research of other CAPs and 
CAAs—after all, as noted by Greene, while scholarly attention of the War on Poverty has 
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largely “been both overly broad and excessively harsh,” most critiques of local 
antipoverty programs contain at least “some kernel of truth.”
22
 Instead, this dissertation 
importantly seeks to demonstrate that CAPs and/or CAAs, in this case COP/CPI, were 
not necessarily wholly defined by white opposition to economic and social progress. 
Aiming to build upon existing research on the War on Poverty, this dissertation has 
instead been written to tell a fuller story of what community action entailed and how it 
functioned in a local community. To borrow again from Greene, “an examination of local 
efforts,” particularly in the South, “yields some surprising discoveries.”
23
 
Thus, to be clear, Orleck and others are not wrong in arguing that power-structure 
types sought to prevent poor people‟s empowerment in a variety of locations (especially 
within the Deep South states such as Mississippi where the poor were frequently black), 
but the narrative of the War on Poverty as it has been told remains incomplete. As this 
work seeks to show, power structure-types as well as middle-class locals (both white and 
black) in Craven County were often key in attracting federal antipoverty programs and/or 
in pushing for the opening up of opportunities for the poor via education, job training, 
employment, health care, and better housing. Many scholars have similarly concluded 
that a significant number of impoverished persons were uninterested in improving their 
individual employability through education and job training, as largely advocated by the 
white and black middle-class, and instead saw more hope in improving their plight by 
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engaging in group demonstrations against local elected officials and collectively 
demanding a better livelihood. With few exceptions, scholars have not looked beyond 
episodic conflicts and controversies to assess the wide-ranging interactions between 
whites and non-whites and between the poor and non-poor in their evaluations of 
CAAs.
24
 Resistance to community action and antipoverty measures did exist at the local 
level but these realities may not have been as universal as scholars‟ arguments continue 
to suggest.  
By the same token, while conflict and confrontational methods were often 
successfully used by black residents (many of who were poor) and their liberal allies in 
order to disrupt, if not dismantle, institutions and traditions that had impeded economic 
progress and/or fairness in Craven County—i.e. Jim Crow, an overabundance of “cheap 
labor,” and the eviction of unwed mothers and their children from the city housing 
project—economic progress within the Eastern North Carolina county would not have 
been possible without biracial negotiation and growing white accommodation to equal 
opportunity. These latter two developments—biracial negotiation and growing white 
accommodation to equal opportunity—were partially compelled by federal pressure from 
the OEO but were also made possible by white leaders and middle-class residents‟ 
economic self-interest in seeing the poor become financially self-sufficient. Like Rev. 
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Charles Edward Sharp of the county‟s biracial Good Neighbor Council, a significant 
number of moderate whites living in Craven in the 1960s had a “concern for the well-
being of the larger community of which we are all a part.”
25
  
In numerous ways, Craven County‟s experiences during the War on Poverty 
reveal a refreshingly different story of 1960‟s antipoverty efforts at the local level. It is a 
story of both black and white leaders agreeing to work together to decrease poverty in 
order to reduce the number of those on welfare, to, as they saw it, genuinely and 
compassionately “help people help themselves,” and to make Eastern North Carolina a 
more attractive place for future industry and economic growth. In a 1965 interview with 
the Raleigh News & Observer, Craven County Commissioner and COP board member D. 
Livingstone Stallings was not afraid to describe the antipoverty program as “both humane 
and selfish,” emphasizing that “the problem of poverty is everybody‟s problem.”
26
 The 
War on Poverty as waged in Eastern North Carolina shows that meaningful progress in 
reducing the numbers of the poor was possible at the local level despite setbacks at the 
federal level such as limited funding and internal divisions among government officials.  
Most interesting, both white and black leaders in Eastern Carolina had shown serious 
interest in tackling the poverty in their midst well before the grandest aims of Johnson‟s 
Great Society were legislated as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Economic Opportunity 
Act, and the Voting Rights Act. The Craven County commissioners, in particular, were 
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astounded by the increase of welfare cases which, by 1963, had risen to some fourteen 
hundred cases in Craven County alone and as a percentage of the county‟s population 
continued to surpass poorer counties.
27
 As they saw it, public welfare was a “direct and 
tangible evidence of poverty,” a drain on local resources, and not a dependable means by 
which the poor could become upwardly mobile. The commissioners were equally 
ashamed to learn that at least half of their young men could not pass the standards for 
military induction.
28
 Simultaneously, several black citizens were searching for local funds 
to establish adult literacy courses in order to enhance the employability of other rural 
blacks. To those ends, a representative committee, consisting of various members of the 
Craven County community (including blacks from the most prominent local civil rights 
organization) met for the first time on December 20, 1963, to discuss submitting a 
community action grant proposal to the recently developed North Carolina Fund. The 
nonprofit Fund, whose primary sponsor was the Ford Foundation, sought to forge 
innovative means to cut poverty in the state; as such, the Fund would serve as a model for 
Johnson‟s design of the War on Poverty. 
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Figure 2. President Lyndon Johnson (seated center) and North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford (seated 
second from far right) at a North Carolina Fund event in Rocky Mount, NC, May 1964. 
 
 
By the onset of the federal War on Poverty, interracial cooperation among local 
citizens representing a variety of political views was already underway in Eastern North 
Carolina. For its part, the North Carolina Fund helped bring black and white residents full 
circle by providing an important early venue for discussing and strategizing about how to 
raise the poor out of their meager circumstances and incorporate them into mainstream 
society. As this study will show, confrontation and direct protest were often important but 
negotiation and moderate white and black leadership were at least as critical to social 
change in Craven County. Furthermore, the progress that was made in reducing poverty 
among blacks (the largest segment of the poor in the region, proportionately speaking) 
owed as much if not more to the achievements of the civil rights movement, local 
industrial development, and a biracial understanding of the widespread benefits of 
fighting poverty in the community than to federal initiatives under the banner of the War 
on Poverty. 
18 
 
In 1965, five out of the thirty-seven COP board members were known to be 
“segregationists.”
29
 Although few of these men played a substantial role in the direction 
of the program—indeed, most of them attended board meetings irregularly—no more 
than two years later, all known “segregationists” had either lost interest in serving, 
broadened their views on race, or had been persuaded to step down either by other board 
members or by people in the community at large. Due in part to their experiences in 
negotiating racial matters during the civil rights movement, white board members of COP 
decided that, if for no other reason than to retain federal funding through the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO) and private funding through the North Carolina Fund, 
broader representation was needed both in policy planning and program participation. 
The records of COP explicitly confirm that not all white leaders, in the words of historian 
Pete Daniel, “subverted equal opportunity to serve their racist agenda.”
30
 In fact, although 
some did so reluctantly, the majority of white leaders in Craven (most notably its first 
executive director Jim Hearn who had served on President Johnson‟s Task Force on the 
War Against Poverty in February and March 1964) followed the civil rights guidelines of 
OEO. This reality conflicts with the standard narrative of the War on Poverty in the 
South. Much in line with this standard narrative, historian Kent Germany argues with 
regard to the Louisiana Delta that “one of the major reasons that [the War on Poverty] 
never reached the lofty goals espoused in Johnson‟s rhetoric was the intense and often 
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violent opposition the antipoverty effort generated.” “In the late 1960s,” he explains,” the 
War on Poverty was little match for the Delta‟s poverty and traditions, which engendered 
extreme white resistance to black advancement and racial inclusion, an economy too 
dependent on the land and on low wages, and an education system designed to perpetuate 
white privilege.” But unlike the place described by Germany, leadership in Craven did 
not generally, in Germany‟s words, “prefer preserving white supremacy over economic 
innovation, quality public education, and investment in human capital.”
31
 In fact, white 
leaders in Craven proved to be more dedicated to bringing economic innovation, quality 
public education, and investment in human capital to the community than in merely 
preserving white supremacy. That Craven was located in one of the South‟s most racially 
progressive states, whose governors helped establish and carry forward the North 
Carolina Fund and never vetoed a federal antipoverty program, is not a coincidence. Yet, 
knowing that OEO had yet to establish a CAA in Mississippi as late as the spring of 
1966, one might be led to wonder: was Craven County, North Carolina, the true 
exception during the War on Poverty or were Mississippi and the Louisiana Delta? 
Certainly, some county and municipal officials in Craven opposed the poverty 
program‟s tendency to cater to and assist poor blacks, but a careful look into the records 
of the poverty program reveals that “white backlash” did not fully define their 
antipoverty efforts. The fact that elements of white racism were present did not mean that 
white racism was the most pervasive or influential factor in the War on Poverty. From 
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COP‟s original inception as a North Carolina Fund community action program in April 
1964, both the quantity and the quality of minority representation and participation 
steadily increased as both moderate and liberal blacks regularly garnered near-unanimous 
to unanimous approval to be seated on the board and were given roles in shaping the 
program‟s direction.  
For instance, a North Carolina Fund review report of October 1966 noted the 
awareness within COP of the necessity of integration. In terms of racial balance, the 
poverty program received a six on a scale of one to seven (seven designating that most 
interest groups are represented), and according to one evaluation report, “Negroes play a 
substantial role in executive committee activities. Both negroes and whites, according to 
one board member, caucus before meetings to organize for specific purposes, and negroes 
at least, feel this has brought some specific gains.”
32
 The board‟s ongoing recognition of 
the advantages of interracial partnerships in the fight against poverty was made 
particularly evident in September 1967, when its membership comprised twelve blacks 
and twenty whites, of whom eleven were representatives of the poor.
33
 
The loudest, most resistant, and most violent protests against the antipoverty 
programs came from the fringes of the Eastern North Carolina community, particularly 
the Ku Klux Klan. In 1965 alone, Klan members placed bombs beneath the cars of civil 
rights leaders, shot at a dwelling that housed black and white student volunteers, posted 
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bumper stickers that read “The Klan is watching you” on cars of poverty program 
supporters, and burned crosses in the yards of poverty program workers. In response, the 
COP board of directors as well as local government officials did not hesitate to publicly 
condemn these activities as “irresponsible” and even “despicable.”
34
 The larger 
community also objected so much that a countywide Good Neighbor Council was formed 
that sought to foster communication, understanding, and peaceful relations between 
whites and blacks—in large part to prevent further Klan uprisings from derailing racial 
harmony as well as the progress of the antipoverty agency.
35
 Ironically, and as will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters, segregationist violence and extremism seemed to 
attract more white supporters to the goals of black civil rights leaders and antipoverty 
initiatives.
36
  
Compared to the rest of the state, the Klan‟s strongest following was in the rural 
east.
37
 However, contrary to popular belief, pro-segregation whites at this time held 
minimal sway in Eastern North Carolina. By the mid-1960s, as substantiated by their 
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increasingly desperate and covert tactics, the Klan was losing influence while blacks 
were gaining leverage. When the federal War on Poverty began in Eastern North 
Carolina, black civil rights activists had already been effectively challenging 
segregationists and successfully negotiating with the white power structure for at least 
five years. Largely due to the leadership of the Craven County and New Bern branches of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), almost all 
local business establishments had been desegregated and teacher and pupil integration 
was gradually rising in public schools across the county.
38
 Within the confines of COP 
itself, black influence became evident in the summer of 1965 after several white board 
members aimed to remove Jim Hearn from his post as executive director, partly because 
of his sympathies toward “forced integration.” In response, the black community and its 
leaders strongly expressed their desire in a sit-down meeting accompanied by Fund staff 
that the director be able to stay. In the end, the white COP board members backed down, 
without being compelled by OEO.
39
  
Based on the available evidence of antipoverty initiatives in Eastern North 
Carolina, it seems appropriate to investigate what other factors, aside from local 
opposition to racial and economic progress, might explain why the War on Poverty 
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ultimately failed to achieve all of its goals. The question of how theories of white racial 
backlash incorrectly blur or minimize the successes of local antipoverty action is also 
worth asking. Finally, and most important, one must seek the true causes of declining 
poverty rates in the 1960s and 1970s. Arguably, historians‟ focus on the presence of 
white opposition to black advancement in economic and political life has obscured 
aspects, both positive and negative, of the War on Poverty. For one, it has veiled genuine 
reasons, beyond those of racial fears and prejudices, why numbers of whites both inside 
and outside the South became concerned with the strengthening of federal bureaucracy 
that accompanied the War on Poverty by 1966. A North Carolina Fund poverty program 
in the Appalachian Mountains, which almost exclusively benefited impoverished whites, 
is only one example that citizens‟ issues with “welfare hand-outs” and “federal intrusion” 
into local affairs were not always centered around racial issues.
40
 
Although it was shaped by questions of race and episodes of white opposition, the 
War on Poverty in Eastern North Carolina was not, as the popular narrative goes, 
dominated by an established white power structure nor did federal money simply fill the 
pockets of middle-class antipoverty workers to the detriment of the black poor. Instead, a 
dedicated effort was mounted to help impoverished blacks and whites alike gain the 
necessary knowledge and skills to “become valuable and contributing citizens of our 
                                                 
40
 Watauga Avery Mitchell Yancey Community Action (WAMY), which sought to diminish poverty in the 
western portion of the state, was one of the seven original North Carolina Fund sites along with Craven 
Operation Progress (COP).  
 
24 
 
society of tomorrow.”
41
 In contrast to the prevalent view of CAAs as inherently 
susceptible to corruption, COP was at least one that did not simply utilize federal money 
for self-aggrandizement.
42
 Notably, when COP was selected by the North Carolina Fund 
as one of the first seven CAPs in the state, Johnson‟s Economic Opportunity Act was 
several months away from being passed. In fact, when the local planning committee 
applied to the Fund in December 1963, no members were aware of either the federal 
plans or the influx of federal money that would begin in November 1964. Not until the 
summer of 1964 did the North Carolina Fund encourage and assist its demonstration 
communities to develop plans to make use of the federal funds that were likely to become 
available.
43
  
Within the historiography of the War on Poverty, scholars have correctly shown 
that poverty rates dipped dramatically during the implementation of the War on 
Poverty—from thirty-three million in 1965 to twenty-five million in 1970—but have 
frequently assumed that various programs‟ goals and efforts were synonymous with these 
results.
44
 This is not to deny that the War on Poverty reinforced changes that directly 
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resulted in a decline in poverty or that some of these changes took place in Eastern North 
Carolina. For example, although the federal War on Poverty did not open the first lines of 
communication between whites and blacks or begin the process of desegregation, its civil 
rights guidelines helped to buttress many of the goals of local black activists such as 
greater hiring of non-whites. As antipoverty beneficiary Ethel Sampson of New Bern 
recalled, “Very seldom did you see blacks working as secretaries” before the antipoverty 
programs began.
45
 It must be acknowledged, nonetheless, that the roles of additional 
factors, including the cooperation of local communities and the growth of local 
industries, have been considerably underemphasized in the scholarship for their role in 
reducing poverty.  
Arguably, the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in combination with 
changing local attitudes, which allowed blacks to push open job opportunities previously 
relegated to whites only, were two such factors. Moreover, these factors appear to have 
been more responsible for the decline in poverty than OEO directives or the distribution 
of government funds. As a policy analyst from the School of Government at Harvard 
University pondered in 1977, “given that social welfare expenditures grew from $37 
billion in [fiscal year] 1965 to almost $140 billion in [fiscal year] 1974, compared to a 
1964 poverty gap estimated at $11 billion…it is reasonable to ask why poverty continues 
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to exist at all.”
46
 The research conducted for this study, which relies heavily on several 
untapped primary sources including 1960s and 1970s-era oral interviews of antipoverty 
workers and local citizens, records from the U.S. Office of Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO), and written communications between COP and the North Carolina 
Fund as well as the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), confirms that negotiation 
and moderate white and black leadership in combination with manpower and economic 
development were key to the creation of economic opportunities for poor people in 
Eastern North Carolina and also to making those opportunities accessible to the poor, 
blacks in particular.  
As the local civil rights movement ushered in greater white accountability and 
understanding of blacks‟ grievances, more blacks began to secure a voice in public policy 
decisions and enter skilled and better-paying job fields that had been historically closed 
to them such as management, clerical, and local government positions. Although few 
Eastern North Carolina whites felt personally responsible for black poverty in 1965, a 
phenomenon which had primarily arisen out of decades-long segregation practices that 
had constrained blacks‟ educational and job opportunities, the barrage of civil rights pleas 
and black voter registration gains of the mid-1960s presented them with both moral and 
pragmatic reasons to reexamine their claim of blamelessness and/or lack of responsibility 
to correct it. Some whites embraced racial fairness and participatory democracy out of 
pragmatism, to prevent “hot summers,” and others sought to avoid the legal repercussions 
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of noncompliance with federal civil rights laws. And for at least a few, namely church 
and religious leaders, the goal was to support the “economic, social, and spiritual 
progress” that will “bring the most lasting good...for all our people.”
47
 
Another related factor in declining poverty rates in Eastern North Carolina was 
the broad commitment within the private sector to advance the economic standing of the 
poor. The cooperation of white businessmen and public leaders in and around New Bern 
with programs such as Manpower Improvement Through Community Effort (MITCE) 
and Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) was particularly open; these men voluntarily 
hired young and low-skilled blacks for the first time. Businessmen, in particular, 
understood that their participation would not only help lower black unemployment rates 
but could also create extra purchasing power for the business community and provide 
themselves with workers for positions that needed to be filled. Similarly, in November 
1964 a group of mostly black middle-class leaders came together to establish Craven 
Industries, Inc. to raise funding for a needle trade-sewing industry to employ 
disadvantaged citizens, especially low-income females “at a wage level [such that] they 
could support their families.”
48
 Finally, local businessmen and middle-class leaders, both 
black and white, were responsible for attracting new and high value-added industry to 
Eastern North Carolina, starting in 1964 and extending into the 1980s and beyond. 
Primarily because they recognized the benefits of a higher tax base and smaller welfare 
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rolls, white political leaders largely encouraged the partnerships between private 
businesses and COP. Private employment would increase 50.5 percent in the 1980s due 
to the construction of Craven Industrial Park, which would employ thousands of citizens 
in various industries across the region.
49
 Between 1970 and 1990, the poverty rate for 
families in Craven County fell from approximately 20 percent to 10.5 percent, the latter 
of which stood right at the national average.
50
 Sadly, however, both middle-class whites 
and blacks are essentially either left out of War on Poverty histories or are inaccurately 
described as supporters of the status quo. The story in Eastern North Carolina was far 
more complex than that. Indeed, a significant number of non-poor residents in and around 
Craven were not only in favor of change but also made concerted efforts to build their 
community‟s economic strength to better the lives and economic opportunities of the 
poor.  
A final major factor that contributed to Eastern North Carolina‟s success in 
reducing poverty, which happened to be unique to the state of North Carolina, was the 
assistance of the North Carolina Fund. Housed in Durham, an industrial and university 
town located in the central portion of the state known as the Piedmont, the Fund provided 
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guidance and funneled private monies to COP so that it could enjoy greater freedom to 
search for new techniques to fight poverty (both before and after the Office of Economic 
Opportunity was established). Taking advantage of their proximity to the East and their 
relatively high degree of knowledge of that area, North Carolina Fund representatives and 
officials frequently visited New Bern—far more often than staff from the Office of 
Economic Opportunity were able to—in order to help moderate community issues and 
defuse community tensions. In its later years, though it would become more increasingly 
distrustful of local non-poor leaders, the North Carolina Fund would still play an 
important role, with the cooperation of local leaders, in funding studies to help bring 
more industry to Eastern North Carolina.  
To summarize, the implementation of the War on Poverty in Eastern North 
Carolina and its effects there warrants fresh analysis. The reappraisal contained in this 
study is intended to reveal truths about the people and institutions that lay behind 
community empowerment and decreasing poverty rates. To achieve this expanded 
analysis, however, historians must look to the local arenas in which change actually 
happened. Top-down studies cannot provide the details that are necessary to explain 
poverty‟s decline. Yet novel and untapped research like that of Eastern North Carolina‟s 
War on Poverty can help to fill this void. Although Eastern North Carolinians have long 
lost their place in the national dialogue, it might be highly instructive to revisit how they 
effectively battled poverty in the 1960s and early 1970s.
51
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Of course, as will be discussed later, poverty was never completely obliterated in 
the area due to certain factors (some of which were largely out of the control of the poor 
to counteract). For instance, there were slightly fewer jobs and training opportunities 
available to unemployed and/or low-income women during this period, as compared to 
unemployed and/or low-income men. This discrepancy, which could be quite stark 
depending on the type of industry (i.e. carpentry), stemmed from both local and national 
realities: much of the poverty in Craven was related to job loss in the predominately low-
income and male-dominated traditional industries like farming and, as historians like 
Annelise Orleck have helped to bring attention to, federal poverty policy during the War 
on Poverty “was bedeviled by the notion that women were secondary economic players 
and by the belief that the primary purpose of poverty programs was to transform poor 
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men into wage-earning heads of households.”
52
 These realities did not prove as 
cumbersome for young women without children in and around Craven who were able to 
find hundreds of job and training opportunities via Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), 
Manpower Improvement Through Community Effort (MITCE), and COP, in general. In 
fact, within a few programs this group of women actually comprised the majority of 
participants. In 1972, 56 percent of all NYC enrollees (145 in total) were black females.
53
 
Of course, single mothers with young children rarely had the same amount of time or 
freedom to pursue a full-time job or career. Daycare was provided through COP but, with 
more demand than funding coming from either the North Carolina Fund or OEO, the 
program had a perpetually long waiting list. As a result, for a significant number of poor 
local mothers, most of whom were single, black and lived in New Bern, their primary 
available opportunity to provide for themselves and their families into the 1980s involved 
becoming a recipient of public welfare. Because welfare payments usually did not raise 
them above the poverty line, government aid was rarely the ideal choice for sustaining 
themselves and their children but, especially after federal rules and requirements for 
recipients became less stringent between the late 1960s to early 1970s, many times it was 
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the most viable one.
54
 As the above discussion indicates, Craven‟s war on poverty was 
not without its drawbacks or missed opportunities. Yet, a growing local dedication among 
leaders to provide better education, job opportunities, and helping the disadvantaged help 
themselves was in the air by 1964, leading the county to see one of the fastest drops in 
poverty in the nation between 1969 and 1999.
55
  
By 1964, North Carolina‟s First District, comprised of nineteen eastern counties, 
including Craven, Jones, and Pamlico, was not only one of the poorest in the state but 
also one of the poorest in the nation. With a median family income of $2,662, it ranked 
430th among the nation‟s 435 congressional districts. Within this grim scenario, black 
families fared even worse; their median income was just $1,546 and at least 30 percent of 
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those families earned less than $1,000 annually.
56
 Historians need to be aware of how one 
of the poorest regions in the nation was able to discover, much on its own, lasting ways to 
eradicate poverty. The example of Eastern North Carolina‟s implementation of the War 
on Poverty proves that biracial coalitions were possible, even in a region where racial 
oppression, inequality, and tension had long been palpable. In the same vein, historians 
need to be aware of how black and white citizens were able to coalesce around the issue 
of pervasive poverty within a community of multiple Ku Klux Klan Klaverns. This is not 
to say that black and whites always agreed on all issues that arose or the way that the 
programs should be run, but with regard to the central tenets of self-help and the need to 
include the community in achieving greater opportunities for others, the majority of those 
involved during the 1960s generally agreed. The fact should not be lost that Craven 
Operation Progress was only one CAA among over one thousand in the nation, but its 
experiences within the War on Poverty are relevant outside the time frame of the Great 
Society and well beyond the small towns and pastoral lands of Eastern North Carolina.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
409 GEORGE STREET 
 
 
Introduction 
At 409 George Street in New Bern, North Carolina, within distance of the tonic 
breezes that waft daily from the nearby Neuse and Trent Rivers, stood an unassuming 
two-story red brick office building with white trimmed windows that served as one of the 
first strongholds in what would become a national War on Poverty. When President 
Lyndon Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 in August of that 
year, critical antipoverty plans and programs for Eastern North Carolina were already 
well underway, many of which emanated directly from that downtown office building, 
which had been recently renovated and donated by the county commissioners for the use 
of Craven Operation Progress (COP). From the very beginning, local plans and incentives 
to combat the causes of poverty in the rural East did not await direction or guidance from 
the federal government but were spurred instead out of local needs and circumstances. 
 In fact, once Johnson agreed to launch the War on Poverty, his administration primarily 
looked to the early experiences and leadership of the original North Carolina Fund 
community action sites, which included COP, to find the prototype to be imitated for a 
nationwide crusade against poverty.
1
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The region of Eastern North Carolina, thought by some at the time to be far too 
segregated to even be funded, nevertheless, provided a model for biracial cooperation in 
the fight against poverty. This chapter will outline the origins of COP, a community 
action program which actually predated the official launching of President Johnson‟s War 
on Poverty by almost one year. With its headquarters located at 409 George Street in 
downtown New Bern, COP was first awarded antipoverty funds through Governor Terry 
Sanford‟s newly-created North Carolina Fund. The nonprofit Fund, whose primary 
sponsor was the Ford Foundation, sought to forge innovative means to cut poverty in the 
state and would serve as a model for President Johnson‟s design for War on Poverty 
programs. Fund representatives were impressed early on with the imaginative leadership 
and the atmosphere of optimism that they witnessed in Craven County. In fact, Craven 
County‟s leadership and proposal for combating poverty was among the best they saw. 
According to Fund officials, “The Craven County proposal” was “an excellent 
demonstration of a comprehensive, community-based approach to poverty,” with a “high 
potential for success” and the group was “strongly recommended for a major grant.”
1
 
This chapter also explains what specific factors led black and white community leaders to 
come together in 1963 to begin to address the poverty in their midst. The chapter ends 
with the hiring of COP‟s first executive director, Jim Hearn, a young former government 
lawyer from Washington, D.C., who, unbeknownst to many in the community, was 
outspokenly liberal on many issues including race.  
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Figure 3. 409 George Street, site of Craven Operation Progress, Inc., New Bern, NC,  circa 1966 
(Source: Still image from “Questions” film, 1966).   
 
 
Poverty’s growing visibility 
Perhaps the most influential catalyst that drove the issue of poverty to national 
importance was the 1962 publication of The Other America, written by future political 
scientist Michael Harrington. Borrowing the “culture of poverty” theory associated with 
anthropologist Oscar Lewis, Harrington compellingly documented “the invisible land” of 
economic deprivation that purportedly trapped millions generation after generation in the 
richest nation on earth. Indeed, Harrington is largely credited for exposing “an economic 
underworld” that few Americans seemed to know about, where unskilled workers, 
migrant farm workers, minorities, and the elderly frequently lived “pessimistic[ally],” 
“defeated,” and “maimed in body and spirit, existing at levels beneath those of human 
37 
 
decency.”
2
 His best-seller would also play a key role in stirring both the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations to enact legislation for antipoverty programs that could empower 
the poor who, out of a “common sense of hopelessness,” were being “held back by their 
own pessimism.”
3
 While the tragic tales of The Other America were on the way to 
inspiring both federal action and the moral conscience of middle-class America, leaders 
in Craven County, North Carolina, were drawing the battle plans for a local war against 
their own not so invisible land of poverty that had developed, by the fall of 1963, into an 
all too noticeable and pervasive threat to the wellbeing and progress of their community.  
Largely due to a historic industrial boom brought on by World War II, the 
building of the Eisenhower interstate highway system, and a new investment tax credit 
made available for U.S. firms during the Kennedy administration, poverty had been 
riding a sharp decline in the nation as a whole since 1945.
4
 Leading the way was the 
South, where per capita income grew at rates considerably above the national average.
5
 
However, in many predominately rural areas, such as Craven County—home to almost 
sixty thousand residents—the incidence of poverty was actually progressing upward, or 
                                                 
2
 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 2. 
 
3
 Ibid., 161.  
 
4
 President Johnson would follow Kennedy‟s lead by signing into law the Revenue Act of 1964 which cut 
federal personal income taxes by approximately 20 percent (the top marginal rate, for one, fell from 91 
percent to 70 percent) and lowered the top corporate income tax rate from 52 percent to 48 percent. 
Between 1950 and 1965, the poverty rate in the United States dropped from 30 percent to 18 percent. See 
Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 57-
58.  
 
5
 Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1986), 239-240.  
 
38 
 
staying stagnant, instead of moving down. Two of the primary factors in the rise of rural 
poverty in the post-World War II era consisted of increased mechanization and 
automation which displaced numerous farmers from their traditional form of labor. 
Between 1955 and 1965 approximately 180,000 agricultural workers were displaced 
across Eastern North Carolina alone.
6
 This economic transformation ushered in by 
enhanced agricultural technologies would make the region‟s monetary dependence on 
tobacco cultivation, a dependence which could be traced back to the early nineteenth 
century, no longer possible. National minimum wage laws implemented between 1950 
and 1961, in particular, also reduced employment in the non-agricultural sector such as in 
the low-wage lumber industry that was one of the largest employers of blacks in Craven 
and outlying counties.
7
 
In 1963, over half of the adults who lived in rural Craven County did not farm and 
possessed both few job skills and little education.
8
 Similar conditions were found in the 
nearby counties of Jones and Pamlico in the early 1960s which, like Craven, were 
composed of between 50 percent and 75 percent rural land. Yet in contrast to the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an age in which one could argue that a high 
school diploma was unlikely to improve a laborer‟s status, in the mid-twentieth century a 
high school education was essentially a prerequisite in areas where low-skill labor jobs 
were diminishing. Beginning in the immediate postwar period, Eastern North Carolinians 
generally lagged far behind in the job market if they lacked either a basic high school 
education or modern industrial skills, which were equally becoming all the more 
important as the region shifted towards a Sunbelt economy that centered on 
manufacturing production. Indeed, due to a lack of skills or skills that were in low 
demand, only 56 percent of adults employed in Craven County in 1960 could find work 
fifty to fifty-two weeks per year. As many as 22 percent worked twenty-six weeks or less 
that year.
9
 As a result, Craven‟s annual average weekly earnings were just 83 percent of 
the state average in 1961 and remained there up to 1964.
10
 Rather than simply an unequal 
distribution of power, much of Craven‟s poverty in the 1960s was related to an evolving 
economy (namely shifts in market demands and technological developments) that led to 
major job loss within low-skill and male-dominated traditional industries like farming. 
Some of the displaced and unemployed left the region for nearby cities such as New 
Bern, Havelock, and Kinston or further west to Raleigh and Durham in search of better 
employment opportunities. Others relocated out of the state. In Jones County, which 
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ranked ninety-ninth among the state‟s one hundred counties in estimated per capita 
personal income in 1962, the population decreased as much as 11 percent between 1960 
and 1970, largely as a result of the dislocation of farm workers.
11
  
Not all whose livelihood was tied to crop growing were willing or fortunate 
enough to leave; substantial factors including family ties to the area, insufficient 
resources to move, and minimal job prospects from either deficient education or 
irrelevant skill-sets kept many in the East. Those who remained along the rural farmlands 
were commonly plagued by one or more poverty-related problems which could be both a 
cause and a symptom of a perpetually low income. Poor health, inadequate housing and 
plumbing, meager education, unemployment, high rates of infant mortality, out-of-
wedlock births, juvenile delinquency, venereal disease, and tuberculosis were among the 
major afflictions that deteriorated the quality of life in various sections of Eastern North 
Carolina. Less than half of the 2,533 occupied households in Jones County, for instance, 
had either flush toilets or hot and cold running water in 1960.
12
 But right alongside the 
woeful living conditions found in rural Craven and Jones counties was a growing 
problem of what was referred to as “blight” in certain sections of New Bern, which had 
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only been growing as more unskilled and unemployed rural migrants came to reside in 
the city. In several urban pockets, as sensationalized by the local newspaper in 1962, 
“Rats are seen running from one filth ridden, gray wooden shack to another” and 
“garbage lies in bare yards.” To boot, “Dirty children in ragged clothes play around heaps 
of metal that still resemble automobiles and stabbings and drunken fights are common 
during the dark hours.”
13
  
This sudden rise in poverty and its symptoms in both rural and urban settings 
during the postwar period would drive Craven County, according to 1959 data, to a 
ranking of thirty eight out of the one hundred North Carolina counties in terms of median 
per capita income.
14
 Around that time, 40 percent of its families were earning less than 
$3,000 a year, which was the approximate poverty line at the time. Officials and citizen 
leaders in Craven could have chosen to blind their eyes to these issues in front of them by 
simply not looking. No later than the fall of 1963, however, several of them would take 
full advantage of the moment in which they lived to confront the most evident causes of 
poverty head on.  
Inspiration for action 
In October 1963, a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Craven County 
Commissioners arrived at the office of its intended recipient, D. Livingstone Stallings. 
Commissioner Stallings, newly elected as chairman in 1962, was a native of Craven 
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County who was deemed by both whites and blacks as a respectable and progressive-
minded member of the community.
15
 A business school graduate of the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, he and his brother Robert—who twice served as New 
Bern‟s mayor in 1957 and 1959—jointly owned and operated an insurance company in 
New Bern. Stallings quickly discovered that the sender of the letter was a non-profit 
organization from Durham, the North Carolina Fund. The letter addressed to him had 
been sent to dozens of community leaders across the state of North Carolina encouraging 
them to submit “a proposal for local action against the causes of poverty.”
16
 As Stallings 
continued to read the solicitation for antipoverty proposals, he surely grew excited about 
the opportunity for outside financial help. Only a few weeks prior, he and other county 
leaders had “recognized the serious problem of the increasing load of welfare 
dependents” for their area and began conducting research to determine what other types 
of assistance they could provide to the poor in order to shorten the welfare rolls, which 
had risen to fourteen hundred cases.
17
  
Around the same time that Stallings began collecting data on the welfare 
recipients in the area, black Pleasant Hill resident Willie Dawson was in contact with the 
Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent of Craven County schools requesting the 
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establishment of adult literacy classes for the poor. Dawson, who was an outspoken civil 
rights leader in the predominately black community where he lived, also worked as an 
aircraft mechanic for Cherry Point Marine Air Base located twenty miles southeast of 
New Bern in Havelock. Constructed between 1941 and 1943 with substantial federal 
money awarded by a war contract, the Cherry Point Naval Base and Naval Air Depot, 
which was the county‟s largest employer, provided never-before-seen industrial job 
training for blacks throughout Craven County during and after World War II. Black 
Americans, like Dawson, who were employed at Cherry Point not only tended to receive 
higher wages than the blue-collar workers of lumberyards, oil mills, and tenant farms, but 
they also experienced improved job security due to their advanced occupational skills and 
their status as federal employees.  
 
 
Figure 4. Aerial view of Cherry Point Campus, Havelock, North Carolina, 1970. Photographs, Cherry 
Point, Box 377, Walter Beaman Jones Papers (#285), Special Collections Department, J.Y. Joyner Library, 
East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina.  
44 
 
Dawson first became aware of the possibilities of instituting adult literacy classes 
through his activism in the North Carolina Joint Council on Health and Citizenship, an 
all-black organization founded in 1960 by black physician Dr. Andrew Best from 
Greenville, who was concerned “about the very high rate of illegitimacy among Negroes 
in eastern North Carolina.”
18
 Around 1962, Dr. Best and Dawson successfully convinced 
Craven County public school officials, including Assistant Superintendent Ted J. Collier, 
to allow classes on sex education for black high school students. Eventually these classes 
were provided in eleven counties in the eastern half of the state. In the early fall of 1963, 
Dawson would re-engage Assistant Superintendent Collier about a new proposition for 
adult literacy classes for the black poor. Persuaded by the merits of Dawson‟s proposal, 
Collier proceeded to contact the director of a nearby community college and a professor 
at East Carolina University in Greenville who both agreed to recruit thirty teachers from 
Craven County and train them at the university. In October, as the demands for the adult 
literacy program began to grow, Collier wrote a letter to North Carolina Governor Terry 
Sanford to inquire about obtaining state funds to operate the literacy classes throughout 
the county.  
What Collier may have not known at the time was that, as of July 18, Governor 
Sanford had spawned the formation of a statewide organization—the North Carolina 
Fund—to attack the roots of poverty across North Carolina, like those of illiteracy that 
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were found in the rural east.
19
 After receiving Collier‟s letter, Sanford forwarded it to 
George Esser, who the governor had just named as the Fund‟s executive director.
20
 When 
Esser replied to Collier and encouraged the pursuit of the adult literacy classes, the initial 
communication between the North Carolina Fund and Craven County was born.
21
 A few 
weeks later, Commissioner Stallings received the preliminary letter from the Fund, 
including its Red Book of objectives and policies, which summoned communities from 
across all one hundred counties to craft antipoverty proposals before the deadline of 
February 1, 1964.  
The formation of the North Carolina Fund, November 1962-September 1963 
Governor Sanford publically announced the formation of the North Carolina Fund 
on the last day in September of 1963. In front of news reporters gathered in the capital 
city of Raleigh, Sanford introduced his broad plans to uplift the state‟s poor by 
improvements in education, economic opportunities, living environment, and the general 
welfare.
22
 Among the chief goals of his initiative was to help the state of North Carolina 
compete in a growing and technology-based national economy that was rapidly 
dependent on a well-educated work force. Just prior to the news conference, Sanford had 
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underlined that his state, much like the nation as a whole, was experiencing “a time of 
plenty” of which “we have never enjoyed such prosperity…leisure, recreation, and the 
pleasures of the good life.” Total personal income was up, and as statistics compiled by 
U.S. Census Bureau revealed, per capita personal income in North Carolina had also risen 
from 55 percent of the national average in 1940 to 74 percent in 1963.
23
 Yet, as Sanford 
clearly recognized, all was not well. Poverty had imposed severe restrictions on the lives 
and livelihood of approximately 450,000 North Carolinians in 1963. Most disturbing to 
the governor was how poverty “withers the spirit of children who neither imposed it nor 
deserve it” and who, without the means to break out, will tomorrow “become the parents 
of poverty.”
24
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Figure 5. Governor Terry Sanford seated at his desk in Raleigh, February 1964. Photograph by 
Billy E. Barnes, courtesy of the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, Billy E. Barnes Collection.  
 
 
In his public address of September 30, Governor Sanford made it clear that the 
North Carolina Fund would noticeably depart from old methods of dealing with poverty. 
For one, his program sought more sophisticated solutions beyond those of public and 
private relief payments, which he and many of the board of directors of the Fund saw as 
insufficient short-term remedies that did not address the roots of poverty. “I have come to 
believe,” Sanford affirmed, “that charity and relief are not the best answers for human 
suffering.”
25
 Sanford, who himself grew up relatively poor during the Great Depression 
in the small southeastern North Carolina town of Laurinburg, perceived “adult 
dependency” and “self-doubt” as intertwined problems resulting from a welfare system 
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which, with little input from the poor themselves, had tended to trap relief recipients in 
poverty.
26
 Accordingly, the North Carolina Fund was to be, as Sanford characterized it, 
the “first massive statewide effort in our country to find ways to break the cycle of 
poverty and dependency.”
27
 To those ends, Sanford envisioned a coordinated effort of 
organizations, government, and education to find ways to provide greater economic 
opportunities, through enhanced teaching methods in reading, writing, and math, as well 
as programs such as youth and adult job training, that “enable[ed] the poor to become 
productive, self-reliant citizens.” Despite being known as the “education governor,” 
Sanford understood that improving schools was not enough to help the poor succeed. As 
he explained, “A child who goes to school with no breakfast under his belt does not have 
equal opportunity to learn, excel, and move toward adulthood in which he will be able to 
use his talents and energies and intellect in a self-respecting role in society.” In the same 
vein, “neither does a child have an equal chance to learn if he happens to come from a 
home where reading is unknown and schooling underappreciated.”
28
 
Although it was Governor Sanford‟s foresight and initiative that were largely 
behind the creation of the North Carolina Fund, the statewide antipoverty organization 
was formed as a private, non-profit, and self-governing entity, which stood outside the 
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influence of the state legislature.
29
 One of Sanford‟s newest aides, John Ehle, had 
strongly suggested to the governor that he not depend on public sources to administer the 
programs of the Fund for the sheer reality that private money would afford Sanford 
greater freedom to attempt multiple and even unconventional strategies to tackle poverty 
that some fiscally conservative state lawmakers might not have favored funding.
30
 
Sanford willingly agreed. Among the philanthropic institutions that Sanford and his staff 
originally considered, the Ford Foundation resided at the top of the list. Founded in 1936 
out of the wealth procured by automobile tycoon Henry Ford, the Ford Foundation was 
annually donating more than four times the capital of the nation‟s second largest 
charitable organization.
31
 The Foundation was also eager to finance community-based 
demonstration projects aimed at developing human resources in low-income areas.  
Beginning in 1961, Ford trustees agreed to establish what was referred to as the 
“Gray Areas” project, which provided millions of dollars to urban development programs 
in New Haven, Connecticut; Boston, Massachusetts; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Oakland, California; and later, Washington, D.C.
32
 The target areas of these cities were 
found specifically “in the growing range of deteriorating real estate between central 
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business district and suburb, which economists are calling the gray area.” Largely as a 
result of post-World War II industrial decentralization, middle-class suburbanization, and 
the in-migration of poor blacks, whites, and Puerto Ricans, various American inner-cities 
suffered from above-average concentrations of juvenile delinquency, school drop outs, 
neighborhood blight, and underfunded and deteriorating public schools.
33
 Under the Gray 
Areas project, job training for career advancement and various other novel programs 
designed by social scientists were led by members of the community themselves to 
demonstrate how the most acute and widespread urban problems might be solved.
34
 The 
project, which could be described as an experimental combination of “institutional 
change, applied knowledge, and citizen participation,” would become “the basis of an 
evolving, eclectic approach to social reform that would eventually become known as 
„community action,‟” in which a balance of power and cooperation would exist at the 
local level between government and non-government officials, professionals and laymen, 
and poor and the non-poor.
35
 When Sanford first contacted Ford Foundation President 
Henry Heald in September 1962, the governor and his staff anticipated that the 
Foundation would view their own plans to address poverty in both urban and rural areas 
of North Carolina as an appropriate extension of the Gray Areas initiative. 
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Governor Sanford first visited the Ford Foundation headquarters in New York in 
November 1962. Shortly following his return to Raleigh, he wrote a letter to Heald 
acknowledging that “we have some very old problems, as you know” but was keen to 
emphasize that “we have a climate here which permits new work now” and, therefore, 
“are in a good position to get some things done.”
36
 In the proposal that the North Carolina 
Fund sent to the Ford Foundation, it was stressed that “half our students don‟t finish high 
school” and “our relief rolls grow faster than they should.” The text also underscored 
how those issues, together with substandard housing, submarginal wage rates, illiteracy, 
and illegitimacy, bore great social costs to the state, which were manifested in “crime and 
juvenile delinquency,” “increasing welfare rolls,” “rising governmental costs,” and “low 
per capita income.” In spite of the mountain of complex problems facing the state, 
however, optimism remained a central theme to the North Carolina Fund proposal. Out of 
a belief in the innate abilities and desire of the poor to “respond to opportunity” and 
“realize the American Dream if given a chance,” Fund staff were confident that highly-
experimental community action programs could deliver enduring economic and social 
change capable of elevating many of North Carolina‟s least fortunate.
37
  
Heald, Sanford, and their respective staffs underwent practically a year of 
discussion before the Ford Foundation agreed, in July 1963, to award the North Carolina 
Fund with $7 million for its five-year experiment to wage “an all-out assault on 
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poverty.”
38
 Heald certainly liked the fact that Sanford‟s plan applied the full resources of 
a state that could realistically “provide a coordinated effort to develop human resources 
to the fullest.”
39
 Yet the primary hesitation for the officials of the Ford Foundation was 
rooted in a concern that Jim Crow practices might “hobble their plans for new work in the 
South.”
40
 By Sanford‟s invitation, the Ford Foundation staff twice traveled throughout 
the state in 1963, once in January and later in July, in a multiple-day tour to assess 
poverty conditions as well as the nature of race relations. Their fears eventually subsided 
as they continued to get to know Sanford and the logistics behind the Fund‟s plans to 
battle poverty.  
As a moderate Democrat, Sanford distanced himself from the racially incendiary 
action and oratory that several southern governors such as George Wallace and Orval 
Faubus were commonly employing. Beyond his 1960 campaign mantra that North 
Carolina needed “massive intelligence” instead of “massive resistance,” he had praised 
President Kennedy in 1962 when Federal Marshals were sent in to protect James 
Meredith in becoming the first black American to enroll at the University of Mississippi, 
and Sanford would allow his own children to integrate public school in Raleigh.
41
 
Moreover, in January 1963, as civil rights demonstrations escalated in cities throughout 
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North Carolina, Sanford spearheaded the idea of the Good Neighbor Councils to 
encourage communication, understanding, and peaceful relations between blacks and 
whites in communities statewide, with the ultimate aim of fostering “equality for all 
citizens.”
42
 Sanford‟s more liberal views on race were reflected in the North Carolina 
Fund proposal through its open call for the involvement of the poor, including blacks, in 
the decision-making process of community action programs. The testimony of John H. 
Wheeler, a black banker from Durham and board member of the Fund, also went far in 
convincing the Ford staff that Sanford‟s plans were sufficient in standing up to Jim Crow, 
which of course, had supplied a great deal of black poverty.
43
A few weeks before the 
Ford Foundation announced its multi-million dollar commitment, Sanford had also 
received good news from two of the leading private foundations in North Carolina. In a 
combined gift of $2.5 million over five years, the Z. Smith Reynolds and Mary Babcock 
Foundations helped to supply the Fund with the local matching that the Ford grant 
required.
44
 The North Carolina Fund was ready to be launched.  
Being the first statewide antipoverty program instituted in the nation, the North 
Carolina Fund was undoubtedly a historic creation. “North Carolina has been put on the 
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map in a new way,” proclaimed a reporter from the Durham Sun. It was true; the Fund‟s 
approach to ending poverty—“to call on the impoverished to help themselves rather than 
remain in poverty and receive public handouts”—never before had been done on such a 
broad scale.
45
 In a motion picture that the North Carolina Fund produced to publicize its 
creation, the narrator reiterated that “the Fund is not a welfare system” and is most 
concerned with “helping people help themselves.”
46
 This notion that self-help was the 
best way to cure poverty continued to be celebrated as a major tenet of the North Carolina 
Fund philosophy, which served as both a statement of purpose and a means of winning 
over conservatives. To a degree, Fund staff would seek to facilitate individuals who 
qualified for welfare assistance get in touch with their local agencies, but this approach 
was a lesser component of the broad and multi-pronged assault on poverty that needed to 
be accomplished in the state. Indeed, one of the key components of the Fund‟s battle plan 
was based on the relatively new idea that a community‟s people, including members of 
the poor, best understood the community‟s problems and, furthermore, that local ideas 
could carry results in defeating poverty.
47
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Figure 6. North Carolina Fund building in downtown Durham, North Carolina, May 1966. Photograph by 
Billy E. Barnes, courtesy of the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, Billy E. Barnes Collection.  
 
 
D. L. Stallings gathers local forces to compile community action proposal, December 
1963 
 
Commissioner D. Livingstone Stallings had faith that the people of Craven 
possessed not only the creative minds necessary to conquer their problems of poverty, but 
also the will. On the evening of December 20, 1963, Stallings‟ faith was rewarded as 
nearly forty local leaders enthusiastically convened at the New Bern-Craven County 
Chamber of Commerce building at his request. The group, which included 
representatives from business, industry, local government, city and county schools, 
churches, and civic groups, had been specially appointed to assist in studying the 
conditions of the poor and designing programs to lift them out of poverty, all of which 
56 
 
would be compiled in a proposal for the North Carolina Fund‟s community action grant.
48
 
New Bern High School Principal Bill Flowers, who was chosen to serve as the 
committee‟s chairman, insisted from the start that the group be racially integrated in spite 
of the customary presence of segregation in various aspects of public life. Stallings, in 
taking the lead in organizing a proposal committee that was representative of all 
geographic areas of the county, was likewise interested in involving at least a few black 
minds in the planning process. As a racially moderate to liberal politician, Stallings was 
also likely aiming to maintain his fairly broad support among local black voters.
49
 
Accordingly, members from the local NAACP branch and the Craven County Civic 
League, considered by many blacks as two of the most prominent minority organizations 
in the area, were invited to participate in the planning process and vote on the 
committee‟s proposal. Black Pleasant Hill resident Willie Dawson, who had inquired 
earlier about adult literacy classes to Assistant Superintendent of Craven County Schools 
Ted J. Collier, was also assigned a role in crafting the proposal to be sent to the North 
Carolina Fund, along with fellow black citizens John R. Hill, principal of Vanceboro 
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Consolidated School, and Roland Sneed, a caseworker with the Craven County 
Department of Welfare.
50
  
Working nights and weekends, and even portions of holidays, to meet the Fund‟s 
deadline, the committee lauded the eventual completion of the fifty-two page proposal as 
a “team effort by the entire community.” Although the committee did not directly involve 
the poor citizens of Craven County (none sat on the original board), several of the 
committee members, like Dawson, Craven County welfare worker Jane Latham, and 
Reverend J. Murphy Smith of the biracial New Bern Ministerial Association, were 
selected by Stallings because of their known volunteer efforts in assisting the poor as well 
as their contacts in poor communities. Moreover, the proposal writing itself both required 
and prompted the committee to communicate with a fairly broad spectrum of the poor in 
order to determine the main issues needing to be addressed. After statistics on health, 
education, welfare, income, and employment were compiled on the poor by each sub-
committee, the group unanimously agreed that “helping people help themselves,” as the 
North Carolina Fund put it, would be a worthwhile endeavor for the sake of the future of 
Craven County.  
The Craven proposal acknowledged that the county was not the poorest in the 
state but located somewhere in the “good average”—over half of its citizens had found 
reliable economic success and lived above the poverty line.
51
 Partially due to the presence 
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of the Cherry Point Naval Air Base, the county was also among the state‟s leaders in 
percent of population employed in white collar occupations, with as many as 34 percent 
in 1960.
52
 As the Raleigh News & Observer accurately pointed out in November 1964, 
“Other counties have poorer people and more difficult problems.”
53
 Still, as understood 
by Assistant Superintendent of Craven County Schools Ted J. Collier, who did most of 
the proposal writing, “It is necessary to the survival of [the American] way of life that a 
solution [to poverty] be found,” for “the problem will grow greater if it is neglected, 
because poverty breeds upon itself.”
54
 Collier‟s statement signaled that Craven County 
leaders did not see themselves as part of a remote community with exceptional problems 
but belonging to a bigger movement to defeat the ideology of communism amid the 
ongoing Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union. 
“Communism,” Collier declared in the proposal‟s foreword, “flourishes best in the 
desperation of the disadvantaged. We must show that our nation has a concern for these 
people that is a reality and not a pretense, and that no political or economic system is as 
well equipped as ours to rescue them.”
55
  
These views were undoubtedly reinforced by President Johnson‟s State of the 
Union Address on January 8, 1964, in which the president first announced his intention of 
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declaring an unconditional war on poverty across America. Approximately two months 
after the nation had first mourned the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on 
November 22, 1963, the former vice-president turned president spoke before Congress of 
“a unique opportunity and obligation,” which Kennedy had always understood, to “prove 
the success of our system” and “to disprove those cynics and critics at home and abroad 
who question our purpose and our competence.” Evoking the fallen president‟s memory, 
Johnson added: “Let us carry forward the plans and programs of John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy—not because of our sorrow or sympathy, but because they are right.”
56
 Like 
President Johnson, then, one of the long-range goals of the Craven leaders was to 
convince the population of poverty that they could live securely and satisfactorily in a 
society of free enterprise, in an effort to forestall radicalism as much as to fight 
dependency. In an age when the international influence of the Soviet Union appeared to 
be growing, indifference to poverty in America could be regarded as equally inhumane 
and reckless. 
From the perspective of the leaders of Craven County, the most humane way to 
help the disadvantaged was through the providing of greater job and educational 
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opportunities that ultimately allowed them to become self-supporting. Public welfare was 
generally viewed as a “direct and tangible evidence of poverty,” read the Craven County 
Proposal to the NC Fund, and not a dependable means by which the poor could become 
upwardly mobile, a view that was in line with many of the most liberal Democratic and 
Republican congressmen at the time.
57
 Echoing a conviction shared by Governor 
Sanford, Collier spoke confidently and from local observation when he alleged in 
Craven‟s proposal “that relief alone does not reach the basis of the evil” of poverty.
58
 
Indeed, in 1963, both welfare demand and the poverty rate for Craven County were at 
one of their all-time highs in the modern era; Craven‟s welfare benefits, which as early as 
1953 the State Board of Public Welfare deemed “liberal” and above the state average, 
had not effectively minimized the county‟s poverty problem.
59
 The problem of poverty 
was seemingly rooted deeper than a simple lack of income—changes in the local 
economy coupled with widespread deficiencies in job skills and education were more at 
fault, which is precisely why self-help strategies to fight poverty, like those envisioned by 
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the staff of the North Carolina Fund, would be perceived as an exciting venture for 
Craven County. No such strategies had been seriously attempted in their community or 
any other in the state.  
Committed as the Craven leaders were to the philosophy of Governor Sanford that 
“our economy cannot afford to have so many people fully and partially unproductive,” 
their proposal did not assail the poor nor did it place the blame solely on the shoulders of 
the disadvantaged they set out to aid. Craven leaders had grasped that poverty was often 
the result of complex factors and, therefore, its existence was elucidated not just in terms 
of bad luck resulting from a prolonged illness or injury, as the will of God, or as a result 
of individual character flaws and choices, like laziness or wasteful spending habits.
60
 
Poverty could be and was caused by some if not all of these reasons, Craven County 
leaders believed, but structural explanations—like increased mechanization, which 
unwillingly pushed the region‟s tobacco farmers into economic hardship—largely 
informed the local battle plan.
61
 Another structural issue that the Craven proposal touched 
on, albeit in short detail, was “the minority group status of the non-white segment of the 
population” and its part in making the effects of poverty “doubly severe to Negroes.”
62
 In 
1963, this statement was a fairly frank and honest observation for Eastern North 
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Carolinians to make. Though the proposal did not explicitly name it, there was a primary 
contributing factor to blacks‟ minority status: namely, the Jim Crow laws and customs 
which, after 1899, segregated the races across North Carolina in all public 
accommodations and institutions, ranging from streetcars, buses, water fountains, parks, 
and theaters to housing, schools, restaurants, waiting rooms, and even children‟s 
textbooks.
63
  
The historical roots of black poverty  
Far more than any technological advances in agriculture, the heaviest and most 
dramatic forms of poverty yielded in Craven County after the Civil War came during the 
Jim Crow years. Comprising 29 percent of the residents in the county and as much as 39 
percent in the county seat of New Bern, blacks had the fewest available opportunities in 
the 1960s in both education and the job market as a result of living years under a 
restrictive system of segregation that was based on a prevalent notion among whites that 
blacks were naturally less intelligent, less diligent, less skilled, less cultured, and often 
less deserving of equal consideration, notions that could be traced back to the era of 
slavery.
64
 In 1960, as many as 14.9 percent of blacks in New Bern and 12.1 percent in 
Craven County were unemployed, compared to 3.3 percent and 5.4 percent of whites in 
New Bern and Craven, respectively; moreover, over half of blacks in Craven had less 
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than six years of education.
65
 Renowned historian of the South C. Vann Woodward 
makes the crucial point that Jim Crow laws, which were added to the statute books in all 
of the southern states below the Mason-Dixon Line by 1904, “applied to all Negroes—
not merely to the rowdy, or drunken, or surly, or ignorant ones.”
66
 The influential U.S. 
Supreme Court decision handed down in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 reasoned that 
segregated accommodations for the two races were not unconstitutional as long as they 
were in effect “separate but equal.” However, as substantiated by scores of post-1965 
histories of Jim Crow‟s effects in the South, “Colored” spaces were almost always of 
lesser quality, especially in regards to education.
67
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Under the Jim Crow social order, blacks were generally not allowed to engage in 
skilled trades, middle-class occupations, or attend the best available schools due to 
perceived deficiencies in capabilities and preparedness such as widespread illiteracy, a 
remnant of slavery, which affected 32 percent of the black voting age population in 
Craven County in 1900.
68
 Accordingly, most blacks in Craven were limited to working 
for whites in jobs that were both low-paying and unskilled. In the late 1930s, with a 
segregated society securely intact, the chief occupations available for black males in and 
around New Bern included sharecropping and other laborer positions. For black females, 
it was domestic work. For over five hundred black women, or approximately 25 percent 
of New Bern‟s black female working population, the only available means of income 
involved cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, and looking after the children of middle-
class whites.
69
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Black doctors, lawyers, teachers, druggists, and real estate agents practiced and 
could find work in the black business district of New Bern, but their numbers were few 
and many of them likely gained their positions prior to Jim Crow.
70
 Without a doubt, 
blacks‟ exclusion from quality education and training and a full range of job 
opportunities prevented the majority of them from demonstrating their intelligence, 
talents, integrity, and above all, that domestic service and tenant farming were not 
necessarily their fated occupations.
71
 With few avenues for upward mobility, blacks also 
had little success in countering white prejudiced attitudes and/or economic interests that 
relegated their wages at rates lower than fellow white workers in the same or similar 
positions.
72
 Thus, black poverty in Eastern North Carolina and various other parts of the 
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South was directly and most often related to an absence of freedom to participate in the 
nation‟s economic system of free market capitalism in which their race was not first and 
foremost judged. In other words, differentials in wages, hours, kinds of work, and 
conditions of work operated to keep blacks from getting ahead.
73
 Adding to blacks‟ 
precarious economic situation had been the Great Fire of 1922 that swept through 
downtown New Bern, burning over one thousand buildings—one third of which were 
black-owned—and leaving fifteen hundred unemployed and thirty-five hundred 
homeless, the latter of which were predominately black.
74
 Speaking on behalf of the 
black citizenry of the state, including those in the East, President of the North Carolina 
College for Negroes James E. Shepard objectively pleaded a few years before his death in 
1947 that “the door of opportunity along economic lines should be open to [blacks].” 
Like other human beings, he emphasized, a black man deserves “the chance to acquire 
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economic freedom by being permitted to work anywhere his skill and training would fit 
him to work,” and he should not be “denied opportunity to work because of his color, nor 
should he be given less money for any given task than would be paid anyone else.”
75
  
More than any other event, the Great Depression exposed the severe economic 
handicaps that were placed on the South from the widespread lack of skills, development, 
and self-sufficiency among its black and white citizens. To proclaim the South as the 
“nation‟s No. 1 economic problem,” as President Franklin Roosevelt did in 1938, was not 
an overstatement, despite its political overtones.
76
 In terms of education, wages, health, 
purchasing power, industry, ownership of land, and housing, the South fell well behind 
other sections of the nation, making the Depression that much more difficult for the 
region to overcome.
77
 “It should be apparent to any thinking person,” argued University 
of North Carolina sociologist Guy B. Johnson, “that the South has been so preoccupied 
with keeping the Negro in the ditch that she has had neither the time nor the strength to 
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pull herself out of the ditch.”
78
 Suggesting that the black citizenry “is the South‟s greatest 
undeveloped human resource,” Johnson further contended that “the South has all to gain 
and nothing to lose by a policy of fairness and justice in the economic sphere.”
79
  
This same line of thinking was held by a group of concerned black and white 
citizens in New Bern—including Mayor W.C. Chadwick and his wife—who helped to 
charter a local subsidiary of the North Carolina Commission on Interracial Cooperation 
(NCCIC) between 1936 and 1942.
80
 In the words of historian Morton Sosna, local CIC 
groups were generally “not meant to challenge segregation.” Yet, “the idea of a southern 
organization in which blacks would be members and be allowed to voice complaints was 
new.” Sosna adds that, “In the 1920s, with the Ku Klux Klan far more potent in the South 
than was the CIC,” meetings such as these were greeted “as giant steps forward in race 
relations.”
81
Around the same time, the black New Bern Ministerial Alliance and the 
white New Bern Ministerial association also began meeting quarterly at a local church to 
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discuss avenues toward interracial cooperation and projects of common interest.
82
 As 
state director of the NCCIC L.R. Reynolds explained, the new interracial movement was 
based on “the growing conviction of the increasing number of influential white people in 
the South that we can not be fair to ourselves and be unfair to others.”
83
 But due to the 
nascent feature of the interracial efforts, except for the small numbers who joined the 
“Great Migration” to the North for better employment and educational prospects for them 
or their children, the racially segregated economy in Eastern North Carolina was 
minimally challenged between 1900 and 1945 as a significant number of blacks chose to 
remain compliant with white bosses rather than risk sacrificing their paychecks.
84
 An 
important foundation had been laid but blacks and poverty would not be easily separated.  
Progress in dismantling Jim Crow, 1960-1963 
Despite the economic, social, and political powerlessness that blacks throughout 
Craven County continued to experience, there was a new and glaring reality that may 
have explained why the Craven County committee did not suggest solutions for 
dismantling racial segregation in their proposal to the North Carolina Fund: Jim Crow 
was already in critical condition in December 1963. The first major blow to the system of 
racial exclusion came in April 1948 with the advent of the New Bern chapter of the 
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NAACP.
85
 Like fellow black World War II veterans from across the South, those who 
helped to charter a NAACP branch in New Bern returned from fighting overseas with a 
transformed confidence to look beyond the limitations of color and begin perceiving 
themselves as both capable and deserving of achieving equal footing with whites. 
Assured by the willingness of the United States government to fight against Nazism and 
the ethnic persecution of Jewish peoples in Europe, most trusted that their sacrifice 
abroad would be rewarded with improved race relations at home. As friends and family 
members of Craven County blacks who served in World War II later testified, the men‟s 
stories of being stationed in places like Paris where, for the first time, they were seen as 
equals and “nobody looked down on them because they had a dark complexion” were 
inspirational in helping to engender other fellow blacks to join the local fight against 
racial subjugation.
86
 In the boldest act to date against white locals who either condoned or 
enforced the mechanisms of Jim Crow, 120 would join the organization in the first year.
87
 
And as the New Bern NAACP branch and its subsidiary Youth Council dramatized local 
discriminatory practices into the 1950s and 1960s, blacks‟ growing expectations of being 
seen and treated as equals swiftly rose alongside black progress in the realms of fair 
employment, education, desegregation, and voting rights.  
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Civil rights leaders confronted black political disfranchisement first. With the 
help of the Craven County NAACP branch formed shortly after the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, the New Bern NAACP led a strident voter registration campaign 
between 1958 and 1960, which amounted in an almost 5 percent increase—from 19.5 
percent to 24.3 percent— in the number of eligible black adults registered to vote in 
Craven.
88
 This uptick in black voting power made it possible for the first competitive 
black candidate, Reverend G.J. Hill, to appear on the ballot for New Bern alderman since 
Reconstruction.
89
 After the votes were tallied, the former president of the New Bern 
NAACP fell short of victory, but Reverend Hill‟s name on the 1959 ballot alone 
symbolized a growing political poise among blacks in the region. Simultaneously, 
although white registrars still used the literacy test to weed out those they believed were 
not equipped for participating in a democracy, blatant white resistance to black 
registration was becoming less acute as well. In contrast to the late 1940s, when reported 
violations of voting denial based on race abounded in several eastern counties including 
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Craven and Pamlico, such violations were drastically disappearing just a decade later.
90
 
By the late 1950s, even though some felt they still needed to “keep it a secret,” it was also 
becoming less common for teachers and other black professionals to worry about losing 
their jobs if white supervisors discovered they had voted. As the injustice of voting 
discrimination by race continued to be publicized in Craven and throughout the state—
like in 1940 when a group of five blacks petitioned the North Carolina State Board of 
Elections after being denied registration in Moore County—it would depend less and less 
on “who you worked for if you got to vote.”
91
  
In 1960, the North Carolina Civil Rights Advisory Committee held hearings in 
over a half-dozen of the state‟s cities, including New Bern, “at which time opportunity 
was given for persons to file complaints of the denial of the right to register or to vote” if 
the denial was based on the applicant‟s race, religion, or national origin.
92
 While 
complaints of voting discrimination originated from arguably more racially conservative 
counties in the east such as Greene and Bertie, none were reported to the committee from 
Craven. Somewhat ameliorating black struggles to gain the vote in this period had been 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1957, signed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as a means to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. The first civil rights measure issued in the twentieth 
century, the federal act had the dual effect of providing blacks greater security to confront 
discriminatory measures while also compelling whites to avoid depriving blacks their 
voting rights through the establishment of the Civil Rights Section of the Justice 
Department which gave federal prosecutors the authority to obtain court injunctions 
against obstructions to the right to vote. Citizenship schools sponsored by Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.‟s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) also dramatically 
reduced the number of blacks in Craven who were denied the franchise. The brainchild of 
Charleston, South Carolina school teacher Septima Clark, the citizenship schools taught 
an historic number of black adults throughout the South the requirements and rights of 
citizenship and how to pass literacy tests in order to register. Between 1962 and 1964, 
adults came from all age groups—the oldest student was seventy-three—and from all 
parts of Craven, Jones, and Onslow counties to attend the citizenship education classes 
organized in New Bern, Riverdale, Pollocksville, and Jacksonville.
93
 As one of the 
female volunteer teachers in New Bern expressed to her supervisor in 1963, “My pupils 
are very eager to grasp on to this school.”
94
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By the time the voting rights campaign had begun to build momentum, the local 
NAACP branches were well occupied with efforts to persuade the Craven County Board 
of Education to observe the U.S. Supreme Court‟s 1954 Brown ruling, which declared 
racial segregation in the nation‟s public schools unconstitutional. The all-white Craven 
school board preferred for desegregation to occur on a volunteer basis as spelled out in 
North Carolina‟s Pearsall Plan, which for its moderate stance and respect for “freedom of 
choice,” was supported by many key leaders in the state including Governor Terry 
Sanford.
95
 For black parents who wanted to send their children to an integrated school, 
however, the plan required them to apply for their child‟s admission by approaching their 
school board members, some of whom were less open to integration. But for a group of 
black parents in Havelock, all of whom were working as military personnel at Cherry 
Point, such an approach landed high dividends. On April 8, 1959, rather than react in the 
fashion of Arkansas Governor Faubus who called on the National Guard to halt black 
students from entering Little Rock Central High School in 1957, the Craven board 
essentially yielded to the law and the black parents‟ applications by ordering the four 
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white schools in Havelock to desegregate promptly.
96
 As reported by the local Sun 
Journal, “This is the first time in the history of Craven county that Negro students have 
been allowed to attend a white school.”
97
 
Although it was a historic step in race relations for a predominately rural 
county—the Piedmont city schools of Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Charlotte had 
first volunteered to desegregate in the fall of 1957— no visible signs of organized white 
backlash occurred. In response to a white constituent of Havelock who desired help in 
“blocking the reassignment of negro children from previously all-negro schools,” 
Congressman Graham A. Barden conceded that while he found the school board‟s action 
“unwise, unnecessary, and unwarranted as well as ill-advised at this time or any other 
time,” he had no power to alter the black students‟ reassignment since “the matter in no 
way comes under my jurisdiction.”
98
  
In general, whites in Craven epitomized the New South as it was described in a 
Raleigh News & Observer editorial shortly after the Brown decision. “The modern South, 
much as many of its people may dislike the law enunciated in this decision,” read the 
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May 18, 1954, editorial, “is not prepared for rebellion.”
99
 Save the forms of massive 
resistance that were primarily instigated by the legislatures of the Deep South states and a 
growing body of local Citizens‟ Councils, most everyday southern citizens, particularly 
in the Upper South, would not only find gradual desegregation in the South inevitable but 
would eventually elect to comply with the court order, those in Craven County 
included.
100
 Another fact that helps to explain the relative ease with which desegregation 
occurred in this Eastern North Carolina county was that the Cherry Point military base 
drew several thousand individuals from across the country, including those from outside 
the South, to work and live in Havelock (in 1960, 27 percent of Craven County residents 
were not native to the state of North Carolina) and, as a result, received federal funding 
from Public Law 874 since at least 1955 for its school system.
101
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would, after all, only receive a total of three letters denouncing the board‟s 1959 decision 
to allow black students to transfer to white schools. Though rarely rooted in enthusiasm, 
an attitude of respect for the law dominated the behavior of most whites in Craven; 
likewise, the closing of public schools to avoid desegregation was not seen as a viable 
alternative for a growing element of Craven whites. Historians Matthew Lassiter, Andrew 
B. Lewis, David Chappell and others have recently chronicled how the majority of whites 
in Upper South states, including North Carolina, Virginia, and Arkansas, generally felt 
and behaved the same way during the post-Brown years of gradual desegregation.
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By the late 1950s these two realities went a long way in facilitating the New Bern 
and Craven NAACP in its desegregation aims. In 1960, the New Bern branch witnessed 
one of its proudest moments when it was conferred the Thalheimer Award, the NAACP‟s 
top award to branches for outstanding achievements, for its work in obtaining the 
admission of black children of the nine military families to the City of Havelock Public 
Schools.
103
 Craven whites would have to be regularly pushed by black civil rights leaders 
to break with tradition and grant black children access to the same educational 
opportunities as white children, but school desegregation, gradual as it was, would not 
have been as peaceful or deliberate between 1959 and 1963 without a fraction of white 
compliance at the local level.  
Already suffering injuries, Jim Crow was further wounded in Craven County 
following the events that transpired in March 1960. By that point, the New Bern city bus 
service had been desegregated since the early years of World War II and the city police 
had been actively seeking black officers to add to its force for about a month, but blacks 
were still being widely refused equal service in white-operated establishments on the 
basis of race or color.
104
 “I think it was like everybody knew their place and tried to stay 
in it,” recalled Barbara J. Lee, a former vice president of the New Bern NAACP Youth 
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Council. “Our place was that we didn‟t touch anything. If we wanted a hot dog, you‟d 
stand at the far corner of Kress Department Store. You had to order your hot dog or 
something and take it out of the store if you wanted to eat it.”
105
 Lee‟s experiences were 
not limited to New Bern and could be found, at the time, in practically any southern 
community where blacks and whites resided. Few businesses refused black clientele 
altogether, as Lee noted, but black paying customers often faced unequal treatment by 
being barred from sitting in the establishment or being made to wait in the back of the 
line until all white customers had been served first.
106
 Among those, the lunch counter 
was one of the least accessible places to blacks. Nevertheless, a bold new attempt to 
modify the South‟s apartheid system was made on February 1, 1960, when four black 
North Carolina A&T students staged the first publicized sit-in, at a Woolworth‟s lunch 
counter in downtown Greensboro. Within weeks, this feat produced a wave of sit-ins and 
other nonviolent demonstrations of civil disobedience in dozens of southern towns. As 
members of the New Bern NAACP branch learned of the rising protest efforts among 
numbers of young black activists to gain inclusion into previously denied white-operated 
establishments, they too were influenced to take a vow to end racial exclusion in the 
public accommodations of their own city.
107
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With the lunch counters of the S.H. Kress and Company Store and the Clark‟s 
drug store chosen as targets, the stage was set for New Bern‟s first sit-in. On the 
afternoon of March 18, led by Reverends Dr. A. Hillary Fisher, G.J. Hill, Leon C. Nixon, 
and funeral home director Bishop S. Rivers, twenty-nine black high school students of 
the local NAACP Youth Council marched downtown in unison to demand service at both 
establishments. When the students and their adult supervisors entered the Kress and 
Clark‟s stores, they immediately sat at the available counter stools and requested service. 
Alarmed at the effrontery of the black youth, both store managers promptly put up signs 
reading “Closed” and asked for each black demonstrator to leave. After refusing to 
abandon their seats, the New Bern police were called in to handle the disturbance. 
Following a short period of resistance, the demonstrators were arrested and escorted to 
the city courthouse on charges of trespassing. While sitting in the courtroom in city hall, 
members of the Youth Council began singing hymns, clapping, and stomping their feet 
with excitement from the strides they had made toward achieving equal access.
108
  
The young students had much to be excited about. Greatly due to their own 
initiative, they achieved an unprecedented task by openly challenging the forces of white 
supremacy within New Bern. Eastern North Carolina was not to be, as scholars Jack Bass 
and Walter De Vries argued in 1976, “bypassed by the Civil Rights Movement.”
109
A few 
weeks after the March 18 demonstration, New Bern Mayor Robert L. Stallings, the 
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brother of county commissioner D. L. Stallings, presided over a special meeting of the 
board of aldermen to consider the formation of the community‟s first interracial 
committee, which was to “provide an opportunity for discussion of all matters concerning 
human relationships,” to “seek understanding, on the part of the different races,” and “in 
the event of claims of injustices [to] seek a solution of the problem.”
110
 NAACP adult 
leaders Reverend Hill and Rivers figured prominently on the committee that came to be 
referred to as the New Bern Good Will Committee. Although attempts at negotiation 
between blacks and whites had been opened, the civil rights revolution sweeping through 
Craven County was far from fading.  
By July, the local Youth Council added another local segregated establishment, 
Anderson‟s Drug Store, to its list of targeted businesses.
111
 Carrying signs reading “The 
Manager SAID we don‟t want your BUSINESS!” and “They still won‟t SERVE US!”, 
black ministers Hill, Fisher, and Shade Marshburn joined the youth group in picket lines 
in front of Anderson‟s as well as Kress‟ and Clark‟s variety stores throughout the summer 
of 1960. Spurred by Reverends Leon Nixon and Willie Hickman, the local NAACP 
branches also initiated a boycott of each store and encouraged all black citizens to 
participate. As James City teacher Dorothy Bryan attested, the boycott movement 
received support from across the black community. “I did not participate in the rallies, the 
marches,” she said, “but if [Rev. Willie Hickman and Mr. Nixon] decided they were 
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going to boycott certain stores, I did not go into those stores. I can vividly remember not 
going into Kress‟s.”
112
 
In October 1960, and after several months of waning profits, Kress‟ became the 
first previously segregated establishment in Craven to agree to serve blacks at its lunch 
counter.
113
 By 1963, as the New Bern Youth Council grew to become the second largest 
city chapter in the state with 219 members, several other targeted establishments like the 
Holiday Inn and the A&W Drive-In followed suit in accepting the demands of 
integration.
114
 In August of the same year, in order to avoid the racial violence that had 
made a national example out of Birmingham, Alabama, another interracial committee, 
known as the Bi-racial Committee, was appointed by New Bern‟s mayor Mack Lupton to 
peacefully and swiftly desegregate the theaters, restaurants, and hotels that remained 
exclusionary. A former member of the New Bern Good Will Committee, Bi-racial 
Committee chairman W.C. Chadwick was valuable in arranging negotiations between the 
Chamber of Commerce and black demonstrators that not only quickened the pace of 
desegregation but compelled many business establishments to provide qualified black 
applicants with jobs when available.
115
 As he expressed in a report delivered at the 
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request of the Mayors‟ Cooperating Committee of North Carolina, the matter of 
desegregation was an urgent one that could and should be achieved voluntarily through 
the cooperation of both races, “rather than by violence or force.” “We, the citizens of 
New Bern,” spoke Chadwick, “are a part of a great State, a great nation, and we cannot 
long resist a movement which is brought about by a sympathetic nation to remedy a 
wrong which has existed so long.”
116
 Moreover, “All of our people realize that the idea of 
desegregation,” continued Chadwick, “must come about.”
117
  
Whites‟ decisions to “become a part of the cure,” however, were not solely 
motivated by wishes to circumvent racial tension or the loss of business profits. The civil 
rights demonstrations, which dramatically lay bare black discontentment under Jim Crow 
(unlike anything before), had also begun to soften white attitudes toward the plight and 
injustices felt by blacks.
118
 “When I see them march, I go on the other side of the street” 
remarked a prominent white banker of New Bern. Whites, he believed, needed to “Let‟m 
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have what they want.”
119
 Signs denoting “white” and “colored” spaces that used to 
broadly adorn the scenery of New Bern and portions of Craven County in the first half of 
the twentieth century were not the only vestiges of Jim Crow that were disappearing. In 
his groundbreaking 2006 study of white Southerners‟ experiences during the civil rights 
movement, which included those of New Bern, Jason Sokol reveals how integration made 
it possible for some whites to start to “see the humanity in blacks.”
120
 Needless to say, not 
all transformations were visible to the eye. “There were many white people who was 
sympathetic toward [civil rights],” remembered Reverend Hickman, but because whites 
often felt they “had more to lose than blacks” by taking a stand, they were afraid to “take 
the lead.”
121
 It appeared that a sizeable number of whites living in Craven would continue 
to view “civil rights not in terms of black liberties, but as a loss of white freedom” and a 
threat to constitutional government.
122
 Yet that mentality, though resilient, was gradually 
losing its hold. Even local whites who believed that “in a free country, forcing people to 
change abruptly, customs they have held for a hundred years can lead to nothing but 
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bitterness” knew and could admit, in the words of white New Bern resident W.J. 
Edwards, that “segregation is not morally right.”
123
 The harsh words and actions of die-
hard segregationists like Atlanta‟s Lester Maddox naturally made headlines, but in the 
early 1960s a growing number of everyday whites in Craven and throughout the South 
were found in the quieter camp of the “southern moderate” who, as outlined by Charlotte 
Observer editor C.A. McKnight, believed in either the “inevitability” or “essential 
rightness” of desegregation, who held “great respect for the traditions of the American 
democracy,” and who “would not be averse to seeing limited school integration.”
124
  
National president of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and advisor to the 
NAACP Floyd B. McKissick, who visited New Bern at least once in 1963 to support the 
ongoing civil rights demonstrations, responded to one of Chadwick‟s solicitations for 
advice by reminding him that “Desegregation can be compared to a child learning how to 
walk, the first steps are the most difficult, after which steps those that follow are less 
difficult and then the process becomes a habit.”
125
 In August 1963, after raising $1,400 to 
take four buses to attend the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom that would 
attract 250,000 civil rights supporters, members of the New Bern NAACP might not have 
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been able to claim that desegregation had quite become a habit and knew there were still 
civil rights battles left to wage, but they could leave for the nation‟s capitol assured that 
Jim Crow‟s reign in their community had been effectively cut back.
126
 A few weeks later 
on September 9, city leadership in New Bern passed a resolution that called upon all of 
its citizens to assume a cooperative attitude to bring about desegregation in public 
accommodations, business establishments, and recreational facilities.
127
 
Local plans to break the “cycle of poverty” 
It was within this atmosphere of mounting black expectations and pressure that 
were leading to fairer race relations that the Craven County proposal to the North 
Carolina Fund was compiled. It was not especially remarkable, therefore, that Craven‟s 
proposal would reflect the antipoverty ideas of Willie Dawson and the other two black 
members of the Craven County committee, such as the inclusion of adult literacy classes 
that were deeply needed in the black community. Nor was it unforeseen in this 
atmosphere for whites on the proposal committee to look beyond the removal of racial 
discrimination and exploitation, both of which were in decline, as solutions to the heavy 
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state of black poverty in their area. An acknowledgment of blacks‟ enduring “minority 
group status,” which stemmed from disadvantages in jobs skills, education, wealth, and 
political power, did not alter the white committee members‟ broader understanding that 
blacks bore at least partial responsibility for improving those disadvantages. The central 
premise behind Craven‟s antipoverty plans was that the less-than-full participants in the 
life of the community, black and white included, were trapped in a cycle of poverty that 
could only be broken through the mutual cooperation and partnership between the 
community and the poor themselves. Borrowing from a North Carolina Fund report 
entitled, “The Dimensions of Poverty,” the Craven proposal committee defined poverty 
as “a downward-circling spiral, whose parts continually feed back upon each other” and 
“as a cycle, in that it is transmitted from generation to generation.” Thus, “inadequate 
education, for example, is certainly a cause of poverty; it is also an obvious result.”
128
  
With this understanding in mind, the Craven proposal outlined that antipoverty 
efforts should primarily be “remedial, rehabilitative, and educational” in order that the 
poor “may leave their present circumstances of want and become valuable and 
contributing citizens of tomorrow.”
129
 Besides adult literacy classes, the county‟s plans to 
combat poverty included a pre-school readiness class, rural environmental sanitation, 
employment opportunities for youth, out-of-school cultural enrichment for elementary 
students, vocational training for young adults, and increased psychological and 
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counseling services in the schools and local welfare department.
130
As these plans 
reflected, Craven leaders believed that the problem of poverty could be solved without 
political restructuring and without tampering with the capitalistic system, such as through 
wealth redistribution. Such plans clearly rested on a faith in the local economy. “Craven 
County is not without the resources to dispel a one-crop economy” read the proposal. 
“There is a vast potential for development in the areas of recreation, fishing, conservation 
of natural resources, light industry, food processing, and diversification of new crops.”
131
  
The original antipoverty planners in Craven were likewise devoted to a faith in 
the potential resolve of the poor. Notwithstanding the poor‟s observed “social outlook of 
resentment,” common feelings of “despair,” frequent acts of “defiance,” and “pitiful 
posture of fragile pride,” Craven‟s leaders trusted that the less fortunate among them 
would embrace most forms of assistance and opportunities that they were given out of an 
inherent human desire to change their lives for the better.
132
 If asked, most of the Craven 
committee members would divulge that they believed that a segment of poor citizens 
would always exist no matter the magnitude or regularity of assistance provided. After 
all, wealth accumulation and economic self-sufficiency in a free market economy would 
continue to depend in part on personal choices and responsibility. Still, this reality did not 
prevent the committee members from expecting that the majority of the poor could help 
bring themselves out of deprivation. Nor did it preclude them from making plans 
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accordingly. Fortunately for the poor, and as will be discussed further in Chapter III, 
there was both plenty of room and plenty of encouragement for economic advancement 
to be found in Eastern North Carolina.  
In late January of 1964, as acting committee chairman Bill Flowers was in the 
midst of putting the final touches on Craven‟s proposal to the North Carolina Fund, he 
took a few moments to compose a letter to Fund director George Esser to be included in 
the proposal‟s opening pages. “Whether or not we are one of the ten chosen 
communities,” wrote Flowers, “the value of this study has been worth the effort.” 
Confident was Flowers that even if Craven was not selected, many of the committee‟s 
ideas for tackling poverty “will be activated” at least “to the extent that volunteer workers 
and limited funds may allow.” Above all, Flowers used the letter to express his gratitude 
to Esser and the Fund for causing “us to focus attention on the problems of poverty in this 
community.”
133
 This latter point was indisputable. Although leaders in Craven County 
had been engaged in means of alleviating poverty before the Fund was officially 
launched, the Fund‟s call for proposals stimulated a greater effort to concentrate attention 
on unifying community resources to tackle poverty which had never been unified. For 
decades, local Protestant and Catholic churches had been providing goods and counseling 
services for poor children and their families, civic and service clubs such as the local 
Salvation Army had supplied clothing, toys, books, food, and entertainment to the less 
fortunate, and the welfare department offered a boarding home for children in addition to 
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work relief, medical care, and minimal job placement for the unemployed, disabled, and 
elderly.
134
 In addition, home demonstration clubs had been in operation in rural areas as 
well as Craven Terrace, the then-all-black federal housing project in New Bern, since at 
least the late 1950s.
135
 Thus, there may have been some truth to the claim in the proposal 
that “without the benefits of the programs, services, and activities in operation now and 
for some time past, the picture of poverty would be much more depressing than it is.”
136
  
The existence of poverty in Craven did not indicate that its leadership had been 
unaware or apathetic to the needs of the poor; however, owing to a lack of coordination 
and resources, efforts to curb poverty had been fragmented and less than fully effective. 
Days before the Craven proposal was mailed to meet the Fund‟s February 1, 1964, 
deadline, Craven committee member Ted Collier predicted that from the start there would 
be critics and detractors of their antipoverty plans who, out of either indifference or 
cynicism, would resent “what they will call a waste of good money and energy.” The 
same arguments, he lamented, “have been used against all undertakings designed to 
alleviate the ills plaguing humanity.” It remained to be seen to what degree Collier‟s 
prediction would be proven correct. But as he said, “The best answers will be results” and 
with a wide range of support from members of the local power structure—who pledged to 
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promote the program with “unflagging determination and perseverance”— Craven‟s first 
coordinated campaign against poverty was off to a promising start.
137
 
President Johnson forms Task Force on the War Against Poverty, February 1964 
On the same day that community action proposals were due to the North Carolina 
Fund, President Johnson carried the domestic agenda of the late President Kennedy a step 
further in establishing the President‟s Task Force on the War Against Poverty and 
appointing Peace Corps Director and Kennedy‟s brother-in-law R. Sargent Shriver as its 
head. Partly owing to a slow-moving economy and rising rates of unemployment between 
1961 and 1962, legislative attempts to reduce the number of the nation‟s poor had figured 
prominently in Kennedy‟s vision of a “New Frontier” for America. Other than the 
creation of the President‟s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 
(PCJD), the signing of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, and his 
approval of a public welfare amendment bill to fight “prolonged dependency,” Kennedy 
had also been working—in the last few months of his life—with his Council of Economic 
Advisors‟ chairman Walter Heller on designing a broader and more concerted approach 
towards defeating the roots of poverty in localities nationwide.
138
 Kennedy‟s vice-
president and successor, a proud “Roosevelt New Dealer” who believed strongly in the 
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capacity of government to solve most problems, happily accepted the helm of a federal 
antipoverty effort. Given that Kennedy never publicly announced his broader strategy 
against poverty, Johnson would have the freedom to enlarge its scope and present it to the 
nation as his own.
139
  
In drafting the Economic Opportunity Act, Johnson‟s Task Force on the War 
Against Poverty nonetheless relied on the poverty knowledge and experiences of former 
Kennedy aides who served in relevant realms such as the PCJD and the Manpower 
program. Between February and August of 1964, task force director Shriver also 
summoned representatives to Washington, D.C. from the nation‟s forerunners in 
antipoverty community action including Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin‟s 
Mobilization for Youth program in New York City as well as the Ford-funded “Gray 
Areas” projects and the North Carolina Fund. Governor Sanford, who incidentally had 
been a potential candidate for Shriver‟s job for launching “a very imaginative program,” 
and his Fund Director George Esser were expressly invited to offer their ideas and know-
how on eliminating poverty to legislators on Capitol Hill in addition to the War on 
Poverty task force.
140
 As highlighted by historians Robert Korstad and James Leloudis in 
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To Right These Wrongs, “the two North Carolinians placed great emphasis on community 
action and the involvement of the poor,” a direction toward which Shriver and many 
members of the task force were leaning in particular.
141
 Due to the North Carolina Fund‟s 
subsequent agreement to pilot community action projects to be used on a federal level, it 
would come as little surprise that community action would become a centerpiece of 
Johnson‟s War on Poverty. In the appropriate words of a Business Week editor at the 
time, the Fund had become an “advance guard of the War on Poverty.”
142
  
One of the more useful resources that Esser shared with the task force was a 
summary of each of the grant proposals the North Carolina Fund received, including an 
inventory of each community‟s ideas to combat poverty.
143
 Only expecting to receive 
between twenty and thirty proposals, Esser and the staff of the Fund were overwhelmed 
when a total of fifty-one proposals representing sixty-six of the state‟s one hundred 
counties arrived at their office in Durham.
144
 Clearly the Fund had not been in a position 
to predict how its call for antipoverty proposals would inspire communities across North 
Carolina to view and assess their poverty problems and the underprivileged in new and 
constructive ways, such helping them move up the economic ladder, for one. With such a 
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“splendid degree of interest” in the Fund, the screening and selection process for Esser 
and his staff promised to be a “formidable” undertaking. But out of a desire to display a 
“vote of confidence” for the antipoverty solutions that each locality had proposed, Esser 
felt strongly that the Fund “owed each participating community a personal visit.” The on-
site trips also presented an opportunity to “size up the local leadership” and to “ask 
questions left unanswered” by the written proposals.
 145
  
 
 
Figure 7. North Carolina Fund Executive Director George H. Esser, Jr. at a Fund staff meeting in Southern 
Pines, North Carolina, February 1964. Photograph by Billy E. Barnes, courtesy of the North Carolina 
Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Billy E. Barnes Collection.  
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North Carolina Fund review team appraise Craven County proposal and leadership 
The Craven County committee was paid a visit from the Fund on February 19, 
1964. After meeting with the community leaders in the eastern cities of Goldsboro and 
Kinston earlier in the day, Fund board of director members C.A. McKnight and James 
Gray along with the Fund staff team of William Koch, Jr., William Darity, and Billy 
Barnes arrived at the Governor Tryon Hotel in New Bern at around seven thirty in the 
evening.
146
 Following greetings and introductions, the meeting opened with the testimony 
of County Commissioner D. Livingstone Stallings who, it was reported, compellingly 
showcased the proposal‟s “strong support” from the county government.
147
 As they 
gathered further details, asked questions, and became more acquainted with “the people 
behind the proposal,” the Fund representatives were impressed early on with the 
imaginative leadership and the atmosphere of optimism that they witnessed in Craven 
County.
148
 “This group, with its turnout of 38 people, was an outstanding one,” read the 
Fund‟s on-site evaluation report. “The leadership was young and dynamic. The 
representatives from all phases of community life—educators, politicians, welfare people, 
and others of both races—not only came to the meeting but seemed to feel free to stand 
up and speak their minds.” There was just “„something different‟ about the New Bern 
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meeting,” continued the report, which “included the presence of two high school students 
who had come just because they had heard about the activities of the North Carolina 
Fund, and were interested in what was going on.” What left the largest impression on the 
Fund representatives that night, besides Craven‟s “fine proposal,” was that “this group 
seemed to be solidly behind its leadership. And everyone—male and female, Negro and 
white—seemed to have a splendid morale, the like of which was evident no where in the 
south east area with the possible exception of Carteret County.”
149
  
Around February 28, the Fund held a board meeting for an initial review of the 
proposal sites which they had visited. During that time it became even more obvious that 
Craven County, especially when compared to other proposal sites in Eastern North 
Carolina, was “at the top of the heap.” While other proposal sites in the eastern half of the 
state including Carteret, New Hanover, and Bertie counties received positive feedback, 
Craven‟s “spark of enthusiasm” and a “good understanding of local problems” was 
observed in few places elsewhere.
150
 In Kinston, for instance, located a short distance of 
thirty-five miles from New Bern in neighboring Lenoir County, Fund members met “an 
old line, hard core of leadership,” which “although they may not be actually out to realize 
personal gain from participation in the Fund did not appear to be genuinely interested in 
the type of thing we are trying to do to break the poverty cycle.” Of the blacks present at 
the Fund meeting in Kinston, only one spoke and, moreover, he showed no signs that “he 
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had much to do with the planning of the proposal.” There was, in short, a lack of 
“understanding in the poverty condition in their county” and a deficient “spirit of 
cooperation among themselves.” Based on these observations, the Fund rightfully 
concluded that the Kinston proposal was “a very poor bet.”
151
  
Ostensibly, what Kinston lacked Craven County had in abundance. As reiterated 
in the Fund staff evaluations of late February, the Craven proposal was marked by its 
thoroughness, its plans for coordination of local departments and resources, and its 
presentation of creative ideas on how to fight the surrounding problems of poverty such 
as the “post-primary year” for children who did not perform adequately through the first 
three grades to be given a chance to catch up to classmates by enrolling in an 
unstructured class, the “exploration of vocational opportunities” in which children 
beginning in sixth grade could move toward selecting and preparing for an appropriate 
future occupation, and a job-finding program for young teenagers and adults. The Fund 
team was further impressed by plans to broaden the North Carolina Council on Health 
and Citizenship programs aimed at black youth, of which Willie Dawson was a part, 
throughout the Craven County school system.
152
 The Fund also affirmed its satisfaction 
that there “was a clear possibility for the involvement of the target group themselves,” as 
well as a “valid and effective leadership” among “the Negro leadership present.”
153
 It 
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followed then that “the Craven County proposal” would be regarded as “an excellent 
demonstration of a comprehensive, community-based approach to poverty,” which “has 
high potential for success” and “is strongly recommended for a major grant.”
154
 When it 
came time for the Fund‟s ranking of submitted proposals, Craven received a unanimous 
vote of “yes” to join the top fifteen sites.
155
  
Governor Sanford announces first seven North Carolina Fund community action 
programs, April 1964 
 
In mid-April, the Fund‟s board of directors met in Asheville to make their final 
selection of the eleven communities to be awarded grant funding. It was also agreed that 
seven projects were to be announced on April 20 followed by the remaining four a few 
months later. As scheduled, Esser and Fund board members accompanied Governor 
Sanford to the state capitol press room to name the first seven community action project 
winners; among those communities to make the cut was Craven County.
156
 Following 
Sanford‟s pronouncement, Esser took the floor to express how “North Carolina‟s 
communities have surprised people all over the nation by reacting as they have to the 
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Fund‟s call to action.” “Acting only on the prospect of getting a few fundamental dollars 
for their communities,” he added, “leaders in 66 out of the state‟s 100 counties have met 
and talked and planned ways to give a better chance to those of our citizens in the cycle 
of poverty.” As for the initial group of seven projects, it was apparent to Esser that they 
represented “the kind of cross-section of communities that is essential if we are to find 
and demonstrate ways to open up opportunity, and help people throw off frustration and 
despair.”
157
 
 
 
Figure 8. Location of eleven North Carolina Fund Community Action Programs, 1964. Number eleven is 
Craven County. (Source: Folder 673, North Carolina Council on Human Relations, Southern Historical 
Collection.) 
 
 
Such a cross-section had not resulted by accident. Among the criteria that had 
factored in the selection process was the Fund‟s belief that the communities selected 
needed to be “well spread over the entire state,” with a good balance between rural and 
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urban areas as well as large cities and small towns.
158
 The Fund understood especially 
well that it was just as vital to tackle rural poverty as it was to tackle urban poverty given, 
that “as poverty and lack of opportunity push more and more people from the land, the 
problems of all cities are increased by the congregation of the unskilled, by 
unemployment, and the delinquency attendant upon ignorance and frustration.”
159
 Other 
standards that informed the selection process included whether the proposal was feasible, 
whether it involved the target group itself, and whether the community‟s plans could be 
carried on after Fund support was withdrawn. Knowing that their community action 
projects would be utilized as national models if the Economic Opportunity Act passed, 
the North Carolina Fund did not merely award grants based on the severity of the 
problem of poverty but looked to areas where they were confident that their efforts and 
resources could achieve maximum results.  
Even though Craven County fit each of these above criteria, Esser admitted years 
later that “we were almost writing eastern North Carolina off in our thinking, despite its 
great need, because we knew that Ford would insist on the involvement of both races 
wherever we worked, and eastern North Carolina was deeply segregated.”
160
 His 
willingness to give Craven a try ultimately won out over his original fear. It probably did 
not hurt that during the initial on-site visit of New Bern, one of his black staffers, William 
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Darity, who had just recently become the first non-white student to receive a doctoral 
degree from the University of North Carolina School of Public Health, became without 
any uproar or visible difficulty the first black guest to stay overnight at the Governor 
Tryon Hotel.
161
  
Craven Operation Progress (COP) is born, June 1964 
Once Bill Flowers received the letter from Fund board member C.A. McKnight 
confirming Craven‟s grantee status, events surrounding the county‟s campaign to fight 
poverty moved at a dizzying pace. Along with the six other recently-named community 
action projects, Craven County was immediately made eligible for three experimental 
programs including a pre-school nursery program and a reading-writing-arithmetic 
curriculum sponsored by the State Board of Education, in addition to the North Carolina 
Volunteers program, in which college student volunteers from across the state were 
assigned to assist the Fund‟s antipoverty programs during the summer.
162
 Shortly 
thereafter, on May 7, Flowers, Stallings, and Ted Collier drove to Rocky Mount, North 
Carolina, where President Johnson flew in by helicopter to learn of the area‟s economic 
problems and to discuss with Governor Sanford the solutions that the Fund planned to 
implement.
163
 Later in the month, the Fund staff team of Darity, William Koch and Jack 
Mansfield visited New Bern to instruct Craven‟s board members on the Fund‟s 
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procedures and on June 30, 1964 the articles of incorporation for “Craven Operation 
Progress” (COP), as the local antipoverty program had been newly entitled, were 
completed. The North Carolina Secretary of State quickly certified that COP was found 
to conform to the law on July 1 and six days later the new community action program 
received an $11,075 organizational grant from the Fund to begin planning its assault on 
poverty.
164
 At a board of directors meeting led by D.L. Stallings on July 8, the COP board 
was finalized for the time being by adding thirteen local leaders including four at-large 
representatives from the black community: Sneed, Dawson, and Hill from the Craven 
proposal committee, and former New Bern NAACP president Robert M. Whitehead. To 
cap off COP‟s swift progression between April and July, a delegation of policy planners 
from Washington, D.C. arrived the next day for breakfast at the Governor Tryon Hotel to 
observe the work already being done by volunteers in COP.
165
 Still, there remained one 
last order of business for Craven‟s emergent community action program: an executive 
director had not yet been named.  
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Figure 9. North Carolina Fund staff members on an on-site visit to Craven Operation Progress, New Bern, 
NC, 1964, from left to right: James Gray, William Koch, Jr., and William Darity. Photograph by Billy E. 
Barnes, courtesy of the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, Billy E. Barnes Collection.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Sign designating location of Craven Operation Progress building, 1964. Still image from Change 
Comes Knocking: The Story of the North Carolina Fund, 2008.  
 
COP hires its first executive director 
The staff of the North Carolina Fund recommended a bright and articulate thirty-
two- year-old former government legal assistant named James Hearn as their top 
104 
 
choice.
166
 Originally from Massachusetts, Hearn held several graduate degrees including 
a degree in law from New York Law School. Following his employment as a legal 
assistant for the Housing and Home Finance Agency, he volunteered as a special assistant 
to the Democratic Campaign Committee between 1961 and 1962 and worked as a paid 
administrator in India for the humanitarian organization CARE, Inc. until November 
1963.
167
 For the purposes of the North Carolina Fund, Hearn‟s true relevance lay in his 
recent service as a staff consultant on the President‟s Task Force on the War Against 
Poverty in the area of management and administration of the proposed Job Corps 
program. The board members of Craven Operation Progress were naturally intrigued by 
his credentials. Also, in part to avoid controversy in selecting between two top local 
contenders for the position, Stallings and others were also interested in hiring a director 
from outside of the area.
168
 At a board meeting on July 13, a motion was made by 
Commissioner Stallings, seconded by Robert M. Whitehead, to appoint a committee to 
visit Washington, D.C. to “investigate Mr. Hearn.”
169
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Figure 11. James J. Hearn, First Executive Director of Craven Operation Progress, August 1964-October 
1965. Courtesy of the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. 
 
 
Hearn was actually vacationing in North Carolina with his wife, COP board 
members Stallings and Frank Efird would learn. And, conveniently for them, Hearn 
agreed to meet the two men at his vacation spot. Hearn‟s interview was apparently 
impressive. He discussed in great detail his experience as a government lawyer, which 
communicated a broad knowledge on financial law and how to obtain funds that Stallings 
and Efird found especially appealing. Hearn also showed much confidence that the war 
on poverty would be more than an empty slogan for the people of Eastern North Carolina, 
understanding that when Craven‟s people were prepared major industries would be 
willing to build new plants in the county to bring investment that could bring stable 
prosperity to the region.
170
 Subsequently, following board approval, Hearn was officially 
hired as the Craven Operation Progress Project Director on August 4. The Fund also 
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provided the new director with two young Community Action Technicians (CAT) to 
assist the start of COP.
171
  
Conclusion 
 Shortly after arriving in New Bern, Hearn moved in next-door to COP board 
member Robert M. Whitehead in a predominately black neighborhood.
172
 An 
unmistakable liberal on issues of race, Hearn believed strongly that segregation was a 
primary reason behind black poverty in the way it erected barriers to black economic 
mobility. In his application to the North Carolina Fund, when asked, “are you willing to 
work with people of different ethnic backgrounds?” he pithily responded, “I was brought 
up to believe and practice the single belief that all men are created equal.”
173
 And he 
certainly did not water down his philosophy while in Craven County. North Carolina 
Fund staff were indeed wary that Hearn had “qualities that might not make him the most 
easily acceptable person in a southern community.”
174
 Yet despite being an outsider from 
Washington who was openly liberal about race relations, Hearn was largely welcomed by 
COP and a substantial portion of the broader community from the start because of their 
corresponding interests in reducing poverty in the area. Things would soon change when 
Craven became part of a Washington-run War on Poverty. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
COMMITTED TO PROGRESS 
 
 
Introduction 
Soon after executive director Jim Hearn applied for and received federal Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO) funds for Craven Operation Progress (COP), community 
action began to take a decidedly aggressive turn in Craven County, especially as it related 
to race relations. Hearn‟s assertiveness in pushing for rapid change was fueled by several 
factors, including his general distrust of local whites as incapable and unwilling to make 
efforts to open up economic opportunity to all and his desire to take advantage of the vast 
amount of federal money made available for the War on Poverty. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, however, Craven County leaders‟ commitment to progress and greater well-
being for all in 1964 and 1965, which was manifested in their broad accommodation to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courage to stand up to the regeneration of the local Ku Klux 
Klan, and their efforts to attract higher-paying industries to the area, explains a good deal 
behind their decision to stay on with COP despite the controversy Hearn was creating in 
the local community. Their commitment to community progress also underlay their 
willingness to broaden representation for local blacks and the poor.  
The launching of the federal War on Poverty, August 1964 
When President Johnson signed the $947 million Economic Opportunity Act 
(EOA) on August 20, 1964, he pledged at once a new day of opportunity for the nation‟s 
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thirty million poor and a new and expansive domestic role for the federal government.
1
 
For the first time in the nation‟s history, the leadership in Washington, D.C. attempted to 
eradicate the central causes of poverty in American communities from countryside to 
ghetto. As Johnson announced at the White House bill-signing ceremony, the War on 
Poverty would not simply ameliorate poverty‟s effects or make poverty more comfortable 
for the poor to withstand. Partially borrowing from the philosophy of the North Carolina 
Fund, the goal of the federally-funded antipoverty programs was instead to “break the 
cycle of poverty” by helping the poor lift themselves out of “the ruts of poverty” so that 
they may join the majority of Americans in sharing in the nation‟s prosperity. “We are 
not content to accept the endless growth of relief rolls or welfare rolls,” the president 
proclaimed just before signing the bill. “We want to offer the forgotten fifth of our people 
opportunity and not doles.” As Johnson promised that day, “The days of the dole in our 
country are numbered.” 
2
 As reflected above, an anti-welfare sentiment greatly informed 
the president‟s War on Poverty. Believing that the “crumbling black family [was] at the 
center of America‟s economic and social problems,” Johnson and his antipoverty 
coalition openly condemned the welfare system, namely Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), which primarily provided cash assistance to single black mothers, as 
being the biggest threat to the male-breadwinner family structure and ideal. In line with 
Patrick Moynihan‟s controversial report on the “crisis” of the black family, released in 
                                                 
1
 At the time the War on Poverty began, the poverty line was set at a $3,000 annual income for a family of 
four.  
 
2
 Marjorie Hunter, “Johnson Signs Bill to Fight Poverty; Pledges New Era,” New York Times, August 21, 
1964.  
 
109 
 
August 1964, Johnson and fellow antipoverty liberals were convinced that black 
disadvantage could be most effectively reversed only when the black family structure 
(a.k.a. a two-parent household) could be stabilized, and that the black family structure 
could be stabilized only when black men were given adequate opportunities to support 
their families.
3
   
President Johnson‟s bid to make “taxpayers out of taxeaters” was a highly 
attractive segment of his antipoverty agenda, especially among the fiscally conservative 
congressmen within the Southern Democratic ranks whose constituents most ardently 
spoke out in favor of the American tradition of self-reliance and who were vehemently 
opposed to single, nonwhite, stay-at-home mothers who, in the words of Senator Russell 
Long of Louisiana, mooched off the hard-working citizens who “work by the sweat of 
their brow to make an honest living.”
4
 Ironically, though, as many scholars have pointed 
out, Johnson‟s bill did relatively little (outside providing increased funding for daycare 
programs) to help female welfare recipients find employment in order to become self-
sufficient. Instead, many of the federal antipoverty programs, such as Job Corps, not only 
provided fewer slots for female participants than males but often emphasized a woman‟s 
primary role as wife, homemaker and mother.
5
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argues Marisa Chappell, “was the main goal of the Johnson administration‟s War on 
Poverty.”
6
 As the thinking went at the time, black women‟s welfare would rise with the 
tide of the creation of black male breadwinners.  
While the bill received a degree of bipartisan support—twenty-two Republicans 
in the House and ten in the Senate voted in its favor—the largest support group, behind 
the mostly liberal Democrats in the Northern states, were Southern Democrats. In the 
House alone, sixty out of one hundred Southern representatives voted for the measure.
7
 
For supporters like Senator James Fulbright of Arkansas, the bill was “not merely another 
program of charity which only temporarily release the symptoms of poverty” but was 
also one whose “purpose is to educate” in order to abate “cultural and material privation 
in America.” Above all, Senator Fulbright remarked, the bill “is a chance for those who 
carp about welfare costs to strike at the conditions which necessitate them.”
8
 In addition 
to the billions of dollars that would be saved in welfare spending, Georgia Congressman 
Phil Landrum also found much to praise in Johnson‟s bill, particularly its color-blind 
nature. “Any assistance it may provide toward eliminating the plight of poverty affecting 
Americans of all races,” he declared, “is a source of pride for me.”
9
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There were naturally a few quid pro quos involved for such a high degree of 
Southern support for a bill that promised to further the aims of Johnson‟s Great Society, a 
major component of which was the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
10
 Led by states‟ rights 
champion Richard Russell of Georgia, Southern senators successfully pushed for an 
amendment authorizing governors to veto the Job Corps or the Community Action 
Program. Similarly, Southern congressmen inserted a section in the bill that required all 
Job Corps enrollees and VISTA volunteers to take a loyalty oath swearing that they did 
not advocate overthrowing the government.
11
 In exchange for the votes of several North 
Carolina Democratic representatives, the Johnson Administration had to promise that an 
antipoverty post would not be given to Adam Yarmolinsky, a former official in the 
Kennedy Defense Department who had declared segregated facilities off-limits to 
military personnel and who had attended several meetings of the Young Communist 
League when he was a young man.
12
 Eager to achieve a major legislative victory, the 
Johnson White House was inclined to agree to these seemingly minor demands for fear 
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that any stalling in Congress might defeat the antipoverty bill altogether. Seven of the 
eleven North Carolina members of the U.S. House of Representatives voted in support of 
the Economic Opportunity Act.
13
  
And with swiftness the bill did move. Only six months separated the antipoverty 
bill‟s enactment from the first meeting of Johnson‟s War on Poverty Task Force. 
Professor of Government and Legal Studies John C. Donavan contended at the time that 
no single piece of domestic legislation of “similar importance and scope moved so 
rapidly and easily through the congress in a quarter of a century.” “One would have to go 
back to FDR‟s one hundred days in 1933, that classic time of executive dominance over 
congress,” he emphasized, “to find a clear precedent.”
14
 In addition to influencing the 
speed at which the Economic Opportunity Act was presented before Congress, the 
executive branch likewise determined the bulk of the bill‟s language, as most of the 
antipoverty ideas came directly from officials within Johnson‟s administration, including 
Johnson himself. In the words of War on Poverty task force member James L. Sundquist, 
the War on Poverty was without a doubt “the administration‟s war.”
15
 The cruelties of 
poverty were a particular soft spot for Johnson, who had personally escaped poverty as a 
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young man and who, during the deepening of the Great Depression, had taught the 
destitute children of Mexican-American migrant workers in rural Texas and served as a 
state director of President Franklin D. Roosevelt‟s National Youth Administration 
(NYA). President Johnson understood better than most members of his administration 
that if a man was poor, “the consequences were that he had little education, that he 
received inadequate medical care and substandard nutrition, that he lived in crowded and 
unsanitary conditions” and “had no real chance to train for a decent job,” making escape 
from poverty near impossible.
16
  
As a result of his past experiences both as a poverty insider and as an enthusiastic 
supporter of Roosevelt‟s New Deal agenda, Johnson would understandably envision a 
bold set of government-led reform programs to eliminate permanently the core causes of 
a lack of income, as he understood it. Centered primarily on enhanced educational 
opportunities for the underprivileged, Johnson‟s War on Poverty was to be “a war not 
only on economic deprivation but on the tragic waste of human resources.”
17
 This belief 
in the nation‟s need for expansive antipoverty programs would only be bolstered in the 
weeks just prior to Johnson‟s signing of the Economic Opportunity Act into law. Within 
that period—between July 18 and August 17, 1964—eight sizeable riots initiated by 
black males flared in major urban areas of the North and Northeast, including Harlem, 
                                                 
16
 Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 73.  
 
17
 Johnson, The Vantage Point, 75; Vice President Herbert Humphrey recalled that Johnson “was a nut on 
education. He felt that education was the greatest thing he could give to the people; he just believed in it, 
just like some people believe in miracle cures.” See Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and  
His Times, 1961-1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 196. 
 
114 
 
Rochester, Philadelphia, Jersey City, and Dixmoor, Illinois. While most of the riots were 
triggered by alleged cases of police brutality, the “emotional tension which sought release 
upon the slightest provocation” appeared to be fed by overcrowding, lack of sound 
educational, recreation, and health facilities, little or no family stability, high 
unemployment due to both racial discrimination and low skills, and other dimensions of 
an impoverished lifestyle.
18
 In a private telephone conversation with Texas Congressman 
George H. Mahon in late July, an irritated President Johnson pledged that his poverty bill 
would “stop these damn riots.” Complaining to the congressman about young boys sitting 
around pool halls with nothing to do and with no work ethic, Johnson discussed his plan 
to “put 150,000 of them to work in 90 days times on useful, hard-working projects,” in 
order to” teach them some discipline and when to get up, and how to work all day.” 
Johnson boasted that in two years “I‟ll have them trained, where they can at least drive a 
truck instead of sitting around a pool room.”
19
 When making his remarks to the nation at 
the signing of the Economic Opportunity Act on August 20, Johnson was speaking from 
an honest belief that “[i]n helping others, all of us will really be helping ourselves.” For 
the president, it was an unmistakable truth that “every dollar spent will result in savings 
to the country and especially to the local taxpayers in the cost of crime, welfare, of 
                                                 
18
 Peter Kihss, “Harlem Riots Spread Over 3 Decades,” New York Times, July 20, 1964.  
 
19
 President Johnson and George Mahon, telephone conversation, July 29, 1964, Presidential Recordings 
Program, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, accessed on May 21, 2010, 
<http://www.whitehousetapes.net/clips/1964_0729_waronpoverty/> 
 
115 
 
health, and of police protection.”
20
 Yet, despite the obvious—and intentional—ways that 
the War on Poverty fell in line with the trajectory of the civil rights movement and its 
chief goals of greater employment and advancement opportunities for black Americans, 
Johnson and his administration made every effort in the beginning, in the words of 
scholar David Zarefsky, “to portray economic deprivation and race as two distinct 
fates.”
21
 
Although the federal role was not spelled out especially clearly in the beginning, 
it was widely understood that the War on Poverty was to be a coordinated effort between 
federal and local entities. The federal government would supply the vast amount of the 
money needed to administer War on Poverty programs at the local level, but the 
antipoverty effort was not to be “completely centralized in Washington.”
22
 Johnson told 
the House of Representatives in March 1964 that poverty cannot “be conquered by 
government alone,” and called on the cooperation of private individuals and local 
businesses to continue to offer economic opportunities to those in need.
23
 In public, 
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Johnson revealed what appeared to be a genuine trust in local communities to being able 
to help solve the problem of poverty. Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, who was 
soon to become Johnson‟s vice president, agreed that “government alone cannot solve the 
problem” of poverty. “In the final analysis,” Humphrey remarked, “it is the union of 
government, private industry, and free labor which gets the job done.”
24
 Similarly, Office 
of Economic Opportunity director Sargent Shriver praised the draft bill authorizing the 
War on Poverty precisely for “the extent of its reliance on local leadership and 
initiative.”
25
 
Of the major components of the Economic Opportunity Act, none was more 
closely related to the belief “that local citizens best understand their own problems, and 
know best how to deal with those problems” than the Community Action Program 
(CAP). Summarizing the proposed trajectory of community action, Johnson affirmed that 
“[t]hese are not plans prepared in Washington and imposed upon hundreds of different 
situations.” Instead, “these plans will be local plans.”
26
 By design, a community action 
program was to be a voluntary effort to mobilize the total resources of a local 
community—including the “maximum feasible participation” of the poor—to come up 
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with innovative antipoverty program ideas, better administer existing programs and, if 
necessary, effect needed social reform towards the elimination of poverty.
27
 As spelled 
out in the OEO Community Action Workbook, the War on Poverty was not to be another 
paternalistic or charitable program but was based instead on the notion that “one of the 
major problems of the poor is that they are not in a position to influence the policies, 
procedures, and objectives of the organizations responsible for their welfare.”
28
 Just prior 
to the passage of the EOA, the House Committee on Education and Labor emphasized 
the limits of the role of the federal government by defining its purpose thus: “to give 
counsel and help, when requested, and to make available substantial assistance in meeting 
the costs of those programs.”
29
 As originally laid out by the Johnson administration, the 
federal government was not to exceed its supportive role.
30
 But the War on Poverty 
would go far beyond this early notion by eventually forging direct links between a 
national poverty office and local groups with varying compositions and notions of what a 
real war on poverty should look like. 
Other key components of the Economic Opportunity bill, including Neighborhood 
Youth Corps (NYC), VISTA, and even the administrative arm of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity that was designed to prevent a series of uncoordinated efforts, also promised 
to coordinate with local people and ideas. And while Americans had never before 
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witnessed such an ambitious amount of legislation that would involve the federal 
government in the economic, social, and education spheres of the nation, the War on 
Poverty was at least presented, if not wholly envisioned, as a predominately hometown 
fight. As the Providence Journal and various other newspapers across the nation 
observed, the War on Poverty was placing “most of the responsibility for initiating and 
operating programs on the state and local governments” rather than “building any big, 
new federal bureaucracy.”
31
 Both due to Americans‟ general fondness for local autonomy 
and their appeal to causes that they believe to be moral, urgent, and in the interest of the 
nation, Sargent Shriver would be able to boast to Congress that “One of the most 
important and exciting things about the war on poverty is that all of America is joining in. 
Religious groups, professional groups, labor groups, civic and patriotic groups are all 
rallying to the call.”
32
 Though for varying reasons, conservatives and liberals alike could 
be found in support of major tenets of a national fight to increase economic opportunity.   
COP applies for OEO funds 
Shortly after the EOA passed both houses of Congress, leaders at the North 
Carolina Fund required each of its eleven community action programs to apply for 
federal money from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in order to keep 
receiving Fund money.
33
 Financial considerations supplied a good deal of motivation. 
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“No board member [of the Fund],” reasoned Executive Director George Esser, “could 
conscientiously spend private dollars for experimental programs when public dollars 
were available for the same purposes.”
34
 As stipulated in Title II of the new antipoverty 
bill, federal funds would pay up to 90 percent of the expenses of any government-
sponsored community action agency in the first two years and up to 50 percent in the 
succeeding years. Jim Hearn quickly applied for CAP status on behalf of COP in October 
1964, making the application from Craven County the first rural proposal in the nation to 
be sent to the OEO. It would also be the first rural county to be awarded federal money 
under the War on Poverty. In the following month, OEO announced COP (now 
encompassing Craven, Jones, and Pamlico counties, as well as portions of the outlying 
counties of Lenoir, Carteret, and Onslow) as a recipient of a one-year federal CAP grant 
worth $125,270 towards which Craven County contributed approximately $40,000. 
Craven County‟s public welfare departments also received an additional $240,000 from 
OEO to provide job training for approximately 240 unemployed heads of households.
35
 
As a North Carolina Fund site, Craven Operation Progress certainly had “several legs up 
actually in this process,” explained North Carolina Fund Research Director Michael 
Brooks. In fact, New Bern was one the first communities in the nation to receive an OEO 
grant, largely “because they were sort of ready, they were off and running and had been 
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working for a while.”
36
 For Governor Sanford, early federal grants like those awarded to 
Craven were “indicative that our state is ready to participate in President Johnson‟s war 
against poverty.”
37
 Accordingly, as the Raleigh News & Observer editorialized, “Those 
who have taken on the job in Craven County will be watched with keen interest 
throughout the state.”
38
 
 
 
Figure 12. Three older blacks participating in adult literacy classes in Craven County, North Carolina, 
November 1964. Photograph by Billy E. Barnes, courtesy of the North Carolina Collection, Wilson 
Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Billy E. Barnes Collection.  
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In a letter to OEO director Sargent Shriver, Craven Operation Progress board 
chairman Larry B. Pate, a self-employed farmer and wealthy landowner originally from 
Lenoir County, voiced his appreciation for the “programs funded by your office for our 
county [which] will substantially contribute to permanently improving the lives of many 
of our most disadvantaged citizens.” Speaking on behalf of himself and the other COP 
members, Pate “hoped that these efforts will eventually enable people living in poverty to 
become contributing citizens to our community rather than a burden to our society and 
our economy.” The recognition that poverty jeopardized the well being of the entire 
community, including those of the middle- and upper-classes, also underlay New Bern‟s 
concurrent urban renewal plans. “Concern over the conditions that exist in residential 
neighborhood need not originate solely from a humanitarian impulse to improve the lot of 
slum dwellers,” read a September 1964 “Neighborhood Analysis” report compiled by the 
New Bern Planning Board and city aldermen. “[Slum dwellers] place a disproportionately 
high demand on the city for such services as police protection, fire protection and welfare 
payments.” What was worse, the report continued, slum areas furnished “a medium in 
which crime can flourish and through which disease and fire can spread easily,” which 
constituted “a hazard to surrounding areas and to any individual who passes through them 
[and] if conditions are bad enough, shoppers will avoid this trip as often as possible or 
forsake the central business district altogether for an outlying shopping area.” Thus, 
because “such areas benefit no one,” the existence of “blight and blighted areas in the city 
122 
 
should be of paramount concern to every citizen.” “It is not only morally good to 
eliminate and control blight, it is economically sound,” the report concluded.
 39
 
Pate‟s letter to Shriver also underscored how locals in COP saw their efforts to 
combat poverty as morally right, especially now that they seemingly had the resources to 
do so. “It would indeed be a shame,” Pate insisted, “if our prosperous county were to 
allow the paradox of poverty amidst plenty to continue,” seeing that “the programs that 
your office has approved represent a real beginning” of a “deadly assault upon the cruel 
enemy.” In closing, Pate assured Shriver that “The money you are entrusting will be 
wisely spent,” stressing that “every dollar” will be accounted for and “most effectively 
utilized to accomplish the noble aims of the War on Poverty.”
40
 On behalf of the Craven 
County Commissioners, D. L. Stallings sent a similar letter to Shriver, vowing that he and 
his fellow commissioners would do “everything in [their] powers to ensure the successful 
implementation” of the Community Action Program.
41
 From their letters, Pate and 
Stallings communicated a clear awareness of OEO‟s high hopes for Craven Operation 
Progress as a model among rural CAAs.  
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Figure 13. Community Action and Technical Assistance Grants issued by Office of Economic Opportunity 
as of early 1965. Communities in Action vol. 1, no. 1, box 149, folder 5, David Newton Henderson papers, 
Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University.  
 
Eastern North Carolinians get behind antipoverty ideas of self-help 
Eastern North Carolinians, in general—not just those inside Craven Operation 
Progress —similarly saw much promise in the early stages of the War on Poverty.
42
 The 
novel idea of community action, as understood by local people, was seen to be 
particularly praiseworthy. An editorial in the conservative-leaning Kinston Daily Free 
Press optimistically predicted that if a community action agency will be a “self-help 
                                                 
42
 One major exception was the editorial staff at Havelock Progress who openly criticized the fact that 
Craven was “spotlighted in Eastern Carolina as the first Tar Heel county to enter the new era of Pride in 
Poverty,” citing that the county was far better off than most of the counties in the eastern half of the state  
in terms of median income, median years of education, number of school drop-outs, and number of 
unemployed. “Politics, pure and simple,” the newspaper argued, “singled out Craven for this great honor 
and ignored lesser, more deserving, more needy counties.” See “Oh Great Society, How Wondrous Thou 
Art!,” Havelock Progress (Havelock, NC), December 3, 1964.  
 
124 
 
program in which education plays a major role it can be beneficial.” There was one 
sizeable caveat, however, as the Free Press maintained: “If it is just another handout, it is 
unlikely to bring about a major reduction in the „pockets of poverty‟ that need to be 
erased from this area and other parts of the country.”
43
 This estimation of community 
action was also shared by Congressman David N. Henderson, who represented Craven 
and the other eastern counties of the second congressional district. Joining with six other 
Democratic congressmen from North Carolina, Henderson enthusiastically voted in 
support of community action and all other major aspects of the Economic Opportunity 
Act from a belief that the use of enhanced education and job training to improve the 
economic status of the poor was a noble goal.
44
 WRAL-TV executive director Jesse 
Helms, whose largest and most loyal viewership between 1960 and 1972 was found in 
Eastern North Carolina, underscored on a March 1964 Viewpoint airing that the “plight of 
the unfortunate members of society is one that ought forever to be high on the active 
agenda of the people of any nation founded on Christian principles” and, thus, few 
citizens “are likely to complain about any program, either private or governmental, 
designed to assist the truly unfortunate.” Yet, Helms would surmise that a war on poverty 
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could not be genuinely won without first acknowledging the “difference between those 
who can‟t work, and those who won‟t work,” perhaps making a reference to single stay-
at-home black mothers on AFDC.
45
 Many residents of the eastern half of the state agreed 
with Helms‟ presumption that the problem of poverty could, in fact, be “an individual 
problem, and often an isolated one.”
46
 Indeed, into the mid-to-late 1960s a majority of 
black and white North Carolinians alike believed that poverty resulted from a multitude 
of factors including a lack of education and job training as well as individual issues such 
as laziness, old age, ill health, or a disability. According to an Oliver Quayle poll 
conducted for the use of the North Carolina Fund, a majority of each race desired to see 
most tax dollars spent on either education or new industry rather than on forms of public 
assistance.
47
  
In terms of methods in addressing poverty, seemingly little had changed in the 
public mind of North Carolina since the New Deal era, when the vast majority of the 
state‟s leaders and citizens also agreed that public welfare was to be a last resort for the 
impoverished, at least among the able-bodied and non-elderly. In the 1930s, North 
Carolina ranked near the bottom, if not last, in the nation in Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) spending, Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) 
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grants, and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) payments.
48
 By early 1940, savings in tax 
dollars that would have been spent on relief helped the state maintain its industrial 
supremacy among fellow southern states while keeping the number of unemployed 
and/or on work relief to less than 10 percent of the state‟s population. This turn away 
from relief preserved the highly-held value of individual self-reliance to which a majority 
throughout North Carolina seemingly ascribed, including in the East where capable adults 
were expected to work and contribute to the betterment of themselves, their families, and 
society.
49
  
The espousal of self-sufficiency and individual responsibility that still resonated 
in the 1960s was not embraced merely by middle-class or upper-class whites who had 
little or no experience with deep-seated poverty. With the arrival of Craven Operation 
Progress, some of the most vocal supporters of the poverty program for its potential to 
broaden the permanent ways out of poverty not achieved by welfare were black citizens 
such as black COP member John R. Hill, principal of Vanceboro Consolidated School 
principal, who believed that the creation of Craven Operation Progress was “one of the 
best things that has ever happened to the county” in providing blacks with the opportunity 
to find jobs “to support themselves.”
50
 Funeral home director Oscar Dove of New Bern, 
who had no formal association with COP, agreed that greater education and job training 
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programs would be most helpful in increasing the economic prospects available to blacks, 
prospects that, during the 1960s, were still basically limited to low-skilled positions or 
forms of public assistance.
51
 When North Carolina A&T University graduate and Craven 
County native James Gavin was hired by the all-white firm of Stephens and Caudelli 
Architects in March 1963, he claimed to have become the first “black white-collar 
worker” in downtown New Bern. As a result of his own employment as well as the 
growing influence of the local civil rights movement, Gavin would soon notice a more 
positive attitude among white downtown employers in hiring black workers, but change 
that went beyond token measures was still a fairly slow process in the fall of 1964.
52
 
Local commitment to economic development  
To be sure, Craven County residents‟ generally widespread faith in the early 
stages of the War on Poverty and its capacity to meaningfully curtail poverty through 
better education and job training received a boost by the ongoing industrial expansion 
and economic development in the area. Between January 1963 and August 1964, Eastern 
North Carolina as a whole experienced a historic industrial surge that brought at least 
twelve thousand new jobs and a $42 million increase in take-home pay, resulting in the 
pumping of over $190 million in additional investment in the region‟s economy.
53
 By far, 
the largest new industry to arrive in 1964 was Texasgulf, Inc. of New York whose 
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fertilizer-producing plant was strategically located in the small town of Aurora in nearby 
Beaufort County, where some of the world‟s richest sources of phosphate rock were 
found. Only about thirty miles from the heart of New Bern, Texasgulf would provide 
hundreds of better-paying jobs for local people, particularly ex-farmers and other semi-
skilled workers, in various counties of Eastern North Carolina, including Craven.
54
  
Paving the way for Eastern North Carolina‟s post-1963 industrial boom had been 
the celebrated arrival of the DuPont Dacron plant in Kinston, which began operation in 
March 1953. The E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company traveled more than twenty 
thousand miles and visited approximately ninety possible sites before it selected Kinston 
as the preferred location for the world‟s first Dacron polyester fiber plant. Soon 
thereafter, the Raleigh News & Observer lauded it as the beginning of a new trend that 
would likely see many other industries locate in the eastern half of the state. “It was 
inevitable that Eastern North Carolina should attract industry,” reasoned an editorial. 
Indeed, “that so large a plant should have been secured…will serve as an example to both 
large and small plants in other industries.” The Kinston plant was also instrumental in 
providing needed and well sought-after jobs for a local economy that was rapidly losing 
farm labor. Like Texasgulf, DuPont was in close proximity to the heart of New Bern, and 
many of its two thousand employees commuted from Craven and other neighboring 
counties.
55
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Figure 14. Map of Eastern North Carolina: approximate location of DuPont plant and Texasgulf, Inc. in 
relation to New Bern, 1964. 
 
For industrialists, the area east of the state capital was attractive for several 
reasons including the large supply of labor and inexpensive land for plants made possible 
by the continued mechanization of farming. Northern industrialists especially found the 
relatively low taxes of the area and reasonable electricity rates (both of which had been 
steadily declining since World War II) especially marketable. That the region was located 
in a state with low union participation rates, which meant substantially fewer work 
stoppages and loss of man-hours, also appealed to businesses seeking maximum 
productivity.
56
  
                                                                                                                                                 
employer of Eastern North Carolinians until the company officially closed its doors in Kinston in the early 
2000s.  
56
 In 1964, over half of the 3,655 work stoppages in the U.S. that led to 22,900 man-days idle occurred in 
heavily-unionized states including New York (with 420 stoppages), Pennsylvania (with 388), and Ohio 
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Since at least 1940, a high priority for the self-proclaimed “on-the-go” city of 
New Bern had been attracting industry and new businesses.
57
 The city‟s 1964 urban 
renewal plan was one the latest attempts to attract additional industry. After all, as New 
Bern‟s “neighborhood analysis” report stated, “Blighted areas are a reflection of the civic 
pride of the community” for creating a distinct impression in the minds of those who 
visited the city and “could influence the decision of businessmen and industrialists who 
are considering the city as a potential location for their business operations or industrial 
plants.” „Is a community which areas as this the type of community in which I want to 
locate my business and settle my family?‟ entrepreneurs must ask themselves, the report 
maintained.
58
 As economic historian Gavin Wright points out, state and local-level 
industrial recruitment in the South grew to levels that outpaced the national average 
because of the introduction of the national minimum wage and decline in traditional low-
wage jobs in agriculture, both of which reduced the “regional wage differential” between 
the South and the rest of the nation while simultaneously reducing the incentive among 
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Southern leaders to turn away federal grants and higher-paying jobs.
59
 Following its 
successful bid to obtain federal grants to build Cherry Point Naval Air Base during World 
War II, Craven County continued to be among the leaders in Eastern North Carolina in 
this process of attracting outside capital, most of which came from private sources. It was 
during the early to mid-1960s that its concessions and cooperation were most successful 
in securing commercial interest. 
In August 1964, with the help of county commission chairman D. Livingstone 
Stallings, Craven County Schools Superintendent Robert Pugh, and New Bern Chamber 
of Commerce manager Olin A. Wright—all of whom were serving on the COP board at 
the time—Stanley Power Tools Company of New Britain, Connecticut, a nationally 
leading manufacturer of hand tools, agreed to open a plant in New Bern that employed 
one hundred at the outset with plans to eventually hire up to one thousand.
60
 Stallings‟ 
brother, Robert (who had been recently appointed by Governor Sanford as director of NC 
Department of Conservation and Development), also played a key role in securing the 
industry. With the opening of the Stanley tool plant, the area‟s number of manufacturing 
firms, which then employed just over two thousand local residents, grew to more than 
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sixty-five.
61
 Around that same time, the New Bern Shipyard announced a million dollar 
expansion that was based, according to the general manager and vice president of the 
shipyard, on an “economic outlook for increased boatbuilding in and around New Bern” 
that was “better than it has been in the last twenty years.”
62
 Rounding out the latest 
business ventures for the city was the building of a new television station, WNBE of New 
Bern, which promised to hire many local people, and the expansion of the Montgomery 
Ward store in July 1964 that was to triple its number of employees.
63
  
 
 
Figure 15. Special Industrial Edition of Sun Journal in celebration of the completed construction of plant 
for Stanley Works, June 25, 1964.  
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Researchers at the University of North Carolina business school boldly predicted 
during the summer of 1964 that the industrial growth rate in Eastern North Carolina 
would be the “growingest [sic] in the state” through the year 1970 and would even 
outperform the Piedmont, which had been a leading industrial stronghold in the South 
since World War II.
64
 Yet several glaring issues would give businessmen pause before 
they committed to operating their companies out of the eastern part of the state. Perhaps 
the most noticeable weakness of eastern North Carolina was its limited pool of well-
educated and semi-skilled workers, which often fell short of industrialists‟ desire for a 
plentiful supply of labor that was trainable. Most industrialists who hailed from outside 
the state also desired to locate in communities where there was little to no racial unrest 
and where relations between the races were mostly amicable. This latter desire was made 
difficult to attain in eastern North Carolina with the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan which 
had revived itself in the region—particularly in the northeastern counties of Martin, 
Halifax, and Warren counties— just shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  
Both progress in black voter registration and greater racial integration in the local 
public schools likewise invigorated numerous rural whites to band together under the 
name of the organization. The Klan “thrives on tension,” observed then-North Carolina 
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) Director Walter Anderson, and it “enjoys its greatest 
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success where there is either mixing or anticipated mixing of the races.”
65
 The rebirth of 
the Klan not only countered North Carolina‟s general climate of acceptance of the civil 
rights movement but also hampered continued economic development where it was 
arguably needed the most. In the years immediately following the Brown decision, a 
“creeping realism” began to permeate the South as the moderating influence of business 
leaders reached new heights: Attempts to build a modern industrial society while still 
allowing for or defending the continuation of racial discrimination would not work. 
Virginia Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.‟s support of Massive Resistance and Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus‟ role in the Little Rock crisis are just two examples of how 
efforts to prevent public school integration proved to be highly detrimental in enticing 
industry.
66
 C.A. McKnight, editor of the Charlotte Observer and future board member of 
the North Carolina Fund, detected in 1956 that “thoughtful businessmen are beginning to 
ask themselves,” can the South offer new industry “the prospect of a stable labor market 
and easy community relations when anger, hatred, and irresponsibility may erupt into 
mob violence?”
67
 
Without question, if Eastern North Carolina was to fully join the burgeoning 
economy of the modern South, the Klan and its small yet vociferous number of adherents 
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would have to be destabilized and the majority of the community would have to be 
inspired to collectively stand up against its possible return. But beyond just distancing 
themselves from the violent tactics of the Klan, white Eastern North Carolinians who had 
not yet done so would have to learn to accommodate to desegregation themselves. 
Arkansas Gazette editor Harry S. Ashmore predicted in 1959 that “[g]radually white 
leaders will recognize that the South cannot expect to remain rooted where it is” as they 
come to recognize “that the arbitrary limits of segregation deny to Negroes the means of 
realizing their individual potential.”
68
 “The South as a whole,” he observed, “draws no 
benefit from the existence of a mass of workers forced by necessity to hire out for 
substandard wages, unable to put much back into the economy, and costly in terms of 
social services. It was economic factors like these,” Ashmore concluded, “not moral ones, 
that led Booker T. Washington to warn that the white man could throw the Negro in the 
ditch, but couldn‟t keep him there without getting in with him.”
69
 In a recent study, 
historian Joseph Crespino indentified such a reality as far south as Mississippi where 
“[s]ome form of strategic accommodation [to black equality and civil rights laws] was the 
necessary precondition for white leaders to continue any number of political initiatives 
that were important to them”—including attracting outside industry in the postwar 
period.
70
 Even as the most racially conservative region in the state, Eastern North 
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Carolina was no Mississippi, yet self-interest proved to be just as decisive in ushering in 
monumental changes in racial policies there as in the lynching capital of the South. To 
borrow the words of scholars Elizabeth Jacoway and David R. Colburn, businessmen‟s 
choice of progress over tradition became an important “entering wedge for much of the 
greater changes that have since taken place in southern life and race relations.”
71
 While 
few Craven whites who were willing to accommodate to racial fairness were completely 
free of attitudes of white supremacy, their decision to open opportunities to blacks was 
not made simply to maintain white privilege but to improve the economic health of their 
community, which many had realized could not be accomplished while blacks were being 
denied equal opportunity to education, job training, and employment.  
One of the greatest opportunities for Eastern North Carolinians to exhibit their 
willingness to accommodate to social change presented itself when President Johnson 
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which legally forbade all enduring practices of racial 
discrimination in public places and employment. A few days after the bill‟s passage on 
July 2, North Carolina Governor Sanford offered comments that reflected his confidence 
that the new law would be respected by the people of his state. Despite being the most 
revolutionary and far-reaching act in the nation‟s history to attempt to eradicate Jim Crow 
practices, Governor Sanford had no doubts that “the citizens of North Carolina will obey 
the law,” noting the “good climate of tolerance and understanding which exists here,” a 
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feeling also shared by North Carolina NAACP president Kelly M. Alexander who 
predicted little trouble in the law‟s implementation.
72
 By and large, Sanford cheered the 
president‟s determination to completely remove all remaining “barriers which has 
imposed some indignities upon the Negro minority which served no good purpose” and 
“which prevented the kind of cooperation between the two races essential not only for 
maintaining of order, but for an economically strong state.” Sanford did, however, see an 
inherent limitation in the law. Along with his words of praise, the governor counseled 
that black citizens should recognize that the federal statute could not accomplish either 
“the economic advance they seek” or the reduction of the “economic disparity they suffer 
now” without “the good will of employers.”
73
 Yet, while Sanford believed racial progress 
could not be accomplished “by force or legal rights alone,” he did not weaken his appeal 
that North Carolinians must honor the law which, he suggested, would bring the South 
one step closer in fulfilling America‟s promise of freedom for all races.
74
 
Congressman David N. Henderson, who joined with both Republican and 
Democrat representatives from North Carolina in voting against the bill, solidly disagreed 
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not only with Sanford‟s impression of the merits behind the new civil rights law but also 
in its potential to achieve the goal of racial equality.
75
 In line with the predictions of the 
majority of his contemporary southern congressmen, Henderson doubted that the bill 
would be well-received among white citizens both for its overreliance on federal force 
and its lack of reliance on voluntary good will. As understood by Henderson, “the true 
goal of the „Civil Righters‟ is personal, social acceptance of Negroes by whites as equals. 
This cannot be brought about by legislation; or court decree; by Executive Order or 
Federal bayonets.” “It will occur,” Henderson maintained, “only when persons of good 
will of both races voluntarily determine in their own hearts that it should be so.” With 
that justification in mind, Henderson promised his Eastern North Carolina constituency in 
a January 1964 newsletter that he would “oppose and vote against the bill in its entirety” 
not “because I oppose equal rights for all, but because I oppose the concept of using 
Federal force to ram down the throats of our citizens social customs with which they 
disagree.”
76
  
The “social custom” of racial segregation, however, clearly did not hold the same 
prominence it once had in his congressional district for, despite Henderson‟s reservations, 
the vast majority of whites did not fight the law, including the substantial number who 
did not agree that civil rights included dictating a person‟s choice of associates. After all, 
according to a white male New Bern resident writing to Henderson in 1963, “when I was 
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a child a Negro would not even go into a drug store, whereas today they come and go 
almost as they please.” The constituent acknowledged that “integration is simply going to 
take time” but that “each generation is becoming more tolerant toward Negroes…” 
Indeed, as expressed by a white woman living in New Bern, few whites in and around 
New Bern had any issue “if a person opens his doors to all people on his or her own free 
will.”
 77
 
 
 
Figure 16. Congressman David N. Henderson, 1964. Box 398, Photographs, 1964, David Newton 
Henderson papers, Special Collections, Duke University.  
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In fact, for some white business owners who had not already desegregated, there 
actually seemed to be a preference for being legally forced to change one‟s policies. Such 
was the case for the Northern owners of a bowling alley in New Bern who apologized to 
a black patron after refusing him access around 1963, explaining they had no power to 
override the preferences of some of their clientele.
78
 Lest they lose federal funding, local 
officials were perhaps the most accommodating to the new legislation. In response to the 
civil rights act‟s push for greater integration of public schools, New Bern city schools 
quickly finished its ongoing plans to desegregate on July 14, less than two weeks after the 
official authorization of the bill. On that date eight black youths—four elementary and 
four high school students—desegregated three previously all-white schools in Craven‟s 
county seat.
79
 Two of the black high school students would face frequent name-calling, 
shoving in the hallways, and other forms of racial prejudice from their white peers, but at 
least for high school student Gwendolyn Bryan and elementary students Michael Rivers 
Morgan and Stephanye Kenyear, they were pleasantly surprised to find either white 
students who instantly befriended them or white teachers who believed in them as much 
as their black teachers had.
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Among mainstream white adults in Craven County, what known defiance there 
was to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was essentially limited to the behavior of L. John 
Moore, owner and operator of Moore‟s BBQ in New Bern. Among local non-white 
residents, Moore was not only known as a “black folks‟ hater” but was also considered to 
be one of the cruelest types of white businessmen for his willingness to hire black 
employees as his cooks while refusing to serve blacks as his equals.
81
 On July 13, 1964, 
not long after displaying signs warning that he would not serve interstate travelers, Moore 
denied service to two local black patrons who sought to eat in the main dining room of 
his restaurant. For years, Moore had allowed blacks to order food to-go only from the 
walk-up window, a practice he continued without any shame in spite of the reality of 
Title II of the new bill. In a letter that thanked North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin for 
opposing the civil rights act, Moore explained that since his business was neither part of a 
chain nor shipped across state lines, he did not believe “the federal government has any 
right to regulate us” and, thus, he continued to operate on a segregated basis.
82
 But 
leading the charge to prevent Moore‟s exemption from the law were incidentally the 
patrons to whom he denied service: Reverend Willie Hickman and Robert Whitehead of 
the local NAACP (both future COP board members).
83
 With the help of local attorney 
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Reginald Frazier and NAACP attorney Julius Chambers, a legal suit was filed on 
November 10, 1964, by New Bern NAACP President Rev. E.W. Wooten, Hickman, 
Whitehead, and seven other black plaintiffs from New Bern. Pointing to the substantial 
number of Moore‟s products that came out-of-state, the district judge would ultimately 
rule in favor of the plaintiffs and fine Moore $5,000 which, in turn, compelled him to 
relocate his business several miles away where it was finally integrated in 1967.
84
 And 
while Moore had attested that a strong white client base was the source of his financial 
success before the civil rights act, Arlestus Attmore, a black history teacher at J.T. Barber 
High School in New Bern, found it ironic that “little did [Moore] know that the blacks 
were spending more money than the whites with him…so when he moved back in town 
and allowed everybody to come and have a meal, he did better off.”
85
  
Trouble caused by the Klan, 1965 
With the cost of suppression higher than most whites were willing to pay to defy 
the federal law, it did not take a police state to enforce the act among the general 
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population in Eastern North Carolina.
86
 A far different situation lurked outside the 
mainstream body of citizens, however, where desperate and violent opposition to all new 
advancements on behalf of black citizens was on the rise. In fact, following the 1964 civil 
rights act, white supremacists and other racial extremists below the Mason-Dixon line 
joined the Ku Klux Klan or one of its affiliates in historic numbers. As observed by 
Charles L. Weltner, the only congressman from the Deep South who voted for the act, 
“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not „solve‟ the race problem” nor did it “mean the end 
of racial injustice or racial strife.”
87
 Partially because of the greater degree of compliance 
at both the state and local level, North Carolina would lead the South by 1965 with 
twelve thousand due-paying members in the United Klans of America.
88
 The Klan was 
especially active in the counties of Eastern North Carolina including Jones and Craven. 
State Bureau of Investigation records reveal that there were at least three Klaverns in 
Craven County at the time, which frequently held outdoor rallies—drawing crowds 
ranging from 350 to 650 persons—in the rural towns of Vanceboro, Jasper, Ernul, Dover, 
and Cove City.
89
  
On the evening of January 25, 1965, Klan activity even spread into the city limits 
of New Bern. Two explosions occurred right outside St. Peter‟s AME Zion Church where 
a local NAACP meeting was being held. Advertised in the local Sun Journal and drawing 
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close to 250 civil rights activists from Craven, Carteret, Jones, Pamlico, and Onslow 
counties, the meeting was put forth to discuss school integration efforts as well as the 
implementation of the 1964 civil rights bill. No individuals were injured in the blasts, as 
only two automobiles parked outside the church were damaged, one belonging to the 
Jones County NAACP president and the other to NAACP attorney Julius Chambers. 
Approximately an hour later that night, another explosion was set off at nearby Oscar‟s 
Mortuary, where again, only minimal damage occurred. Owner Oscar Dove, who was a 
known black integrationist leader as well as a member of the New Bern Bi-Racial 
Committee, informed authorities that this was not the first incident of its kind. He 
indicated that in July 1964 a cross was burned in front of his establishment and that on 
several occasions bottles had been thrown through his front window.
90
 More bewildered 
than he was fearful, Dove was compelled to ask, “If they want something why don‟t they 
come to me?” The three white males who were arrested in connection with the crimes 
later admitted to setting off each of the bombs at both the church and the mortuary. 
Before leaving the suspects‟ homes in Vanceboro, federal agents seized Klan robes, 
minutes of secret Klan meetings, and Klan application forms.
91
 News reports quoted 
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citizens as being “shocked” and in disbelief that such an act of violence could happen in 
their town or be perpetuated by someone who lived there.
92
 
White supremacists‟ frustrations in Craven would not be merely limited to black 
gains emanating from the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Adding to their sense of vulnerability 
was the steady expansion of Craven Operation Progress (COP), which represented yet 
another arena in which both black influence and interracial dealings were emergent. At a 
COP board meeting held just a few days prior to the New Bern bombings, black board 
member Robert Whitehead‟s motion to approve the $1.25/hour minimum wage for the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) program was accepted, despite opposition from 
several white conservatives on the board. For both inside and outside observers, the most 
significant aspect of Whitehead‟s feat was not that black youth were a majority of NYC 
participants in Eastern North Carolina but that the wage was higher than many paying 
jobs in the area for low-skilled workers.
93
 The nature of NYC would promise to provide 
temporary work-related assistance to more of the area‟s black citizens than its white 
ones.
94
 By the end of January, COP had also welcomed the Look magazine team who 
came to spotlight VISTA and anti-poverty workers in and around New Bern. These 
workers included a male and female college student from Oregon and California 
respectively, one of whom was signing up black and white children for preschool 
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readiness classes in Craven while the other worked with the county sanitarian in testing 
water supplies and inspecting sanitary facilities.
95
  
Drawing attention to Klan reactions has the potential to exaggerate the degree of 
white resistance as doing so obscures the diversity of white feelings as well as the broad 
civil obedience that existed within the greater white community. Nonetheless, even as the 
larger community was seemingly going along with many of the new changes during the 
mid-1960s, the year of 1965 was off to a rocky start for Craven Operation Progress as 
rising Klan activity contributed to feelings of uneasiness among the organization‟s 
advocates. As COP board member Bill Flowers explained, one major issue to deal with 
was heightened apprehension among racist white citizens that COP “will be an all-Negro 
program.” Early in the year, executive director Jim Hearn made sure to stress to a Raleigh 
News & Observer reporter that Craven‟s antipoverty effort is about “helping people as 
they want to be helped—not by handouts, but by training them for jobs and teaching them 
skills so that they can get themselves out of the cycle.”
96
 Dr. W.A. Browne, head of the 
Craven County Health Department and member of the COP board, also spoke from a 
defensive position that “this isn‟t a giveaway program. It‟s self-improvement.”
97
 The 
emphasis on “opportunity through self-effort” was not just an empty phrase to assuage 
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critics, however, nor was it simply the official motto that adorned the letterheads of the 
antipoverty agency.  
Hearn’s assumptions about local people 
Being a newcomer to Eastern North Carolina, Craven Operation Progress‟ 
executive director at first appeared sensitive to the need of building community trust in 
the supposed benefits of a new and still fairly unknown operation, which became an even 
more crucial task after the Klan bombings that shook New Bern. However, save the local 
airing of a television special on Craven antipoverty efforts in December 1964, which was 
primarily pushed by Hearn‟s two Community Action Technicians (CATs), little publicity 
had been made about the programs Hearn so deeply desired to succeed. A North Carolina 
Volunteer assigned to Craven, who helped to complete forty-six environmental sanitation 
surveys in the area, wrote in a summer 1964 report that “local cooperation has been good, 
but it has been slow,” which he attributed to the fact that “both the N.C. Fund and the 
Volunteer program are virtually unknown to the public of Craven County.” But on a 
positive note, “Reception has been excellent when the program is explained,” the 
volunteer added.
98
 As the above suggests, publicity efforts had been minimal in the 
months prior to Hearn‟s hiring but were not noticeably improved when the former CARE 
administrator took the lead. “We realize that your overall picture of Craven‟s attack on 
poverty is somewhat vague,” Hearn would tell a group of incoming staff members in 
early 1965, noting how “programs have been designed and approved with considerable 
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rapidity and limited publicity.” Yet, as he assured them, their understanding of the 
programs and how to help the disadvantaged help themselves will increase “as you 
become involved in your job, work under the leadership of present staff members, and 
exhibit a desire to learn and grow.”
99
  
Hearn‟s incoming assumption that most Southerners, specifically the white non-
poor, would spurn progress and social change explains a good deal about why he chose to 
limit publicizing the happenings of COP. At a VISTA training session sponsored by the 
North Carolina Fund at Camp New Hope in Chapel Hill, an event that attracted local and 
national reporters, Hearn warned the group, “Remember you‟re another string from 
Washington, and a lot of people in these places you‟ll be working don‟t like 
Washington.” Hearn proceeded to emphasize to the young volunteers that “every place 
you go you‟ll wonder and fret why people running the show don‟t do it as quickly as you 
would. Maybe they aren‟t as excited about it as you. Maybe they have their doubts about 
changing their community. You will have to use every bit of tact at your command.”
100
 
For Hearn, however, tact tended to mean limiting antipoverty activities to behind the 
scenes and largely outside of the view of the greater community. Instead, Hearn‟s 
greatest priority from the start was “direct contact with people who are recipients of the 
action of this program to make them active participants.” Those who are recipients, 
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Hearn maintained, “should be given a voice in the administration.”
101
 This priority to 
give voice to the poor began early on and would remain throughout his tenure as head of 
COP.  
Because of the want of knowledge among many of those not involved in the local 
antipoverty program, Hearn was still selling himself and the program to skeptical 
individuals in the community into February 1965, reportedly keeping him and his staff 
busy explaining the benefits of COP after the fact to those who argued that Craven “„is 
not really poor‟” and that the last thing needed is “„money pumped in from Washington 
with strings attached.‟” Yet even though “not everyone is getting up to cheer us on,” 
Hearn was pleased to remark that “no one has come in to attack me and I‟ve been here for 
six months.”
102
 Indeed, the executive director was known to speak fairly well of Craven 
in the media, but in ways that reflected favorably on his leadership and the general 
substance behind the War on Poverty. For instance, when Hearn boasted to the VISTAs 
assigned to New Bern in January 1965 that “Craven has made more progress than any 
other community in the nation,” it seemed he believed that much of the credit for the 
coming together of the community to seek social and economic progress lay with himself 
and/or the promise of federal funds.
103
 After all, as he discussed in an interview with a 
Durham Herald reporter, he saw Craven as a largely retrograde population in which the 
people “are having to change their way of life” in order to meet the integration 
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requirements of the OEO. Based on Hearn‟s testimony, the newspaper affirmed that 
“Craven‟s „Operation Progress‟ is leading the way” in the War on Poverty, “showing the 
problems can be solved, and quietly.” “They‟re working together—both races—and 
letting the chips fall,” the Herald quoted Hearn as saying, before he concluded that 
“[t]hese people have done more than any other in the South.”
104
  
While it was true that local blacks and whites were communicating and coalescing 
on issues of mutual interest at a high rate in early 1965, the degree to which this progress 
in Craven was attributable to the War on Poverty was indeed overemphasized by Hearn. 
Arriving in New Bern for the first time in August 1964, Hearn was largely unaware of 
how the pressures of the black freedom movement and the subsequent Civil Rights Act of 
1964 led to black and white leaders addressing one another on a more equal basis. The 
racial cooperation that Hearn observed in 1965 did not happen overnight and could not 
have been possible without past practice of cooperation or without civil rights leaders 
pushing whites to see how their own economic interests could be advanced by giving in 
to those central to blacks. Although federal funds certainly helped in motivating many to 
cooperate, they alone do not explain interracial agreement. Since the New Deal, white 
conservative Southerners have been known to deny federal funds when the requirements 
to obtain them contradicted with their principles or their perceptions of the interests of 
their constituents.  
It is equally important to note that even though civil rights demonstrations 
certainly influenced whites in Craven to make concessions to black demands for equality, 
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most of the demonstrations, which were rare, were followed by carefully thought-out 
negotiations between blacks and the “power structure.” In fact, as most local black civil 
rights leaders would acknowledge, negotiation was an important means by which civil 
rights achievements in desegregation and greater black employment were made in New 
Bern.
105
 And negotiation was accomplished by many of the same men and women who 
would later join the COP board including NAACP leader Robert M. Whitehead, mayor 
Mack Lupton, Reverend L. D. Munn of the city‟s ministerial alliance, Craven County 
public welfare department director Constance Rabin, and chamber of commerce director 
Olin Wright, to name a few.  
The tactic of negotiation would, thus, continue to function as a chief means by 
which whites and blacks settled issues and expanded black participation and inclusion 
during the War on Poverty. Writing in the journal of Law and Contemporary Problems, 
John Wheeler of the North Carolina Fund noted that “the prospect of new federal payrolls 
in poor counties of the South can produce sharp changes in local custom and traditional 
attitudes of race,” but, in communities like Craven, Wheeler‟s observation explains only 
part of the story.
106
 Simultaneously, changes in local custom and traditional attitudes of 
race spurred largely by earlier experiences during the civil rights movement also made 
the prospect of federal money more attractive to whites as well as much easier to attain.  
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This development of bi-racial cooperation had also been assisted by blacks‟ rising 
political stock since at least May 1964 with the founding of the Combined Civic 
Organizations of New Bern and Craven County (CCO). The CCO eventually combined 
the local NAACP branches of New Bern, Vanceboro, and Havelock, the Southern 
Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), and other black civic groups to increase latent 
voter registration in the black community in hopes of electing James Gavin to the Craven 
County School Board.
107
 Craven County Commissioner D.L. Stallings was perhaps the 
most powerful local politician who depended on black votes. Prior to the formation of 
this group which Robert M. Whitehead would lead, black civil rights leaders in New Bern 
and Craven County had been divided over many central issues that slowed the 
registration effort. Division over style, pacing, and methods were particularly strong 
between the New Bern and Craven County NAACP branches, founded in 1948 and 1954, 
respectively. In April 1964, New Bern NAACP leader Leon C. Nixon and several other 
blacks calling themselves the “Civil Rights Committee” wrote NAACP executive director 
Roy Wilkins to announce that “due to the lack of help” from the national NAACP branch 
on six unanswered complaints about local infighting they “will have to call on other 
national Civil Rights organizations to assist us.”
108
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The “Civil Rights Committee” would quickly branch off from the NAACP by 
gaining sponsorship by the SCLC, whose convention had impressed the group on their 
trip to Georgia a year earlier.
109
 While the Craven SCLC was known to be more 
confrontational than the NAACP, and thereby the last group to agree to join the new joint 
civil rights organization, the decision to combine forces caused immediate gains for black 
voting strength, particularly in the November 1964 presidential election.
110
 Moreover, the 
observation made in 1952 by NAACP Director of Public Relations Henry Lee Moon that 
“longstanding resistance to Negro voting in the Black belt counties of eastern North 
Carolina” had created “a certain amount of apathy among Negroes in that section of the 
state,” would hold far less traction in 1964 and onward, especially in New Bern and 
especially after the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
111
 Not only had previous obstacles to 
black voting such as the poll tax been removed but both black interest and black initiative 
were also growing as best evidenced by Joseph Edwards‟ run for alderman in the May 
1965 city election. As only the third black citizen in New Bern to aspire to city political 
office in the twentieth century—the first two ran in 1951 and 1959—Edwards was only 
about 200 votes short of election. Sizeable support in the heavily black-populated wards 
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made it possible for him to beat out two white challengers including incumbent R.B. 
Bratcher.
 112
  
Hearn’s distrust is shared by OEO 
Even though gradual racial progress was occurring prior to Hearn‟s arrival, Hearn 
was not alone, among non-natives, in suspecting that whites in Craven Operation 
Progress were averse to following the civil rights guidelines of the War on Poverty. By 
March of 1965, it was evident that the Office of Economic Opportunity shared a similar 
notion. Following a telephone conversation with a representative from OEO, COP board 
member Whitehead would inform Hearn that OEO planned to make certain that Craven 
carried out its CAP and other programs in “strict conformity with the law.” Whitehead 
explained that he was also told that there is “so much invested in Craven that it makes 
logical sense to test the law.” In a memo sent to George Esser over the matter, North 
Carolina Fund staffer Bill Koch added that “Jim gets the impression that this means the 
schools as well, and that the plan for integration next year will be given rigorous 
examination.”
113
 That OEO sought accountability and compliance from COP was fully 
understandable. COP had recently expanded to almost $1,500,000 in OEO-approved 
programs, of which approximately $600,000 in federal funds was slated for the first 
Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) program to be administered in the state based on 
local plans to employ 817 youths from Craven, Jones, and Pamlico at a cost of $1,293.69 
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per enrollee.
114
 However, OEO‟s promise for strong surveillance appeared distrustful of 
local happenings related to integration in the schools.  
Following the December 1964 filing of a suit by black parents against the Craven 
County Board of Education for its continued use of race in school assignments, the 
county board began plans on February 1, 1965, to comply fully with the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) desegregation guidelines. Before the district 
court judge‟s ruling, the board enlarged “the scope of its plan for inviting application for 
changes” by agreeing to remove all district lines, making sure no child, due to his or her 
race, was refused to attend a school of his choice, and desegregating employment and 
assignment practices of the Board of Education for all personnel in order that 
“qualifications for the particular job will be the determining factor.” Since agreeing to 
desegregate on a small scale in 1959, four of Craven‟s twelve all-white schools were 
desegregated, but the desegregated schools were limited at that time to the military 
district of Havelock. In order to speed up the reach of integration, the board set a 
maximum of three years for the new plans to be fully implemented to the point that “all 
evidence of a dual system are eventually eliminated.”
115
 Chairman Stallings and the 
Craven County Board of Commissioners endorsed the action taken by the county school 
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board to be in a position to sign the civil rights pledge required by the federal 
government. By March, the Craven Board of Education was then ready to allow parents 
of both races not just to ask for reassignment, as had been the policy in the past, but to 
choose the school in their residential area that they wanted their children to attend with 
full access to bus transportation. As stipulated in the Craven “Freedom of Choice” form, 
parents were free to choose “either the nearest formerly Negro school or the nearest 
formerly white school”; by July, each of the 179 black students who requested 
reassignment was accepted and at least four black teachers were sent to previously all-
white schools.
116
 In contrast to assumptions within OEO, HEW would find nothing to 
disapprove of in Craven‟s plans to meet civil rights guidelines. In May 1965, after 
becoming the first of the state‟s 170 school units to gain the approval from the federal 
Office of Education for its desegregation plans, Craven was awarded $500,000 in federal 
funds for the upcoming fiscal year.
117
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Figure 17. Colonel Wilbur F. Evans, on right, assists in signing up the first Neighborhood Youth Corps 
enrollee in North Carolina, 1965. Blueprint for Opportunity 1 (June 1965), box 149, folder 4, David 
Newton Henderson papers, Special Collections, Duke University.  
 
 
Lack of publicity breeds local skepticism of War on Poverty 
Despite the vast amount of federal money being pumped into both COP and the 
county schools in 1965, some of which promised to indirectly boost several sectors of the 
local economy, tensions between white conservative members of the community and 
COP were beginning to brew. Although Craven‟s heftier compliance with civil rights law 
played a role, tensions appeared to derive more from a lack of understanding of the goals 
of the programs, several of which had just recently hired a full-time staff. Cognizant of 
the fact that “no results will be seen overnight,” Hearn argued in a variety of ways that 
COP was “not a miracle program, but an idea that requires hard work.”
 118
 Yet, as seen 
above, little effort was made on his part to communicate the various components of that 
“idea” to conservatives or to persuade them of the benefit to themselves and the 
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community of getting on board. At a COP board meeting held on April 21, 1965, North 
Carolina Fund Executive Director George Esser made a special visit to New Bern to 
express his concerns over the relationship between the antipoverty program and the 
Craven community. After remarking that COP “represents an effort to adjust successfully 
to complicated problems thrust upon us by rapid change,” Esser voiced his uneasiness 
over the fact that “local support is not up to par.” Board member Bill Flowers seconded 
Esser‟s concern by noting his observations of misunderstanding in the community in 
regards to the purposes of Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), specifically the negative 
reactions to the $1.25 minimum wage. However, judging from the NYC advisory board 
that was voted on at the April 21 meeting, support was at least rather high among many 
of the leaders of the community. The eleven member board was comprised of 
representatives from all facets of the local population: the New Bern City Manager, local 
SCLC chairman Rev. Leon Nixon, Father Thomas Hadden of the New Bern NAACP, a 
member of the Pamlico County Board of Education, an area attorney, Craven County 
Commissioner Grover Lancaster, Rev. Al Fisher of the all-white Centenary Methodist 
Church, two members of the poor, and one black and one white high school student from 
New Bern.
119
 That several of the aforementioned were elected or appointed officials 
suggests that there was little if any anticipation that accepting the invitation to serve in 
the local War on Poverty could result in public contempt. Some of the advisory board 
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members may have joined primarily for the sake of influencing the direction of NYC in 
their own interests or most likely toward their perception of what was best for the 
community. But regardless of the reason why one joined, his image and reputation among 
the public would largely hinge—for good or for bad—on the public‟s assessment of that 
program.  
Arguably, as long as its leaders appeared to be in favor of the goals and programs 
of COP, a good many uninformed Eastern North Carolinians in and around Craven may 
have been willing to give the anti-poverty program the benefit of the doubt. Of course, 
this would not include the growing number who, regardless of the degree of sponsorship 
by community leaders, would remain skeptical of the merit in COP and unimpressed by 
the amount of federal funds bestowed until shown real results in poverty reduction or 
Craven‟s economic betterment. As Vice President Hubert Humphrey reminded Hearn in a 
letter sent in early April, “Craven County can be very proud of the progress it has made 
in a short time…the cooperation which has been shown is certainly to be commended,” 
but the “major task is yet before the community—implementing the programs.”
120
 
Interestingly, Humphrey‟s advice basically paralleled that from a News & Observer 
editorial just days after Craven Operation Progress was awarded its initial CAP grant in 
November 1964: “No swift improvements in Craven county or anywhere else are going 
to come as a result of federal grants to combat poverty.” Without a doubt, the editorial 
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continued, “The federal grants are greatly needed, but once in hand they become the least 
important element in this ambitious program.”
121
 
“Maximum feasible participation” and the COP board, May 1965 
At the same time that new programs—Neighborhood Youth Corps, Manpower 
Improvement Through Community Effort (MITCE) and Adult Basic Education 
Recruitment (ABER)—were being fully implemented, representation on the COP board 
was also nearing full realization of OEO‟s requirement of “maximum feasible 
participation,” which would begin in earnest in May. Guiding the board‟s agreement to 
increase membership from twenty-seven to thirty-seven were Esser, who had first 
suggested broader representation at the April 21 meeting, but more importantly board 
members Whitehead, Frank Efird, Mrs. Philip Kennel, and Bill Flowers who were 
appointed by Stallings to study how it could be best accomplished while staying in line 
with OEO regulations.
122
 Responding to a comment that the board was already too large, 
Board Chairman Larry B. Pate argued at the May 26 meeting that COP had no alternative 
but to involve recipient groups and more minorities (they were currently zero and four, 
respectively) in decision-making so to keep receiving federal funds, which had 
effectively become the lifeblood of the programs.
123
  
Based on the suggestions from Esser, the committee appointed by Stallings 
recommended that the board add three minority organizations and increase the number of 
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at-large members to seven including one non-public school representative, four non-
whites (most of whom would be low-income), and two independent low-income rural 
whites. Each local agency, including the schools, would be limited to only one member 
on the board. Moreover, it was proposed that the five-person executive board, or steering 
committee, include at least one minority, one member of the poor, and one at-large 
member. The final suggestion was that all board members, except for the original nine 
and their successors, which included Commissioner Stallings and New Bern Mayor Mack 
Lupton, would serve staggered one-year appointments. With a minimum of discussion, 
all of the suggested changes to the board were carried out and plans were made to re-
write the COP Articles of Incorporation. The apparent ease with which the board agreed 
to expand—in spite of the presence of three fairly powerful segregationists—gave 
credence to recent comments made by John Wheeler of the North Carolina Fund board of 
directors who, following his on-site visit, felt COP had “progressed more than any other 
community in the state.”
124
  
During the subsequent COP board meeting of June 10, plans to enlarge the board 
faced a slow-down after Whitehead requested that four non-white civic groups be added 
to the list of approved organizations, instead of the number of three originally agreed 
upon. Although he agreed to reduce the number of non-white at-large members, he 
stressed that the organizations be allowed to name their own representatives since he “did 
not believe this Board of Directors could know the community leaders in the minority 
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groups.” Such a request was “not a personal matter,” Whitehead tried to assure local 
whites but predicated instead on his wanting to “protect the 2 million dollars we have 
coming into this county.” Nonetheless, the controversial nature of the suggestion was 
made obvious as vibrant discussion ensued over whether the board should be allowed 
input over the specific members selected by the non-white organizations. Pate interceded 
by warning the group of what he saw as increasing “resentment in this county toward 
these programs,” in part because some saw them as catering to black interests first. 
Whitehead‟s follow-up comment that black organizations both inside and outside Craven 
County were proud of the programs, but wary that they would continue to be run properly 
prompted white board member and local businessman Robert Monte to offer a rhetorical 
question as to whether the program was intended to help primarily blacks or the entire 
community. Monte proceeded to answer his own question, stating that he “strongly 
objected to anyone who would say that we are not trying to better the whole 
community.”
125
 At meeting‟s end, disagreements over technicalities and philosophy 
would leave the issue of the board membership far from settled.  
Controversy also colored the debate that evening over the hiring of the local 
director of Head Start, which ended with Roland Sneed calling for the program to be 
abandoned all together and at least two white members calling for Hearn‟s resignation.
126
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The strongest factions arose as school officials who supported Clinton LeGette—a white 
elementary school principal familiar with the educational facilities—convinced the board 
to override Hearn‟s high recommendation for a white female assistant professor in child 
development from the University of Tennessee.
127
 In a vote of fifteen to four, the board 
opted in favor of Principal LeGette, who Hearn suspected not only would have trouble 
“handl[ing] the program” but who also “had said detrimental things” about him 
“personally, and against the program.” What exactly those “detrimental things” were is 
unknown. But Hearn‟s outspoken opposition to hiring the school principal at least led 
Monte to quip that he thought the director “was supposed to be capable of working with 
anyone and everyone, or so they were told when he was hired.” In part because he felt his 
power as director had been abdicated—after all, Hearn reasoned that the schools lost their 
right to choose a director since they had recently agreed to turn Head Start over to COP 
after discovering that they were not going “to have control over the project”—Hearn 
sought immediate counsel from the North Carolina Fund through phone calls placed to 
both Koch and Esser. Following their conversations, Esser convinced Pate to organize a 
special meeting of COP at which every major issue including that of board membership 
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could be smoothed out in the presence of all concerned.
128
 A dinner meeting was 
scheduled shortly thereafter at Berne Restaurant off Highway 70 in New Bern.  
Just prior to the June 15 dinner meeting held at Berne Restaurant, Whitehead 
phoned Durham representatives of CORE, and possibly Floyd B. McKissick himself, in 
preparation for a demonstration in case negotiations fell through. What unfolded next was 
neither truly planned nor expected. But before proceeding into those events, it is 
important to clarify the general nature behind Robert Whitehead‟s tactics which cannot 
be simply classified as those of an either accomodationist or a radical.
129
 A long-time 
leader in the New Bern NAACP and current head of the Combined Civic Organizations 
of New Bern and Craven County, Whitehead had refused to acquiesce completely to the 
wishes of the white power structure at least as many times as he had refused the wishes of 
Leon Nixon and his SCLC followers, while avoiding to burn bridges with either party. 
His position as a manager at Cherry Point military base, which garnered him both 
financial independence from whites and a middle-class status that white community 
leaders tended to respect and share in common, helps to explain a good portion of his 
ability to maneuver between the parameters of white and black interests and find middle 
ground between the two. Yet perhaps more than any other local black leader, Whitehead 
was a skilled practitioner of the art of diplomacy and understood that to effect change in 
New Bern was to rely on a careful mixture of negotiation and demonstrations, which 
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varied depending on the context. But he would ultimately maintain that “issues were 
resolved by negro negotiations and not by demonstrations.”
130
 A few exceptions 
notwithstanding, his general cordiality and ability to resolve racial issues and make 
demands on behalf of the black community without arousing hostility earned him high 
regard in both the black and white community.
131
 He, therefore, aptly described himself a 
“civic leader” rather than a “civil rights leader” as he regularly spoke about the “good of 
the community” rather than black interests alone.
132
 During committee talks held back in 
April and May, Whitehead was one of the strongest proponents of adding poor whites to 
the COP board.  
Whitehead‟s presence on the COP board challenges a common argument among 
historians that middle-class blacks on community action agencies were not independent-
minded, rarely concerned themselves about the interests of the poor, and served merely as 
a rubber-stamp for white aims and purposes.
133
  Instead of being an obstacle to change in 
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Craven, Whitehead was one of its indispensible ingredients. In contrast to Nixon, 
Whitehead typically preferred to refrain from holding demonstrations while negotiations 
with whites were underway or likely. Indeed, Whitehead‟s decision to call in outsiders to 
New Bern was made without an awareness that Hearn, Pate and Stallings had been 
conferring with North Carolina Fund Director George Esser and his assistant Bill Koch 
up to a few hours before the scheduled dinner meeting over means to compromise with 
black requests for expanded representation.
134
 Recent contact with OEO‟s Southeastern 
District Director and staff at both the Ford Foundation and the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission, all of whom assured Whitehead that his position and understanding of the 
issue of board representation was correct, further convinced him that local whites were 
not interested in following the Economic Opportunity Act, a stand from which he would 
not easily budge. Just a few days earlier, he had called off a picket line in front of Pate‟s 
home and COP headquarters only after one of the CORE organizers dissuaded such 
action because of the dangers in involving persons who had no prior training in 
nonviolent techniques.
135
  
Conclusion 
Whitehead did not learn until he entered the Berne restaurant‟s dining room that 
white board members were seeking primarily to negotiate that evening. This realization 
came a little too late. Whether Whitehead personally invited them to the restaurant is not 
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known, but, in addition to a group of interested local black citizens, a team of 
approximately ten CORE members arrived at the meeting time of 5:30 pm wearing 
buttons with the organization‟s name and remained standing in the presence of the board 
members who were finding seats, all of which gave the look of a demonstration.
136
 Not 
only were whites on the board, Koch and Esser, surprised at the sight of the civil rights 
activists but so were the restaurant‟s owner and the few Klansmen who reportedly were 
eating there that evening. Soon, police were called to the scene and several whites in 
COP whispered to one another their intentions of walking out. Sensing the volatile and 
potentially explosive atmosphere, Esser persuaded Pate and Whitehead to reconvene the 
meeting for the following morning in a private setting and under less hostile 
circumstances.
137
 But as Chapter IV will discuss, Hearn‟s primary loyalty to Washington 
at the expense of local people would continue to delay the realization of maximum 
feasible participation since few whites on the board trusted him. This delay, of course, 
was only temporary. Chapter IV will also address the simultaneous growth in biracial 
interest for peace and community progress that continued to increase in spite of growing 
white conservative opposition of COP both inside and outside the organization. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
WASHINGTON‟S WAY 
 
 
Introduction 
Today‟s historians of the War on Poverty, most of whose mentors can be traced 
back to the “New Left” that came into being during the civil rights movement, have 
generally agreed that there was little common ground to be found between whites and 
blacks during the War on Poverty, particularly in smaller Southern communities. As has 
been argued passionately by Susan Ashmore, George Lipsitz, and others, white southern 
racism was so paramount during the mid-1960s as to be one of the primary reasons 
preventing full success (i.e. fully integrated programs, equitable biracial staff, widespread 
representation of the poor, and true economic freedom for the underprivileged) in 
community action projects in that region. As compelling as these arguments have been 
over the years, they are notably incomplete. One reason for their incomplete nature is 
that, in these histories, whites—specifically conservative to moderate middle-class 
leaders—are generally assumed to be and thereby classified as the antagonists of the 
story. This assumption often derives from a heavy reliance on the testimony of those 
individuals, many of whom were found in the poor populations, whom historians have 
understandably tended to sympathize with most. But this assumption can mean that the 
dynamic set of motivations and incentives that compelled whites‟ behavior are glossed 
169 
 
over.
1
 Thus, as historian David Farber has recently pointed out about 1960‟s United 
States history in general, “Few, if any, middle-class white people, let alone conservatives, 
play important roles in these historical accounts of American history.”
2
  
Racism and disregard for the interests of the poor certainly colored the thoughts 
and actions of a number of whites within CAAs in the South, including North Carolina, 
but they did not always get to define the direction of community action. In fact, partially 
because of OEO guidelines for funding, not only did racism and insensitivities to the 
unfortunate have a rather small space to maneuver within Craven Operation Progress 
(COP), but there were also plenty of earnest and committed locals on the board who saw 
an integrated antipoverty effort as a positive development if it could be managed 
gradually, fairly quietly, and without stirring up white resistance or black militancy. 
Interestingly though, as this chapter will show, a preference for moderation and 
gradualism was not a recipe for obstructionism. Because of their broader understanding 
of the community‟s preference for moderation, it was not surprising that many whites on 
the COP board would grow wary of an executive directorship possessed by Jim Hearn, 
who seemed to have little to no problem stirring up local controversy. As Larry Pate and 
Stallings would later claim to George Esser, Hearn “threatened several times to have 
thousands of Negroes on the New Bern streets” if certain demands of Hearn‟s were not 
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met such as setting the wage rate for NYC enrollees at $1.25.
3
 This dynamic between 
Hearn and the board raises an important question: Would Hearn‟s tendency to try to 
please federal bureaucrats in Washington, D.C. rather than working with the COP board 
or seeking to persuade the majority of the local white citizens of the benefits of his vision 
for a antipoverty program be an effective way to fight the War on Poverty at the local 
level? 
The long but deliberate road to broader local representation 
Immediately following the Berne Restaurant incident, there was increased talk 
among several whites on the board about removing Hearn as director. Even Stallings, 
who had put much faith in him in the beginning, had reached a breaking point. That 
breaking point, however, was partially rooted in a likely misreading of Hearn‟s actual 
participation—which seemed to be none—in engineering the CORE “demonstration” as 
an attempt to arouse racial conflict. In a meeting with Koch several days before the 
dinner meeting, Stallings and Pate had already expressed a desire for someone 
“reasonable” who “could work with the agencies.” They likewise complained that both 
Hearn and COP had become targets of criticism from “all over the community,” which 
they surely feared had increased as word spread of the presence of CORE in New Bern. 
As Pate and Stallings clarified to North Carolina Fund representatives, Hearn‟s frequent 
visits to black churches, his invitations to blacks to his home, his push for quick and 
immediate integration in places where desegregation was occurring slowly but steadily, 
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and his refusal to make friends among key leaders in the community gave off an 
appearance that he was either interested in the black community‟s needs first and 
foremost or in “stirring up racial antagonisms.” Other charges the two men had brought 
against the executive director were that Hearn was “arbitrary in his administrative and 
management practices,” made “unreasonable demands” upon the agencies for 
administrative control of the program, and was “often tactless,” all of which “was 
destroying staff morale” in the program.
4
 The latter complaints issued by Pate and 
Stallings may have been magnified beyond their intent because of their obvious 
frustration, but they were certainly not baseless. A North Carolina Fund review of COP 
completed by staffer Morris Cohen as far back as October 1964 cited impressions “that 
Jim is not easy to work with; he certainly is difficult to listen to, if only because he talks 
so fast and doesn‟t do much listening himself.”
5
 That Hearn might have been involved in 
the CORE incident only added fuel to a rapidly engulfing fire.  
Salisbury, North Carolina, native Frank Efird remained one of the few white 
board members who was willing to defend Hearn publically. A housing contractor in his 
early thirties, Efird made the 230-mile move to New Bern in 1964 to build a retirement 
community in the River Bend area. From COP board minutes and interviews conducted 
by the North Carolina Fund, his views on racial and economic issues appear to have been 
fairly liberal and largely in line with those of Hearn, who Efird described as “a good 
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man.” In part because he judged that too many local citizens were in his opinion “very 
provincial in their thinking,” Efird believed that the aggressive administrative methods 
Hearn employed were the only ones by which “you could get an anti-poverty program 
started in New Bern.” He also admired Hearn‟s “tough hide” because “you could tell him 
he was wrong, criticize him, spit in his face,” but he “would come right back for more.”
6
 
Outside Frank Efird, however, consistent support for Hearn on the board was essentially 
limited to black members Whitehead and Sneed.  
Not surprisingly, in one of the board sessions that followed the last one attempted 
at Berne Restaurant, the meeting evolved into a scene in which conservative school 
officials and Hearn began hurling charges of wrongdoing at one another. The anger of the 
school officials was particularly palpable as they continued to maintain that Hearn had 
personally invited CORE to the board meeting. Since no fruitful compromise on either 
the issue of board representation or the new Head Start director was reached, yet another 
meeting had to be scheduled for the following morning. However, to the delight of most 
involved, two developments would increase the chances of a calmer and more productive 
meeting the third time around. Although the nature and substance of the dialogue was 
purportedly unbecoming, the air had finally been cleared between Hearn and the school 
officials who for too long had left much unsaid (leading to an incessant mounting of 
tension between the two). In addition, a separate set of negotiations between five white 
COP board members and five members of black civic organizations, including Nixon of 
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the SCLC, exposed commonalities and similar interests and, thus, prepared the way for a 
lasting and workable compromise.  
On June 17, and with Esser‟s supportive presence, the entire COP board of 
directors and representatives of the local black organizations sat down at the table 
together and over the course of two-and-a-half hours made concessions and arrangements 
that all agreed upon. Whites officially agreed to allow the four non-white organizations 
that were to be added to the board the license to choose their own representatives. In turn, 
Hearn and black representatives gave sanction to Craven school principal LeGette to 
direct Head Start but with the added appointment of black principal Leander “Lee” 
Morgan, who had been Whitehead‟s choice, as assistant director. Before the meeting was 
adjourned, Esser was even able to sway Pate and Stallings to stop pressing, at least 
temporarily, for the removal of Hearn, reasoning that local blacks would see it as a slight 
and “a sign of bad faith.”
7
  
But once more, calm soon drifted into chaos and the enactment of promises made 
was postponed. On June 19, just two days after the successful resolution was reached 
among Hearn, the board, and black community leaders, Floyd McKissick and the CORE 
delegation from Durham came to Father Julian Hall in New Bern to discuss issues related 
to schools, jobs, and alleged police brutality. But “upon arrival,” one CORE member 
recalled, “we learned that the plans [for a march] had been radically altered during the 
time of our absence.” Nonetheless, against the wishes of Whitehead, who stressed that 
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important negotiations with COP had been settled, McKissick and Leon Nixon of the 
SCLC convinced approximately one hundred of the attendees to march spontaneously in 
silence to the county courthouse.
8
 Even though the demonstration was supposedly not 
motivated by specific problems with COP, Stallings and other whites on the board felt 
betrayed and some were quick to suspect Hearn‟s participation. In fact, in a telephone 
conference requested by Stallings, Stallings told Esser he could not promise that a motion 
to dismiss Hearn would not be offered at the upcoming board meeting of June 23.
9
  
No such motion was actually made but following the sixteen-to-one board 
approval to provide room for both the non-white organizations and at-large members, 
board member Robert Monte read the following motion: “In the event of passage of these 
amended by-laws at this meeting, the directors that are to be selected by civic groups 
should be persons of integrity, honesty and persons whom the community can look on 
with confidence and pride.” Clearly influenced by the recent demonstrations, Monte 
continued by asserting that the board should have “the right to investigate and to refuse 
any person sponsored that has a criminal or communist record or background at the 
regular August meeting. This rule should also hold true for any future members of the 
board up for election.” No discussion would follow, but Whitehead was clearly not 
pleased with Monte‟s resolution. Perhaps Whitehead did not want to detract from the 
peaceful and somewhat buoyant tone of the meeting. Besides the board‟s near unanimous 
approval for the additional slots for poor white and black representatives, the meeting had 
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been highlighted by snippets of encouraging news including a report that 225 children 
had signed up for project Head Start in less than a week and 66 teachers and staff had just 
been hired.
10
  
Either way, instead of bringing up his disagreements with the board, Whitehead 
felt compelled to contact Esser, who agreed to a meeting with him and three other black 
leaders from Craven at the Fund office in Durham on June 28, 1965. In addition to Bill 
Koch, two black Fund staffers, James McDonald and John Wheeler, would also be 
present. According to a confidential Fund report, Whitehead explained that Monte‟s 
resolution was seen as “a move on the part of the present board membership to delay 
representation by the Negro community even further,” specifically “to block membership 
to any Negro who had been involved with the police following civil rights activity.” He 
reasoned that any person who was qualified to vote in Craven should be qualified to serve 
on the board of directors of a poverty program. Whitehead was equally apprehensive that 
the board might still be continuing its efforts to remove Hearn as executive director even 
though Whitehead had recently informed Stallings that such a move would be regarded as 
“an affront to the Negro community.”
11
 In answer to these concerns, Esser promised that 
he would “keep a careful watch on the situation” and continue “to seek mediation before 
any official action might be taken by the board” in regards to Hearn.
 12
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Emboldened by the assurances provided during his meeting with Fund officials, 
Whitehead decided to take action after a delegation of white COP board members, which 
most likely included Stallings, sought out Whitehead and other black leaders to negotiate 
for Hearn‟s removal.
13
 On June 30, 1965,—as Stallings joined with the thousands of flag-
raising ceremonies held at the White House and antipoverty centers across the country in 
celebration of the beginning of Head Start—Whitehead was busy composing a letter to 
COP leadership that clearly affirmed the black community‟s decision to stand behind 
Hearn.
14
 One of the primary purposes of the letter was to “vigorously deny that there 
have ever been any affiliations, encouragement or suggestions from Mr. Hearn to any of 
the Civic or Civil Rights Organizations or any other Civil Rights activity.” “We assure 
anyone concerned,” Whitehead added, “that any demonstrations or other types of Civil 
Rights Actions have been organized, sponsored, and initiated by the Combined Civic 
Organizations of New Bern and Craven County,” which had been “organized and active 
long before O.E.O. of 1964 and/or the North Carolina Fund were established.” In closing, 
the letter looked to establish the fact that most in the black community were pleased that 
“the director is trying to follow the guidelines of O.E.O. and instruction of the North 
Carolina Fund” as evidenced by “programs developed and administered [that are] 
designed to help the total poverty elements of our county.” Thus, as Whitehead 
concluded, “if a Board of Director of a community Action Program [is] permitted to 
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discharge their director at will without JUST cause, we question the benefits the poor of 
the total communities will receive from the programs.”
15
  
Around the same time, while requesting advice from C. T. Vivian in the SCLC 
Atlanta office, since Craven was “now involved in an intensive employment program,” 
Leon Nixon bemoaned that even though “we have one of the best poverty programs in 
the country,” it appeared to him that “we might [lose] it because of the board of directors. 
They do not want to follow the guideline of Washington, D.C.,” implying that white 
board members who were opposed to Hearn‟s style were intentionally snubbing the OEO 
guidelines of “maximum feasible participation.”
16
 This observation, of course, was solely 
Nixon‟s opinion as it related to COP. To the contrary, most whites were well aware that 
they would have to expand the board in a fair manner or lose the program. Above all, 
Nixon‟s letter, as well as Whitehead‟s, underestimated the determination of Stallings, 
Collier, Pugh, Pate, and other leading white board members to preserve COP even when 
some of their chief demands were not met, namely the removal of Hearn. But the will and 
resolve of these men, none of whom received direct financial payment to serve on the 
board, would be tested in a rather dramatic fashion following a near tragedy on July 9, 
1965.  
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A catalyst to greater community support of COP 
At approximately 2:00 am on the morning of July 9, one or more local Klan 
members found their way inside the locked gate that led up to the two-story cabin where 
ten North Carolina Fund Volunteers—seven white and three black—were staying for the 
summer. Located within ten miles of New Bern near the remote community of Bridgeton, 
the cabin was the property of former board member Bill Flowers, who had recently 
resigned from both the New Bern school system and the COP board to work for the North 
Carolina Fund in Durham. Described by Whitehead as “fair a man as ever lived in Craven 
County,” Flowers had offered his home to the integrated group of volunteers as a living 
space while he was away. This team of volunteers first arrived in Craven in mid-June.
17
  
Accompanying the college students was their volunteer team director, twenty-six-
year- old Duke Divinity School student Franklin Ingram, who stayed with his wife in a 
separate room in the residence. Before arriving in Craven, Ingram had a long and 
impressive record of working with the poor, beginning with his work in the summer of 
1961 as a counselor for at-risk adolescent boys in Dobbs Ferry, New York, and soon 
progressing into mission trips, including to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras, where 
he served as a volunteer carpenter. While an undergraduate student at Duke University, 
he had also participated in multiple civil rights demonstrations and negotiations between 
1960 and 1963 that led to the eventual desegregation of Durham businesses and theaters. 
Perhaps Ingram‟s proudest moment was his joint effort with fellow Duke undergraduates 
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in pushing the university to admit blacks as both students and faculty. For Ingram, the 
chance to work for the North Carolina Fund promised not only a sizeable part-time salary 
for a graduate student but also an opportunity for him to carry out his life‟s passion for 
social justice.
18
 His passion, however, would challenged while in Craven.  
On that morning of July 9, as the Klansmen came within ten feet of the cabin‟s 
front door, at least one of them fired a total of five shots from a twenty-five-caliber pistol 
into the house, three of which went through the upstairs windows. Ingram, who was still 
awake and talking with two of the volunteers in the second-floor meeting room, yelled to 
the young women in the adjacent bedroom, as shot blasts rang out, to drop down and lie 
flat on the floor. Once the shooting ceased and it was determined that no one was hurt, 
Ingram immediately contacted the FBI, the Craven County Sheriff‟s Department, and Jim 
Hearn each by CB radio, there being no phone in the house. As daylight approached, 
Ingram‟s next move was to find the nearest pay telephone, from which he called his 
supervisor, Jack Mansfield of the North Carolina Fund. But before Mansfield arrived in 
Craven County, Ingram had been the target of yet another gunman.  
While driving toward New Bern in the early morning hours, Ingram and North 
Carolina Fund Director of Public Information Leon Cepetanos were shot at by a man who 
was standing outside his trailer home carrying a rifle. Neither man in the car was 
wounded as they drove on to the county Sherriff‟s office to report the incident. The two 
Fund employees would identify a forty-two-year-old former Marine Corps military 
policeman as the shooter who, it was later verified, was heavily intoxicated when 
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Ingram‟s car had passed his home. The shooter‟s home was sited only about one mile 
from Flowers‟ cabin. Except for the fact that the North Carolina Volunteer team was 
targeted in both cases, there appeared to be no connections between the two shootings. In 
terms of timing and physical location, that one shooting followed another so closely 
could suggest that residents in and around the Broad Creek section had only recently 
picked up on the location of the group‟s living quarters or the type of car that Ingram 
drove. It likewise suggests that frustration over the presence of the integrated group had 
been rising in certain sectors of Craven despite much of their early work revolving 
around seemingly unpretentious work like the building of outhouses and other rural 
environmental sanitation projects, including fly and rodent control. During the previous 
summer of 1964, all seven of the North Carolina Volunteers assigned to Craven, three of 
whom were black, had found the Craven community to be either “actively cooperative,” 
“approving/receptive” or “indifferent”— but none described it as “hostile” or “not 
accepting.”
19
 In comparison, the atmosphere during the summer of 1965 certainly 
appeared to be far more hostile, at least within rural areas. Ingram claimed that earlier in 
the month Ku Klux Klan literature had been tacked onto a North Carolina Volunteer sign 
designating a community barbeque.
20
 Generally unsympathetic with integration efforts 
themselves and perhaps upset by the thought of the negative publicity that was surely to 
come to Craven following the FBI investigation, even Craven County Sheriff Charlie 
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Berry and his white deputies were initially unfriendly to Cepetanos and Ingram when 
they came to arrest the man who shot at them, reportedly asking the question, “Why are 
you here? We ain‟t got no poverty in Craven County.”
21
  
North Carolina Fund executive director George Esser expressed “deep concern 
and sorrow for the inexplicable acts of violence” to news outlets that carried the story of 
the North Carolina Volunteers‟ confrontations with violence in Craven.
22
 In spite of the 
frightful scare, however, the college volunteers would stay surprisingly calm following 
the shootings. Many of them would naturally feel a degree of anger and vulnerability but 
not a single volunteer voiced a desire to leave Craven County and, according to Jack 
Mansfield, even their parents “did not indicate extreme alarm at this incident.” Ingram, 
who described the group as “energetic” and extremely motivated—one of the students 
was a Morehead Scholar at UNC-Chapel Hill—believed that their spirit was a 
manifestation of an idealistic yet deep-seated belief that “they could change the whole 
face of the world.”
23
 During their short time in Craven, several of the volunteers had 
already engaged—though at a minimal level—in the process of stimulating local poor 
citizens to help themselves and in recruiting local volunteers to form organizations in 
order to carry on projects; such activities tended to feed the students‟ sense of purpose. 
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One of the white male volunteers, for instance, was proud to have begun to sign up 
residents in the James City area for homemaking and adult education classes in the same 
way that two black female volunteers felt a sense of accomplishment in starting up 
Mother‟s Clubs and a Teen Club for residents of the Duffyfield neighborhood in New 
Bern.
24
 Because of their observable longing to continue the work they had started, several 
of the volunteers were given permission by the Fund, on the morning of the shooting, to 
continue their scheduled day‟s work to construct a privy for a recreational area in the 
black community of Pembroke.
25
  
Assisting the students‟ calm was a realization gathered from their team director 
that the shootings were likely not intended to wound or kill anyone. As Franklin Ingram 
testified, the shots served more as a scare tactic than an actual attempt at murder.
26
 “They 
may have just been shooting in the air, wanting to scare people. Rednecks do that,” North 
Carolina Fund staffer Billy Barnes would also recall. “They have six beers, and they want 
to go out and scare somebody. If there's a bunch of black kids living with white kids and 
they're mixed gender and race, that's reason enough to drive there and try to scare the 
liver out of them. So, you drive there and just make some noises and try to scare them.” 
Strengthening this theory was the fact that, even during one of the heights of Klan 
resurgence in Craven, “no one was hurt all summer.” Nonetheless, rather than take a 
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chance with the students‟ safety, the Fund suggested that they all move out of the 
secluded woods of Broad Creek and into the Governor Tryon Hotel in downtown New 
Bern. None of the students protested and obligingly packed their belongings. 
Interestingly, one of the reasons Flowers had offered his cabin for the volunteers was 
exactly because of its relatively secluded location, which he believed would prevent them 
from attracting as much attention as if they lived in a hotel or a church in town. But, as 
Barnes noted, “it didn't work out that way.”
27
 Helping the students pack was board 
member Willie Dawson, who had learned about the shootings only by reading about it in 
the local Sun Journal, two days after the fact. For reasons unknown, Hearn did not relay 
any information about the shootings to the COP board members. As a result, according to 
the Fund, only Dawson, New Bern City Manager Ed Welch, and D. L. Stallings took the 
initiative to contact the group to see if they were safe or needed any assistance. Among 
these, Stallings made the biggest impact. Speaking directly with the volunteers, he not 
only apologized for the incidents that occurred but assured them that the people in Craven 
would “try to compensate for this and to make some correction of the conditions.”
28
 For 
Stallings, one of the surest ways to accomplish this objective was to enlighten the public 
of the background of the North Carolina Volunteers and their purpose. Leading this 
campaign would be Stallings himself. 
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At a meeting of the COP Volunteer Advisory Committee held on July 12, which 
included Ingram and his wife, Capetanos, Dawson, Lee Morgan, and several black and 
white local ministers, one of the unanimous agreements reached by the committee was 
that “virtually nothing was known in the community about the programs that were in 
operation,” leading each committee member to vow to do more reaching out in the future. 
As Ingram lamented, Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) Assistant Director Neal Evans 
had just received a “Klan‟s Watching You” sticker on his car that very day.  Swift action 
to publicize the programs was becoming all the more necessary. Reverend Al Fisher 
deemed the North Carolina Volunteer program to be the “poorest job of selling to the 
community” he had ever seen, because no one was “trying to sell us as a non-civil rights 
group.” Reverend Richard L. Newby, leader of a local black congregation, concurred that 
if a group is seen as “civil righters” they can be “branded as outsiders,” and, thus, “we 
need [larger] community participation.” The COP board “should have sold the 
community,” claimed Morgan, particularly in the white areas.
29
 Indeed, the more the 
Craven community learned about the Volunteers through direct contact or observation of 
the programs they were assisting, the more they tended to be won over.  
A day or two after the shooting, the local Police Captain and his patrolmen tailed 
the Volunteers to a restaurant near the hotel, for no obvious reason. Once the police car 
parked, Ingram walked outside and spent about an hour talking to the men. The Captain 
was said to have been “extremely impolite” and indicated that “he had no use for the 
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group.” After explaining the program to the point that they better understood its purpose, 
Ingram apparently helped to change their attitudes. By the end of the conservation, the 
police team assured Ingram of their help and cooperation and drove away.
30
 Even greater 
success in improving the image of the program would come following the statement 
issued by the COP Board of Directors. On the third day after the incidents, Stallings 
gathered the COP Board of Directors together to agree to sign a statement that not only 
condemned the behavior of the violent extremists but also reflected their support of the 
work being done by the North Carolina Volunteer program. The statement, signed by all 
members of the board, was published the next day in the Sun Journal. The volunteers 
“have been and will be very fruitful here in Craven County,” the group asserted.
31
 Also 
led by Stallings, the Craven County Board of Commissioners approved of a similar 
resolution that same evening that admonished “these dastardly deeds of violence,” while 
serving to assure the public that “such irresponsible acts are not characteristic of our fine 
citizenship, who are law-abiding, God-fearing people, with a strong sense of our 
responsibility to maintain law and order, and to protect the rights of our citizens, and 
those that come within our boarders from time to time.”
32
 Although many Craven whites 
“were just not ready to accept” the interracial living arrangements of the Volunteers, far 
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more came out strongly against the ways the youngsters were targeted, including those 
who had never taken an active public stance before.
33
 
On July 16, Jack Mansfield of the North Carolina Fund wrote a letter thanking 
Stallings for his concern and the assistance given to himself and the Volunteers, confident 
that “out of this will come considerable change in the attitude of the Craven 
community.”
34
 Mansfield appeared to be right. According to a later report by Mansfield, 
both signed documents had a major impact upon the community. “We have had a number 
of comments by people that we have been dealing with and working within the 
community who up to this time had „accepted us,” he later wrote, “but had not really felt 
very strongly about us.” But after the COP board and the Craven County Commissioners 
made such strong statements against the “cowardly acts,” Mansfield observed far more 
citizens with an open mind and a willingness to support both the Volunteers and COP.
35
 
Though it was far from their intention, activity by extremists actually helped to spur 
moderates and those on the fence to support, at least privately or among friends and 
acquaintances, efforts to bring about equal opportunity in Craven. The letter signed by 
the COP Board was especially helpful in bringing the community to see that the North 
Carolina Volunteers were not “outsiders” but hard-working youth who came from small 
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North Carolina towns much like New Bern and who had agreed to contribute “their time 
and energies” unselfishly to cure the roots of poverty in communities across the state. 
When Governor Dan K. Moore learned about the Craven shootings, he assertively 
declared that “this kind of action will not be tolerated in North Carolina.” No less could 
be said about the majority of Craven County.
36
  
                                                 
36
 “Governor Condemns Incident,” News & Observer, July 13, 1965. Governor Moore, a conservative 
Democrat, was not as supportive of the North Carolina Fund as his predecessor, Terry Sanford, but his 
support grew overtime especially following his wife‟s invitation to sit on the North Carolina Fund board  
of directors. According to a March 1966 article published in Pageant magazine, “The Tarheel state has  
had the kind of intelligent political leadership that makes it difficult for any hate group to thrive,” adding 
that the state‟s spiritual leaders as well as “the bulk of the population have no use for the Klan‟s negative, 
destructive attitudes.” Ethel Ryan, “How North Carolina Ripped the Sheets Off Its Ku Klux Klan,” 
Pageant, March 1966, 134-135.  
188 
 
 
 
189 
 
 
Figure 18. Statement by the Board of Directors of Craven Operation Progress, Inc. Sun Journal, July 13, 
1965.  
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While on the surface it might seem counterintuitive, integration efforts both inside 
and outside COP ran fairly smooth in Craven and its environs after the Klan-inspired 
violence. On July 15, 1965, the Reverend Thomas Hadden, only about twenty-five-years-
old at the time, became the first black priest to take over a formerly all-white Catholic 
parish in New Bern when St. Joseph‟s, where Hadden had been the priest since 1962, 
merged with St. Paul‟s. Several weeks later Hadden, also a youth adviser to the local 
NAACP branch, reported that while a few local white Catholics protested his 
appointment community reaction was overall “very good,” citing no noticeable decline in 
attendance. Successful in proving to white congregants that his skin color made no 
difference in how he performed his duties, Hadden would continue to serve as St. 
Joseph‟s Catholic priest for approximately ten more years.
37
 Moreover, in early 1965, 
Jones was one of only two counties in the state with signs above the welfare building 
restrooms designating race. But in July, the signs were uneventfully removed by the 
Jones County sheriff, as the Jones County Board of Commissioners unanimously agreed 
it should be done. Of course, both Jones and Craven were home to CAAs that depended 
on OEO approval of the degree to which they complied with civil rights laws and 
afforded racial equality to their citizens, but leaders in both counties had the full choice to 
relinquish federal funds for their antipoverty programs in favor of past racial practices.  
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Within COP, not only were integrative measures reaching a high mark in July, 
especially in regards to staff employment, but so was local black influence.
38
 The timing 
of both of these advancements was not solely motivated by OEO guidelines, however, 
but was rooted instead in a mixture of local circumstances and thoughtful encouragement 
from the North Carolina Fund. This reality was especially evident during the last week of 
July at a meeting George Esser called at the Governor Tryon Hotel to determine whether 
Jim Hearn would retain his job. In addition to Esser and COP board members, those 
attending the meeting included North Carolina Fund Board of Directors Wallace 
Murchison and John Wheeler as well as Cliff Campbell, a black representative from the 
Ford Foundation. Pate and Stallings continued to make clear their strong demand for 
Hearn‟s termination as executive director, a demand that was not lessened by the ongoing 
demonstration, led by Nixon and the SCLC, who supported Hearn, right outside of the 
hotel. Robert Whitehead, who had earlier received Nixon‟s word that demonstrations 
would not be used unless the negotiations failed, stayed remarkably calm despite his 
frustration over the outside distractions and gave a balanced argument on behalf of the 
black community that Hearn should remain at his post. It was perhaps the first time that 
Whitehead had spoken to the entire COP board face-to-face about his support of Hearn.  
Pate and Stallings give up campaign to remove Hearn 
The Fund board members and Campbell naturally sided with Whitehead, and 
together, as a group, they would convince Pate and Stallings to officially give up on their 
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campaign to remove Hearn.
39
 According to Bill Flowers, the result of the meeting 
represented the first time that powerful Craven whites had backed down to black 
demands.
40
 This was not exactly true, of course, as records from previous civil rights 
negotiations show, but it was certainly a sizeable victory for black interests, which had 
been boosted by the presence of the North Carolina Fund. To their credit, Pate and 
Stallings preferred to work with Hearn rather than to quit or let go of the program 
altogether. With the issue of Hearn‟s foreseeable future out of the way, room was left for 
addressing other agenda items left to be tackled, most notably the expansion of the COP 
board of directors, which was still unsettled.  
COP board officially expands representation, July 1965 
On July 30, 1965, and after a nearly two-month delay, the COP board agreed to 
formally expand its representation. Two days earlier, Harold Bailin of the OEO had been 
a guest at the regularly-scheduled board meeting, where he reminded COP directors to 
clear up their disagreements over representation so as to continue to receive War on 
Poverty funding, which as of July 23 the House had approved to double from $750,000 to 
$1.5 billion.
41
 Fortunately, the task that lay ahead did not require COP board members to 
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have to start from scratch. In addition to rescinding Monte‟s motion of June 23, the board 
approved the addition of four black low-income residents chosen by Frank Efird‟s 
committee, which included Elizabeth Evans, a welfare recipient with seven dependents; 
church janitor David Whitfield; housewife Catherine Berry; and Jarrat Brown, a laborer. 
The three white low-income residents added were Donna Kethcum, who was on 
disability income; tenant farmer Otis Ipock; and Edith Holton. Lastly, representatives 
from three of the non-white organizations were hand-picked by the organizations 
themselves, which included Bishop S. Rivers of the New Bern Civic League, Reverend 
Willie G. Hickman of the Craven County Civic League, and Claretta Wordlaw of the 
NAACP, but as agreed upon earlier in the meeting, their appointment would be 
contingent on the approval of the board of directors. The fourth non-white organization, 
the SCLC, had nominated Leon Nixon but he was quickly rejected by the board by a 
twelve-to-one vote. As Stallings reasoned, “Despite all the good things that were 
expected to come from the poverty program, Mr. Nixon had displayed a disfavorable 
attitude” by leading a demonstration march. Stallings moved that the SCLC resubmit 
another name from their organization. Monte seconded the motion.
42
  
As reflected in the twelve-to-one vote against Nixon‟s addition to the board, 
whites were not alone in generally perceiving Nixon as too divisive. Since the summer of 
1963, Nixon had lost support among black civil rights leaders and participants, most 
notably the youth of New Bern NAACP, due to, and according to local black youth and 
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NAACP commando Ronald W. Stewart, “his dominating procedures, his stubborn 
attitude and his refusal to allow the officers of the youth Council to preside over their 
meetings and make their own decisions.” Nixon also regularly consulted no one, Stewart 
charged, and “openly accused every Negro in the community of being an Uncle Tom if 
he or she disagreed with his procedures,” which eventually led him to form his own 
SCLC Civil Rights Committee in 1964.
43
 Moreover, at Whitehead‟s urging, Nixon had 
been recently dropped from the Combined Civic Organizations of Craven County and 
New Bern after demonstrating outside the Governor Tryon Hotel a few days prior. One of 
the most controversial actions Nixon would later take was his staging of a march on the 
day of the funeral for a revered local civil rights leader, C.C. Sparrow, which upset most 
blacks in the community, including Father Hadden, who had recently chosen to leave the 
SCLC.
44
 Although Nixon claimed to attract a large following during the 1960s, the truth 
was that most local blacks found him both untrustworthy and primarily interested in 
protest for his own self-promotion.  
Instead of simply being afraid of “employing blacks they didn‟t know and 
couldn‟t control,” white leaders in COP sought to have a say in the appointment of the 
non-white organizations partially because they believed the SCLC might appoint Nixon, 
who both the black and white communities found unacceptable and almost impossible to 
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work with.
45
 In fact, all of the new black members of the board could be described as 
strong-willed, outspoken, and determined to fight on behalf of fairness for other blacks. 
All of them had been and continued to be involved in the local civil rights movement. 
Claretta Wordlaw, who served as the secretary for the local NAACP, was among the 
most outspoken and strong-willed. Born in New Bern circa 1930 and raised in nearby 
Greenville, Wordlaw was always a leader since she was a young girl. “I was just bossy,” 
she recalled years later. In addition to teaching her dad how to read the Bible, she claimed 
to have been one of the few to have had the audacity to throw things back at white 
children who used to throw things out of the school bus at her and other black children 
walking home from school. She had always taken the attitude that she was “just as good 
as whites,” if not better. After all, she asserted, blacks had “started from nothing” but had 
been able to “make something out of themselves” despite that fact. Not long after moving 
back to New Bern to live with her aunt following her mother‟s passing, Wordlaw met her 
husband whom she would have one son with before he also passed away. Her husband‟s 
death landed her in financial difficulty. With a $152 monthly check from the veteran‟s 
administration as her only income, she was only able to afford to rent an apartment at 
Craven Terrace, one of New Bern‟s two public housing units, where she moved to with 
her young son in 1949. Over time, life grew increasingly difficult for her and her son due 
to the fact that she had never finished high school which severely limited her economic 
opportunities. No later than 1965, however, she would decide to re-enroll at Jones County 
High where she eventually received her high school diploma in June 1966 at age thirty-
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six. While working towards her diploma, she applied for part-time work at a local grocery 
store but was refused consideration by the white manager. Judging the manger‟s decision 
to have been made without just cause, she was encouraged by the local NAACP to file 
suit against him. Action was still pending in February 1966.
46
  
Wordlaw clearly could not be described as an “Uncle Tom” nor was she willing to 
accommodate to white prejudices. She, like the other black civil rights supporters named 
to the COP board in July 1965, was willing to engage in protest and to use the law to 
fight against any remnants of racial discrimination. Yet, unlike Nixon, they were willing 
to work with whites and saw benefits from doing so. Nixon, on the other hand, saw no 
benefits from negotiating with whites, believing that whites would never truly “make 
improvements for the Negro possible” without force.
47
 For many whites on the board, a 
role in leading economic and social progress for the whole community was frequently 
more motivation than a craving for control. Craven County Schools Superintendent 
Robert L. Pugh perhaps most clearly voiced such a view. A contributor to the NC 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation since the 1940s, Pugh was among several leading 
whites who were vocally supportive of a new era of change in Craven. His embrace of 
the racial and economic changes in his home county were at least partially rooted in his 
identity as someone who “knew something of the meaning of poverty” being born, as he 
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put it, “not only on the other side of the railroad tracks” of New Bern “but almost on the 
tracks” themselves.
48
  
Just prior to the closing of the July 30 meeting, Pugh was granted permission to 
speak upon on a matter which for several months had caused him and “a great many other 
citizens of the community tremendous concern,” namely that Craven‟s progressive steps 
into “the new era” might be sabotaged by those seeking to “tear down or destroy the 
harmonious relationships between both races that are necessary to the total welfare of our 
people.” For Pugh, it was not enough that a great deal had been learned about local 
poverty. The more vital lesson learned over the last several years was the value and 
importance of “living together in peace and harmony.” Without naming specific persons 
or groups to which he was referring, Pugh devoted most of his speech to praising the 
progress made in school desegregation and programs of “mutual interest” within COP. 
Above all, he heralded the fact that the Craven County school plan for August 1965 
would soon lead to a completely desegregated school system, which “can and will be 
taken without the necessity of any undue or outside influence.” Also citing the addition of 
“good men and good women” to the COP board, which presented a “wonderful 
opportunity” to move forward “in more harmonious relationships” and in “creating better 
living conditions” for “all our people,” Pugh asked that blacks and whites “present a 
united front” and “work together” to secure “economic, social, and spiritual progress” of 
the entire community. Since he believed that local citizens “have a spirit of common 
interest in the welfare of all of our people,” Pugh suggested that “we plead not only with 
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the members of the Board of Directors, but with people of good will throughout the area 
to rise up in one thunderous voice in opposition to any element or influence that is going 
to be detrimental to the welfare of all,” likely referring to both the Ku Klux Klan and self-
proclaimed militants such as Leon Nixon. However, Pugh‟s speech was not meant to 
condemn all episodes of dissent but to reflect his belief that, “We will make progress 
together or we will not make progress at all.” The first to concur with Pugh‟s remarks 
was Whitehead followed by Pate who, after Monte personally welcomed the new 
members to the board, expressed “his appreciation for the attitude displayed in working 
out the problems.”
49
 If nothing else, the eventual agreement with which the board not 
only expanded but welcomed broader representation challenges historians‟ claims that 
whites and blacks could not find common ground in small Southern communities and that 
white prejudice or racism prevented successes early on in the War on Poverty. 
Furthermore, as encapsulated by Whitehead‟s approval for Pugh‟s speech, white southern 
support for community harmony was not necessarily a veiled attempt to maintain the 
status quo. Indeed, voluntary cooperation could be highly conducive to some forms of 
change. 
The expansion of the number of decision-makers within COP to include both 
members of the poor as well as a more proportionate number of black citizens was a 
momentous development in local cooperation. It was likewise an important step towards 
success for Craven‟s war on poverty which required support and assistance from the 
whole community. In growing to a total of thirty-seven members in July 1965, the board 
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became a more representative body by incorporating more voices from neighborhoods 
and groups not yet fully heard while mitigating the power and influence of each of the 
individual members who served when the board previously stood at twenty-six. The 
inclusion of the poor—black and white alike—was arguably more revolutionary than the 
addition of black representatives from local civil rights organizations, the latter of whom 
were financially stable and had kept direct contact with the power structure for years. The 
same could not be said of the poor. According to an OEO-sponsored North Carolina Fund 
study of 11,600 families in thirty-one low-income neighborhoods in the state, which 
included 356 housing units in New Bern and 340 in Craven County—between 93 and 98 
percent of the members of the households tracked in 1965 did not belong to any type of 
community organization (or labor union) whether agricultural, fraternal, civic, racial, or 
political in nature.
50
 The poor‟s deficient participation in the democratic process, which 
carried over into the act of voting, stemmed from at least one if not several causes from 
being uninformed, having a lack of interest, time, or money to join, and possessing 
feelings of minimal influence or sense of belonging in organizations that were often led 
by middle-class and upper-class residents of their community. It was not all that 
surprising, therefore, that for decades the poor had been practically unheard if not unseen 
among the middle-class in Craven since, for various reasons, few of them expressed their 
desires and needs on a consistent basis to those in power or those with influence. Indeed, 
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many of the poor who were added to the board in July, such as white tenant farmer Otis 
Ipock, had not yet heard of COP and had to be recruited by current board members 
themselves.  
But the same North Carolina Fund study showed promising signs of the potential 
of the poor to positively affect their own circumstances if given the opportunity. 
According to the findings, only 10 percent of the respondents were receiving public 
welfare at the time they were interviewed while the vast majority claimed to work forty 
hours per week or more and that they would be willing to take advantage of educational 
and job training opportunities if they became available, reflecting both a sense of work 
ethic and aspirations for self-improvement.
51
 Coupled with the compassionate notion of 
self-help that lay at the heart of the local antipoverty effort, the poor in Craven had one of 
the greatest occasions to date to make a better life for themselves and their families. After 
all, to truly espouse self-help strategies was to trust that the poor, with only a modest 
degree of outside assistance, had the ability and the desire to help themselves and take 
personal control of their circumstances in the long-term. Under this mindset, rather than 
simply engage the poor as clients as typified by their treatment by employees of the local 
welfare department, Hearn engaged program directors to hire the poor as partners in 
fighting poverty.  
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The growing influence of the poor 
Indeed, the influence of the poor in Craven County in 1965 would outmatch that 
of many more populated communities in the nation, including urban centers in the North. 
No later than April, twenty-two poor people from Craven, most of whom were black 
women, were employed in COP as day care attendants, home management aids, and 
health aids, which actually outperformed fifty CAAs at the time, such as those centered in 
New Rochelle, New York, where seven members of the poor were hired strictly as bus 
matrons, and Cleveland, Ohio, where eighteen poor persons were hired as teaching 
assistants.
52
 For bearing a good deal of responsibility for their own uplift, the poor would 
have to be regularly pushed and persuaded to expect benefits from the programs of COP. 
“The peons down the road don‟t come to the centers to get help,” board member Willie 
Dawson told the News & Observer in January 1965, “You got to go to them.”
53
 This 
statement held particularly true for whites in rural areas who lived up to twenty-five miles 
away from COP headquarters in New Bern and who had already associated the War on 
Poverty as a set of programs intended primarily for blacks. 
Serious efforts to organize the poor in and around Craven were first taken in 
August 1965. Leading the struggle were COP board member Robert Whitehead and the 
North Carolina Volunteers assigned to New Bern, all of whom sought to translate 
grievances among the poor into positive action. The first target they rallied against was 
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New Bern‟s public housing director, I.I. Blanford, who regularly engaged in arbitrary and 
questionable practices since at least 1962, such as raising tenants‟ rental rates based on 
the occupations of their dependents and imposing either “penalty rents” or evicting 
women who had additional offspring out of wedlock.
54
 Blanford, who had implored Rep. 
David N. Henderson to “do all possible to defeat the so-called „civil rights‟ legislation” in 
1963, was also seen by both Whitehead and the volunteers as racially prejudiced, as 
partly evidenced by the fact that he was still maintaining two segregated public housing 
apartment complexes—Trent Court for whites and Craven Terrace for blacks.
55
 Black 
and white tenants also complained that there were no public telephones, no sidewalk 
lights outside of the buildings, a growing infestation of rats and roaches, delays in 
painting and repair work due to an inadequate number of staff, and that, during the winter 
months, Blanford primarily answered their requests to turn up the heat by encouraging 
them to put on more clothes and keep doors and windows closed.  
One of the worst offenses for which Blanford was solely responsible was the 
raising of rent—to rates that were almost double—for families at both Craven Terrace 
and Trent Court who had children enrolled in the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) 
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where they were earning $1.25/hour. This practice of Blanford‟s was not only deemed 
unethical but was also specifically forbidden by the Economic Opportunity Act, leading 
Whitehead, Bishop S. Rivers, and two other local black civil rights leaders to personally 
present a letter to Blanford and each housing authority member on August 2 to request 
that the policy of disparate rates be immediately terminated.
56
 In addition to promising to 
meet soon to discuss each of the complaints, Blanford and the commissioners 
unanimously agreed to amend the lease allowing the earnings of children under nineteen 
years of age as an “allowable deduction from net family income” and authorizing the 
thirty day rental period to begin on the tenth of the month for those tenants whose income 
partially or fully derived from public welfare sources (which were not made available 
until the tenth of the month). Both of these resolutions were to become effective 
immediately.
57
 The news of these victories, however, did not halt outside criticism of 
Blanford and the housing authority. Just a few days later, North Carolina Volunteer 
Lloyd F. Reese, who had surveyed the tenants‟ complaints and compiled a report for the 
North Carolina Fund, went as far as writing OEO representative Harold Bailin in regards 
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to Blanford. After outlining his argument that Blanford did not understand the poor and 
had “exploited them as much as any slum lord,” Reese asked that Bailin get involved in 
helping to permanently remove Blanford as executive director of New Bern Housing 
Authority.
58
  
Outside pro-segregationist Cedric Boyd of the city public works department and a 
number of top administrators at the Bank of New Bern where he served as president, 
Blanford appeared to have few allies in New Bern.
59
 Even fewer appeared willing to 
defend or protect many of Blanford‟s policies as director of the housing authority. This 
attitude held true both inside and outside local government. For Craven County Welfare 
Department head Constance Rabin, who was simultaneously serving on the COP board, 
Blanford‟s method of raising the rent on families whose salaries improved had 
particularly negative after effects in her own department. “When anyone‟s salary was 
raised, the Housing Authority would also raise the rent,” Rabin lamented to Whitehead 
during a July board meeting. Consequently, when “the rents were raised, they also had to 
raise the welfare.”
60
 A September 1964 “Neighborhood Analysis” prepared for the city of 
New Bern by the board of aldermen and the New Bern planning board with the help of 
the North Carolina Department of Conservation and Development (which was then 
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headed by D. L. Stallings‟ brother Robert) similarly observed the problems Blanford was 
creating for the community. Speaking of the problem of blight, the analysis argued that 
“such areas benefit no one, except perhaps the landlord who rents substandard property to 
tenants who can afford nothing better,” adding that “the profit such a landlord is able to 
realize by exacting low rents…and turning none of it back into the improvement of the 
property—therefore paying little tax—is paid for by the entire community in terms of 
high taxes, loss of business, and loss of revenue-producing property in these blighted 
areas.”
61
  
Nonetheless, even though local people who were familiar with his practices rarely 
sympathized with Blanford, he was neither elected by the people nor appointed by either 
the mayor or the aldermen. He was selected instead by an independent housing board 
comprised of five local residents, appointed by the Mayor, but over which the city of 
New Bern held no real jurisdiction.
62
 Due to the housing board‟s tendency to defend 
Blanford, he was not only able to remain in power with little fear of being removed but 
his policies of raising the rent and evicting families whose unwed mothers bore additional 
children were also kept secret to many of the non-poor community, most of whom were 
white and a sizeable portion of whom would most likely have been appalled to hear of 
them.  
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The larger white community was also kept in the dark by the silence of the poor 
themselves who had never truly organized to speak out against Blanford. For most 
tenants living in the New Bern housing projects, rent ranged between 20 and 40 percent 
of their income—only a handful paid as high as 50 percent—and, thus, despite its 
obvious drawbacks, it was the one of the most affordable and stable living arrangements 
for the poor. Not surprisingly, many chose not to protest for fear of possibly being 
evicted while others may have felt grateful for the housing provided or may have not 
been directly affected by Blanford‟s practices. The poor‟s silence, however, officially 
ended on August 23. At the urging of Whitehead, Lloyd Reese, a VISTA volunteer, and a 
half-dozen local civil rights leaders including Nixon, Bishop S. Rivers, and at least 150 
residents—twelve from Trent Court and the remainder from Craven Terrace—attended a 
meeting scheduled for that evening at Craven Terrace to discuss organizing against 
Blanford in order to attain better living conditions. Neither the public housing conditions 
found in Craven County nor the growing protests against them were particularly unique 
to the area. By the mid-1960s, low-income residents and civil rights leaders came 
together to confront housing project landlords in numerous communities across the 
nation, including many in North Carolina. In Durham, for instance, low-income black 
families went as far as proposing to organize a rent strike and agreeing to live in 
makeshift tents if they were evicted.
63
 In response to the tenants‟ frustrations in New 
Bern, Blanford would agree to amend several of the city‟s controversial housing authority 
                                                 
63
 See Christina Greene, Our Separate Ways: Women and the Black Freedom Movement in Durham, North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 124-137.  
 
207 
 
practices, but he maintained that proper care of the premises and surroundings was 
primarily the responsibility of the tenant and left unchanged sections of the lease that 
allowed for the eviction of female tenants who had additional children out of wedlock.
64
 
While the arrival of the North Carolina Volunteers, VISTA workers, and Craven 
Operation Progress itself clearly provided a safer environment for the poor to come 
together to protest unfair living conditions, other factors, including the victories won by 
the civil rights movement and enhanced economic opportunities available in new or 
expanded industries in and around Craven also bolstered confidence behind such action. 
Partly due to Blanford‟s administrative procedures but also because of additional and 
higher-paying jobs for semi-skilled workers like those available at the Stanley and 
Texasgulf plants that arrived by 1964, the occupancy of both projects in August 1965 was 
at 56 percent; approximately 86 percent of the 361 apartments at the all-black Craven 
Terrace and only 33 percent of the 218 units of the all-white Trent Court were occupied.
65
 
The knowledge that, if evicted, there was not a waiting list of potential tenants to replace 
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them may have inspired a good degree of participation. Blanford clearly had no issue 
evicting a family here and there but a lack of tenants to fill the public housing units he 
oversaw would lead to his loss of all funding and income from the Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA). Out of the significant number who came to the August 23 meeting was 
the birth of what became the Craven Terrace-Trent Court Improvement Organization, 
which, as will be discussed in Chapter V, led to meaningful improvements in the 
livelihood of public housing residents beginning in the early months of 1966 following a 
lawsuit won against Blanford himself.  
 
 
Figure 19. Advertisement for meeting of residents of housing projects, August 23, 1965. Folder 1604, 
North Carolina Fund Records. 
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Promoting Good Neighborly Relations in a Post-Watts Nation 
Even as other factors played a part, the War on Poverty in Craven was clearly 
helping to raise the expectations of the poor at a historic pace, especially among the black 
poor who were generally closest to COP headquarters and its outreach and programs. It 
was also becoming clear that the more expectations rose, the more the poor demanded to 
participate in bettering their life conditions and confronting those obstacles in their path. 
This new reality was not just evident in Craven but could be seen in communities across 
the nation where it was met with varying degrees of acceptance from the general 
population. But while the poor‟s early participation had basically been nonviolent, the 
week-long riots that erupted in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles beginning on 
August 11 proved that the poor might also participate in destructive ways if desperate 
enough. The Watts riots, which began just five days after President Johnson signed the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, in response to the brutality that came out of the Selma march, 
left as many as thirty-five dead and over $40 million in property damage.
66
 Most of those 
who joined in the riot were young black males who lived in a one-parent home in a 
racially segregated ghetto where the annual income stood right at or just above the 
official poverty line.
67
 Both because of and in spite of the new civil rights legislation—
which raised expectations at the same time that it failed to meet their needs of a life of 
full dignity—the young rioters felt a strong sense of isolation from white Los Angeles 
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residents at large as well as from the ongoing antipoverty measures that they believed had 
not adequately reached them. Negative feelings toward the white community also carried 
over into views of the mostly-white local police force.
68
 By August 1965, Watts had thus 
become a tinder box where a rumor of police brutality was sufficient to spark a series of 
violent attacks and looting that aimed to “get Whitey.” The riots also reflected that a 
seemingly growing segment of young blacks did not feel represented by moderate civil 
rights leaders who pushed for nonviolent techniques and compromise with the white 
community to achieve racial parity. As captured by Life magazine reporters, when a black 
minister protested the beating of a white couple on the street in Watts, he was told by a 
black youth, “Look, Reverend, you preach on Sunday—we‟re preaching today.”
69
   
The aftershocks of Watts reverberated from coast to coast as the majority of 
whites and blacks alike were disturbed by the scenes of chaos that they saw on the nightly 
television news broadcasts. As figuratively argued by historian Michael W. Flamm, 
destruction and fire damage was not limited to the neighborhood boundaries of Watts or 
even the city limits of Los Angeles: “The optimistic vision of a Great Society built on 
material prosperity and racial harmony also lay in ashes.”
70
 In the months immediately 
following the riot, its meaning would be contested across the county as Americans either 
accepted or rejected the explanation of the McCone Commission that Johnson had 
requested to study the sources of the unrest. Led by Los Angeles businessmen and ex-
                                                 
68
 “Interview by a policeman assigned to the Watts Area,” National Review, September 7, 1965.  
 
69
 Jerry Cohen and William S. Murphy, “There‟s Still Hell to Pay in Watts,” Life, July 15, 1966. 
 
70
 Flamm, Law and Order, 58.  
 
211 
 
CIA director John McCone, the commission found little fault with police procedures 
before or during the riot and instead blamed unemployment coupled with false 
expectations raised by the War on Poverty and media attention given to lawless violence 
elsewhere in the nation.
71
 Liberals, who generally believed social conditions were at fault 
for the behavior of the rioters, generally agreed with the commission that the solution to 
the problem of riots was increased War on Poverty funds in job training and education. 
Conservatives, on the other hand, often blamed moral failure, a declining respect for 
authority, and poor choices of individuals and thereby questioned whether increased War 
on Poverty funds would unintentionally reward “bad behavior.”
72
 Despite these 
differences, both conservatives and liberals could agree that America had an urgent 
ghetto problem. Eastern North Carolina Congressman David Henderson reflected these 
dual beliefs in a letter to his constituents shortly after the riots. “There can be no doubt 
that crime and poverty go hand in hand; that broken family life, slums, unemployment, 
lack of education and many other factors contribute to crime,” he wrote, assuring his 
readers that “we are working at many levels of government in many types of programs to 
alleviate these things.” However, in the meantime, “we must enforce our laws and hold 
each individual responsible for his own conduct.”
73
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President Johnson, who felt personally betrayed by the riots after all the 
legislation that he had authorized on behalf of black Americans, spoke vehemently 
against the hateful and violent behavior that enflamed the riots.
74
 Like McCone, Johnson 
also believed that the rioters were a minority faction that was hardly representative of 
blacks or the poor and, thus, he saved few words in his condemnation, understanding that 
the majority of Americans had little sympathy for what had transpired in Watts. But even 
after declaring that “We must not let anger drown understanding” and comparing a black 
rioter with a Molotov cocktail to a Klansmen with a sheet on his face, Johnson remained 
convinced that more poverty funds would help to quell the riots.
75
 As Johnson expressed 
to advisers, if young blacks continued to engage in “unwise actions out of frustration, 
impatience, and anger” it would only “make it more difficult to pass Great Society 
legislation and threaten the gains we‟d already made.”
76
 Before the riots, Watts had 
received little funding for the War on Poverty but this would change almost overnight. 
However, as historian David Carter explains, Johnson was careful to continue to speak 
tough against rioters to the public while he quietly sent money to fund antipoverty 
programs in Los Angeles.
77
 Nonetheless, in contrast to Johnson‟s wishes, many American 
citizens who learned of Johnson‟s approach began to see the War on Poverty not as an 
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“anti-riot bill” as it had originally been marketed. Rather, for a significant number of 
American observers, the War on Poverty appeared to actually condone riots by seeking to 
satisfy the rioters.
78
 Moreover, given that the new antipoverty money was being 
especially appropriated to the black poor it officially put to death the colorblind approach 
to ending poverty which had helped to maintain a fairly high degree of white support. 
According to national polling taken sometime in August 1965, when asked how President 
Johnson was managing the War on Poverty, 20 percent answered “poor,” 38 percent 
responded “fairly good” while only 28 percent said “very good.”
79
 Johnson‟s handling of 
Watts demonstrated that his administration believed, as suggested by the 1964 Moynihan 
report on the black family, that black poverty was unique and would have to be given 
special preference and attention.  
This shift in poverty policy was surprising to most outside the White House. In a 
controversial address on June 4 to the graduating class at Howard University, Johnson 
had first mentioned his administration‟s dedication to bring about not just equal 
opportunity but equal results: 
 
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and 
liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race, and then say “You are 
free to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have 
been completely fair. Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of 
opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those 
gates…This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil 
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rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal 
equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but 
equality as a fact and equality as a result.
80
 
 
 
Yet the notions behind this speech had largely lain dormant and were not made effectual 
until the crisis surrounding Watts. Following Watts, the connection between the War on 
Poverty and the civil rights struggle became inseparable and practically one in the same, 
which differed drastically with the beginning of the War on Poverty, when the poster 
child of poverty was a white citizen of Appalachia. The chief problem of such a 
connection was that the civil rights movement was in the process of taking a radical turn 
away from both nonviolence and white cooperation, as best reflected by the actions of the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which, under Stokely 
Carmichael‟s leadership, had fallen further outside of the mainstream.
81
 The Johnson 
administration‟s seeming shift away from equal opportunity likewise stood in opposition 
to the intent of the authors of the Economic Opportunity Act who had, in Gareth Davies‟ 
words, “explicitly repudiated notions of racial targeting” in favor of a philosophy 
“predicated on the notion that all the poor needed was individual opportunity,” which was 
a philosophy generally shared by most Americans.
82
  
Since it came across that the War on Poverty was rewarding the lawless poor at 
the expense of the law-abiding poor, which directly challenged most Americans‟ sense of 
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fairness and justice, sympathy for the Great Society agenda began to fall in most regions 
in the nation, including North Carolina. The North Carolina Fund sought to combat 
sagging sympathy by pleading with local community leaders to maintain their 
commitment to ending poverty, which included giving the poor an equal voice. At the 
annual convention of the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, held in 
Asheville and likely attended by Craven County‟s D. L. Stallings, North Carolina Fund 
Executive Director George Esser addressed the crowd with a speech entitled “The 
Challenge to Counties,” which primarily pushed for even greater participation of the poor 
within local CAAs. “The Los Angeles riots offer fresh evidence that, whether we who are 
not poor like it or not, the poor are going to participate in American life,” Esser began. 
“The question is, how will they participate? Destructively or constructively?” Esser 
believed the answer was obvious: it depended on whether antipoverty leaders upheld the 
Economic Opportunity Act, which “provides, indeed requires, that the poor be involved 
in our planning for the future.”
83
  
Craven County and its environs would avoid a Watts-like riot for various reasons, 
not least of which was Jim Hearn‟s commitment to involving the poor on the board and in 
employing them in paid positions within Craven Operation Progress. Yet other factors 
outside of Hearn‟s control may have played an even more important role, since only a 
minority of the poor were employed by COP or sat on its board. Unlike Los Angeles, the 
nation‟s largest city at the time, no city in Craven County had enough residents nor the 
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amount of influence within the Democratic Party to attract the same attention from the 
federal government. By the same token, the sprawling nature and vast size of Los 
Angeles made it much easier for those of the white middle-class to be unaware of the 
deep pockets of black poverty that were miles away from the major businesses and 
political buildings. On the other hand, in New Bern, which was Craven‟s largest town, 
the city hall, the county courthouse, and many of the major businesses were within 
walking distance of the two public housing projects and the vast majority of black 
neighborhoods. In addition, despite factional disputes, the black civil rights leadership in 
and around Craven County, namely Robert Whitehead and Leon Nixon, was not fully out 
of touch with the youth or the poverty-stricken, as was the case in Los Angeles, because 
of their close vicinity to the poor, their having far fewer to reach or in need (in 
comparison to a city with over one million residents), and their multi-year work within 
the local black voter registration movement, which kept them in constant contact with the 
poor who were the least likely to be registered. Finally, as will be discussed further in 
Chapter V, how the poor in Craven viewed themselves and their life in poverty also likely 
contributed to a calmer atmosphere than that in the ghettoes of Watts. A white NC 
Volunteer who spent the summer of 1965 working among the black poor in New Bern 
described them, most of whom had not graduated from high school, as having “accepted 
their „fate‟ even though they are far from happy with it.” Even more revealing for her was 
her observation that they “don‟t believe that life can be different for them or that there‟s 
anything they can do to change what they don‟t like.”
84
 Several of the other middle-class 
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volunteers who came to Craven that summer, both black and white, made similar remarks 
about the attitudes that some of the poor had toward their conditions including 
observations that many low-income people that they met, perhaps either out of pride or 
satisfaction with their lifestyle, refused to be labeled as poor or lacking any necessity. It 
is important to keep in mind, as historians Korstad and Leloudis have given attention to 
in their history of the North Carolina Fund, that these middle-class student volunteers, 
both black and white, often came with their own preconceived notions of what led to 
poverty which colored their perceptions of the poor as not truly interested in improving 
their lot.
 85
 Yet even those who believed that poverty was less a problem of attitude than a 
lack of power and/or resources acknowledged that many of the poor, in the words of then 
controversial Durham community organizer Howard Fuller, had lacked an adequate 
amount of “dignity” and a “feeling that they can play a part in deciding things about their 
lives.”
86
 Of course, far from all poor persons were afflicted by such defeatist attitudes as 
described above but, as suggested by the surviving sources that chronicled and described 
the area‟s poor, such attitudes appear to have existed in at least somewhat substantial 
numbers in and around Craven.  
New Bern and outlying areas may have avoided the type of riots that surfaced 
some twenty-five hundred miles to the west, but the Watts riots were surely on the mind 
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of both blacks and whites who agreed to serve on the newly formed Craven County Good 
Neighbor Council. One of Governor Sanford‟s most celebrated initiatives of 1963, Good 
Neighbor Councils had been formed in dozens of cities and counties in North Carolina to 
address and eliminate the roots of racial conflict in hopes of building more equitable and 
integrated communities. Heading the statewide program was Sanford‟s special 
consultant, David S. Coltrane, who first spoke to D. L. Stallings earlier in 1965 about 
putting together a local council as part of a means for Craven County to prepare for 
integration in the upcoming fall semester.
87
 However, Stallings‟ support for the idea of a 
council in Craven was probably informed more by past events of racial trouble rather 
than unforeseen ones, the former of which included the KKK-inspired bombing of a 
black church and mortuary in January and the shooting at North Carolina Volunteers and 
their director in July. Adding to the list were recent cross burnings at several black and 
white homes and a successful attempt to set fire to the chicken houses of former mayor of 
Vanceboro and current COP Director of Manpower Royce Jordan on August 9.
88
 
Stallings‟ confidence in the potential good of a Good Neighbor Council was rooted in the 
fact that, by the mid-1960s, white public opinion in Craven was clearly on the side of 
peaceful change and progress, both racial and economic. Even whites who claimed to be 
in favor of segregation, including COP board member Cedric Boyd, were not willing to 
support the violent means by which extremists sought to preserve it, a reality that was 
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best reflected by the number of white leaders who openly condemned the KKK following 
the NC Volunteer incident in July.  
Historians who study the 1960s, however, have generally been unimpressed by 
white Southerners‟ refusal to turn a blind eye to the Klan and other racist extremists. In 
his study of Mississippi, Joseph Crespino argues, for example, that “opposition to white 
extremists burning black churches was a thin plank on which to build the moral and 
religious condemnation of white supremacy.”
89
 Crespino and others may be correct in 
arguing that opposition to the Klan was not a particularly valiant stand for Southern 
whites to take. To be sure, self-avowed white supremacists in Craven County could also 
be opposed to forms of extremism. Nonetheless, whites‟ open condemnation of the 
violent means to preserve forms of white supremacy during the 1960s was an important 
historical development worth paying attention to. In addition to building a greater 
consensus among community members that helped to prevent future violent uprisings, it 
was an important step towards the eventual demise of racial inequality itself. After all, 
Jim Crow had enjoyed a long stay in the South largely due to entrenched laws and other 
forms of physical force, but as the force begin to dwindle, so went the arguments to 
maintain it.  
In addition to Stallings, the idea of a Good Neighbor Council was widely 
supported by a wide cadre of local black and white leaders, many of who had worked 
together on biracial groups as far back as 1957, such as Whitehead, Bishop S. Rivers, and 
white ministers Charles Edward Sharp, Al Fisher, and John Murphy Smith. As many as 
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thirty-three residents from across the county were asked by Stallings to join, including 
New Bern Board of Education member Genevieve Dunn, black architect and civil rights 
activist James Gavin, and white saleswoman Janet Latham. With hope-filled anticipation, 
the Craven County Good Neighbor Council had its first meeting on August 20, 1965. 
Reverend Al Fisher and Ed Sharp were appointed as the two chairmen of the group.
90
As 
the new co-chairman described the council, it was as made up of “plain people” who had 
joined to help eradicate extremism on both ends of the civil rights debate. “They‟re not 
crusaders,” expounded Reverend Sharp, “Some of them might not even have been in 
favor of the civil rights law, but they know we have to live with it.” Moreover, their 
moderate positions on civil rights and race relations gave them the ability, in the words of 
Sharp, “to try to bring pressures on those who are extremists in the county.” Indeed, most 
of the council members had realized that racial division was impeding progress for the 
county and had decided to take a stand for peaceful change. “We‟re living in a new day,” 
asserted co-chairman Reverend Fisher, who also served on the local advisory board of the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps. “We‟ve got to bring the county to realize its future is at 
stake. We can‟t turn back the clock.”
91
  
For many who joined the council, the co-chairmen included, COP was believed to 
be the main force that incited the recent racial violence, whether intentional or not. 
Therefore, most agreed that COP‟s success would continue to be questioned as long as it 
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was seen primarily as an “integration program.” But such a belief did not influence them 
to disparage COP or seek to see it disappear. Instead, their utmost desire to keep Craven 
from erupting in violence actually tended to invigorate or at least maintain their support 
of the local War on Poverty, specifically the efforts of COP. During a subsequent meeting 
of the Good Neighbor Council, it was agreed by all those present to call on churches, 
civic groups, PTAs, and the local news media, the latter of which was blamed for 
perpetuating negative and unfair portrayals of COP, to assist in “bring[ing] an attitude of 
brotherhood to Craven County.” The biracial group also demanded greater protection of 
local citizens by the local law enforcement. Over the subsequent years, the council would 
become one of the most vocal supporters of the goals behind COP. In a prepared 
statement shared with the press, the Good Neighbor Council made clear their position 
that “the future development of this area is dependent upon a sane handling of the 
problems which are before us” which, above all, would depend on the degree to which 
“the citizens of our county will see that peace prevails among our people.”
92
 Time would 
tell that the longing for “peace” did not entail ignoring local racial problems. It involved 
confronting them head-on. The heightened potential for uncontrollable racial turmoil 
coupled with a growing commitment among locals to community progress and growth 
led to one of the highest levels of communication and consensus ever seen between the 
two races in Craven.  
The Good Neighbor Council and its encouragement of “brotherhood” among 
Eastern North Carolinians could not have come at a more opportune time. On August 27, 
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most Craven County schools were officially desegregated as dozens of black children 
entered previously white schools for the first time. In preparation for that day, Governor 
Dan Moore had ordered members of the State Highway Patrol and the State Bureau of 
Investigation into the county. Perhaps because of the known presence of such lawmen, 
desegregation occurred without any violence or major incidences, even in rural areas 
such as Bridgeton where the Klan was most popular. Only four black students failed to 
report for classes. Concerned by the number of unusual-looking cars parked outside the 
elementary school in Ernul, the father of three of them chose his children‟s safety over 
“trouble.”
93
 Overall, though, as the News & Observer described it, the scene in Craven 
was mostly positive. In several instances, “White children greeted Negro children at 
buses and escorted them to their classrooms past alerted Highway Patrol and SBI men,” 
the paper reported.
94
  
The increase in blatant local criticism of COP also provided a need for a 
mediatory group such as the Good Neighbor Council. As late as July 1965, many 
volunteers such as those in the Head Start program came from among “the best families 
in town,” and according to a North Carolina Fund review, there had been “no editorial 
attacks in local papers or impassioned arguments by representatives of substantial 
community groups against the program.
95
 Yet, in part because of the embarrassment that 
cascaded over Craven following the shooting of the North Carolina Volunteers, a 
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growing number of residents would speak out against the local CAA by August while 
questioning its motives and benefit to the community. The vast majority of the 
complaints came from Craven‟s white citizens. One such citizen was New Bern attorney 
Laurence A. Stith, who wrote to inform Congressman David Henderson that “there are 
many, many people in this area who are thoroughly out of sympathy and somewhat 
disgusted with the local so-called Poverty Program.” Particularly troublesome was 
executive director Jim Hearn. Not only were Hearn and other administrators “drawing 
very high salaries in the amount of $15,000 a year,” but the executive director appeared 
to be primarily “using the program as a vehicle to foster the promotion of integration.” 
Evidence for this latter charge, Stith stressed, was largely based on his observation that 
there was “a very definite alliance” between Hearn and “CORE, NAACP and Negro 
organizations.” But Hearn was not the only one to face criticism in the letter. In 
disapproval of the way in which COP endorsed social equality of the races, Stith also 
called out COP Manpower Director Royce Jordan for having “his superior, a colored 
man, in his home,” likely speaking of James McDonald of the North Carolina Fund. For 
many of the reasons listed above, “There seems to be more racial unrest in the county 
with the advent and development of this program than there has ever been before,” the 
letter continued, citing “the Ku Klux Klan [which] has been burning crosses.” Claiming 
to have several friends on the COP board, Stith felt sure that “many who supported this 
program, including yourself, were expecting that other things would be accomplished and 
224 
 
that the administration of the program would not fall into the hands of people who were 
using it for matters other than its announced purpose.”
96
  
Local criticism grows louder 
Criticisms of COP were also being made in the public arena. The editorial staff of 
the major local newspapers—specifically the Sun Journal, the New Bern Mirror, and 
Havelock Progress—had been fairly distrustful of the CAA for several months but not 
until August were there enough vocal critics in Craven to publish in their viewpoint 
sections. The local editors had been especially critical of the amount of money that Hearn 
and COP employees were being paid, but they were even more critical of the way that 
their county leaders had accepted the designation as a poverty-ridden community and, 
thereby, welcomed the expansive arm of the federal government into local affairs. Many 
of these same themes were passionately assailed against by New Bern resident Raymond 
Hopkins whose letter to the editor of the Sun Journal was printed on September 11. The 
letter began by praising the “character, strength, and backbone” of Charles Kimbrell as 
the sole member of the New Bern board of aldermen to vote down the continuation of the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps program in New Bern. The writer proceeded to question 
whether the other four aldermen were acting in “our city‟s best interest” by going along 
“with this rotten great society, its throat-cramming, its threats, and its appeasement 
measures.” Hopkins was proud to say that “Craven County and the city of New Bern long 
endured the natural circumstances of our area before Shriver, LBJ, or any such thing as 
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the Poverty Program was ever heard of.” “We had industrious people and lazy people, the 
employed and the unemployed,” he explained, contending that “for the most part, those in 
an unemployed status were there out of a matter of pure choice” since it “was so much 
easier for them to reach their hands down in the mail boxes once a month and withdraw 
their relief or welfare checks.” Beyond his perception that the national War on Poverty 
effort was filled with “monetary waste, wreckless conduct, down-graded morals, 
promotion of riots, unruly demonstrations, and civil disobedience,” he found the proposal 
of “our current administration” to “take from the „haves‟ and give to the „have-nots‟” 
unjust and destructive, to say the least, as well as in disharmony with his rights as an 
individual as spelled out under the Declaration of Independence. For Hopkins, who 
placed himself in the category of those who “have something because they worked and 
strived for it,” poverty would continue “as long as free hand-outs are made available to 
them—out of the pockets of we, the hard-working, striving class.” The poor would 
naturally “continue to sit back and survive on the fruits of our labor,” he concluded.
97
  
Despite their obvious biases, not all of the harsh criticisms that some Craven 
residents leveled at the ongoing War on Poverty, those racial in nature excluded, were 
wholly unfair, irrelevant, or even limited to the happenings in Eastern North Carolina. 
Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., out of concern that little War on Poverty 
funding was trickling down to help the poor, was among the most prominent figures on 
the national scene to vocally oppose the comfortable salaries that executive directors of 
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CAAs were being paid.
98
 At the same time, major news publications were increasingly 
featuring troubling stories of scandal, confusion, red tape, waste, bureaucratic in-fighting, 
and class and racial friction that simultaneously challenged the effectiveness of the 
federal War on Poverty and the vision of the OEO. One year and three days after the 
Economic Opportunity Act was passed on August 20, 1964, the U.S. News & World 
Report printed a five-page article entitled “Poverty War Out of Hand?” that, in addition 
to detailing disturbing reports of recent violence among enrollees at seven Job Corps 
centers, told of complaints of wasteful procedures at OEO and poor communication 
between OEO and local CAAs.
99
 Fortune magazine ran a similar story that same month 
that discussed complaints that OEO‟s insistence of maximum feasible participation of the 
poor was leading to amplified class hostility and a disregard for the authority of elected 
officials. Such hostility was especially palpable in large cities such as Chicago where it 
was being encouraged by radical community organizers like Saul D. Alinsky. The article 
was also critical that “whatever it may do for the poor, the war on poverty is the best 
thing that‟s happened to social workers since the New Deal was established.”
100
 Writing 
in the first volume of Public Interest, which was founded primarily by former radicals 
who had become disillusioned with post-New Deal politics and federal largesse, 
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sociologist Nathan Glazer added to the growing War on Poverty criticisms by voicing his 
doubts of OEO‟s assumption that “the best way to improve services is by attack from the 
outside, rather than reform from the inside.” When local governments protest that federal 
money is being used to attack it and its services, Glazer clarified, “the Federal 
administrator will have to explain: but that is the only way to get you to do your job.” 
Using government funds for “controlled revolution,” he concluded, will likely turn out to 
be “too demanding for both Federal administrators and local community-action 
organizers.”
101
 
Nevertheless, Americans in general had not yet fully made up their minds about 
the War on Poverty. According to national polling conducted between August 2 and 
September 3, 1965, the number of Americans who believed that Johnson‟s War on 
Poverty would help “wipe out poverty in this country” stood at 48 percent, compared to 
37 percent who believed it “won‟t help much,” which was a significant boost for the 
Johnson administration over earlier polling. In July 1964, the same group found that only 
34 percent of the nation believed the federal effort would help end poverty while 36 
percent believed it would not.
102
 Based on the fact that approval numbers for the War on 
Poverty would drop off significantly by early 1966, the relatively favorable results 
garnered from the August-September 1965 polling implies that Americans were just 
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learning of the issues surrounding the War on Poverty and were giving the programs—
most of which had been highly touted in the media up to that point—the benefit of the 
doubt at such an early stage. Those same poll numbers also suggest that those who 
responded may still have had a general fondness for the work being done to curb poverty 
through their own local CAA, despite reports of malfeasance elsewhere.  
Opposition was not as pervasive as it appeared? 
Tales of corruption and tension, both violent and non-violent, were on the 
increase during the War on Poverty and are not to be taken lightly. Nevertheless, as the 
experiences of COP reveals, the problems spotlighted in national news outlets were 
mostly sensational stories not found across the board in 1965 and were most likely issues 
for a minority of CAAs. Of course, few local CAAs avoided all forms or semblances of 
controversy or criticism, COP included. Addressing the National Conference on Social 
Welfare in 1965, Shriver proudly remarked that “I said to Congress that if our activities 
did not stir up a community, then Congress should investigate it.”
103
 When a diverse 
range of people from a community come together there are naturally bound to be 
disagreements and conflict over philosophy and methods. During the 1960s, this reality 
was especially true with regard to different views on the proper role and function of the 
OEO. But likely owing to Craven‟s fairly tight-knit community, locals‟ early 
commitment to quell poverty, and immature efforts to organize and/or revolutionize the 
poor, COP did not face the same degree of issues or in-fighting found in the headlines of 
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the Chicago Daily News or the Los Angeles Times. Thus, despite more vociferous 
criticism from a minority of citizens, Stallings and most other local leaders, including 
Congressman Henderson, continued to support COP because of both their personal 
investment and their conviction that a break to the uneducated and untrained was also a 
break for Craven County.
104
  
The whites who felt strongly enough to complain to their congressman or write to 
their local editor could neither claim to have spoken for the majority of the community 
nor to have changed the course of COP or the structure of its programs.
105
 As observed 
by Kathleen Orringer, elected as the first female to the New Bern board of aldermen in 
1957, not enough of those who support COP have “stood up to be counted,” likely 
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making the opposition appear larger than it was.
106
 Those in Craven who did not voice 
public opposition to COP likely understood that higher salaries were necessary in 
attracting qualified and motivated people to serve in the antipoverty program.
107
 Others, 
namely the several hundred who volunteered or were employed by COP, likely 
understood that the programs were working with poor people to help them to become 
self-sustaining rather than merely giving them welfare checks. On the same token, they 
recognized, as understood by executive director Jim Hearn, that the poor do not lack 
education and skills “because they are lazy” but because “they didn‟t need the education 
to work in tobacco.”
108
 Finally, others understood that integration was not the main 
reason to have a poverty program in Craven but that it was a reality that they could not 
avoid while pushing for goals of economic growth and community progress. By August 
1965, COP had also achieved several accomplishments that local leaders, in particular, 
saw as positive signs that COP was mostly on the right track in leading toward greater 
prosperity for all in Craven.  
Hearn’s weaknesses dilute his strengths 
The last day in August had marked the end of a productive first year for COP as a 
federally-funded CAA. Between February 1 and August 31, 1965, COP received just 
over $1,700,000 from public and private sources, leading to the establishment of a multi-
faceted program that was attacking the sources of poverty from all sides. Each of the six 
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titles of the Economic Opportunity Act had been implemented and, as a result of CAP 
funding, the programs of existing agencies begun solely under the North Carolina Fund 
had expanded by 300 percent.
109
 For COP Board chairman Larry B. Pate, the greatest 
cause for pride was the strides that had been made in the development of human and 
economic resources. Pate was likewise pleased by the degree of participation of local 
people who had been employed from all economic, social, and educational backgrounds. 
Between August 1964 and August 1965, the COP staff grew from just Hearn and his two 
Community Action Technicians (CAT) to 197 people, almost three-fourths of whom 
were residents of the county and as many as one-third who were minorities. Yet the rather 
hefty staff payroll of approximately $355,000, which was larger than almost all of the 
private business payrolls in Craven except for those of its top industrial employers, did 
not exceed 20 percent of the overall budget for the first year of the grant.
110
 
In the minds of those involved in COP, the major highlights of its first fiscal year 
had less to do with its payroll and more to do with the implementation of the programs 
themselves. These included one hundred farmers joining the Strawberry Marketing 
Cooperative, the establishment of a day-care center to supervise children of working 
mothers in low-income neighborhoods while also providing employment for said mothers 
as aides, the installation of fifty new privies through the Rural Environmental Sanitation 
Program, the establishment of a Home Management Aid program to train ten low-income 
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women as instructors for neighborhood groups on topics such as money management and 
nutrition, and the work of the North Carolina Volunteers to help secure a fire truck for the 
Pembroke community and begin sanitation work in the Duffyfield neighborhood.
111
 
Other accomplishments were related to the securing of funds from OEO, the U.S. 
Department of Labor, and the North Carolina Fund to begin the operation of the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) for youths between sixteen and twenty-one, the Work 
Experience program for unemployed fathers, Manpower Improvement through 
Community Effort (MITCE) to provide industrial training for low-income and 
unemployed heads of household, Head Start for the culturally disadvantaged, and a small 
business development center to provide loans for rising entrepreneurs. In July, COP also 
received more than $800,000 in federal grants for the Adult Basic Education Recruitment 
(ABER) program for a six-county area that included Craven, Jones, and Pamlico. It was 
the first program of its type in the nation, whose goal was to employ the aid of twelve 
VISTA workers to recruit at least five thousand eligible individuals for the twenty-five-
week course who were in need of basic skills such as reading, writing, and language 
arts.
112
 COP had discovered in their research included in the grant proposal that 89 
percent of the unskilled in Craven alone could not meet minimum requirements for state 
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and federal job training programs, making the ABER program a key first step to the 
success of the entire community action program.
113
  
 
Table 1. Six-county area served by Adult Basic Education via Craven Operation Progress, 1965. Adult 
Basic Education Recruitment Program, an Amendment to: Craven Operation Progress, Inc. Community 
Action Proposal, January 15, 1965, Folder 5063, North Carolina Fund Records.  
 
County Number of Adults 25 
years and older who had 
not completed eighth 
grade 
 
Percentage of 
population 
Craven 9,636 35.6% 
Jones 2, 407 47.8% 
Pamlico 2,134 43.9% 
Carteret 5,446 34.6% 
Lenoir 12,176 45.4% 
Onslow 6,567 22.8% 
 
 
By August 1965, 346 children signed up for Head Start, and, as Hearn boasted to 
the COP board, the NYC had added $588,000 of wages into the pockets of low-income 
youth in Craven and a neighboring county. In addition to NYC, Hearn touted the 
potential benefits that the “multiplying effect” would have through other programs such 
as the Strawberry Marketing Cooperative and Small Business Development Center in 
increasing the flow of money into the county. But, in part because many of the programs 
funded under the EOA had just recently been implemented, Craven Operation Progress‟ 
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in-house progress report of August discussed little about the numbers of those helped or 
how specific individuals had landed full-time jobs and were moving out of poverty. 
Nonetheless, before September, Hearn sent in a second CAP proposal on behalf of COP 
that would increase the number of programs from six to fourteen. The proposal, which 
included applications for dental services for school children, a Federal Credit Union, and 
a Community Development project for ten target areas was quickly approved by OEO 
without any delay. Southeast representative Harold Bailin deemed COP‟s proposal 
“magnificent,” especially its health component that had been selected as a prototype to be 
encouraged all across the nation.
114
 Accompanying the administrative growth of COP and 
the additional programs funded under the EOA was talk of combining COP with Jones 
and Pamlico counties following a new OEO rule that no CAA that served an area of less 
than fifty thousand would be given federal money.
115
 The influence of Craven Operation 
Progress looked as if it was only to expand.  
Yet the quick growth in the number of COP programs, much of which was driven 
by Hearn with minimal board input, did not lead to a simultaneous growth in either 
community support or board approval of Hearn as executive director. Around mid-
August, Hearn received a letter from North Carolina Fund employee Wallace Murchison 
praising Hearn for the accomplishments of COP in its first year as a CAA. Murchison 
was quick to tell him, however, that there was at least one major issue that still needed to 
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be addressed. “It is clear that your relationship with the board and the community is in 
need of improvement,” Murchison wrote, adding that “This is just as much a part of your 
job as obtaining grants from O.E.O. or employing competent staff.” On a copy of the 
letter sent to George Esser, Murchison wrote a note in the margins to his supervisor. “I 
don‟t think Hearn is free of all blame for the troubles and I want him to assume some 
responsibility for board relationship, etc. Do you agree or not?”
116
 There is no record of 
Esser‟s reply, yet the North Carolina Fund director may have agreed in some measure 
with Murchison‟s assessment. Years later, Esser expressed regret that “recruitment for 
project directors was not handled as well as it should have been.” As it related to COP, 
Esser wished that Fund staffer Bill Koch had not encouraged Jim Hearn “to take actions 
with respect to staff and programs that challenged the New Bern community from the 
very beginning.” “There was goodwill in part of New Bern,” remembered Esser. In 
particular, speaking of D.L. Stallings, “The chairman of the Board of County 
Commissioners there was really a good man.”
117
 But, as is commonly said, hindsight is 
always twenty-twenty. In 1965, Esser would defend Hearn despite the wishes of D. L. 
Stallings, Larry Pate, Ted Collier, and other leading board members of COP that Hearn 
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be removed.
118
 Esser was, after all, the main figure who convinced the COP board not to 
fire Hearn but to attempt to strengthen their relationship with him.
119
 
The Fund‟s position on Hearn was not unreasonable. For one, Esser and his staff 
believed Hearn‟s dismissal would be interpreted as punishment for having attempted to 
carry out a program in compliance with the law. “The effect of such an action upon the 
local Negro community, upon the community at large, upon North Carolina and its 
relationship with the Office of Economic Opportunity,” read a confidential Fund report, 
“would clearly be deleterious to the total anti-poverty program in this state.”
120
 Plus, with 
ten other Fund sites to keep tabs on, Esser could not possibly see how Hearn was 
administering COP on a daily basis or how his actions continued to supply tension 
between himself and the majority of the board. For the same reason, Esser did not fully 
understand or was not willing to see that an aggressive style, though perhaps encouraged 
by Koch, seemed a naturally occurring aspect of Hearn‟s personality. Without a doubt, 
Hearn‟s forceful push of integration explained a good deal of how he was able to rub 
many whites inside COP the wrong way. But his forcefulness over non-racial issues, such 
as deadlines for projects, and his tendency towards other uncompromising positions were 
at least as troublesome. In a 1966 interview with North Carolina Fund staffer John Miller, 
COP board member Nora Kennel described Hearn as “pushy” and “always throwing 
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deadlines at the board members” like something that needed to be sent to D.C. by the day 
after tomorrow. She explained further that Hearn came across as trying to “teach people 
about civil rights,” knowing that most whites in Craven preferred gradualism in race 
relations. Moreover, Hearn seemed to believe there was only one way of promoting the 
antipoverty program, as Kennel put it, “Washington‟s way.”
 121
 Local businessman and 
COP board member Harry Wright offered a similar testimony for the North Carolina 
Fund. After applauding Hearn for his ability to get the amount of OEO funding for COP, 
Wright complained that Hearn rarely listened or took criticism well. He was “an 
exceptionally intelligent man,” but “You could not tell Hearn that he was wrong,” Wright 
said.  This held true even if “you could prove it to him.”
122
 These testimonies were not 
unsupported. North Carolina Fund staffer John Miller agreed in a written report that 
Hearn “demanded rather than requested,” often gave “ultimatums,” and “involved the 
board on as few a number of the decisions and negotiations as he could.” In doing so, 
Miller reasoned that the board knew “little of the day to day operations of COP” and had 
“little knowledge of programs they were approving.”
123
 
Few whites on the board who criticized Hearn‟s administrative tactics were doing 
so merely to discredit his directorship in hopes of ultimately avoiding racial integration. 
The ones who bent down to that level were in the minority and, arguably, held minimal 
impact in the direction of the antipoverty programs. In fact, most of the few outspoken 
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segregationists on the COP board, including local attorney David Henderson, New Bern 
Director of Public Works Cedric Boyd, and Mayor Mack Lupton, were regularly absent 
from board meetings and, therefore, missed out on multiple opportunities to vote on 
board policy.
124
 Even with this fact in mind, most whites on the board seemed to have 
had less of a problem with integration itself than the manner in which it was being 
pushed.
125
 As Robert Whitehead understood and acknowledged, whites in Craven had 
generally learned to accept greater civil rights for blacks and some degree of federal 
intervention in local affairs. Most saw these changes “as inevitable and are willing to go 
along rather than fight it tooth and nail,” he observed, adding that the thinking of the 
county was conservative but “not the ultra-conservative die-hard segregationist type, 
which exist in other areas in the South.”
126
  
Hearn‟s white supporters, including those who shared his views on race, were also 
willing to concede that his administrative tactics and his view of the local whites who he 
had to work with might be causing unnecessary trouble. In a one-on-one conversation 
with Craven Manpower Improvement Through Community Effort (MITCE) director 
Royce Jordan in mid-September, Hearn complained of “being tired of defending 
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Manpower in Craven” after receiving a complaint that a black field supervisor had been 
unprofessional when addressing a white female behind the desk of a local firm. Hearn‟s 
attempt to address the situation, however, actually made the bookkeeper more upset. 
After his efforts to get her to overlook the mistake made by the Manpower supervisor, 
Hearn apparently asked her in a stern tone “Have you ever fought for your country? 
Negroes have, have you?” Jordan was even more concerned, however, by Hearn‟s 
comment to him that “New Bern being a small rural southern community had to be 
treated as such.” Hearn implied “that I would have to instruct my people to keep this in 
mind at all times when they were in public,” Jordan wrote in a field report to the North 
Carolina Fund.  “This caused me to wonder if we are to work in one way behind doors 
and another in public. I think the progress that has been made by Manpower in Craven 
County speaks for itself.” Feeling that “We have as of this date, had to hide nothing,” 
Jordan did not “believe any useful purpose would be served by changing our methods.” 
Indeed, “small incidents and small mistakes are going to be made.” “Mr. Hearn does not 
have to defend Manpower in Craven County,” Jordan concluded.
127
  
Any effort to deal with these issues related to Hearn were temporarily put on hold 
as COP prepared for a press conference in Washington, D.C. scheduled for September 
20, 1965. Hosted by Sargent Shriver of the OEO, the press conference was designed to 
give much-needed national exposure to little-publicized antipoverty programs in rural 
areas. An antipoverty group from Mississippi and New Mexico were also present. Except 
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for a Chicago Tribune reporter who asked how much money it cost the federal 
government to pay their way, Craven was generally well accepted by the press.
128
 Many 
of the national reporters seemed impressed by their initiative and the ingenuity of their 
programs. Shriver also sang high praise for COP as “one of the most successful anti-
poverty in the nation in spite of difficulties from external sources,” speaking primarily of 
the Klan.
129
 Hearn, who was joined by board members D. L. Stallings, Frank Efird, 
Constance Rabin, Robert Whitehead, and Catherine Berry, was appreciative of the praise, 
adding that COP would remain dedicated to providing jobs so that Craven County would 
not contribute to the migration of rural poor to the ghettoes of Northern cities.
130
 But the 
political correctness of the OEO publicity show evidently did not satisfy reporters. 
Perhaps seeking a juicy story on race relations in a small southern community, several 
reporters would push Whitehead to expand upon the recent trouble with the Klan.  
In a private dialogue with reporters, Whitehead told of twelve incidents of 
beatings, homes being fired at, bombs set off, and automobile windows smashed in the 
black community of Vanceboro by the KKK, making the case that blacks there need 
“more adequate police protection” from Klan harassment. In fact, Whitehead would 
blame lack of police protection for the recent arrest of twenty-one black youths for firing 
guns and attempting to scare citizens around the area late on a Saturday evening. Several 
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of them, according to Whitehead, had been to the police station earlier in the evening 
asking for protection for themselves and their families. “We regret that the Negro citizens 
of Vanceboro had to pick up arms to protect themselves and their families, but we would 
like to question in public what other course they had to follow,” Whitehead told the press, 
also noting that at least four KKK rallies had been held in Vanceboro in six weeks.
131
 But 
instead of intending for his comments to the press to raise controversy over COP, he 
hoped that they would be used to bring extra praise toward the poverty program. Klan 
activity, Whitehead made sure to stress, did have a good effect “in bringing to bear upon 
all the decent thinking people how detrimental this Klan activity is to the total 
community.” What is more, Whitehead emphasized, the antipoverty program “has done 
much to bring together the races” and in his opinion, the number of blacks and the poor 
on the board proved that “we have followed the guidelines of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity better than any other program in the country.”
132
 Whitehead‟s latter 
contention is difficult to substantiate but he was certainly correct to say that COP had 
followed OEO guidelines very well. In September 1964, four blacks and seventeen 
whites made up the board of directors. Exactly a year later, the thirty-seven-member 
board would include twelve blacks as well as seven representatives of the poor. COP‟s 
five-person executive committee then also included black representatives Bishop S. 
Rivers and Catherine Berry.  
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Despite Whitehead‟s intentions of portraying the majority of the Craven people in 
a good light, he was met by an unexpected amount of criticism after he returned home to 
New Bern and his comments at the press conference were published. At a COP board 
meeting held on September 22, which Whitehead did not arrive at until the very end, 
assistant superintendent of New Bern schools James W. Allen remarked to the group that 
if Whitehead “can‟t be relied upon to stick to the subject and not choose a national press 
conference to present some of his personal views,” that he be left back in New Bern the 
next time a similar trip was planned. Fellow board member Robert Monte had also 
conveyed his thought that it was unfortunate that the race issue was injected, especially in 
a setting where reporters who “have nothing else to do but stir up people” would make 
what “they could of it.”
133
 Not surprisingly, Craven County Sheriff Charlie Berry took 
Whitehead‟s comments the worst, particularly his critique to the press that the Klan had 
not been properly dealt with by local authorities. A few days later, and perhaps afraid for 
his personal job security, the sheriff likely helped in digging up records of Whitehead‟s 
past criminal behavior which the New Bern Mirror editor, who had little sympathy for 
COP, caught wind of and ran with. In an editorial entitled, “He Should Know,” that 
appeared in the Mirror in October 1965, Whitehead was blasted for his supposed 
hypocrisy in condemning lawlessness in Craven. As the editorial read, Whitehead 
“learned some of it [lawlessness] firsthand on October 24, 1938 when along with Henry 
and George Whitehead he pulled an armed robbery of a service station in Pitt County” for 
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which “he served six years before he was paroled.”
134
 It mattered little that Whitehead 
had committed the crime over twenty-five years ago at sixteen years of age. Neither did it 
matter much that he had committed no crimes since. That Whitehead merely had a record 
at all was enough to be used as a rallying cry among a minority of whites, led by Sherriff 
Berry, who called on Governor Moore to remove Whitehead from his post on the Craven 
Good Neighbor Council. This minority cadre of white citizens also asked for Whitehead 
to step down from serving on COP.
135
 His detractor‟s efforts to delegitimize him, 
however, did not equate with success. Governor Moore kept him on the Good Neighbor 
Council. He was also allowed to remain on the COP board as far more citizens in Craven, 
both black and white, saw him as both a strong and conciliatory leader during local 
crises.  
As the campaign against Whitehead demonstrated, the agenda of extreme 
conservatives to fight against the avenues of racial and social changes, more times than 
not, came up short in Craven County. Many of these same avenues were attached to other 
important community goals such as economic growth. Despite making their presence 
known through boisterous rhetoric, extreme conservatives‟ lack of success suggests that 
moderates and the minority of liberals together far outnumbered them, especially within 
prominent positions. The closest that extremists came to realizing their agenda, though 
due to little of their own effort, was in early October with the somewhat sudden 
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resignation of Hearn as executive director of COP.
136
 On that day, Hearn announced that 
he was leaving for a promotional job offer he had accepted to head an adult literacy 
program in Mississippi, a position for which the OEO had drafted him.
137
 That he had 
grown weary over his lack of getting along with the community, which had even led to 
threatening phone calls to his home, surely contributed to his decision.
138
 His finding 
Eastern North Carolina to be not progressive enough may have contributed as well but, 
ironically, he would leave the area to work in a state where, given studies like John 
Dittmer‟s Local People, he would arguably face more conservative resistance. But as he 
had done in Craven County, Hearn could take greater risks as an outsider and quickly 
leave town if need be. 
 The reaction among COP board members to Hearn‟s resignation was a mixture of 
relief and disappointment, as reflected in a series of interviews the North Carolina Fund 
conducted in the months just following Hearn‟s departure. Most of those interviewed felt 
the same way as COP board chairman Larry Pate who believed “Jim was working for 
Washington” and, thus, was never really interested in working with key leaders in Craven 
County. “When the economic opportunity act passed,” Pate disclosed in his interview 
with Fund research associate John Miller, “this changed the entire concept of [COP] and 
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no one knew what to expect then.” 
139
 Craven County Welfare Department head and 
fellow board member Constance Rabin agreed, telling Miller that she and Stallings “are 
sorry we got involved in this mess,” even though she came across as though “she would 
have involved herself in an anti-poverty program, no matter what the circumstances.” 
Rabin believed it was “ridiculous” to establish a new antipoverty agency and then hire 
“an outsider who is totally alien to the area and its people.” According to her, resentment 
toward COP first began to escalate among local people because, in her words, “as soon as 
they opened up over there, the place was swarming with negroes.”
 140
 Indeed, Hearn had 
done most of his recruiting in the black areas of New Bern for both personal and logistic 
reasons. In addition to his view that black poverty was more entrenched and difficult to 
overcome, the black poor were the largest and closest target group to COP headquarters. 
For these reasons, a growing number in Craven would see COP “as more of a civil rights 
organization than as an anti-poverty program,” asserted Reverend Al Fisher. Plus, by 
openly “flaunting” his intentions to spear civil rights efforts, which had the potential of 
increasing unwanted racial tension, Fischer claimed Hearn lost support among numbers 
of the community who were sympathetic with COP.
141
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New Bern Schools Superintendent Robert Pugh and his assistant superintendent 
Ted Collier went even further by implying that Hearn had an obsession with pushing civil 
rights issues. According to both men, Hearn once confronted Stallings with an ultimatum 
that “either the [COP] board of directors gives me what I want or I‟ll see that this town 
turns into another Selma.”
142
 Other complaints gathered about Hearn from the COP board 
could be summarized by Cedric Boyd, who criticized Hearn for spending money because 
it was “simply available” and “rushing the program.”
143
 Not everyone on the board was 
happy to see Hearn leave, however. Black domestic worker Elizabeth Evans, a 
representative of the poor who was also a member of Nixon‟s SCLC group, believed 
Hearn “ran the program the way it should be run,” saying she felt he was trying to help 
“all the poor people” but was hindered because “the Board members wouldn‟t go along 
with him.” Evans also thought Hearn “really cared about the Negro,” noting that he was 
“well liked by all the Negroes in Craven County.”
144
 Willie Hickman, a black 
representative from the Craven County Civic League, found it unfortunate that the 
relations between Hearn and the majority of the board were “not amicable,” which he 
believed, like Evans, was because “Hearn was doing the job the way OEO wanted it to be 
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done.”
145
 Most other blacks on the COP board, Whitehead included, were in agreement 
with the majority of these latter two testimonies.  
Although there is a good measure of truth in most of the interviews, at least one 
thing is missing which helps to fill in the gaps in explaining not only why Hearn did not 
get along with the majority of the board but also why some segments of the community 
viewed COP in a negative light. What is primarily missing is a discussion of Hearn‟s own 
overall perception of the white community and the ways that they should be dealt with, 
which, in the end, became a self-fulfilling prophecy. By the time he resigned, Hearn had 
a narrow and firmly established view that whites in Eastern North Carolina, particularly 
those who for a variety of reasons disagreed with “forced” measures of integration, were 
naturally resentful, prejudiced, and largely incapable of treating blacks fairly or changing 
their racial customs without coercion. Of course, Hearn did not mention these views in 
public when he was still in control of the program such as at a national Community 
Action Conference in Washington, D.C. where he told Sargent Shriver and other national 
War on Poverty chiefs present that Craven County would not have “been first in the 
nation or received as many new programs as it has” without “the dedicated efforts of 
local citizens” in wanting to help the underprivileged.
146
 Only after his decision to resign 
did Hearn‟s unfavorable views of the community surface for all to see. According to 
North Carolina Fund research associate John Miller, who interviewed Hearn soon after he 
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had announced his resignation, the former executive director “would not admit any 
problem failures or shortcomings for the simple reason that he saw himself as The 
Program” but, he was willing to share his opinion that the COP board members were 
“never quite sure about the federal government” and were “immediately suspicious to its 
intentions, especially with regard to integrated programs.” Moreover, because few poor 
whites had yet to participate in COP programs, Hearn regarded “the whites as being 
afraid to participate” mostly because, in his mind, they saw “themselves as „above‟ the 
negroes.”
147
  
 
 
Figure 20. Craven Operation Progress dinner meeting, New Bern, NC, April 1965. From left to right: 
Executive Director Jim Hearn (standing), Hearn‟s wife, North Carolina Fund Manpower Director James 
McDonald, unknown, Billy Barnes Collection, Courtesy of North Carolina Collection.  
 
 
Right around the time that Hearn resigned, such views would inform a rather 
unflattering portrayal of Craven County in the Washington Daily News that made no 
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mention of the area‟s moderating influences. “The white southerners hate pretty 
powerfully,” the newspaper quoted Hearn, speaking about his experiences as a poverty 
director in the Coastal Plain region. “Here they hate Lyndon Johnson, and they hate him 
far worse than they hate you and me. He‟s a Southerner himself, and to them he‟s a 
turncoat. It‟s understandable to them for me to be what I am. I‟m an outsider and it‟s 
almost natural.” Hate may have been a strong word. Arguably, more Craven whites were 
unhappy or upset with Hearn‟s leadership style than what he stood for. In the interview 
with the Washington Daily News, Hearn went on to mention that “When I first got here, 
everyone told me that Negroes would never work but 90 percent of our projects are 
supported by Negroes. Now we can‟t reach the poor whites because they think the 
program is dominated by Negroes.”
148
 That literally “everyone” in Craven told him that 
black people would not work was clearly an exaggeration. There is little doubt that Hearn 
heard such prejudiced talk from segments of the white community who strongly believed 
that blacks in the area were stereotypically lazy. Yet such an attitude did not represent the 
main sentiment among the substantial number who either joined or supported the poverty 
program—especially local white businessmen who, as will be discussed in chapters V 
and VI, would voluntarily hire historic numbers of black workers at reasonable to good 
wages from 1966 onward. Due to his choice to focus his attention on the words and 
behavior of the critics of COP, Hearn‟s unfavorable views of Craven would only get 
worse by the end of his directorship.  
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But Hearn‟s distrust of the white community, which led him to treat Craven as a 
“small rural town,” would ironically feed the beast of criticism and distrust, as little 
publicity was made of the program and its benefits. His assumption that many whites did 
not trust Washington ultimately became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
149
 As discussed above, 
there were certainly deep-seated prejudices and traditional views of race that butted up 
against Hearn‟s plans and vision but they were not as formidable as Hearn described 
them. For whatever reason, he chose to overlook the fact that many whites in Craven still 
approved of the program and saw the potential good that could come out of it, including 
not only businessmen but other community leaders such as Stallings, Frank Efird, Robert 
Pugh, Larry Pate, Reverend Al Fisher, and others. Hearn also overlooked or chose to 
forget the developments that had been made in Craven on the race relations front. By the 
time Hearn left New Bern, there was not a single store in New Bern without at least one 
black clerk; in 1960, it was hard to find any.
150
 Such progress, much of which occurred 
prior to the War on Poverty, could not have happened in the community that Hearn saw 
and described. “As a lifelong resident of this county,” Craven MITCE director Royce 
Jordan, a racially liberal white man who regularly invited blacks into his home, remarked 
at a COP board meeting in the fall of 1965, “I have been surprised that the racial aspect 
of our program, which is a total opportunity program, has been so well received as it has 
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by both races without any real friction.” “Prejudice,” Jordan argued counter to Hearn‟s 
perception, “has not hampered our progress.”
151
 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding Hearn‟s weaknesses in the area of public relations and 
cooperation with locals, the Hearn era could still be characterized as successful on several 
fronts. Since poverty rates did not have time to significantly dip during the short time that 
Hearn was director, his success was predicated primarily on bringing in historic amounts 
of money. According to the North Carolina Fund, Hearn “took advantage of the money 
available from the OEO perhaps more than any other rural CAP in the country.”
152
 
Federal money helped to jumpstart several innovative and successful programs to combat 
the sources of poverty in Eastern North Carolina in ways never seen before, namely 
Manpower Improvement Through Community Effort (MITCE), the Strawberry 
Marketing Cooperative, the Mobile Dental Unit, and Adult Basic Education Recruitment 
(ABER), each of which will be discussed in later chapters. Hearn was also justified in 
feeling proud that the COP board membership involved most sectors of the population of 
New Bern and Craven County under his directorship.
153
 Finally, with Hearn as the head 
of Craven‟s antipoverty effort, COP enjoyed a good deal of autonomy from OEO, which 
rarely felt compelled to intervene in local affairs. A North Carolina Fund report clarifies 
that in the CAA‟s first year, “COP encountered no serious difficulties with OEO in 
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meeting guidelines or in obtaining program grants. Relations between the two probably 
couldn‟t be any better” with both “placing unbounded trust in the other,” in part because 
Hearn had made contacts in OEO while serving on the Task Force and that “Hearn saw 
his reference group as the federal government.”
154
 If poverty could have been cured alone 
by being awarded vast amounts of federal funds, involving all sectors of the community 
in the planning process, and following OEO demands, Craven may have been able to 
obliterate poverty completely. Yet, there were many issues left to deal with before an 
efficient antipoverty effort could be found, including new problems that arose because of 
Hearn‟s tight relationship with Washington, D.C. and subsequent poor relationship with 
the local community. Among those issues was the low participation rate of the poor, 
especially among the rural white poor who had come to believe, based on appearances, 
that the Johnson administration had created the War on Poverty at the exclusion of them, 
serving instead as an extension of the civil rights movement and nothing more. COP‟s 
choice of businessman and current board member Robert Monte as the new executive 
director—who proudly called himself Hearn‟s “loyal opposition”—reflected the 
seriousness with which its leaders would seek to improve its image in the community in 
hopes of reaching a greater number of the white poor. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
“CRAVEN OPERATION STANDSTILL” 
 
 
Introduction 
Moderate businessman Robert R. Monte was not the Fund‟s first choice for 
COP‟s next executive director. Fund director George Esser was happy about the 
relationship that he and the staff had developed with Hearn. Of the eleven Community 
Action Programs (CAPs) the Fund was helping to supervise, few if any of the executive 
directors agreed more than Hearn with the importance placed by the Fund upon the 
poor‟s participation in community action as well as the perceived need for rapid social 
change in local communities through the democratic process.
1
 Yet a desire to keep the 
antipoverty agency moving forward without interruption—along with strong 
recommendations by Craven County Commissioner D. L. Stallings and COP chairman 
Larry B. Pate—compelled Esser and his staff to reluctantly agree to Monte. As Esser‟s 
newly appointed Deputy Director Tom Hartmann reminded him in a memo, “Stallings 
and Pate have it within their power to destroy COP.”
2
 But while those in Durham 
accepted Monte as COP‟s new leader on the surface, a general distrust of Monte‟s 
viewpoints on the War on Poverty and his ability to effectively lead and coordinate the 
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North Carolina Fund, 139. 
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programs in reaching the poor to the Fund‟s satisfaction would remain within the Fund 
leadership. Unfortunately for Monte, his critics while head of COP would not be limited 
to the North Carolina Fund.  
In addition to George Esser and his staff, Monte would also draw heavy criticism 
from officials in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the U.S. Department of 
Labor, and a handful of COP staff hired to direct seemingly non-controversial programs 
such as Adult Basic Education Recruitment (ABER). One female staff of the ABER 
program would go as far as to describe COP under Monte as “Craven Operation 
Standstill.”
1
 But mounting criticism, and the strained relations that followed—which 
stemmed from various sources, including Monte‟s aim to better cooperate with and 
accede to the wishes of the COP board of directors, his desire to avoid upsetting or 
offending the broader community, and his approach of not pushing the growth of the 
antipoverty agency as fast as Hearn—were not entirely the fault of Monte. Factoring into 
these strained relations between himself and those listed above was the fact that the North 
Carolina Fund was undergoing a radical shift in objectives in 1966, and federal officials 
were seemingly starting to make more arbitrary administrative decisions. Nonetheless, 
despite the criticisms from those who had different beliefs in the proper methodology of 
running an antipoverty agency than he, some of COP‟s greatest successes were 
accomplished during Monte‟s tenure (October 1965 to October 1966), particularly within 
the Manpower training program. Monte‟s skill in gaining wider support among Craven‟s 
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white community was especially critical in assisting the progress of COP to better reach 
the poor, as were developments generally unrelated to Monte, including a greater local 
black voter influence following the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the fact that most of 
COP‟s programs began to run at full or near full potential for the first time. 
The reasons for placing faith in Monte 
Pate and Stallings first made their positive feelings about Monte known to the 
North Carolina Fund in a meeting with Tom Hartmann on October 12. The reasons the 
two COP leaders gave in defense of their choice for executive director indicated their 
practical understanding that the need to improve the image of COP in the white 
community would have to be balanced along with the need to maintain the financial 
support of the North Carolina Fund as well as OEO. As noted in chapters III and IV, COP 
leadership was mostly willing to cooperate with the early antipoverty philosophy of both 
entities and, thus, was not compelled to stretch themselves too much to meet the 
guidelines of either as it related to the participation of the poor or minorities. However, 
COP leadership also knew that it would not be difficult for the operation to lose the trust 
of the Fund or OEO if more attention was paid to the white poor at the expense of the 
black poor. Nor would it be difficult for COP to lose the trust and support of the black 
community which, in addition to being the largest beneficiary of the antipoverty 
programs, was becoming an ever more important political force within Craven. Keeping 
these realities in mind, Pate and Stallings outlined to Hartmann how Monte‟s strengths 
would benefit everyone connected with COP. Along with his status as a respected 
businessman, they greatly touted Monte‟s interest in involving poor whites (which Hearn 
256 
 
was far less interested in), his desire in getting “better press” for COP, and his ability to 
gain the support of COP staff and better coordinate the antipoverty programs of the 
Community Action Program (CAP). Just as important, Pate and Stallings promised that 
Monte who, despite being fiscally conservative, was known to be fair in race relations 
and would have the unanimous support of local blacks.  
In Hartmann‟s subsequent interview with Monte later that same day, which 
Stallings and Pate sat in on, Monte was asked several direct questions about his views of 
poverty and how he would approach the authority of the executive directorship. For 
Hartmann, Monte‟s answers were of mixed quality. As a memo to Esser revealed, he was 
particularly dissatisfied with Monte‟s understanding of the importance of involving the 
poor in planning operations. In Hartmann‟s opinion, Monte did not voice opposition to 
involving the poor at the policy level but appeared primarily concerned about increasing 
the vocational education opportunities in the area and helping to develop local 
employment opportunities. Hartmann also seemed unconvinced that Monte was aware 
that his so-called “bluntness and rigidity” would have to be avoided in his relationships 
with officials in Washington, D.C., even though Monte said he understood. Hartmann 
was perhaps most satisfied by Monte‟s answer to the final question he asked him, which 
concerned whether Monte had “a full appreciation of the reality of Negro power in 
Craven County” and if would he “be able to handle this reality.” After replying in the 
affirmative, Monte agreed with Pate and Stallings, both of whom had chimed in, that one 
of Jim Hearn‟s greatest contributions had been helping to convince the white community 
in Craven of these circumstances. After the interview, Hartmann reported to Esser that it 
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seemed that “we had no alternative at this point” but to accept Monte and pay him the 
executive director‟s salary.  “Pate and Stallings made it all too clear to me that Monte 
was their choice,” and thus “I must support Monte‟s selection because of the realities of 
the situation.” “On the other hand,” Hartmann continued, “no matter what Monte does or 
does not do, Negro power and the reality of COP exists.” Moreover, said Hartmann, “I 
believe that Stallings and Pate are committed to the future of COP and if Monte fails to 
continue the programs, either by inaction or a change of thrust, we will have every right 
to enter the picture again.”
2
  
Before George Esser would take any action on the appointment of COP‟s next 
executive director, however, he wanted to hear how local blacks would take the news if 
Robert Monte was selected. As Esser would discover during a lengthy conversation with 
Robert Whitehead, Pate and Stallings were not alone in their spirited support of Monte. 
Indeed, Whitehead told Esser rather emphatically that, in the opinion of himself, fellow 
black members of the COP board of directors, and the leaders of the other black 
organizations in the county, “Mr. Monte would have the support and respect of the Negro 
community as the Executive Director.”
3
 As Whitehead elucidated, while Monte was 
“relatively conservative in his political views, he is a liberal in terms of race relations.” 
According to Whitehead, who had recently spoken to Monte‟s employees at his rendering 
plant, Monte had the reputation of being “a fair and just employer” and was paying wages 
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“as high as any paid Negro labor in Craven County.” Even though Monte was “a man of 
pronounced opinions,” Whitehead added that he is “willing to discuss problems, to 
change his mind when convinced, and to admit when he is wrong.”  
Most likely for these same reasons, COP staff members informed Whitehead that 
they would have no issues with working under Monte and actually preferred him to other 
candidates. Last of all, Whitehead himself expressed the view that the hiring of a 
moderate like Monte could strengthen and improve the effectiveness of COP by 
garnering more approval for the operation‟s programs among both the business and low-
income white communities, the latter of which had expressed almost no interest at all in 
the local anti-poverty agency.
 4
 In praising Monte in this way, Whitehead reflected the 
same understanding held by Pate and Stallings; that broadening its base of public support 
was essential to COP‟s survival. Indeed, even though most black members of COP had 
disagreed strongly with whites on the board about whether or not Hearn should have been 
asked to resign as executive director, their shared support for Monte as Hearn‟s 
replacement reflected a cooperative and bi-racial vision for COP in going forward. 
After concluding that “any man who had the support of all elements of the 
community and who had the technical skills and understanding of the program,” was 
highly suitable for the position, Esser determined that Monte “should receive the 
agreement of The North Carolina Fund.” This decision, however, did not prevent Esser 
from reserving the right to get involved if Monte did not live up to the Fund‟s 
expectations. In addition, it was expected that Monte “would not attempt at the same time 
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to manage his business but would spend full time on the affairs of Craven Operation 
Progress.” Esser‟s decision to hire Monte was also contingent on the agreement Esser had 
reached with Whitehead and Stallings that, even though Monte would technically 
maintain the responsibility of hiring his own assistant, COP‟s Deputy Director should be 
a qualified black resident who had the confidence of the board‟s black members.
5
 Esser 
would still feel a need to validate his judgment in endorsing Monte, which he was able to 
do with a quick phone call to OEO officials. The final remaining task was a meeting of 
the COP board of directors during which they would vote on Monte.  
At the regularly scheduled COP board meeting on October 14 (which included 
Hearn who had officially resigned at the beginning of the proceedings), Stallings notified 
all present that he and board chairman Pate had received the blessings of George Esser, 
the North Carolina Fund, and the OEO to nominate Robert Monte for executive director. 
Stallings then went on to say that, with the exception of two or three people, Monte had 
the greatest knowledge of the programs and that this was one of many reasons he was 
absolutely sure that Monte would make an excellent executive director. After Monte 
temporarily left the room at Stallings‟ request, in fewer than five minutes, the board 
unanimously approved his appointment. Monte was given time to thank the board for 
their approval, after which Whitehead suggested that he would need an assistant and 
asked him to consider black public school principal Lee R. Morgan, a thirty-something 
transplant from Washington, D.C. who held a bachelor‟s degree from Howard University. 
Incidentally, Morgan‟s wife, Barbara Rivers Morgan, was the daughter of Bishop S. 
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Rivers, one of the most respected civil rights leaders in the area. Monte, who was already 
aware of Morgan‟s credentials as well as his connections, promised to give Whitehead‟s 
recommendation considerable thought.  
Work left to be done from Hearn era 
Seeking to take advantage of the fresh start embodied by the end of the Hearn era, 
board member Constance Rabin took the floor in the meeting‟s closing moments to 
politely remind fellow directors of their great responsibility to “sell these programs to the 
community.” “We should all try to work a little harder in interpreting these programs to 
the people,” she told them. Rabin became rather fervent, however, in calling on 
naysayers—although it was not clear whether she was directing her admonishment to the 
audience, the board, or both—to realize that merely criticizing instead of “picking out the 
best parts” of the programs only “hurts the image of COP.” She also prompted them not 
to forget that “the agencies are trying to do something they had not been able to do in the 
past because of the lack of money.”
6
 
Rabin was perfectly right. On the day that Hearn resigned, evidence abounded 
that interpretation of COP‟s programs to the people in and around Craven could be 
greatly improved. Efforts to reach poor whites were especially crucial, as this population, 
generally speaking, appeared to be not only largely apathetic but physically and mentally 
resistant at times, largely as a result of a limited knowledge of COP and its programs. In 
October 1965, the boards of most if not all of the  North Carolina Fund‟s eleven CAPs 
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included one or more representatives of the poor, including the COP board, which had 
had three low-income whites and four low-income blacks for approximately three 
months. Yet, for the white poor, inclusion had not led to regular involvement.
7
 For 
example, Otis Ipock, a white rural tenant farmer, had never once attended a board 
meeting and had not even known that he had ever been named to the board. As Ipock told 
John Miller of the North Carolina Fund in a one-on-one interview, he did not have 
“anything to do with the organization” and his only knowledge of COP came from the 
three times that the Craven Manpower Improvement Through Community Effort 
(MITCE) program contacted him at his home in 1965. Moreover, it was during this 
interview with Miller in October 1966 that Ipock claimed to have first heard that he had 
even been recommended to join the COP board. According to Miller, Ipock had “no idea 
what [COP] is doing or what is happening with it” and showed little concern that he had 
missed the opportunity to participate on the board.
8
  
Through little fault of his own, Ipock was aptly dropped from the board of 
directors under Monte‟s tenure for failure to attend any meetings. He would not be the 
only poor white representative to be dismissed from the COP board for lack of 
attendance, however. The other two poor white representatives, Mrs. Ketchum and Mrs. 
Holton, were also dismissed because they had attended no more than two board meetings 
between them from July to October 1965. That none of the original poor white 
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representatives on the board had demonstrated any sustained interest in COP, and at least 
one had never agreed to serve at all, reflected more than Hearn‟s indifference to genuine 
involvement of poor whites within the anti-poverty program. These conditions also 
seemed to indicate a widespread opinion within the poor white community that COP 
offered them little if any benefit and that their input would probably not make a positive 
difference in their lives.  
The vast majority of poor whites would not participate in COP for a variety of 
reasons, not least of which was a lack of reliable transportation from the rural county to 
COP headquarters in New Bern. Transportation issues may have explained, at least in 
part, why the two female poor white representatives attended so few COP board 
meetings. Poor whites had decent participation rates in the rural strawberry marketing 
cooperative, for instance, in part because the program allowed them to stay in the vicinity 
of their own homes. Even so, taking into account the fact that whites at the Trent Court 
housing project were far less involved than their black counterparts at nearby Craven 
Terrace, other factors, such as ignorance of COP programs and philosophy, distrust of 
government programs, satisfaction with or acceptance of their circumstances, racial 
prejudices, and a general feeling of exclusion, better explain the behavior of poor whites 
in Eastern North Carolina toward the War on Poverty.
9
 Many poor whites‟ dislike for or 
disinterest in COP was based upon more than one of these factors.  
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in Craven was low in comparison to that of blacks. A North Carolina Fund survey of low-income families 
in the area conducted between July and December 1965 found that only one-fifth of the over 200 
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The reports completed by Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) workers 
who recruited poor people for Adult Basic Education (ABER) during the summer of 1965 
are fairly illustrative of the varying viewpoints of poor whites in Eastern North Carolina. 
VISTA workers assigned to Jones County, most of whom were white college-age out-of-
staters, reported to their supervisor that participation was frustratingly low, in part 
because “there seems to be the idea that we are civil rights workers.” But even after the 
volunteers dispelled this notion, the problem of “getting the people to realize their need 
for this basic education” still remained because “there is a certain suspicion towards us 
offering something for nothing.” One of the VISTA volunteers placed in Pamlico County, 
who reportedly signed up thirteen adults for classes, similarly testified that “Many 
despise Craven Operation Progress, Inc” and noted that the people he met were 
“lukewarm at best toward education.” He also commented that he thought it might have 
been “unwise for VISTA to adopt a policy of sending volunteers away from their home 
areas,” since, in his view, some of the poor had a tendency to be wary of outsiders. 
Although VISTA workers were far more successful in recruiting within Craven County, 
they still encountered a measure of distrust from poor whites. One of the two VISTA 
workers there, who signed up as many as ninety-five of the 110 she interviewed, 
described how she had felt resented before she was able to explain that “we have come 
here to help all that need help regardless of race.” The other VISTA worker from Craven 
                                                                                                                                                 
respondents in Craven, where the majority of poor whites resided, were familiar with COP compared to 
two-fifths of respondents in New Bern, where a sizeable portion of the black community in Craven lived. 
See North Carolina Fund Survey of Low Income Families in North Carolina, Characteristics of Individuals 
in Areas Served by Craven County Community Action Program, Report no. 3e, August 1967, North 
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found that, even though “Most of the county is not aware that Basic Adult Education 
classes exist,” many of the poor were receptive to the idea. Yet, after perceiving what he 
observed as the “social stigma” that surrounded COP because it predominately assisted 
blacks, he felt the key to greater participation by the white poor was finding a proper 
balance between pushing too hard and not pushing hard enough.  
While issues of race colored the decisions of poor whites throughout Eastern 
North Carolina, the VISTA volunteers in Onslow County were the only ones to give 
considerable attention to how fears over integration within the classroom were a major 
problem. As one of them explained in their report, “Some of the people I have talked to 
are very strongly against the Negro and say they don‟t want to attend classes because 
they might have to sit next to a Negro.” Other poor whites in nearby counties, including 
those who feared that the VISTAs were civil rights workers, probably felt the same way 
but either did not express it in such terms to the VISTAs or were not contacted about the 
adult basic education classes. In general, the VISTAs found the black poor to be the most 
receptive to adult education, followed by some white poor who were already recipients of 
welfare and who had been told that their local welfare department head supported the 
ABER program.
10
 
Taking into consideration that these VISTA reports supply one-sided 
perspectives, the attitudes of poor whites that they describe are unsurprising as well as 
realistic. It was not unexpected, for instance, for poor whites to feel that COP programs 
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catered to blacks; they could conclude as much by simple observation. Undoubtedly, 
blacks made up a majority of participants in most COP programs, both as a result of Jim 
Hearn‟s special campaigning in the black communities and a comparably higher degree 
of black poverty, that in turn fostered greater enthusiasm. In addition, some of the 
eligibility requirements of programs such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) 
program, which were specifically designed by the U.S Department of Labor, also 
prevented whites from enjoying equal access to the program. For example, a youth from a 
nonfarm family of seven persons or more, whose annual family income was not in excess 
of $5,090, was eligible for NYC while a youth in a farm family of the same size would 
only be eligible if the annual family income did not exceed $3,560. The same eligibility 
rules held true for a nonfarm family of three whose annual income could not exceed 
$2,440 and a farm family of the same size whose income could not exceed $1,710.
11
 
Whether or not these rules were intentionally designed by the Department of Labor to 
give preference to youth in urban areas, most of whom were black, is of limited 
importance. In Craven County, where the vast majority of nonfarm families were white, 
the end result was that many more black youth were eligible for NYC.  
Feelings of racial animosity or racial superiority towards blacks notwithstanding, 
the reactions of poor whites in and around Craven were not surprising in light of the fact 
that many of the nation‟s CAAs, including most of those sponsored by the North Carolina 
Fund, had difficulty attracting white participation. Sargent Shriver acknowledged this 
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problem before Congress in April 1965. “A statistic frequently overlooked in this war 
against poverty,” he affirmed, “is that 80 percent of the poor people in America are not 
Negroes.”
12
 Numerous demographic and social variables explain the nationwide gap 
between white and black participation in the War on Poverty, however, one cannot 
overlook the degree to which the black civil rights movement informed President 
Johnson‟s evolving vision of the Economic Opportunity Act and which population he 
believed it could most help. Between his June 1965 address to the graduating class of 
Howard University in Washington, D.C. and the onslaught of riots in the low-income Los 
Angeles neighborhood of Watts two months later, it became apparent that Johnson 
believed that America‟s black population, many of whom had suffered for decades under 
the restrictive policies of Jim Crow, would not only benefit most from the federal 
antipoverty effort but were also most deserving of such assistance. As a strong supporter 
of both the Johnson administration and the War on Poverty, COP executive director Jim 
Hearn certainly shared Johnson‟s convictions, and had therefore tended to favor black 
participation over white with regard to COP. The poor whites in Eastern North Carolina 
who would have benefited from COP programs but opted out because of issues related to 
race could have chosen to overlook the ratio of black-to-white participation but, 
understandably, they did not want to participate in programs that they believed were not 
truly intended for them or designed with them in mind.  
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The low level of poor white participation in COP had become an undeniable 
problem by October 1965, but there was another area that COP board member Constance 
Rabin thought could be improved by an enhanced effort on the part of herself and fellow 
board of directors to interpret the programs to the community. Until this time, the local 
forces in favor of COP had been greater than those against it—most white businessmen, 
in particular, understood the boost that COP brought to the local economy—but concern 
remained that this balance could shift if Craven‟s white middle- and upper-classes did not 
stay well informed about the programs and their progress.
 13
 As COP Chairman Larry 
Pate observed, support from the community at-large had fallen off considerably as a 
result of how Hearn ran the organization. “In the beginning we all were really interested 
in this program [and] what it could mean to our poor people,” Pate told the North 
Carolina Fund‟s John Miller.  “We wanted to help people help themselves.” Yet, as Pate 
saw it, Hearn “turned out to be a missionary for civil rights” and the program “got off to a 
bad start as he rubbed people the wrong way.” After Hearn “threatened several times to 
have thousands of Negroes on the New Bern streets,” Pate recalled that “People who had 
been with us since the beginning backed off and began to criticize what we were trying to 
do.” “I was disappointed in George Esser,” Pate also disclosed to Miller. “We talked with 
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him about Hearn but he said we couldn‟t fire him. Somehow we couldn‟t get through to 
George that Hearn was hindering racial understanding rather than helping.”
14
 
 Mrs. Grady McCotter, chair of the New Bern Planning Board, was one of the 
middle-class white citizens who, besides having doubts about COP, still “had a bad taste 
in their mouth” from the Hearn era. Although she saw COP as necessary, especially for 
blacks, she believed that when Hearn took over “the program went too fast” and that not 
enough emphasis was placed on education and job training. She also resented that some 
of the black NYC enrollees had reportedly “waved their paychecks in the faces of some 
of the city employees” and had not been appropriately reprimanded by their supervisors. 
In part because of her lack of faith that COP could be redirected, McCotter did not think 
it would be productive to consider coordinating the activities of the city planning board 
with the goals of COP.
15
 A similar lack of faith informed the decision of the Cove City 
town council who, believing that NYC was not well liked in their community, voted in 
September 1965 against accepting a contract with the Department of Labor for a local 
beautification project. Cove City Mayor D.M. Grady, who was greatly outnumbered, 
found the decision especially unfortunate because, in his view, the community needed the 
work and the federal government was willing to pay for it.
16
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COP efforts to rebuild support that had been lost would not be achieved 
overnight. In fact, such efforts would face an uphill battle with a less-than-sympathetic 
group of local newspaper editors whose negative opinions had not softened in spite of 
Hearn‟s resignation. J. Gaskill McDaniel, who ran the New Bern Mirror, came to believe 
that COP was “corrupt, dishonest, disgraceful, and a big waste of money” and wrote 
editorials accordingly, while the editors at the Sun Journal relegated material given to 
them by the COP staff to a section titled “Negro News.”
17
 COP also had to compete with 
leading commentary from WRAL-TV executive director Jesse Helms whose growing 
number of negative portrayals of President Johnson‟s Great Society programs, generally 
speaking, helped to influence viewers in Eastern North Carolina who were less than fully 
familiar with COP or its merits. In his Viewpoint editorial on October 29, 1965, for 
example, Helms would share his understanding of the “progress” of the War on Poverty: 
“A year ago, your money was being spent at the rate of $245,000 per minute,” he 
satirized. “Now that Lyndon Johnson has shifted gears, it‟s being dished out at the rate of 
$266,000 per minute.”
18
 Hoping to counter the criticism coming from conservatives both 
inside and outside Craven, North Carolina Fund staffer Billy Barnes was assigned to 
produce an educational film, “Questions,” that was to be shown to COP board of 
directors, local civic clubs, church groups, and other community members to underscore 
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the purpose of the anti-poverty program and what had been accomplished.
19
 Filming 
began soon after Hearn resigned and would be completed by 1966. Some of the most 
pertinent issues the film sought to address revolved around race and the involvement of 
the federal government in anti-poverty programs. In the narrator‟s words, those who 
watched the film would either be informed or reminded that “poverty is not limited in 
Craven to one race,” that COP consisted of “local people solving local problems,” and 
that “if Craven doesn‟t use this money to fight its problems, some other community will 
be glad to have it.”
20
 
 
 
Figure 21. Robert Monte (on right) leading a COP board meeting, circa 1966. Still image from “Questions” 
1966, produced by Billy E. Barnes, North Carolina Collection. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Esser, My Years at the North Carolina Fund, 146.  
 
20
 North Carolina Fund, “Questions” film, 1966, North Carolina Collection.  
 
271 
 
Improving the Image of COP 
To say that unsettled issues remained or that work was still to be done when 
Robert Monte officially took over as COP‟s next executive director on October 20, 1965, 
would be an understatement. However, a confident Monte promised to tackle the 
challenges before him quite differently than Hearn, but without any “radical changes” in 
the operation of COP.
21
  If, as the North Carolina Fund claimed, Hearn had seen his 
reference group as the federal government, Monte would see his reference group as the 
local agencies, board members, and the community at-large. Of these groups, the COP 
board of directors was perhaps the most enthusiastic about the hiring of Monte. Although 
the board had been pleased with the funding progress made during Hearn‟s tenure, many 
agency-oriented board members felt that they had not been sufficiently consulted or 
involved in decision-making due to Hearn‟s tendency to supply the board and local 
agencies only with what he considered to be essential information. This past operating 
procedure was changed immediately with Monte‟s arrival. In line with the board 
leadership‟s desire for “someone opposite from Hearn,” Monte began to regularly consult 
with the directors and to ask for their input before he made any major or final decisions.
22
  
Monte would also depart from Hearn‟s precedent by engaging heavily in the public 
relations side of COP. For one, he showed respect and openly courted the local media 
rather than continuing to alienate them and helped to create the position for COP‟s first 
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Public Information Officer.
23
 Monte also made strong efforts to attract whites into the 
programs, especially through NYC, and regularly attended local civic club meetings in 
which he answered questions, emphasized that most poverty programs were administered 
by local organizations instead of the federal government, and encouraged the public to 
visit COP headquarters to see first-hand what the programs were accomplishing.
24
 A 
month into his new position, Monte sent out thirty thousand letters inviting community 
people to take a tour of COP during office hours to learn more about its programs.
25
 All 
of these actions were in line with one of the primary reasons that Monte was hired, which 
was to improve the image of COP among the community, especially among whites who 
believed it was first a civil rights organization and second an anti-poverty program. Also 
in line with this goal was Monte‟s plan to enlist the community itself in changing COP 
from a “Poverty Program” into what he referred to as an “Education Program” that would 
focus even more intently on improving the employability of the local poor, both black 
and white. Like most Americans at the time, Monte took the conservative-to-moderate 
position that the habits and attitudes of the poor helped to explain why they were poor 
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and in the minority and that, in order for true poverty reduction to occur, these habits and 
attitudes would have to be transformed to a greater degree than those of the larger 
society.  
 
 
Figure 22. Miss Patricia Giles of Oriental in Pamlico County, center, was one of several NYC Corps 
enrollees of the month which the Sun Journal began to publish after Monte took over as executive director. 
“Corps Enrollee of Month,” Sun Journal, May 25, 1966. 
 
 
Most of the new changes Monte sought to implement as head of COP derived 
from his less-than-liberal views of the purposes of the War on Poverty, which he 
uniquely preferred to call the “War on Ignorance.” Monte also placed a considerable 
amount of responsibility on the poor to take advantage of opportunities of self-uplift. 
“We are not going to eradicate poverty and ignorance in Craven County,” Monte told the 
New Bern Rotary Club in one of his first public appearances, “but we‟re going to give 
these people a chance to get out if they want to take it.”
 26
 The bulk of these views, which 
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Monte wrote down soon after he was hired, were shared with the North Carolina Fund‟s 
Tom Hartmann. These notes, which Hartmann would send on to George Esser, mainly 
provided fodder for the Fund to dedicate special attention, in Hartmann‟s words, to 
“developing Monte along our own lines.”
27
 One of the politically incorrect beliefs Monte 
jotted down was that “the great society is not one big class—it means only that everyone 
has the opportunity to reach, by working and earning it himself, whatever goals he 
desires…It is a modern version of the „Horatio Alger‟ success story.” 
28
 Although the 
North Carolina Fund continued to advocate improvement to the livelihoods of the poor 
through education, by late 1965, Esser and leaders were also beginning to believe that the 
poor could benefit by engagement in demonstrations and other confrontations with the 
power structure as well as with any other entity (such as the local housing authority or the 
local employer) that the poor felt were exploiting them or treating them unfairly. 
Historians Korstad and Leloudis phrased the shift this way: “As the Fund and its 
community partners set about their work in earnest, the issue of justice pressed heavily 
upon them, eventually demanding that they reconsider the assumptions, tactics, and 
alliances that they brought to bear on the „monstrous problem‟ of poverty.”
29
 In other 
words, the Fund no longer saw local power structures as necessarily reliable partners in 
ending poverty and no longer saw the poor as mostly capable of overcoming poverty 
through their own motivation and/or changes in habits. It is no surprise, then, that the 
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Fund was less impressed by Monte‟s emphasis on the importance of programs to promote 
better dress and personal appearance, improved speech, and dependability as 
enhancements to one‟s ability to gain employment. The Fund probably found little to 
criticize in Monte‟s desire to raise the rates of participation among the white poor whose 
“pride or prejudice,” Monte wrote, had made them reluctant to participate despite their 
needs to “be educated out of ignorance.” Still, the Fund found his central push for more 
vocational education and manpower training for the poor, while important, to be less than 
adequate.
30
  
The role that Monte’s background would play 
Monte‟s background in private industry and the military, in comparison‟s to 
Hearn‟s background in government and charitable work, explains much about Monte‟s 
more conservative trajectory as executive director of COP. Monte‟s perspective as a 
businessman, in particular, informed his view that in order to escape poverty the poor 
must be made employable. The fact that Monte had lived in New Bern for at least thirteen 
years, whereas Hearn had been new to the area in August 1964, also helps to explain 
Monte‟s decision to run the antipoverty program less aggressively. Born in Westchester 
County, New York, in 1921, Robert Monte enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1942, served in 
several campaigns in the South Pacific, and attained the rank of Captain. After his 
discharge, Monte graduated from the University of Delaware and next worked his way up 
to president of the Joseph B. Beste Company, followed by employment and the eventual 
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presidency of the Milltown Realty Company (both of which were located in Wilmington, 
Delaware). Looking for an opportunity to earn more money and escape the brutal winters 
of the “Diamond State,” in 1952 Monte left Wilmington with his wife and two children 
for the historic coastal town of New Bern, North Carolina. As a former resident of 
Delaware, Monte was part of the influx of white Northerners to New Bern who were in 
search of a warmer climate and less crowded atmosphere, beginning in the 1950s. Due in 
part to this influx, Craven County as a whole saw a 20 percent increase in its population 
between 1950 and 1960 even with a minus 13 rate of net migration for the non-white 
population during the same period.
31
  
Just prior to this move, Monte received a diploma from the Fort Belvoir 
Engineering School in Fairfax, Virginia, that would help him to start up the business 
known as Craven Rendering Company. Soon after Monte and his family settled in New 
Bern, his background of leadership and national service seemed to stimulate him to 
become involved in his new community, which he did by joining numerous organizations 
including the Eastern Carolina Yacht Club, the New Bern Golf and Country Club, the 
New Bern Elks Club, the First Presbyterian Church, the local Boy Scout troop, and the 
New Bern 4-H clubs.
32
 Prior to his COP board appointment in 1965, Monte also 
socialized with Craven‟s leading citizens through his memberships in the local Chamber 
of Commerce and the Craven Industrial Development Company. During his time on the 
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COP board of directors, Monte‟s business savvy and the respect he earned in the 
community landed him positions on the COP executive committee as well as the twelve-
member committee of the Small Business Administration program, the latter of which 
strove to create more local jobs by helping small businessmen to apply for loans under 
the EOA, providing management counseling to applicants, surveying business needs, and 
suggesting how businessmen might meet those needs.
33
  
As clear as it was that Bob Monte had his own interpretation of the War on 
Poverty apart from the North Carolina Fund and was more interested in pleasing the 
power structure than Hearn had been, Monte was arguably a far more complex and 
serious individual than the Fund staff typically portrayed him to be in their reports and 
internal memos. After recruiting a temporary replacement to run his rendering company, 
Monte immediately went to work gathering information about COP from Hearn, 
particularly in the areas of future programs, projects, and plans, in addition to reviewing 
all existing programs with program directors to learn what might have to be done to more 
efficiently and effectively reach the poor.
34
 Arguably, the seriousness with which Monte 
assumed the job of executive director in the very beginning was indicative of his passion 
to help improve the community, given that his decision to accept the position was 
probably not based upon the $15,000 he stood to earn. (Monte‟s combined $25,000 
annual earnings as head of both Craven Rendering and Monte Enterprises, Inc., the latter 
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of which designed models of historic sites, already well exceeded this respectable salary). 
Early on in his administration of COP, Monte also showed a willingness and open-
mindedness to expand the scope and number of programs offered. Within the first month 
of his tenure as executive director, not only did he approve a merger of COP with the 
CAAs of Jones and Pamlico counties, he likewise approved the addition of a federal 
credit union after reassessing his earlier belief that the costs outweighed its benefits.
35
  
As the head of COP, Monte experimented with a multitude of innovative ideas of 
his own. One was the establishment of a state-run vocational high school in the Craven 
area. Although this idea was ultimately discouraged by the Chairman of the North 
Carolina State Board of Education, Dr. W.D. Herring, who argued that the state board 
believed in “comprehensive high schools—schools that offer every student every 
opportunity to develop all of his talents,” Monte would not be dissuaded from 
experimenting with future ways to grow COP.
36
 Neither would he be completely 
dissuaded from endorsing either the addition or the renewal of programs when doing so 
conflicted with the wishes of elements of the power structure. His support of NYC, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter, was one illustrative example. Monte‟s general 
open-mindedness, which was a result of his desire to lead COP into a more successful 
era, also characterized his dealings with the black community, first made apparent in his 
hiring of black school principal Lee Morgan as Deputy Director (at first urged by Robert 
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Whitehead). Monte would have preferred to hire someone of his own choosing, but he 
had come to understand, as a result of both his time as a board member and additional 
reminders from D. L. Stallings and the North Carolina Fund, that COP could not operate 
smoothly or effectively without the support of Craven‟s leading black citizens. Monte 
must have also been aware that his job security as executive director would likely be in 
jeopardy with the North Carolina Fund if he did not agree to Morgan‟s appointment. 
Therefore, with the support of Robert Whitehead and members of the Combined Civic 
Organization of New Bern and Craven County, Monte agreed on December 6, 1965, to 
officially bring Morgan in to assist him in his administrative responsibilities.  
Monte‟s ability to be flexible did not prevent him from making tough decisions, 
however. In January 1966, only three months into his directorship, Monte ordered a 
couple of VISTA volunteers out of Craven Terrace where they had led demonstrations 
against New Bern Housing Authority Director I.I. Blanford, who remained unwilling to 
upgrade the housing projects‟ buildings and grounds to the satisfaction of the tenants or 
to revoke his policy of evicting women who bore additional children out of wedlock.
37
 
Monte‟s order was based not on a desire to protect Blanford but on a need to maintain a 
positive image of COP, whose by-laws prevented employees and affiliates from 
participating in demonstrations. North Carolina Fund staff members would disapprove of 
this action, but Monte‟s position on demonstrations was not made precariously nor was it 
substantially out of line with the current thinking of the War on Poverty leadership. A 
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month earlier, in December 1965, OEO director Sargent Shriver had made headlines over 
a Chicago speech in which he openly called on the poor to agree to work with the 
establishment. During the speech, as approximately two hundred supporters of the 
Woodlawn Organization protested outside with signs that read “The War on Poverty is a 
Big Fraud,” Shriver clarified that “maximum feasible participation” meant that the poor 
would be significant participants but not that they would run the anti-poverty programs. 
Just as no one should “prejudge the poor and say they don‟t have any ideas,” Shriver 
asserted, neither should one “prejudge the establishment.” After denying that he was 
buckling under pressure from city mayors (e.g. Richard Daley) in making his comments, 
Shriver reassured his audience that OEO would not give up on pushing for the poor‟s 
participation in community action agencies.
 38
 Indeed, Shriver would continue to 
withhold funds for CAAs in several cities including Los Angeles, Cleveland, Memphis, 
San Antonio, Mobile, Atlanta, St. Louis, and Albany, due to what he considered a lack of 
participation by the poor.
39
 Shriver had clearly realized the necessity of a balanced 
approach to the War on Poverty in which OEO policies would alienate neither the poor 
nor the majority of middle-class taxpayers. Similar to Shriver, Monte understood in order 
for COP to survive, both the community and the local officials who accepted the funds 
and programs must generally be in favor of the organization. For Monte, the primary way 
that COP would become better accepted and poverty would be most effectively overcome 
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would not be through increased demonstrations but through increased and better-paying 
job opportunities for the poor.   
Manpower begins to attract community support, January 1966 
By January 1966, the growing success of the Manpower Improvement Through 
Community Effort (MITCE) program would reveal that Craven County residents—black 
and white as well as poor and non-poor—were just as supportive as Monte of a job-
focused antipoverty initiative. MITCE, an experimental program developed and 
supervised by the North Carolina Fund, promised to reach at least five thousand 
unemployed rural persons in its first year, including adults from farm families earning 
less than $1,200 a year. The ways that MITCE intended to reach this population included 
on-the-job training, direct job placement, employment counseling, vocational guidance, 
and all other means approved by the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) 
of 1962 to secure steady employment or enhance future employability.
40
 Most of the 
funding for the demonstration phase of MITCE was provided by the U.S. Department of 
Labor under the Office of Manpower, Automation, and Training (OMAT) and was 
originally limited to the area of three North Carolina Fund CAPs in Eastern North 
Carolina, one of which was COP.
41
 As outlined by the North Carolina Fund, one of the 
key purposes of MITCE was to validate that on-the-job training is “a realistic and 
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desirable training device in rural areas” and is “the most efficient way of meeting the 
needs of the small employers who exist in these areas,” in hopes that similar projects 
could be funded in rural communities across the state and throughout the nation.
42
  
Prior to the War on Poverty, programs funded under the MDTA had been 
essentially limited to the unemployed who lived in urban centers where large private 
employers with nationwide operations, which were the most willing and able to 
efficiently train vast numbers of potential employees, were relatively abundant. Yet, even 
during the War on Poverty, as concluded in August 1965 by the National Association for 
Community Development (NACD), an organization of CAP officials whose board of 
directors included the North Carolina Fund‟s George Esser, “a comprehensive manpower 
development and employment program was the critical component lacking in a majority 
of community action endeavors,” many of which were rurally based. In addition, “forty 
percent of those persons eligible for training under the [MDTA] are farm workers earning 
less than $1,200 per year,” the NACD reported, “but only two percent of the trainees 
under the act come from this group.”
43
 The approval given to the North Carolina Fund in 
August 1965 to administer manpower programs under MITCE was an important step 
towards beginning to fill in the economic opportunity gap between rural and urban areas.  
The North Carolina Fund and the Department of Labor encouraged the expansion 
of manpower in North Carolina‟s predominately rural communities, such as Craven, for 
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many of the same reasons that MITCE had been so readily accepted in Craven by 
employers, potential employees, and community leaders. By the mid-1960s, at the same 
time that service-type jobs were on a historic rise, the nation‟s number of skilled and 
semi-skilled manufacturing jobs was also growing exponentially due to new consumer 
demands and technological advances that boosted efficient plant production. As a result, 
unskilled workers, who would represent less than 10 percent of the manufacturing 
production worker total in 1965, would become even further marginalized in the 
American economy.
44
 This trend was especially prominent in the South where since at 
least 1950 industrial growth was occurring far more quickly than the national rate.
45
 
Although highly skilled and value-added industry generally brought improved wages and 
elevated tax revenues to the region, its natural preference for workers with skilled 
experience and at least a high-school diploma (if not an advanced degree) also tended to 
upset the livelihoods of the low skilled and undereducated. Craven County officials and 
business leaders, who had jumped on the bandwagon of industrial development years 
before, were sensitive to the reality that their ability to continue to attract industry that 
bettered the lives of their own residents would be hamstrung by large numbers of low and 
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unskilled locals who possessed minimal education.
46
 The hiring practices of the Stanley 
Tools Company, which opened a plant in New Bern in the summer of 1964, were a case-
in-point.  
The growing need for job training skills 
A study compiled by the North Carolina Bureau of Employment Security 
Research between May and November 1965 found that more than 97 percent of the 
Stanley Company‟s 187 workers in New Bern had completed high school; of this group, 
approximately 40 percent (mostly accountants, machinists, and tool and die makers) had 
training beyond the high school level. Faced with a sizeable farm-based population in 
Craven where less than 50 percent of its adults had obtained a high school diploma, 
Stanley would predictably have to look elsewhere for much of its workforce.
47
 No data 
was gathered on race but, based on blacks‟ lack of access to industrial employment in the 
area and across the South due to a combination of educational deficiencies and white 
employer prejudices, it can be confidently assumed that few if any local blacks were 
hired. According to black COP board member Elizabeth Evans, of the black workers 
Stanley did hire, at least up to 1966, practically all were from outside the county.
48
 The 
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state study observed “no major emphasis” on hiring those with the “most experience” but 
did mention that more than 45 percent of the workers hired were not local and many 
traveled from out of the state or were transferred from the home office in Connecticut.
49
 
Clearly, Stanley‟s requirements for a more advanced employee could not then be fulfilled 
in the county where it was located. Although these requirements did not prevent several 
dozen white locals from finding employment at Stanley, non-locals would still make up 
almost half of the company‟s work force during its first eighteen months of operation. 
These and other findings resulted in the following conclusion by the NC Bureau of 
Employment Security Research: “Since Stanley Power Tools is a type of industry 
completely new to the New Bern area and experienced workers are generally not readily 
available in any appreciable number, a youthful and trainable labor supply is even more 
important.”
50
 Thus, though on different levels, white and black locals alike were at a 
disadvantage in gaining access to the type of higher-paying jobs they were seeking. As 
previously mentioned, poverty in Craven was largely due to a changing economy that 
required a more educated and skilled worker.  
Since 1962, in order to avoid situations in which future industrial employers, such 
as Stanley Power Tools, would be forced to search outside the county for employees, 
Craven County had helped to operate an industrial education center supported by the state 
board of education. The school, which was originally a subsidiary of Lenoir Community 
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College, had since attracted several hundred high school graduates from across Eastern 
North Carolina for a total of twelve classes offered; however, as the number of students 
began to grow in 1964 and 1965, Craven County board of education officials, local 
businessmen, and black and white civic leaders including COP board member Willie 
Dawson sought to establish a self-supporting center that would be given preference to 
Craven residents. On June 6, 1965, the state legislature gave Craven County permission 
to open such a center under the Technical Community Industrial Center Act.
51
 The 
establishment of the county-wide Industrial Education Center (IEC) was certainly a move 
in the right direction in terms of enhancing locals‟ chances of taking advantage of the 
growing number of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the area. However, the introduction of 
a more targeted approach, like MITCE, in which on-the-job training and counseling were 
designed to match the unemployed with employers‟ needs, would prove far more 
effective than industrial education classes alone in producing a genuinely efficient local 
labor market. As understood by both Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz and the 
President‟s Council of Economic Advisers, some of the most seriously unemployed, most 
notably younger workers and minorities who had been left out of the general educational 
and employment opportunity patterns, were in need of preparation and training measures 
aimed directly at them.
52
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MITCE in Craven would operate with exactly these needs in mind. At least six 
field representatives, several of whom were Eastern North Carolinians, were assigned to 
conduct door-to-door surveys in target areas of heavy unemployment, underemployment, 
and high incidence of poverty to discover the reasons for individuals‟ unemployment or 
lack of income as well as their families‟ employment needs. For North Carolina Fund 
MITCE director James C. McDonald, “one of the great strengths of this staff is its 
heterogeneous nature” according to “race, sex, age, educational levels, and social-
economic backgrounds.” “[T]hese trainees have the ability and interest, and were given 
the technical information,” McDonald added in an internal memo, “to provide a needed 
and successful service in Craven County.”
53
  
These field representatives‟ ultimate goal was to persuade the unemployed 
individuals to begin the screening and testing process that would presumably match them 
with an obliging local employer either through direct job placement or on-the-job 
training. If individuals could not be matched with an employer, because they were 
underage, lacked experience, or had educational deficiencies, or health issues, MITCE 
staff could refer them to NYC, Adult Basic Education classes, institutional training at the 
Craven IEC, the local health or welfare departments, or counseling provided by MITCE. 
As for the able-bodied, a Craven MITCE background paper noted that “Manpower 
realizes that the type of severely indigent and culturally deprived person is not always 
readily employable.” In addition to lacking experience and basic educational skills, the 
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paper went on to observe that “more often than not, they do not understand the 
responsibilities that go along with a job” such as the importance of being on time, coming 
regularly to work, and dressing and behaving professionally.
54
 Craven MITCE counselor 
Ken Williams agreed. “Many of these people have never known anything except poverty 
and joblessness. So they don‟t expect anything better.” Because they are “so used to 
living as they do, without the routine of a job,” if they “are not counseled before they are 
given a job, they won‟t do well in it.”
55
 For these reasons, counselors also promised to 
“stay in contact with the employer after the client has been put to work” to straighten out 
any issues that might arise between employer and employee/trainee.
56
 
Craven businessmen on board with MITCE 
In addition to the efforts of the field representatives and counselors, two training 
supervisors within MITCE each contacted at least one new local employer per week to 
learn about their labor needs and any immediate opportunities for placement of 
unemployed persons in jobs or on-the-job training. Sometimes a local employer would 
agree to sign a contract with Craven MITCE for direct placement but employers more 
often preferred the lower-risk option of on-the-job training, which also functioned as a 
trial period. Moreover, the training supervisors informed the employers that agreeing to 
contract with MITCE meant not only that they would be in charge of the requirements 
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and the number of weeks of the training but also that they would receive a certain amount 
of reimbursement to defray the costs of training. These offers of reimbursement were 
crucial in winning over employers to MITCE. Because many business owners in Craven 
County ran small operations of twenty-five workers or less, few could afford either the 
time or the money expense of training new workers, which placed inexperienced young 
persons at a particular disadvantage in finding employment. Yet employers may have 
been won over just as much, if not more, by the fact that MITCE supervisors pre-
screened the potential trainees, thereby weeding out those not genuinely committed to a 
five-day work week or prepared for the jobs in which they might be placed. Several 
employers who agreed to contract with MITCE, such as mechanic foreman Jack Jones of 
Johnson Automotive in New Bern, had expressed frustration over their past experiences 
of recruiting in poorer sections of the county and being disappointed with the unreliable 
workers they found. Jones later reported complete satisfaction with one of his new 
employees, a former tenant farmer discovered through MITCE. “He‟s doing a fine job. 
He is going to make a fine mechanic. He has an interest in the job, and that‟s what really 
counts,” said Jones, adding that “I think the Manpower program is a good thing.”
57
  
Jack Jones was one of a growing number of businessmen in Craven who found 
that MITCE suited their needs and preferences, as seen by training supervisor field 
reports between October 1965 and January 1966. Even those who were not hiring at the 
time expressed approval of the manpower program. “I was surprised and pleased with the 
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reception I got,” Dave Sasser wrote after interviewing potential employers in Havelock. 
“All of the businessmen I contacted were overwhelmingly in favor of the program.”
58
 
MITCE supervisor Charlie Boyd received the same type of positive feedback from local 
businessmen, many of whom agreed to a manpower contract for trainees. One of those 
employers told Boyd that “matching men with jobs were the right move” while another 
affirmed that “this program is great for the employees and employer.”
59
 Boyd and other 
Craven MITCE representatives heard similar statements from many more businessmen in 
terms of how the manpower program helped both employer and employee and, in turn, 
the overall community. Clearly, the North Carolina Fund understood in forming MITCE 
that there was “a shortage of good labor in some areas of the state.”
60
 This shortage was 
so severe in Craven that some employers, for example the head of the Waco Sales 
Company, signed a contract for trainees for reasons other than reimbursement. The Waco 
president admitted that the reimbursement helped but that his ultimate interest had been 
in securing two qualified and pre-screened workers.
61
 Another example was the manager 
of Belk‟s Department Store in New Bern who was in such need of reliable workers that 
he was willing to hire a MITCE client even after the man, who was black, had failed pre-
qualifying tests because he was, in the manager‟s view, prompt, neatly dressed, and 
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courteous.
62
 Between September 1965 and January 1966, fourteen contracts were 
activated with a variety of local employers for thirty on-the-job training enrollees, both 
black and white. These fourteen employers—whose job openings were almost always of 
a higher status and on an improved wage scale than the trainees had previously held—
included Charles Jennett Brick Masonry, Commodore Boats, Precision Machine Works, 
Inc., Tryon Palace, Craven Lumber, Carnival Candy, Johnson Automotive, and W. R. 
Poole Construction.
63
   
The positive reception that Craven MITCE received from local businessmen so 
early in its demonstration phase was rather remarkable given that many of these 
businessmen, most of whom were small businessmen and politically conservative, had 
made it clear in the past that they were not strongly in favor or were even directly 
opposed to COP and the War on Poverty. Although many of the employers contacted by 
MITCE never had anyone explain the manpower concept to them before, almost all who 
needed workers became open to the idea, including an employer at New Bern‟s WNBE 
radio station who had originally told Charlie Boyd that he wanted “nothing to do with 
any affiliate of the poverty program.”
64
 This apparent disconnect did not necessarily 
mean, however, that these businessmen were behaving as hypocrites. Their dislike for 
COP was based in part on of a lack of knowledge of the programs as well as a sense that 
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either manpower was a “give-away program,” overly wasteful of tax payer money, or 
interested primarily in bestowing preferences upon blacks, or all three. These men 
certainly participated largely out of their own financial self-interest; however the 
program‟s philosophy that with a new job the unemployed who “had once been a drag on 
the local economy” could become “useful, tax-paying citizen[s]” also fit their 
worldview.
65
 Many advocated the program from a similar belief to Robert Monte‟s that 
“There is dignity and satisfaction for every person that does a job or performs a service 
that is done well—both to the employee and employer.”
66
  
Businessmen who may have originally believed that funding for the program was 
excessive became convinced that this was not so; moreover, they saw its tangible results 
first- hand. In addition, many of these businessmen, particularly those affiliated with 
larger and well-respected employers such as Belk‟s, Tryon Palace, and Commodore 
Boats, had long been expected to contribute to the well-being of their community by 
volunteering their time or money including becoming involved in a civic group or 
donating to the local Red Cross.
67
 Because of the direct assistance manpower brought 
them and their feeling that by participating in it they were helping to alleviate the local 
unemployment problem, conservative businessmen could and did widely support MITCE 
in spite of its origins as a government-backed program. But MITCE did not just match 
employees with the interests and needs of employer. It also served the interests of the 
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poor and unemployed, most of who desired the benefits of steady employment. MITCE 
reduced some of the ways, both intentional and unintentional, that employers 
discriminated in their hiring processes; these included preferring to hire kin (at least 
within family-operated establishments) and relying on word of mouth and current 
employee recommendations. These and other methods had tended to exclude job 
applicants who were not of employers‟ race and social class. Whether or not Craven 
employers—most of whom were white—understood the changes that were happening 
around them, MITCE offered them never-before-seen incentives to be more open to 
training or hiring those they might not have considered or those they might have feared 
giving a chance to before, most notably blacks. “Many fears disappear when you get to 
know a person,” Sarah Herbin of the North Carolina Good Neighbor Council once told a 
group of Wake County Democratic Women in 1964. “And the best way to get to know a 
person is to work with him.”
68
 
Biracial beliefs in a conventional path to economic freedom 
For years black residents in and around New Bern had sought well-paying jobs 
like those held by middle-class whites; since at least 1960 black civil rights leaders had 
been engaged in concerted efforts to garner such jobs for their community. One of the 
later attempts by civil rights leaders to persuade white business owners to hire came in 
June 1965 in the form of a letter from member organizations of the Combined Civic 
Organization of Craven County and New Bern addressed to the thirty-one largest 
employers in the area. “On June 15, 1965,” the letter read, “Craven County employers 
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offer little more equal opportunity employment than they did one year ago” (before the 
passage of the  Civil Rights Act of 1964). The letter writers went on to remind the 
business owners that Title VII of the 1964 bill would go into effect on July 2, 1965 and to 
ask “therefore, to help now…to hire now. This is our opportunity, as responsible citizens 
of Craven County, to secure to our people today the benefits of equal opportunity 
employment and to secure to our children tomorrow a better community in which to 
live.” While the letter suggested that business owners contact Father Thomas P. Hadden 
if “you are having trouble finding qualified Negro applicants,” there was no discussion or 
charges issued within the letter that qualified blacks had been regularly denied 
employment.
 69
 Of course, racial prejudice still prevented a number of white employers 
from hiring blacks in jobs that were traditionally held by whites or for jobs that would 
primarily serve white clientele. Arguably, however, an equally strong, if not stronger, 
reason that blacks were not being hired was due to a lack of work-related skills or basic 
education such as a high school diploma. Of the low-income in Craven who were 
surveyed by the North Carolina Fund between July and December 1965, three times as 
many whites as blacks had finished high school.
70
 In fact, along with the lack of 
encouragement and incentive within white society in the past for black upward mobility, 
the lack of proper education and work training that blacks inherited from the segregation 
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era explains a great deal about why North Carolina NAACP leader Kelly M. Alexander 
complained to Governor Dan Moore in 1965 that the average income of blacks in North 
Carolina was just 43 percent of the average for whites‟ income.
71
  
One growing area of the southern economy that was particularly promising in 
terms of enhancing the opportunities for higher wages and upward mobility for the 
region‟s black citizens was industry. However, largely due to its emphasis on skilled 
labor, for which educated and trainable employees were essential, it was among the 
hardest for blacks to enter. As early as 1953 the Southern Regional Council had begun to 
argue that “Full use of Negro workers in industry is the challenge that now faces the 
South.”
72
 Yet more than ten years later liberal and moderate southern leaders were still 
making similar assertions. In a speech given in the mid-1960s, North Carolina Good 
Neighbor Council Director David S. Coltrane complained that while “Jobs are the 
fulcrum on which Negro progress rests…The Negro, generally speaking, has not seen an 
opportunity for himself in industry.” Coltrane placed the largest share of blame for this 
situation on remnants of white prejudice. Along with the regrettable reality that blacks 
“lack training and skills” due to longstanding denial of vocational and technical training, 
he pointed out that “The better educated Negroes have been turned down by industry so 
frequently in the past that they became uninterested in even applying for such jobs.”
73
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As late as 1966, despite some progress over the previous five years, blacks 
comprised only 9 percent of the more than one hundred thousand North Carolinians who 
were employed in the state‟s textile industry, for instance.
74
 Obviously, greater 
employment for blacks in skilled industries would not be accomplished solely by the 
removal of purposeful racial prejudice. Though far from extinct, white employer 
discrimination against black employees, which was primarily based on race, was on a 
marked decline. In fact, by the mid-1960s, as evidenced by the significant number of 
blacks hired by well-paying white employers under MITCE, white opportunity and self-
determination were becoming less and less dependent upon black oppression and/or 
exploitation. Instead, stricter federal equal employment legislation, a growing sense of 
responsibility among whites, and new opportunities in training qualified blacks on-the-
job meant that more white employers were beginning to see their own survival, if not 
progress, through their support of greater black economic opportunity. Few whites, in 
other words, condemned equal opportunity practices anymore.
75
 Moreover, the 
businessmen who gave blacks equal chances to compete with whites for jobs would, by 
the mid-1960s, receive little condemnation from the greater white community. As one 
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Southern congressman stated, “The realistic Southerner needs no humanitarian impulse 
nor any democratic idealism in order to recognize poverty among Negroes is the chief 
cause of the Southern gap” nor, moreover, that “The South can never attain equality as 
long as one-fifth of her people live in poverty.”
76
 Indeed, a black individual in Craven 
County who was steadily employed with decent pay would become not only a reliable 
city and county taxpayer but also a more active consumer of the county‟s products and 
services. While, as Gavin Wright argues, increased southern industrialization  during the 
pre-World War II years resulted in greater wage differentials between blacks and whites, 
by the 1960s the opposite was becoming true. In Wright‟s words, “the „Southern 
economy‟ came to look less and less southern over time.”
77
 
If racial prejudice was on the decline and was beginning to play a smaller role in 
preventing black entry into jobs, the implication, particularly among whites, was that 
blacks would be partly responsible for their own uplift.
78
 Along with employers who 
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were being persuaded to relax prejudices and other discriminatory hiring practices, blacks 
would need to take advantage of opportunities to improve their education and skill levels. 
Although segregation remained the most obvious reason for the disparity between blacks‟ 
and whites‟ economic status, its removal was not destined to lead to black progress and 
prosperity. After all, businessmen still reserved the right to discriminate based on their 
employment needs. Therefore, when white leaders like COP board chairman Larry Pate 
argued that “I am afraid that most of the OEO people think that the program exists to 
force integration. Of course, mixing of the races is a by-product, but we do not think it is 
the most important,” they were right to believe that integration alone would not cure 
poverty, black or white.
79
 Leon Sullivan, who helped found the Opportunities 
Industrialization Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1964, understood this reality 
from personal experience.  “Integration without preparation is frustration,” was one of his 
famous mottos.
80
 Sullivan discovered that in Philadelphia, which had never experienced 
the harshness of the Jim Crow system that was prevalent in the South, “when 
opportunities opened up, I began to find it difficult to find black men and women to fill 
the jobs in business and industry.” “These jobs were a new world to us,” he explained.” 
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Indeed, “Our world had been more of a „servicing‟ world that required little education 
and few skills.”
81
  
Local blacks throughout Craven, both the poor and the middle-class, were just as 
willing to recognize the necessity for greater training and education for black 
advancement. Black school principal and COP board member John R. Hill lamented, for 
instance, the case of seven former NYC enrollees, all high school graduates, who 
remained unemployed and unable to find jobs because of their low skills as well as the 
lack of industry in the area.
82
 Fellow COP board member David Whitfield, a fifty-seven-
year-old janitor at New Bern‟s Christ Episcopal Church, concurred that higher-paying 
jobs were of paramount importance for blacks and added his belief that COP and the poor 
would be better served by putting at least as much emphasis on education as on 
neighborhood organizing.
83
 Catherine Berry, a housewife and president of the James City 
PTA, who like Whitfield had been appointed to the COP board in August 1965 to 
represent the black poor, agreed with Hill and Whitfield that “the major need of local 
Negroes is for job training to enable them to gain better employment,” since it was 
difficult “for a Negro to get a job in Craven County.” Despite Berry‟s belief that “a White 
is always hired before an equally well-qualified Negro,” she admitted that MITCE was 
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attempting to reverse this trend.
84
 New Bern mortician Oscar Dove also concluded that 
since “Craven Negroes have never had many job opportunities open to them” that the 
“best thing COP could do [is] to provide increased education and job training.”
85
  
These views within the black community, both inside and outside of COP, not 
only agreed with those of white leaders like D. L. Stallings and Olin Wright who wanted 
to bring more industry and job training to Craven County but also with what most local 
whites believed would be only fair. Many whites in New Bern and Craven were willing 
to admit that “Negroes have been the victims of discrimination” and “have not had equal 
opportunity” but also believed that “any man, black or white, will usually get the respect 
from his fellow man as he merits.” In other words, if blacks did not take full advantage of 
the heightened opportunities within their neighborhoods to enhance their employability, 
whites would continue to hold on to another widely held belief, namely that “A good 
many more Negroes simply do not try to better themselves and do not try to earn the 
respect of white people and even their own race.”
86
 In line with their fairly high 
participation rates in COP programs, many blacks in and around Craven would step 
forward and heed the call.  
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Mounting issues within NYC program 
The new emphasis on manpower, which was appreciated by blacks and whites 
alike, contributed substantially to improving COP‟s image in the Craven community from 
October 1965 through February 1966; however, mounting issues surrounding the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) program looked as if they might counteract this 
progress. The NYC program had endured its share of detractors in Eastern North Carolina 
since its first funding by the U.S. Department of Labor in January 1965, but by January 
1966, the number of naysayers seemed to be growing, particularly in the white 
community.
87
 The whites who opposed the program were not necessarily disturbed by the 
fact that almost 70 percent of the NYC enrollees were black, although the 
disproportionate numbers of blacks in the program did trouble many of them.
88
 Other 
issues, however, added to this concern or played at least an equal role. Aside from the 
federally mandated $1.25 minimum wage for NYC enrollees, which was above the 
prevailing wage for several sectors of both private and public employment in Craven, 
NYC jobs were limited by law to public agencies such as the Craven County Welfare 
Department, Craven County Hospital, and Pamlico Board of Education, where 
responsibilities typically were small in nature ranging from raking leaves to helping mail 
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letters.
 89
 Sometimes, out of a desire to keep troubled youth in school and off the streets, 
public agency heads would agree to hire enrollees where there was little work to be 
done.
90
 Not surprisingly, when enrollees were seen sitting down for long periods or 
“goofing off” with fellow enrollees when not on an official break, outspoken citizens 
would complain to the local NYC director and/or the public agencies themselves who 
hired them. Adding to the problem was the fact that the young enrollees, who had to be 
between sixteen and twenty-one years of age, were often not supervised on a consistent 
basis due to insufficient staff. In fact, in response to these latter two issues, in early 1966 
the City of New Bern reduced its employment of NYC enrollees by almost half, from 
fifty-two to twenty-seven.
91
 Criticism would also compel the New Bern Board of 
Aldermen to begin to consider whether they even wanted to renew their contract with 
NYC after its expiration date of February 11, 1966.
92
  
Until the New Bern aldermen decided whether or not to renew their contract with 
NYC, they put off signing a new equal opportunity assurance agreement as required by 
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the Department of Labor for all participating agencies; the agreement essentially required 
that agencies not treat NYC enrollees differently on the basis of race in terms of both the 
use of facilities and the type of work to be done. The aldermen‟s delay in signing the 
agreement, which had been due on January 3, 1966, was clearly a matter of concern for 
COP executive director Robert Monte. Just prior to the regularly scheduled aldermen 
meeting on January 18, Monte announced a deadline of forty-eight hours for their final 
decision, citing the fact that the aldermen had known since “before Christmas” that their 
contract with NYC would expire in February. Monte‟s concern only grew after the board, 
which claimed it needed more time to study the costs and benefits of NYC, decided on 
January 18 to table the vote until their next meeting on February 2. Because the aldermen 
did not vote on the matter within 48 hours as he demanded (a demand that Monte did not 
see as a “pressure move” as described by the aldermen), Monte told the local press that 
he felt that their refusal left him no choice but to halt the program in the city. All NYC 
enrollees were subsequently withdrawn from the city workforce.
93
 New Bern City 
Manager Edgar E. Welch, who had lent his assistance for Craven County‟s original 
community action proposal to the North Carolina Fund in 1964, agreed that both he and 
the aldermen had known about the expiration of NYC even before November but stressed 
that they “didn‟t receive the actual contract and the new Equal Opportunity Assurance 
until just a few days prior to the [January] meeting.” Monte was confident, however, that 
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he could reinstate the program if the city signed the assurance even if it was late.
94
  But 
on February 2, 1966, the board of aldermen again tabled a vote on NYC, this time citing 
the absence of one of its five members.
95
  
Although all of the other participating agencies in Craven County—including the 
county hospital, county health and welfare departments, county board of education, and 
county commissioners—had signed the assurance statement, the New Bern aldermen 
were not the only public organization that was feeling wary about continuing the NYC 
program. Nor were they the only group that delayed signing the statement. The New Bern 
City Schools, which had hired approximately eighteen NYC enrollees since the fall of 
1965, deliberated renewing its NYC contract in January and February 1966. Like the 
aldermen, school representatives had also not signed the equal opportunity assurance and 
had recently lost their NYC enrollees.
96
 In February, a Raleigh reporter picked up on the 
story, interviewed some of the individuals involved, and wrote an article that was 
published in the News & Observer; both New Bern boards, the article stated, “have 
withdrawn from the Craven County Neighborhood Youth Corps because of a requirement 
for equal opportunity practices.”
97
 Other media outlets both inside and outside the state 
echoed this conclusion that the refusal to sign was based on a decision to maintain racial 
prejudice. Among those was the Virginian-Pilot, which ran an article entitled “Boards 
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Balk at „Equality.‟”
98
 But only the New Bern City Schools would admit to refusing to 
renew their contract with the NYC because of the assurance statement itself. For New 
Bern Schools Superintendent Harry J. McDonald, who was admittedly against integration 
for its supposed potential to negatively effect the educational level of whites, the signing 
of “an additional compliance statement is the bone of contention” because signing had 
not been required in the past program. As McDonald told the News & Observer in early 
February, he had referred the assurance statement to the school board‟s attorneys after 
“we were unable to interpret the meaning.”
99
 Although McDonald‟s explanation for not 
signing was most likely motivated by racial prejudices, the same could not be said of the 
Board of Aldermen. They had delayed their renewal of the NYC program, City Manager 
Welch maintained, not because of the new assurance statement but instead because of the 
growing numbers of people in the community who had spoken out against NYC as not “a 
good thing” due to its controversial $1.25 minimum wage requirement and that some of 
the enrollees “aren‟t good workers.”
100
 Of course, whether there really were a substantial 
number of enrollees who were not “good workers” cannot be substantiated and mattered 
less to the New Bern aldermen than the impression among them that a sizeable number of 
the public believed it to be true.  
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Much to their dismay, the aldermen‟s decision on whether to renew with NYC 
was only made more difficult following a city hall meeting held on February 15. As the 
city‟s elected officials either discovered or were reminded, New Bern citizens were 
anything but unanimous over the matter of NYC. In fact, both black and white were 
willing to speak out in favor of its continuance. Among the more than two dozen who 
came to the city hall meeting to request that the aldermen reconsider the contract with 
NYC, several were members of the Craven County Good Neighbor Council including 
vice-president C.C. Sparrow and former New Bern mayor Dale T. Milns. In addition to 
Monte‟s assistant director Lee Morgan, several members of the COP board of directors 
were also present to endorse NYC, including Claretta Wordlaw and Robert Whitehead.  
Perhaps one of the most hard-hitting speeches that evening came from Dale Milns 
who, despite describing himself as a “political conservative,” was “concerned” with the 
flippant way with which the board seemed to be dismissing NYC. In his opinion, the 
program had “considerable merit” despite its mistakes. Milns also spoke well of the 
county‟s antipoverty efforts in general by describing them as a “bold experiment” whose 
“story cannot be told in finality in one short year.” He proceeded to warn the aldermen 
that their failure to participate in NYC would erode the program altogether in Craven, 
Jones, and Pamlico counties. “It is not fair to damn the whole thing because some parts of 
it did not work out,” he declared, before asserting that if the board failed to re-contract 
with NYC that they “should come up with a better suggestion.” Whitehead, who spoke 
soon after Milns, concurred that the benefits of the NYC program overshadowed its 
307 
 
weaknesses and cited the fact that there had been fewer high school dropouts since the 
program began in the Craven area.
101
  
As Milns, Whitehead, and other NYC supporters understood the program, it did 
not just provide part-time or full-time employment opportunities for at-risk youth but also 
taught professional skills such as punctuality, respect for authority, proper dress, and 
personal responsibility. In addition to these professional attributes that could help NYC 
enrollees land a job, many were also given remedial education and counseling; together, 
these benefits better enabled them to return to or remain in school and would also, as 
local NYC director Colonel W.F. Evans put it, “orient them to the world of work.”
102
 For 
these exact reasons, the New Bern Employment Security Commission had first agreed to 
cooperate with the NYC program in November 1964 by rendering placement services for 
the youth who had completed their training and would need assistance in finding 
employment.
103
 Whites and blacks who preferred to keep NYC knew that the jobs to 
which enrollees were assigned not only did not displace current employees but instead 
frequently contributed to the community‟s benefit through higher wages, better public 
services, and reducing the numbers of unemployed youths on the streets. In support of the 
NYC advocates‟ assertions, COP Deputy Director Lee Morgan estimated that 
approximately $2,000 in local revenue had been lost because the city of New Bern and its 
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city schools had not complied with the NYC requirements.
104
 This testimony provided 
the opportunity for the aldermen to reconsider their decision to let the program expire. 
There again, the aldermen would have to weigh this most recent testimony with that 
which they had heard or continued to hear from other influential citizens such as City of 
New Bern Public Works Director Cedric Boyd, who claimed to have observed first-hand 
how NYC‟s guaranteed minimum wage of $1.25, which was slightly above the pay rate 
for his own employees, was leading to “idleness” among the enrollees, for whom he did 
not have enough work, and low morale among his full-time staff.
105
 Even more moderate 
figures such as Belk‟s Department Store manager W. Ted Kennedy, who accepted COP 
as “a fact of life” and realized the economic benefits it offered to his business, said that 
NYC had not been proven to provide consistently useful job training for those hired by 
the city.
106
  
After hearing testimony in favor of NYC at the February 15 city hall meeting, 
New Bern aldermen Paul Cox attempted to explain to the crowd, a large number of which 
were black citizens, that the board of aldermen‟s intentions had been misunderstood. 
Referring to the News & Observer article of February 13 that had stated the aldermen 
were delaying the renewal of their board‟s contract with NYC because of its equal 
opportunity assurance pledge, Cox asserted that “This was just as far from the truth as it 
can be.” Fellow alderman Tommy Davis agreed, emphasizing that “Prior to the night that 
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the contract was brought up, we had only one report as to whether the program was 
constructive or detrimental to the youths employed and the city” and also that nobody 
from COP had been available to answer the board‟s questions. After promising to revisit 
its contract with NYC again in March, the board then unanimously adopted a 
resolution—in order to assure those present of their sincerity of purpose—that fully 
denied the implications of the N&O article.
107
  
A follow-up story in the News & Observer on February 18 would also amend its 
earlier assumption about the board of aldermen by explaining that the board had felt no 
rush to comply with the equal opportunity requirement. As one of the aldermen informed 
the N&O reporter, their belief had been that “signing the assurance, before considering to 
re-contract with NYC” would have been “premature.”
108
 This attempt by the aldermen to 
deny all wrongdoing on the basis of race demonstrated that, even in a conservative region 
such as Eastern North Carolina, to be seen as opposed to equality opportunity had 
become stigmatizing for white leaders by the mid-1960s.
109
 The aldermen‟s apparent 
willingness to spend more time studying the program‟s record also gave credence to an 
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N&O editorial entitled “Survival is Success,” which argued that even in the face of “some 
local governmental officials [who] are overtly hostile” (which most likely referred to 
New Bern Schools Superintendent Harry J. McDonald), that “efforts to discourage these 
programs have been sorely felt.”
 110
 Indeed, even if conservatives, “hostile” or otherwise, 
would be able to convince the New Bern board of aldermen to let their contract with 
NYC expire, most of the major public agencies in the county, including COP itself which 
was then employing around eleven enrollees, continued to support the program.
111
  
Progress, the moderate way 
To be on board with a particular antipoverty program, however, did not 
necessarily mean one could avoid being seen, by all of the program‟s proponents, as an 
adversary of progress or the poor. In fact, when there was wide disagreement over 
methods or style, ironically, a program supporter could face as much hostility and 
marginalization from a fellow supporter as an outspoken opponent of the program would 
have received. This possibility perhaps came closest to creating a disastrous result for the 
Adult Basic Education Recruitment (ABER) program due to the relationship among Bob 
Monte, the director of the Craven Industrial Education Center (IEC), and several of the 
local ABER staff. At the same time that the city of New Bern first began contemplating 
its renewal contract with NYC, controversy was also afoot within ABER over who 
should be given primary teaching responsibilities—the twelve VISTA workers assigned 
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to the six-county area or the Craven IEC staff of college graduates—and how quickly the 
program should be expanded to reach more of the county‟s uneducated and illiterate 
citizens. Monte had made it clear on multiple occasions that he wanted to see the 
expansion of the ABER program (after all, he saw education as central to his vision of a 
“War on Ignorance”), but his aversion to “the shot gun approach” would not be 
welcomed by Sandra Fisher, the director of the program.
112
  
Fisher, a young special education teacher with a master‟s degree from the 
University of Michigan, had been hired by Jim Hearn in August 1965 to take on the 
administrative responsibilities of ABER. As a staff member of the North Carolina Fund 
described her, she was a “hard worker” and passionate about her job but had a tendency 
to be “rather impulsive.”
113
 Because of her desire to simultaneously expand both the 
number of classes and the teaching role of the VISTA volunteers, she interpreted Monte‟s 
slow and steady method of attack, in which he sought to test out the idea of using more 
volunteer teachers before fully implementing it, not only as evidence of his lack of 
interest in helping the poor but also as proof that his objective was centered around 
“slowly killing the program.”
114
 Based on her feelings that she could “no longer operate 
                                                 
112
 Minutes from meeting held between Sandra Fisher, Tom Wallace, Robert R. Monte, Thuman  
Brock, Preston Kennedy, L.R. Morgan, January 28, 1966, folder 4975, NCFR; Kate Erwin,  
“Craven Poverty Plan Enters Second Stage,” News & Observer, February 20, 1966.  
 
113
 Sandra Fisher, interview by John Miller, February 16, 1966, transcript, folder 7090, NCFR.  
 
114
 Ibid.  
 
312 
 
professionally through the organization,” in late January 1966 Fisher resigned effective 
March 10.
115
 
Fisher‟s frustration over the pace of ABER first arose shortly after state funding 
ran out for the Craven IEC, which had partnered with COP to provide teachers for the 
basic education classes. Because Thurman Brock, the Craven IEC director, made it clear 
that his current staff, which was then teaching around seven hundred, could not handle 
the growing number of adult students without more funding, Fisher pushed the idea to 
use as many VISTA workers to teach the classes as possible instead of continuing to rely 
mainly on Brock‟s staff. Before this disagreement, the VISTAs had only been recruiting 
the “functionally illiterate” and assigning those who were interested to classes. Monte, 
who was wary over the fact that, in contrast to the Craven IEC staff, few of the VISTAs 
had degrees in education or even much teaching experience, expressed to Sandra Fisher 
that he did not want to start an expansive program of volunteer-led classes until VISTAs 
had been shown to be successful teachers. Brock, who naturally had less confidence in 
the VISTA workers than in his own staff, agreed with Monte; he would remain most 
interested in using the volunteers as recruiters, the precise issue that caused Fisher to 
submit her letter of resignation.
116
  
In spite of the prospect of Fisher‟s departure, Monte and Brock were determined 
to continue the program. After receiving a promise from the state that additional money 
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would be made available by February 3, Brock agreed to ten more classes, but of these no 
more than two would be taught by volunteer teachers on an experimental basis. While 
interest in ABER was growing in several counties in Eastern North Carolina, most 
notably Craven, there appeared to be a problem with consistent attendance among current 
enrollees. In light of this problem, Brock clearly did not want to stretch his staff too thin 
for additional classes that were not at full enrollment nor did he want to potentially 
jeopardize the quality of the classes by allowing unproven VISTAs to teach them. “I 
would also like to point out,” Brock wrote Monte on January 31, “that we are not only 
interested in reaching a maximum number of citizens in need of elementary level 
education but that we also wish to maintain quality and a degree of success with the small 
number with which we are now working.” “We still have too many drop-outs,” Brock 
reminded Monte, “even though our classes are provided free of cost and are located 
within the communities in which these people live.”
117
 Despite Brock‟s observation, 
Sandra Fisher was not convinced that the dozen additional classes would be sufficient to 
meet local need and cited the fact that more than two thousand local applicants were still 
on waiting lists.
118
 Fisher was right that twelve classes of twenty-five students each 
would not empty the waiting lists. Nonetheless, in the opinions of Monte and Brock, 
these classes would at least be a start in the right direction. Even so, Fisher remained 
opposed to any negotiations that involved numerical limits on the program and refused to 
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withdraw her letter of resignation, even after Preston Kennedy of the North Carolina 
Fund asked her to do so on January 28.
119
 Fisher‟s resignation would spell trouble for the 
immediate futures of both ABER and COP. Not only did it lead directly to the resignation 
of her assistant director Tom Wallace, a graduate of North Carolina College in Durham 
(now known as North Carolina Central University), it also resulted in the decision by 
OEO officials in early February to demand that all twelve VISTA workers, including the 
three who sought to remain in the area after Fisher‟s resignation, immediately be pulled 
out of Craven and the other five participating counties.  
In the aftermath of the Fisher‟s resignations and OEO‟s insistence that VISTAs be 
removed from COP target areas, several COP board members, white and black, expressed 
worry that the recent events involving the ABER program could give off the appearance 
that local leadership did not care about adult education or the alleviation of poverty and 
that this perception could damage COP‟s future relations with OEO. At the COP board 
meeting on February 3, one of the VISTA workers in attendance probably added to these 
worries by revealing that he had been told by his supervisor that the reason he and the 
other VISTAs were being ordered out of the area was because “there was not enough 
support from the community.”
120
 In hopes of convincing OEO of COP‟s undiminished 
commitment to adult education and the alleviation of poverty, Monte, COP deputy 
director Lee Morgan, and Tom Wallace (who had actually withdrawn his resignation 
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after being asked by the Fund to replace Fisher as acting director of ABER), each wrote 
letters to the project officer of VISTA in which they requested that the volunteers stay.
121
 
“These Volunteers have done very constructive work in our community” Monte wrote to 
Glen Blackburn, in an attempt to assure him that “the misunderstanding within this 
Community and program…has been resolved.” Promising a “continued but more 
effective utilization of Volunteers in Service to America,” including future work 
assignments in the Community Development program, Monte asked for “a thirty day 
moratorium on your decision to withdraw Volunteers from this area.”
122
 As a beleaguered 
Monte later told the press, “We want these people desperately and are trying to keep them 
here.”
123
 
Most if not all of the COP board of directors agreed with Tom Wallace that 
Craven County‟s nine thousand illiterate adults in Craven would have to be reached 
“before any of the Craven Operation Progress programs can work” and also agreed that 
Monte‟s approach of cooperating with Thurman Brock and initiating volunteer-led 
classes on an experimental basis was essentially sound. At the board meeting on February 
3, Robert Pugh reminded fellow board members that the Craven IEC, because it was 
funded by the State Board of Education, was bound to follow regulations—including the 
one that insisted that class instructors must have a bachelor of arts degree. Moreover, 
Pugh explained, the IEC-led classes were “part of a very orderly process” that would reap 
                                                 
121
 Preston Kennedy, Field Report, February 4, 1966, folder 5040, NCFR.  
 
122
 Robert R. Monte to Glen Blackburn, February 2, 1966, folder 5040, NCFR.  
 
123
 “Problems Seen Here Yesterday in Poverty War,” Sun Journal, February 4, 1966. 
316 
 
benefits in the end. Pugh, who was still serving as the superintendent of Craven County 
schools, felt that a major reason not to begin more volunteer-led classes was that they 
often had mixed results in comparison to those with paid, trained instructors. Referring to 
the fact that the classes meet for a total of twenty-four nights, he reasoned that, “Very 
often volunteer teachers will start off with much enthusiasm, but after a few weeks some 
of this enthusiasm is lost.” COP board chairman Larry Pate, who had tried to convince 
Fisher that her resignation was a mistake, agreed that “we should not jump the gun” and 
“blow the whole program.” Even Robert Whitehead, who at first had questioned Monte‟s 
logic in continuing to push for a limited ABER program when the goal, as Whitehead 
saw it, was to reach as many of the twenty-five thousand (as possible) in the six-county 
area, temporarily gave Monte‟s judgment the benefit of the doubt.
 124
 In an interview with 
OEO administrators around March, he disclosed that he, Whitehead, had “changed his 
attitude” in recent months with regard to his original belief that “Monte was working for 
the power structure.”
125
 
This series of events revealed that those who did not push for rapid expansion or 
revolutionary new methods were not necessarily, as their critics assumed, uninterested in 
effectively serving the poor. For one thing, the jobs of both Monte and Thurman Brock 
depended on exactly this type of commitment. By the middle of March 1966, Tom 
Wallace reported that he was receiving considerable cooperation from Monte and 
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concluded that Monte was not “out to get” either him or the ABER program. This 
conclusion was quite a turnaround from the opinion he and Fisher had shared earlier, 
namely that Monte never wanted to use the VISTA workers and secretly wanted to run 
the ABER program into oblivion. John Miller of the North Carolina Fund, who had been 
following the dynamics of the ABER controversy since January, arrived at a similar 
conclusion. “Actually, Monte never was out to sabotage the operation of the program as 
Sandra Fisher had charged.”
126
 Instead, despite his ability to be critical of Monte, Miller 
appeared to place most of the blame for the issues within ABER on Fisher.
127
 As Miller 
reflected, “this entire matter turned out to be a point-of-no-return personality clash” 
between Fisher and Monte and, in the end, “The basic and over-riding object of helping 
the poorly-educated of Craven County got lost in the thoughts of Miss Fisher at the 
expense of her desire to have her own way completely.”
128
  
The removal of the VISTA workers, which proceeded in spite of the requests by 
Monte, Morgan, and Wallace, would impede the progress of the ABER program only 
briefly. With assurances from the North Carolina Fund that the Craven IEC would 
continue to receive enough funds and teaching staff to meet local need, by March 1966 
the program grew to more than fifty classes in basic education and high school 
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equivalency that served slightly more than one thousand individuals in Craven, Jones, 
and Pamlico counties alone.
129
 However, although the removal of the VISTA workers did 
not lead to the dissolution of the ABER program, OEO‟s refusal to reinstate the 
volunteers did have the potential to jeopardize a pending Community Development 
program in which COP planned to rely heavily on VISTA recruitment and facilitation of 
neighborhood organizing among the poor. Monte would have to wait to resolve this issue 
later.  
City of New Bern decides whether to renew NYC contract 
Meanwhile, whether the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) program would be 
renewed in the City of New Bern remained unsolved. After granting themselves more 
time for consideration and after meetings with several groups, including the Craven 
County Good Neighbor Council and the Craven County Commissioners, the New Bern 
aldermen at last became willing to set a definitive date to vote upon the NYC contract for 
March 22. Perhaps New Bern mayor Mack Lupton, who was motivated by both the 
urging of the county commissioners and his desire to win federal funds for an urban 
renewal project and a new city water system, was the most interested in convincing the 
majority of the aldermen to keep the NYC program.
130
 However, another influential 
situation had risen to prominence by the March 16 meeting, a day after the aldermen had 
agreed to take their vote on March 22, that trumped all previous arguments in support of 
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NYC.
131
 This situation had to do with matching funds required from the county. 
Reverend J.A. Babington-Johnson, a black member of the Good Neighbor Council, was 
among the few privy to the weight that concern over the NYC contract‟s clause about 
local matching was exerting upon negotiations between the aldermen and the council. As 
the reverend witnessed, one of the main stumbling blocks in convincing the board to 
renew its one-year contract with NYC was concern that the city‟s current local matching 
requirement of 10 percent, which according to the original Economic Opportunity Act 
was set to expire on August 20, 1966, could be raised to as much as 50 percent during the 
1967 fiscal year beginning on July 1, 1966.
132
  
Concerns about local matching came to a head after a local radio broadcast of 
March 16 during which the host played a tape of his interview with Bob Monte. When 
asked about the NYC requirements for local matching, Monte had stated his belief that 
the level would remain at 10 percent for at least the next four years. However, after 
playing the interview, the radio host gave his own commentary on the subject, which 
challenged Monte‟s answer. Congress had passed legislation, the host argued 
authoritatively, that would require local communities to contribute matching fund levels 
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of 50 percent starting on July 1, 1966, arguing that this was “the law of the land.” The 
host concluded that, “Station WHIT is neither for or against the program, but believes 
that those citizens of New Bern who do have definite feelings on this matter should make 
them known to members of the Board of Aldermen by contacting them and by attending 
their March 22 meeting.”
133
  
This radio broadcast not only damaged the credibility of both Monte and COP but 
also alerted New Bern citizens to the prospect of raised levels of local matching that 
some feared might require a tax increase. The board of aldermen, which probably had not 
raised the issue of local matching in the past either because of uncertainty about whether 
an increase would definitely happen or because of a reluctance to worry the community 
unnecessarily, now found itself unable to ignore this concern on the part of its 
constituents. In any case, at the March 22 meeting, the board of aldermen was presented 
with two petitions, signed by more than 350 local residents, that asked for the NYC 
program to be dropped by the city.
134
 Many, if not most of the signees, had heard the 
rumor of a future increase in local matching funds and were, presumably not in favor of 
raised taxes to cover this expense. In hopes of resolving this confusion, the aldermen 
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called upon attorney A.D. Ward, who presented a letter from NYC official Mike Lorenzo 
to Bob Monte, which had led him to deduce that the federal government‟s current 
matching fund ratio of ninety/ten would end on August 20, 1966. According to the North 
Carolina Fund‟s John Miller, who was present at the city hall meeting, Ward‟s testimony 
was so convincing that “advocates of the NYC were thus clearly hindered in that they had 
nothing in writing that would negate [his] contention.”
135
 
Because no one in attendance at the March 22 meeting knew exactly what 
changes would or might be made to local matching levels after August 20, the majority of 
the board of aldermen felt that they had no other choice but to reject the renewal of the 
NYC contract.
136
 Paul Cox, the most liberal of the New Bern alderman, cast the sole vote 
for extension. The four aldermen who voted to end NYC in the city felt that the 
uncertainty over local matching had become an unacceptable additional political liability 
for a program that they already believed the community viewed as problem-ridden and 
therefore not cost-effective.
137
 It will never be known, however, whether the voice of the 
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majority was actually heard in this matter. John Miller of the North Carolina Fund 
seemed to believe that the outcome did not necessarily mean that the majority of the 
people of New Bern were against the NYC. “But it did indicate,” Miller reported, “that 
those who were for it did not make their opinions known and were not as well 
represented as those who were opposed to the program.”
138
 City Manager Edgar Welch, 
who agreed that a vocal minority had swayed the vote, felt that the aldermen mostly 
listened to their friends. “It just happened that the friends of the aldermen were not for the 
NYC,” said Welch.
139
 Several prominent citizens, including New Bern businessmen 
Harry Vatz, would voice opposition to the aldermen‟s decision after the fact; however, 
their support for NYC appeared to come too late because, as Welch argued, not enough 
of them spoke out in its favor before the vote. Many supporters including Vatz, then 
president of the New Bern Merchants Association, had been urged by D. L. Stallings to 
attend the March 22 meeting, but Vatz was unable to do so because of prior 
commitments.
140
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Community support for NYC largely prevails 
Despite the loss of the City of New Bern and the New Bern City Schools, which 
were the only major public agencies that did not renew their contracts with NYC, local 
NYC director Colonel Evans was not particularly upset about the city‟s decision. One 
reason, which he shared with the New Bern aldermen at the March 22 meeting, was that 
he preferred to work only with fully cooperative agencies. Moreover, Evans was 
confident not only that the overall community would continue to stay on board with NYC 
but also that the enrollees dropped from the city‟s program would quickly find openings 
elsewhere. His confidence turned out to be well founded: on March 24, just two days 
after the city of New Bern dropped out of the NYC program, sponsoring agencies in 
Craven, Jones, and Pamlico counties announced that 350 new jobs for high school drop-
outs would be available on April 1, in addition to approximately 200 more that would 
become available over the summer. After this announcement, Evans proudly declared 
that “Sponsoring agencies in this area, feel a responsibility to today‟s young people who 
have dropped out of school for economic reasons, home problems or because classroom 
work has become meaningless to them.”
141
 Again he was correct. In addition to hiring 
youth for necessary jobs, public agency staff felt that they were doing their part to 
contribute to the community by helping school drop-outs stay in school and ready 
themselves for employment rather than roaming the streets and becoming welfare cases. 
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The fact that D. L. Stallings, who also ran an insurance company in New Bern, admitted 
during a March 1966 COP board meeting that he and other citizens had not “done enough 
in the past to provide employment opportunities for youth and male heads of families” 
was certainly a positive sign that attitudes toward the community‟s responsibility to the 
poor were changing.
142
 Although Evans did not specifically predict it, program 
proponents also continued to make their case before the board until the New Bern 
aldermen were convinced to reinstate the NYC program and did so in 1967.
143
 Despite 
NYC‟s problems, many Eastern North Carolinian residents, black and white, honored the 
program‟s past successes and favored its potential over its nonexistence.  
Conclusion 
Community support of COP was not as strong as it could have been, but Monte‟s 
style of handling the administration of COP had certainly helped to build it up from 
where it had stood under Hearn‟s leadership. It is unclear whether poor white 
participation had yet to substantially improve due to Monte‟s leadership, but sizeable 
evidence reveals that middle-class white support did. COP board member Reverend L. D. 
Munn estimated that during the tumultuous summer of 1965, when Hearn was still COP‟s 
executive director, about 90 percent of the white community had disapproved of COP; by 
April 1966, Munn estimated that the split between proponents and opponents for COP 
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was fifty-fifty.
144
 Indeed, early that spring two New Bern ministers urged their mostly all-
white congregations for the first time to support COP.
145
 With certain exceptions, such as 
Sandra Fisher‟s resignation, Monte‟s efforts in the areas of public relations, cooperation 
and dialogue with board members as well as local agency heads, increased delegation of 
authority to COP staff, and innovative approaches to program development all helped to 
improve insider morale and thereby improved program effectiveness.  
Surprisingly, little of this progress was mentioned in a North Carolina Fund-
requested review of COP that was conducted in April 1966.
146
 When the Fund hired three 
outsiders to evaluate the performance of COP, a procedure similar to the handling of 
reviews for the other ten CAPs receiving Fund financial assistance, it was more than 
likely expecting an impartial assessment. However, the biases of the program reviewers 
(a newspaper publisher from Selma, North Carolina, and the Deputy General Manager 
and the Staff Training Specialist of the St. Louis Human Development Corporation or 
HDC) were not only obvious but arguably prevented a thorough examination of either 
COP leadership or the execution of its program. In addition to their recommendation that 
none of the agencies that had contracts with COP, such as the county department of 
welfare, should have voting representation on the COP board of directors, the reviewers 
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found it problematic that Monte “functions in the role of avoiding conflict” and 
suggested, based on Monte‟s personal observation that some poor would choose not to 
accept help, that he did not have “an understanding of the principles underlying the War 
on Poverty.”
147
  
In part because the reviewers spent only three days in the area and in part because 
of their belief that Monte‟s philosophy did not match with OEO philosophy, much of the 
content of their review was inaccurate. For example, their claim that “program 
development is not innovative” was made in spite of the fact that Monte had 
enthusiastically supported several new ideas, including a wildlife management program, 
and was in the process of starting others, including an intra-staff newsletter, the latter of 
which would soon receive recognition and praise from OEO in the form of a request for 
one thousand copies to send to rural CAAs across the nation.
148
 In addition, the 
reviewers‟ overreliance on their observation that a few local television, radio, and 
newspaper heads were distrustful of COP, caused them to wrongly conclude that “Mr. 
Monte does not understand the importance of a „good image‟ outside the COP 
framework” and that the “staff does not realize what a good public relations program can 
mean to them in [terms of positive] attitudes from the general community.” Verifiable 
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refutations of these statements include actions by Monte that were, in some cases, being 
undertaken for the first time in the CAA‟s history; his announcements to the Sun Journal 
of the dates and times of COP meetings, his hire of a public relations officer in January 
(who helped to get a high number of stories about the poverty program published in the 
Sun Journal), his early organization of a series of speaking engagements with local civic 
groups led by staff from both COP and the North Carolina Fund, and his leadership of a 
tour in March of at least forty local people that was intended to show them how these 
programs were successfully helping both the black and white poor.
149
 A final, major flaw 
in the review was the complaint that “attendance at board meetings is poor,” a condition 
that was in fact intermittent, dependent on a multitude of variables, and had been 
corrected in March with a new COP by-law that forbade any board member to miss three 
meetings in a row without a valid excuse.
150
 These new requirements would not begin 
until June 1, 1966; however, no mention was made by the reviewers that the issue of 
board attendance had been addressed.  
Despite their inclusion of some positive remarks about the COP staff‟s sincerity 
and dedication to the programs, the review team ultimately concluded that “Mr. Monte is 
operating in a very unsatisfactory manner” and recommended that “ongoing evaluative 
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procedures of the CAP Director” be undertaken by the North Carolina Fund. One of the 
reviewers, A. Donald Bourgeois of the St. Louis HDC, went so far as to include, for the 
Fund staff‟s eyes only, a limerick of his own composition:  
 
There once was a fellow named Jim Hearn 
Who went to a town called New Bern 
In his heart he was right 
But he gave them a fright 
And the program made a full U-turn 
Along came a fellow named Monte 
Who began to act sua sponte 
In his heart he cared not 
And the program was shot 
To hell like Inferno by Dante.
151
 
 
 
Biases clearly seemed to plague the review process of COP but Monte‟s performance had 
not been flawless. For example, the reviewers were probably right that Monte could have 
relinquished more routine paperwork to his staff, which would have allowed him to 
remain focused on more important executive tasks. The reviewers were also not incorrect 
to think that giving the poor the opportunity to democratically elect their representatives 
to the COP board could enhance COP‟s ability to understand their needs and 
circumstances, even though, according to reports from other CAAs, turnouts for such 
elections tended to be rather low.
152
 In general, however, the April review presented a 
limited view of reality and obscured the ways that both the COP board of directors and 
the larger community were in greater support of COP programs as well as Monte‟s 
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administration of them. For example, 75 percent of the twenty-four COP board 
respondents to an anonymous questionnaire issued around April 15 expressed a desire to 
continue serving on the COP board.
153
 In addition, despite COP‟s political liability in 
certain voting sectors, all of the incumbent Craven County commissioners won their 
primary races in May 1966 including COP‟s greatest champion D. L. Stallings who, with 
Robert Whitehead‟s help, was able to beat off separate attempts by both SCLC leader 
Leon Nixon and conservative whites in a newly formed chapter of the John Birch Society 
to unseat him. As COP board chairman Larry Pate described the importance of this feat, 
“The future of Craven Operation Progress depends on whether or not Livingstone 
Stallings is re-elected as county commissioner. He has held us together…and I am afraid 
that if Stallings is defeated in May, there will be an effort on the part of rank 
conservatives to put us out of business.”
154
 Monte‟s preference for the middle ground and 
a steady yet deliberate pace for COP expansion probably helped keep Stallings in power 
and COP in business. However, Monte‟s job would be made more difficult during the 
second half of 1966 when both the OEO and the North Carolina Fund began to turn away 
from their original insistence on local control of programs and local strategies to fight 
poverty.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
RISING INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Partially influenced by the conclusions of the North Carolina Fund-requested 
review of COP that was conducted in April 1966, Fund staff assigned to the Craven area 
would begin to deliberately “run things around Monte” until Monte‟s eventual 
resignation in September.
1
  Monte might have been able to cope with this increased 
intervention on the state level, however, had it not been for the simultaneous increase in 
federal intervention. By 1966, federal officials within both the OEO and the Department 
of Labor had begun to conclude, similarly to Fund staff, that local control of community 
action would never allow the types of social and institutional change they believed were 
necessary to meet the true needs of the poor. From their perspective in Washington, too 
many businessmen, elected officials, and other power structure-types were serving on 
local boards; moreover, these men were either incapable or unwilling to make the kinds 
of decisions that would enhance the poor‟s political influence or economic standing.
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Eventually, save for the rare instances in which the poor made up a majority of a 
CAA board, local community action experiments began to be seen as a roadblock to the 
War on Poverty‟s goals of improving opportunities and justice for indigent populations 
(especially in the South where many of the hard-core poor were black). But, as this 
chapter sets out to demonstrate, the attitude on the part of national War on Poverty 
officials and the Fund was both misinformed and misguided as it related to COP. Above 
all, local people on the COP board were deeply interested in attaining the justice that the 
poor were also keen to attain, namely in the form of access to better-paying jobs.  
Monte fears he will be fired 
 
Fearing that the COP board had “no alternative but to fire me” based on his 
negative performance review in April 1966, on May 3 Bob Monte expressed his strong 
concerns about the review process in a letter to North Carolina Fund executive director 
George Esser. Evaluating a CAA based only on its philosophy and methodology was both 
short-sighted, Monte wrote, and less useful than an evaluation based on how that CAA 
had positively affected the lives of the poor, especially in regard to employment.
1
 
According to Monte, the COP staff had reached no fewer than three thousand local 
people and, most crucially, the agency was providing jobs, higher incomes, and basic 
skill education to hundreds of the unemployed and undereducated through the 
Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) and Manpower Improvement Through Community 
Improvement (MITCE) programs alone. In addition to the 480 privies built for rural 
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families under the rural environmental sanitation project, which had been accomplished 
with the help of sixty-six of the poor and unemployed themselves, COP‟s emphasis on 
self-help among the poor had also motivated at least seventeen individuals who lacked 
the capital to set up small businesses to apply for loans from the Small Business 
Development Center and through a marketing cooperative had encouraged several dozen 
farmers to plant more than fifty acres of strawberries (a more profitable crop) in place of 
tobacco.
 2
  
Several of these programs continued to receive national attention while Monte 
was executive director. OEO director Sargent Shriver visited Craven farms himself, in 
May 1966, to taste the strawberries that more than sixty farmers had planted, grown, and 
sold under the Neuse Trent program.
3
 This program was also cited before the U.S. House 
Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, during the War on Poverty 
hearings, held in June 1966, as proof of community action at work.
4
 A chart displayed in 
the conference room of the COP building that read “Citizens Served Thru Craven 
Operation Progress as of 2/28/1966” showed the following totals:
5
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Community Development    1,003 
Small Business     313+ 
Adult Basic Education    707 
Neighborhood Youth Corps    913 
Federal Credit Union     38 
Health (Public Education and Health Nurse)  55,000 (based on TV,  
newspaper, radio) 
Welfare      481 
Agriculture      89 
Rural Environmental Sanitation   3,208 
 
 
Monte‟s contention that both he and COP had been subjected to an inadequate 
review in April was only one of the frustrations he expressed to Esser in his May 3 letter. 
In addition, he accused the Fund‟s technical assistance staff of overstepping its bounds 
and attempting to undermine local control by telling COP staff to ignore his decisions and 
those of the board of directors.
6
 Although he did not cite specific examples, one of the 
recent incidents Monte was most probably referring to had occurred when Fund technical 
staff encouraged Deputy Director Lee Morgan to continue to assert himself 
independently of Monte; this advice came soon after Morgan had been verbally 
reprimanded by Monte over the printing of a paid political advertisement in the Sun 
Journal in advance of a local primary election. However, the real issue at hand in this 
instance was not that the advertisement, which publicized free transportation of registered 
voters to the polls, was signed and authorized by Morgan and the director of COP‟s 
Community Development program without Monte‟s approval. Instead, Monte—who 
believed that “everyone should register and vote”—was troubled that he had not been 
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informed of the voter registration drive organized under the auspices of the Community 
Development program. Had he been informed, Monte contended, he would have wanted 
to make sure that it was not at all partisan in nature.
7
  
Adding to these tensions was the fact that Monte and Morgan had been at odds off 
and on since at least February. In Monte‟s opinion, Morgan continued to avoid his 
primary responsibilities.
 8
 For Morgan, Monte‟s hiring of twenty-nine-year-old New Bern 
native and 1963 UNC-Chapel Hill graduate Ralph Jacobs as his administrative assistant 
was an intentional move to circumvent his authority as Deputy Director.
9
 While the two 
men had patched up some of their issues by March after Monte gave Morgan full 
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responsibility for four programs, including Community Development and ABER, their 
disagreement about the Sun Journal ad reopened old wounds not yet healed.
 10
 Well 
aware of the history of tension between Monte and Morgan, North Carolina Fund staff 
would nonetheless push Morgan to generally act the way he saw fit regardless of Monte‟s 
wishes.
11
 
Because Monte had consciously been trying to implement COP‟s programs to the 
satisfaction of the community at-large while also attempting to reach as many of the poor 
as effectively as possible, he did not understand why the Fund staff believed that his style 
of executive leadership should be challenged. Although George Esser agreed with Monte 
that “it is clearly against Fund policy for people on the technical assistant staff to tell 
members of local staffs to ignore decisions of local CAP directors and their boards,” his 
assurance that the Fund‟s main purpose to provide advice and counsel should be “duly 
considered as helpful techniques in coping with various problems of community action” 
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would comfort COP‟s executive director only temporarily.
12
 (Incidentally, Esser also told 
Monte that he, Esser, had not inferred from the review that “there were any problems that 
did not have solutions” or that would lead to Monte‟s firing.) Despite Esser‟s assurances, 
the Fund staff assigned to the Craven area continued to deliberately “run things around 
Monte” until Monte‟s eventual resignation in September.
13
   
Expanding opportunities for the poor 
Because OEO and the North Carolina Fund together provided around 90 percent 
of the total costs for COP resources and staff salaries, by 1966, both organizations were 
enjoying a decent amount of influence over how local people in Craven administered the 
antipoverty efforts. The Fund‟s role in convincing the COP board of directors not to fire 
Jim Hearn during the summer of 1965 is one obvious example. In addition, ever since 
their operational budgets were made available, both OEO and the Fund had openly 
challenged the attitudes and understandings of a number of local people through their 
joint insistence upon wide participation by minorities and the poor in community action 
programs. Both organizations would step up the intensity of their intervention in local 
community action, however, during the second half of Monte‟s term as executive 
director. Although Monte‟s refusal to expand the scope of the programs as quickly as 
Hearn had was a significant factor, the impatience of officials in both OEO and the Fund 
with Monte was a more significant factor. This impatience was due to their belief that 
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Monte‟s lack of support for demonstrations among the poor and his chief focus on 
education-based initiatives was limiting COP‟s ability to empower the poor on all fronts. 
For example, in March 1966, OEO had approved Monte‟s plans to combine COP with the 
CAAs of Jones and Pamlico Counties into one all-encompassing CAA, which became 
known as Coastal Progress, Inc. (CPI); however, federal officials rejected Monte‟s 
original name, “Coastal Educational Cooperative, Inc.,” because of objections to the 
word “educational,” which they felt was too limiting and specific.
 14
  
Nonetheless, neither Monte‟s belief in the centrality of education in empowering 
the poor nor his slow and steady approach were the foremost reasons that the poor were 
not participating to the degree that OEO and the Fund had hoped.
15
Although less than a 
majority of the local poor were taking part in COP programs in mid-1966, the waiting 
                                                 
14
 The by-laws of Coastal Progress, Inc. (CPI) was officially approved by OEO in March 1966. CPI was  
set up to organize paperwork and write proposals on behalf of other three agencies that would remain 
intact. COP (which served an area of approximately 79,000 residents), Jones Economic Development 
Corporation (which served an area of approximately 11,000), and Pamlico Operation Progress (which 
served an area of approximately 9,000) would each maintain their own executive director and each board 
would also remain in charge of running its own programs. The head of COP and Coastal Progress would  
be the same person, however. At a board meeting of CPI on March 16, 1966, Monte officially became the 
head of CPI, Larry Pate was named president, and black civil rights leader C.B. Chadwick, Sr. and J.D. 
Jenkins, both of Jones County, were named first and second vice-president, respectively. See COP Board 
meeting minutes, January 3, 1966, folder 4975, NCFR; COP Board meeting minutes, March 16, 1966, 
folder 4975, NCFR. 
 
15
 By June 1966, OEO director Sargent Shriver was openly critical of the vast number of poor across the 
nation who he claimed had not been reached by the War on Poverty. As he argued before the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty, “in a mere 20 months the program has…affected 
the lives of 4 million impoverished Americans in the slums of 800 urban and rural communities.” But, in 
spite of this beginning,” Shriver lamented, “we have today reached only: 30 percent of the children of the 
poor; 15 percent of the youth in the slums; 2 percent of the illiterate; and a scant 5 percent of the aged.” 
Thus, Shriver added, “Our request for fiscal year 1967 is 17 percent above the last fiscal appropriation.” 
Indeed, “The $1.7 billion for the coming fiscal year will keep this program moving forward. True it is a 
budget for troubled times. And under other circumstances would have been larger.”See Amendments to  
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, 
and Poverty of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 89
th
 Cong. 43-44 (1966) (statement of  
Sargent Shriver, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity). 
338 
 
lists for the ABER program alone indicated that the numbers of program participants had 
grown significantly between the Hearn and Monte eras. In spite of this positive 
development, however, there was considerable proof that factors outside the immediate 
control of Monte or his staff were influencing the poor‟s wanting participation rates. 
Based on data compiled from both black and white poor who were contacted by COP 
staff, less than full participation was due to issues of motivation, low self-esteem, drug 
addiction, family responsibilities, and a personal assessment of one‟s needs which could 
often trump the incentives of the programs presented. The latter factor, notwithstanding 
others such as racial prejudice among segments of the white poor, appeared to be the 
most common determinant whether poor people to participate in a COP-supported 
program such as on-the-job training. Nonetheless, even though less than ideal 
participation rates were largely beyond their control, OEO would place blame almost 
entirely on Monte and CAA leaders in other parts of the nation.  
Even staff of COP programs that were successfully adapting to the wishes and 
needs of the poor, most particularly the Manpower Improvement Through Community 
Effort (MITCE) experimental program, regularly found it difficult to convince the poor 
(almost all of whom were contacted in person) to get involved in the novel opportunity 
that had literally come knocking on their front doors. In reference to the MITCE 
programs sponsored by the North Carolina Fund, George Esser explained that “they did 
much the same thing as [the Employment Security Commission]” but “were more 
flexible and could be tailored to the job-seekers better than the bureaucratically 
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entrenched ESC,” which had been set up to meet the needs of employers.
16
 In contrast to 
the local ESC, whose staff had tended to screen out individuals based on the 
specifications of employers, as, indeed, ESC staffs throughout the country were doing, 
MITCE placed more emphasis on matching employers to low-income or unemployed 
individuals. In effect, the poor were engaged more as partners in fighting poverty than 
merely as clients of antipoverty services.  
Continued success of manpower efforts 
By July 1966, there was plentiful statistical and anecdotal evidence that the 
MITCE program had begun to successfully match low-income Craven County residents 
with open jobs or skill training that fit their work preferences and long-term career goals. 
Only a month after the entire COP board of directors endorsed the local Manpower 
program on June 22, 1966, Craven‟s biracial Manpower staff had contacted and/or 
interviewed more than 1,690 families in target areas and placed more than five dozen 
rural and urban heads of households with local employers for on-the-job training or direct 
job placement through contracts they had secured with twenty-two local employers, 
which had risen from fourteen since January.
 17
 Some of the heads of household were 
placed within COP as recruiters for Adult Basic Education or as Home Management 
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aides, but the majority had contracted with private companies.
18
 By late July, local 
MITCE staff had also helped to place at least fifty-one individuals who lacked the skills 
for on-the-job training in the field of their choice in institutional training at the Pitt, 
Pamlico or Craven County Industrial Education Centers, each of which was supported by 
the ESC and the North Carolina Department of Community Colleges.
19
 Most of these 
low-skilled workers were sent to the Craven IEC, which by this point, was fully 
operational and boasted 1,952 enrolled students in more than 137 classes that 
corresponded to area employment opportunities including carpentry, secretarial training, 
and machinist training. In addition, the Craven IEC planned to add college-level 
instruction for would-be nurses‟ aides, welders, and auto mechanics.
20
  
According to the monthly reports sent by MITCE to OMAT in 1966, most of the 
poor who agreed to participate in Craven MITCE were low-income black residents 
without high school diplomas. A report from March, for example, showed that of the 367 
people in and around Craven who had been contacted by local Manpower staff (and who 
were found to qualify for the program), 297 were black and at least 80 percent of the 
entire group had less than a high school education. The reports from 1966 also show that 
very few of the Craven residents contacted by MITCE were on any type of welfare. In 
fact, almost all were employed at the time as domestics or as seasonal workers such as 
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farm laborers, tobacco stemmers, and tenant farmers. Due to the low-skilled and 
temporary nature of these jobs, it was not surprising that almost all claimed to be earning 
less than $1,200 per year, which was less than half of the official poverty income of 
approximately $3,000. However, virtually all of the low-income residents who were 
either immediately matched with jobs or placed in on-the-job training began to work 
consistently between thirty and forty hours per week for earnings at or above the 
minimum wage.
21
  
Naturally, these MITCE participants were very enthusiastic about and grateful for 
the program and were especially pleased with the local staff. In late July 1966, numerous 
trainees and hires, many of whom were black, wrote glowing letters of support about 
program staff, including MITCE director Ruth Dial Roberts, who had been indispensible 
not only in finding them employment or signing them up for industrial education but also 
in instilling self-confidence in them and optimism about their future.
22
 Because of its role 
in helping them gain a greater sense of purpose, enjoy financial security, better support 
their families, learn new skills, and contribute to the well-being of their community, 
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several participants believed MITCE to be the best program ever begun in the state.
23
 
Black participants, in particular, some of whom had never been judged on their own 
merits, expressed appreciation for the opportunity to work either alongside or directly 
under whites in jobs that had been previously closed to them. One black female nurse 
aide trainee at Craven County Hospital, whose only previous work experience had been 
as a farm laborer earning $.50/hour, told MITCE director Roberts that even though “this 
was the first time that I have had white instructors,” she “found them to be very kind” and 
inspiring, emphasizing that they “showed great interest in their work.”
24
  
In his recent study of the interdependent relationship between liberalism and 
black power in North Carolina, Devin Fergus downplays the manpower programs widely 
supported by Eastern North Carolina white conservatives during the 1960s. As he argues, 
their efforts went no farther than “training workers for the area‟s labor-intensive low-
wage textile industry” and that they did little to “ameliorate the overarching problems 
manifested in substandard housing, chronic unemployment, and daily struggles with basic 
services as garbage collection and police protection.”
25
 Although Fergus correctly states 
that the possession of a job was not a universal ticket out of poverty and its harmful 
effects, he misses the fact that the type of jobs that the Fund-supervised MITCE program 
                                                 
23
 Eva Jones Canday to Directors and Staff Members of MITCE, July 20, 1966, folder 5301, NCFR; Mrs. 
Elnoria Jones to Mrs. Ruth Dial Roberts, July 21, 1966; Bertha A. Dawson to MITCE staff, July 19, 1966; 
William Nathaniel Butler to Manpower staff, July 18, 1966; Mr. Carl Davis to Mrs. Ruth Dial Robert, July 
19, 1966; Hazel Smith to Mrs. Roberts, July 20, 1966: James Lee to MITCE staff, July 20, 1966, folder 
5300, NCFR.  
 
24
 Enda Henderson to Mrs. Ruth D. Roberts, July 20, 1966, folder 5300, NCFR.  
 
25
 Fergus, Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 16, 19-20.  
 
343 
 
matched with low-income residents of Eastern North Carolina were not low-wage jobs 
but rather high-skilled and well-paid positions that, aside from helping to lift workers and 
their families out of poverty for the first time in their lives, also provided new 
opportunities for upward mobility.  
Fergus and other scholars of the War on Poverty have also failed to give proper 
attention to the fact that low-income blacks in Eastern North Carolina (and elsewhere) 
were primarily interested in employment and finding higher wages with the 
understanding that better wages would give them the best potential of moving out of the 
slum areas where poverty-related problems such as substandard housing and lack of civic 
amenities such as garbage collection were most prevalent.
26
 Indeed, although these and 
other improvements that poor black communities in Craven pushed for such as 
recreational opportunities and road repair were sorely needed, such initiatives often did 
not directly address the sources of a low-income.
27
 Black leaders on the national scene 
saw the same inadequacies. Speaking of his constituency in Harlem, New York, 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell publicly declared in January 1966 that “We do not 
need any more experimental or demonstration projects.” “All we need, are jobs. That‟s 
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all. Jobs.”
28
 Of course, Powell did not mean any type of job; he was referring to jobs that 
would allow individuals to become self-sufficient and improve their quality of life, like 
those available within the MITCE program. This sentiment, shared by many fellow black 
congressmen at the time, was not short-lived but carried on throughout the 1970s. Citing 
the disproportionately high unemployment rate among blacks in 1970, Rep. John 
Conyers, Jr. of Michigan argued that the prime goal of the Labor Department should be 
putting “everybody in this country to work” by establishing enough programs to train the 
unskilled and retrain those whose skills were no longer relevant to the new jobs of that 
era.
29
  
Eager for both higher-paying and higher-skilled jobs, members of the black 
community in and around Craven remained among the most vocal supporters of local 
manpower efforts to bring better days in the present and immediate future. Referring to 
the MITCE program, COP board member Robert Whitehead warned that if the whites 
“don‟t move along with us, they‟re going to be in a position they never dreamed 
possible.” When more industry began to move into the county, Whitehead predicted, “the 
Negroes might be qualified for jobs while [whites‟] children might not be.”
30
 Whitehead 
and most black observers understood at the time that MITCE represented a local 
revolution, albeit one based on conventional values of work ethic and self-sufficiency. 
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Due to the nature and wage scales of the available jobs or the prejudices of employers, 
job training and industrial education had not been available to blacks and the poor in 
general, particularly in heavily agricultural regions like Eastern North Carolina. A North 
Carolina Fund survey of more than eleven thousand low-income residents across the state 
reported that 80 percent of poor adults had never received any type of job training at all. 
If this survey was truly representative, job training and education sponsored by the 
MITCE program could greatly increase the employability and earning power of most 
low-skilled and undereducated residents; as they learned more about the MITCE 
program, the poor were becoming acutely aware of this possibility.
31
  
Many of the poor already recognized the correlation between full-time, secure, 
high-skill jobs and better lives. As expected, then, Craven‟s participating businessmen 
continued to find the low-income MITCE enrollees whom they agreed to hire directly or 
place in on-the-job training to be generally dependable, capable, and willing to prove 
their value. Much of this mutual satisfaction was attributed to the Craven MITCE staff, 
which consistently heeded the advice given by James McDonald of the North Carolina 
Fund to “sell the program to the employer” by letting him or her “know the experience 
and background of the employee” but not to promise “anything you can‟t back up—be 
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honest.”
32
 Eventually, as a result of the wide success of matching employers with 
dependable and capable employees, growing numbers of on-the-job trainees were given 
full-time positions. On average, fewer than 20 percent of the Craven MITCE on-the-job 
participants were dropped from the program; of these, even fewer quit because they 
disliked the job requirements or the employer. The local man who quit his training as a 
chain saw operator at Craven Lumber within two weeks because he “felt it offered no real 
skill” was far from typical. It was much more likely for workers to be dismissed because 
they were deemed unreliable or lacked the ability to learn the trade or follow directions; 
for example, one local man training as an electrician was let go because, according to his 
employer, he had an “alcoholic problem” and “did not work steadily.”
33
  
But, again, just to be clear, those deemed undependable, and subsequently 
dropped from the on-the-job training portion of the MITCE programs, were in the 
minority. Accordingly, almost all of the employers who participated in the MITCE 
program in the summer of 1966 said that they would continue to cooperate with the 
program in order to not only correct the labor shortage issue but also for their own 
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economic well-being and the well-being of the community.
34
 As New Bern businessmen 
Thomas Boyd Hadder wrote to the MITCE director in July 1966, “Employers and 
businessmen, when they understand the program, are willing to take time to help upgrade 
and train these people so that they will become self-supporting and good citizens.”
35
 
Melvin Grady of Grady‟s Moving and Storage also applauded the program as an 
opportunity “given to the man who might otherwise go un-noticed and un-employed.”
36
  
The tightening labor market of the mid-1960s, in which there were more jobs 
needing to be filled than potential employees to fill them, played a major role in 
loosening standards of employability.
37
 Indeed, most of the businesses contacted by 
Manpower who did not accept either a Manpower client or an on-the-job contract, 
claimed to like the sound of the program but considered themselves too small to add extra 
personnel. An extremely small minority of the businessmen who did not participate 
responded that they were “antagonistic toward the Manpower program” or did not want 
“to take part in a government program”; even fewer indicated that they would only accept 
trainees who were white.
38
 There were far more white employers such as Mr. Whitford of 
the Carnival Candy Company in Vanceboro who would keep his black hires despite 
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threats by local KKK members.
39
 These examples show that, by the summer of 1966, 
Manpower was no longer considered an experimental program and had largely proven its 
value to the larger community. By this time, similar successes had been noted in other 
MITCE programs sponsored by the North Carolina Fund within the vicinity of the CAPs 
of Nash-Edgecombe Economic Development (NEED) and Tri-County Community 
Action (TCCA).
40
 Due in part to the successes of MITCE across Eastern North Carolina, 
whose reports the U.S. Labor Department‟s OMAT was collecting on a monthly basis, 
job training would become a much bigger part of the War on Poverty budget, comprising 
46 percent of its total in 1966, and would thereby fall more in line with Secretary of 
Labor Willard Wirtz‟s long-held belief that “The most direct answer to poverty is jobs.”
41
  
The complexity behind fighting poverty 
But despite the growing participation in MITCE, and the fact that it continued to 
be among the preferred programs among the poor and the businessmen alike, in 1966 a 
far greater number of the low-income and unemployed in Eastern North Carolina were 
not taking full advantage of the opportunity, oftentimes out of choice. As the Manpower 
staff acknowledged by July 1966, the program could benefit from more training openings 
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“especially for our numerous female heads of households,” but, as they saw it, high 
turnover was a more significant problem.
42
 Openings almost always outnumbered the 
numbers of potential workers who were willing and available to fill them.
43
 A Craven 
report from June 30 revealed that of the more than 2,100 county residents who had been 
contacted by the MITCE staff, 637 were deemed qualified for institutional or on-the-job 
training but only 184 had actually enrolled in either. The 400-plus persons who chose not 
to enroll, all of whom were either unemployed or underemployed at the time, listed 
reasons that included “obtained employment on their own;” “age (too old);” 
“handicapped;” and likely unaware of, uninterested in, or unable to drive to the free 
daycare program sponsored by COP “no one to look after family.” “Not interested” and 
“other” rounded out the negative responses, the latter of which likely included people 
with transportation issues.  
The majority of these reasons, of course, were clearly not contingent upon choice. 
However, “not interested” was by far the most popular single response after “age.” To 
boot, of the 184 who enrolled in either on-the-job or institutional training, 64 dropped 
out, only some of whom claimed to have found employment.
44
 Other monthly reports in 
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1966 showed similar figures. MITCE staff, however, would not immediately give up on 
these individuals. Those who were terminated from training, regardless of whether they 
were fired or had quit, were typically followed up with counseling or were referred to 
another COP-sponsored program such as adult basic education or the health department. 
Even so, the counseling phase, which was also begun before contracts were made with 
employers, saw a sizeable number of drop-outs as well. A March 30, 1966, report showed 
that 175 of the 367 being counseled (or almost half) dropped out or were terminated.
45
 
As these numbers suggest, the poor did not always take advantage of 
opportunities made available to them—especially if the poor thought that the benefits of 
participation would not outweigh their current employment situation or might involve 
risks that they believed they could not afford at that particular point in their lives. Of 
course, it was to be expected for a portion of on-the-job trainees to withdraw. After all, 
this aspect of the program was largely designed to serve as a trial period for both 
employee and employer. Manpower field workers, counselors, and trainers also 
acknowledged “the existence of „Blue Monday‟ persons—people that simply will not 
work out.” 
46
 For example, according to an April 1966 team report, one individual who 
qualified for on-the-job training not only missed his first employer interview (because he 
had been in jail) but also showed up intoxicated for the second one.
47
 In spite of this 
awareness, however, local MITCE staff continued to express astonishment that hundreds 
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of unemployed and underemployed who they contacted would not even take the first step 
to give training a chance. “We have been unsuccessful in trying to get them to leave the 
farm,” counselor James K. Adams lamented in an April 1966 report about several low-
income individuals who refused training because of outstanding debts, despite the 
training allowance they would have received.
48
  
MITCE records also show that a significant number of the poor were unwilling to 
participate in the program without guarantees of instant matches with job openings. 
These decisions were somewhat logical: many of the underemployed poor could barely 
make ends meet in their current positions and, therefore, could not afford to quit, possibly 
offend their employers, and enroll in training that might not secure them the jobs they 
desired. Middle-aged and older individuals with children were the least likely to risk job 
or career changes. Black workers of all ages, because of experiences with prejudiced 
white employers, also tended to fear that training would not necessarily lead to the jobs 
they would be trained for.
49
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Placement Coordinator Lessie Stram found that this skeptical mentality caused 
some poor to insist on a guarantee of a higher-paying job before they would enroll in 
training.
50
 Stram also discovered that although it was best “to let [the poor] know that 
they have to want our help and be willing to sacrifice in order to better themselves,” some 
still did not seem to understand that “by sacrificing now they will profit from it later.”
51
 
Most of the poor who were contacted by MITCE probably understood the amount of 
sacrifice that was needed but, as mentioned, did not always believe that the effort was 
worth what might be lost if they did not find new jobs that paid better than the ones they 
already had. Prolonged periods of poverty and repeated disappointments also probably 
influenced many of the poor to distrust those who claimed to be there to help and to be 
wary of the supposed paybacks they might derive from new opportunities.
52
 For others, 
poverty had created a lifestyle to which, despite its stresses, many had grown accustomed 
and for whom it felt predictable and therefore relatively safe. The following excerpt, 
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which illustrates these ambiguities, comes from a report Stram delivered to his supervisor 
about a particularly unsuccessful outcome:  
 
By appointment, I met a client of mine who has been considering entering 
the carpentry class….My client and his wife have discussed this over the 
week-end and have decided that he will not enter the carpentry training 
class. They have a daughter in college, (her last year) and a son in high 
school; this plus their living expenses are more than the small allowance 
will take care of. I asked my client if he had considered the future and 
what this training would mean to both him and his family in getting a 
better job. He stated he had thought on both sides of the problem, and he 
feels he should stay where he is [working part-time at the mill], rather than 
take the training. He thanked me for my time and effort in trying to help 
him better himself.
53
  
 
 
Despite numerous targeted plans and uncountable man-hours spent in trying to educate 
the poor about available job training opportunities and persuade them to enroll, less-than-
ideal participation rates persisted throughout the life of the MITCE program.
54
 Was the 
program‟s philosophy or execution essentially flawed? The available evidence suggests 
that the answer is most likely no. In fact, as partially gleaned from 1960‟s interviews of 
both black and white poor residents, MITCE remained one of the most popular programs 
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within Craven Operation Progress among those who enrolled. Yet even a program that 
provided one of the surest avenues yet offered for the types of jobs the poor wanted could 
not by itself overcome intended beneficiaries‟ doubts, skepticisms, or diminished 
initiative after years of disappointment or unfair treatment. Neither could such programs 
overcome a belief among some low-income residents—most of whom were rural, were 
used to doing without certain luxuries, and lived in proximity to other low-income 
residents—that they were not desperately in need as defined by the North Carolina Fund 
and OEO.  
As the 1965 North Carolina Fund survey of the state‟s poor residents discussed 
earlier revealed, slightly more than 50 percent of the more than eleven thousand polled 
expressed an interest in job training and education in order to improve their incomes and 
their way of life; however, almost 30 percent said they would not be willing to take 
advantage of either. Some of these 30 percent may have been distrustful of all 
government-funded programs. Yet the same survey showed another surprising yet similar 
result: as many as 41 percent of the poor would not move elsewhere to get “a good job” 
and, of those, 28 percent claimed they would not move regardless of the potential 
salary.
55
 These numbers do not mean, however, that most of the low-income residents of 
Craven County did not desire the same things as the mainstream culture such as financial 
security and a fulfilling lives for themselves and their families, including the ability to 
move beyond subsistence living and purchase consumer products that would bring them 
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pleasure, enjoyment, and comfort. With this largely being the case, some might find it 
somewhat puzzling that only a minority of the poor joined a program that was designed 
with these desires of theirs in mind. Historian Thomas Kiffmeyer has given quite a bit of 
detail to this phenomenon among rural people in the Appalachian Mountain region. As 
spoken by a white antipoverty worker in Kentucky whom Kiffmeyer quoted, “When the 
[War on Poverty] is aimed at a certain group of people [there] is an isolation that causes 
them to feel the stigma of this sense of poverty. I doubt that they there are very many 
here who are in the same, or as poor a circumstance, as I was at a boy. But we never 
thought of it as poverty. I think it has a lot to do with the mental attitude…But I believe 
that if somebody had stuck me in a little group and said „You are here because you‟re 
poor‟ it would have hurt me perhaps beyond recovery.” Kiffmeyer concludes that the 
poor‟s “resentment of reform efforts that labeled them as poor,” helps to explain the “[the 
War on Poverty‟s] immediate failure” in the Appalachian area, adding that “many 
Appalachian residents saw the War on Poverty as just another in a century-long tradition 
of reform that ultimately saw them as objects, as tools to fulfill someone else‟s agenda.”
 
56
 
Perhaps another reluctance of a significant portion of poor people in Craven 
County to participate in anti-poverty job training programs can be better understood if it 
is considered against the diminished expectations that can and do develop after years or 
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even decades of insufficient income, as well as habits and actions that could appear self-
defeating to the middle-class observer. In such cases, a poverty-induced mindset could 
very well prevent the poor from taking the initiative to seek help, accepting help when it 
was offered, or being willing to make sacrifices to achieve goals in which they had little 
or no faith. Moreover, not until one sees an issue with how one is currently living can 
there be any change. Franklin Ingram, who was Craven‟s volunteer team director during 
the Klan-inspired shootings in the summer of 1965, recalled that the poor he encountered 
often lacked confidence and had little hope, especially the undereducated. “Their world is 
very small,” he added, after acknowledging that a good number of poor people never took 
advantage of the opportunities they were offered.
57
 North Carolina Volunteers who were 
assigned to work among the poor in Craven during the summer tended to agree. “I am 
convinced that all of the money and programs we can apply to the problems of poverty,” 
a white female volunteer reported, “will never be really effective without a real 
understanding of the people of poverty and their view of themselves and their  
problems.”Another female volunteer, who worked in the predominately black 
neighborhood of Duffyfield, would similarly argue that “though prejudice was certainly a 
factor [in black poverty], I believe ignorance was a cause as well.”
58
 In short, whether or 
not certain attitudes and/or behaviors among the poor were leading causes of poverty or 
                                                 
57
 Franklin Ingram, interview by author, Cary, NC, November 5, 2010, transcript of interview in author‟s 
possession. 
 
58
 Sandra Johnson, Report on Work  Done in the New South Front Street Area (Pollock St.) in New Bern, 
N.C., August 25, 1965; Anne Jones, Report, Summer 1965, Duffy field, New Bern, NC, in Craven 
Operation Progress, Inc., North Carolina Fund Volunteers Reports, Summer 1965 (in possession of Mr. 
Franklin Ingram). 
 
357 
 
developed because of poverty, they did appear to influence the choices made by poor 
people in Eastern North Carolina when faced with opportunities that seemed to promise a 
better livelihood. Often, it would take considerable time for these attitudes to change.  
This reluctance to participate in job-training programs was not limited to Eastern 
North Carolina. Opportunities Industrial Center (OIC) founder and director Leon Sullivan 
quickly discovered that “almost all of [the trainees] were coming to OIC with a poor 
opinion of themselves” and even that many of the unemployed and undereducated black 
youth “had been brainwashed into inferiority.”
59
 Although social scientists who have 
studied poverty in America since the 1960s have generally discounted “the culture of 
poverty” thesis that underpinned both the North Carolina Fund and the War on Poverty, 
arguing that it is merely a way to “blame the victim,” since 2010, the thesis has 
experienced resurgence as fewer scholars are completely rejecting the notion that 
“attitudes and behavior patterns [may have] kept people poor.”
60
 Most historians who 
have studied the War on Poverty agree with liberal critics at the time, such as Martin 
Luther King, Jr., that the anti-poverty programs, which never amounted to more than 1.5 
                                                 
59
 Leon H. Sullivan, Build, Brother, Build (Philadelphia, PA: Macrae Smith, 1969), 98.  
 
60
 Following Daniel Patrick Moynihan‟s controversial 1965 report on the self-perpetuating behaviors that, 
he argued, were creating a crisis among the black family in the growing number of unmarried mothers and 
welfare dependents, social scientists have been wary of the “culture of poverty” theory and have instead 
placed most of the blame of poverty on the larger society or economic system itself. Yet, as mentioned 
above, there has been growing numbers of scholars who have begun to reexamine this thesis and whether it 
should be fully discounted. See Mario Luis Small, David J. Harding, and Michèle Lamont, “Reconsidering 
Culture and Poverty,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 629 (May 2010): 6-
27; Patricia Cohen, “„Culture of Poverty‟ Makes a Comeback,” New York Times, October 17, 2010; Robert 
Rector, “Liberals Reexamining the Culture of Poverty? Guess Again,” National Review, October 18, 2010. 
 
358 
 
percent of the national budget between 1965 and 1970, were inadequately funded.
61
 
Depending on the location, such as a large city like Watts with significant black youth 
unemployment, they might be correct. But at least in Craven, seeing how many available 
job-training slots were left unfilled, lack of money was not necessarily the primary issue 
faced in attempts to reduce poverty. 
This discussion of the Craven MITCE program demonstrates that fighting poverty 
in the 1960s in Eastern North Carolina was a complicated endeavor that was not 
dependent simply upon opportunity expansion or the depth of passion that may or may 
not have been present among COP staff and leadership, including COP executive director 
Robert Monte. Instead, the success of these antipoverty initiatives depended at least in 
part upon the trust and goodwill of the poor, neither of which could be fully won 
overnight or, sometimes, at all.
62
 By July 1966, Monte was also seeing first-hand that the 
problem of less-than-ideal participation rates was not limited to the local Manpower 
program. For example, late that month black COP board member Catherine Berry urged 
Monte to meet with her and members of her community in Brice‟s Creek about their 
concerns that COP programs were not reaching people in need. After this meeting, Monte 
“checked into the reasons for the Brice‟s Creek area being neglected,” and found, as he 
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would later write to Berry, “that this is not completely true…Many persons were 
contacted concerning the Adult Basic Education classes and were expected to enroll,” 
Monte explained, “however, no one ever attended.” He also informed Berry that 
childcare and transportation would be provided only if people signed up. Monte added 
that “the Rural Environmental Sanitation Program made a survey of your area and 
residents were told to apply at the Craven County Health Department for privies if they 
so desired. Our records indicated that only two persons requested privies.” Therefore, 
“Two privies were installed.”
63
  
Monte‟s matter-of-factness in his letter to Berry could be seen as a demonstration 
of insensitivity toward the poor‟s circumstances. However, Monte understood at least as 
well as the majority of COP leadership and staff that the poor, largely due to their 
distrust, hopelessness, lack of access to information, busy work schedules, or 
transportation issues, would have to be directly contacted by COP staff, possibly multiple 
times, in order to actually benefit from the assistance available through the antipoverty 
programs. As executive director, Monte also considered it fair for the poor to be granted 
some concessions in certain situations so that they could have a say in COP program 
development and implementation. For example, in April, Monte had overseen and 
supported the codification of new by-laws for Coastal Progress, Inc. (CPI), which were 
endorsed by OEO, that included that “1/3 of this board shall consist of low-income 
individuals” who would be elected democratically by members of the poor communities 
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themselves.
64
 In order to improve attendance, Monte had also persuaded the COP board 
to approve of the use of transportation funds by the poor members of the board so that 
they could  attend board meetings regularly, had suggested that staff members help 
transport them, and had gained OEO approval for funding a Home Management program 
for the Jones County CAA, (a new affiliate of Coastal Progress) that would use peer 
education models to help low-income families assist each other in improving their living 
standards. 
65
 These actions notwithstanding, Monte continued to believe that the poor 
would have to take partial responsibility for their situation and take the initiative to seek 
available help. Monte, like most liberals and conservatives alike understood, knew that 
true change ultimately rested with the poor.
66
 
Consensus-seeking decision-making 
Monte similarly believed, as did most of the COP board of directors, that 
demands made by poor residents and their advocates should be met with some degree of 
community approval. By the spring of 1966, several young volunteers from VISTA and 
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the North Carolina Fund‟s group of Community Action Technicians (CATs) who had 
been assigned to Craven County that year were encouraging the poor to use 
confrontational techniques with public officials in order to achieve better living 
conditions.
67
 One of these volunteers, CAT organizer Marv Zommick, had allied himself 
with Leon Nixon of the SCLC, who continued to frustrate many COP board members by 
regularly picketing past COP headquarters instead of meeting to discuss his grievances. 
Nixon‟s demonstration on March 19, which occurred within minutes of the funeral of 
black Good Neighbor Council member Charles C. Sparrow, angered many local blacks 
because Sparrow had been so well respected in the black community and had worked so 
hard to establish interracial harmony in New Bern.
68
 Nixon led another demonstration in 
June, consisting of a small picket (of approximately ten persons) in front of Rivers 
Funeral Home in an attempt to win, as North Carolina Fund staffers put it, “a personality 
battle” against the funeral home‟s owner Bishop S. Rivers (also a COP board member 
and revered civil rights leader), who Nixon believed was “trying to break the unity of the 
Negro community.”
69
 These actions were as unpopular with the majority of blacks and 
whites in Craven as they were with black leaders outside the county. Among these was 
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Floyd McKissick of the NAACP, who reportedly called Nixon “corrupt and 
ineffective.”
70
  
But Monte‟s problems with Zommick were not limited to his association with 
Nixon. According to Monte, Zommick had falsely raised the hopes of the black poor he 
was working with in the Harlowe neighborhood by oversimplifying various issues and by 
overpromising results, especially with regard to the installation of an adequate drainage 
system for the area, which required state approval.
71
 Zommick‟s imprudent style had 
prompted Community Development Director Maggie Blow, her assistant Jim Massie, and 
Robert Whitehead, all three of whom were immensely interested in organizing the black 
poor, to complain about Zommick‟s work in Harlowe. Eventually, former Craven MITCE 
director Royce Jordan, who had been working as a field representative for the North 
Carolina Fund since early 1966, was able to convince Monte not to fire Zommick (based 
on a letter of request from Harlowe residents). Monte did insist, however, that if 
Zommick was going to stay he would have to stop participating in Nixon‟s 
demonstrations.  Monte was also persuaded by Jordan‟s announcement that Blow, 
Massie, and Whitehead recently agreed that COP should sponsor Zommick‟s work in 
Harlowe.
72
  
Yet, largely based on Zommick‟s past liability, Monte felt that COP should be 
allowed to screen the eight VISTA volunteers he had requested from OEO as part of a 
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new Community Development program proposal, in order to prevent an explosive 
situation from developing between the poor and the larger community. He even 
suggested that he, Lee Morgan, and possibly James Massie of Community Development 
should go to Washington themselves to conduct such interviews. At the COP board 
meeting on March 22, most of the board seemed to agree with Constance Rabin that it 
was important for volunteers to be oriented to the community and to the situation they 
would be facing.
73
 Clearly, the Craven community preferred gradual methods of change 
over accelerated ones, and thoughtful negotiations to public demonstrations. Monte 
understood this well.  
Even though it was often a slow process, negotiation was preferred over 
demonstrations, but not simply in hopes of wearing down the poor by delaying their 
requests. Neither was negotiation necessarily a dead-end road. In fact, earlier negotiations 
with the New Bern Civic League, which was headed by Bishop S. Rivers, was critical to 
the appointment of Grover C. Fields, black principal of J.T. Barber High School, to the 
New Bern Housing Authority in January 1966. Fields became the first black to hold such 
a position.
74
 Co-Chairman Rev. Al Fisher of the Craven Good Neighbor Council had also 
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been facilitating negotiations between the New Bern Housing Authority and residents of 
Craven Terrace public housing project since at least January, following action taken by 
I.I. Blanford between November and December 1965. During that two-month period, 
Blanford had ordered the evictions of at least eight black women receiving AFDC 
because they had given birth to more out-of-wedlock children after moving into their 
apartments.
75
 These women certainly preferred the process of negotiation as an 
improvement over the situation described by COP board member and Craven Terrace 
resident Claretta Wordlaw, who claimed that in December 1965 she and five other female 
residents had been refused a meeting by Blanford because “he was too busy.”
 76
 Yet, after 
about a month, the process was apparently not moving quickly enough, which influenced 
Whitehead to talk the group of women into filing suit in federal district court.  
As expected, this move by Whitehead and the female tenants alienated members 
of the city housing authority, including Blanford, who temporarily withdrew from all 
negotiations. Back in September 1965, Blanford had agreed, by request of Whitehead, to 
set aside one apartment in each of the two city housing projects for the operation of a day 
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care center. Moreover, Attorney David L. Ward had written to Whitehead on behalf of 
Blanford and the housing authority members expressing their “desire to provide 
illegitimate children with a decent place to live” and to ask for “further suggestions as to 
how we might handle this matter in order to be fair and at the same time keep the decency 
and respect of our tenants who are not subject to the illegitimacy problem.”
77
 The filing 
of the suit also frustrated Reverend Fisher of the local Good Neighbor Council, who had 
believed that the parties were on the verge of reaching a fair agreement. Among the 
recommendations agreed upon by the Council was a lowering of the rental rates at 
Craven Terrace and Trent Court and an upgrade of the overall maintenance of the two 
housing projects, both of which the Council thought were reasonable and likely to be 
approved by Blanford from a desire to “provide an example of decent and clean and 
attractive living.”
78
Although Rev. Fisher conceded the right of blacks to believe that 
“things have moved too slowly,” he also made clear his convictions that the Good 
Neighbor Council must remain a county-wide group that “deals with all the people in the 
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community” and that it could not retain its effectiveness if it became a civil rights 
organization that solely argued on behalf of blacks.
79
  
Norma Richardson et al. v. Housing Authority of City of New Bern was filed on 
March 7, 1966. NAACP attorney Julius Chambers of Charlotte represented the plaintiffs 
who, in addition to seeking the removal of clauses from the lease that required tenants to 
vacate the premises if they had additional children out of wedlock, sought relief from 
having to move to “substandard, unsanitary, and unsafe, crowded living conditions.”
80
 As 
Chambers argued, not only had the women been evicted without proper due process but 
eviction on the grounds of additional out-of-wedlock children born during the terms of 
their leases was merely a “punishment” that violated “the intent of social welfare 
legislation” and the women‟s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
81
 On March 18, U.S. District Judge John D. Larkins, Jr. ordered that New 
Bern Housing Authority cease “from evicting plaintiffs and members of their class for 
having illegitimate children” and “without just or reasonable cause.” During the time that 
temporary restraining order was effective, approximately one year, the New Bern 
Housing Authority agreed to conform to the 1967 policies of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), which officially ended their policy of evicting tenants 
who bore additional out-of-wedlock children while living in Craven Terrace apartments. 
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Judge Larkins also directed the plaintiffs and defendants to confer with one another in 
order to settle amongst themselves any remaining issues.
82
 By March 1968, following 
further negotiations, both parties would agree that all matters under controversy had been 
resolved and, thus, the case was dismissed.
83
  
Monte had believed Blanford to be vulnerable well before this lawsuit. In fact, 
soon after the suit was filed in March, Monte was quick to openly predict that the Craven 
Terrace group would win.
84
 Monte not only predicted this outcome but seemed to prefer 
it. While he had criticized the VISTA-led demonstrations against Blanford just a few 
months prior, Monte expressed no problems at all with the tenants‟ decision to take 
Blanford and the housing authority members to court. In addition to the likelihood that 
Monte found Blanford‟s willingness to evict single and low-income mothers and their 
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children without a fair trial inappropriate and insensitive, he knew that resolving tenants‟ 
disputes in the courts would significantly lower the possibility of future protests that he, 
Monte, would have to deal with. Nonetheless, as previously discussed, although Monte‟s 
interest in seeing the poor be treated fairly and justly was sincere (if not for his own 
desire to avoid conflict), he believed that any expansion of programs assisting them 
should be, on the whole, approved by members of the community and/or any cooperating 
agencies. Monte‟s unwillingness to budge from this belief was most apparent during COP 
board discussions about adding Legal Services, a program designed to provide free legal 
assistance to the poor, to the list of programs sponsored by COP.  
The first full discussion about possibly adding Legal Services occurred at the June 
22 COP board meeting, just before three new at-large members of the poor were added. 
Seth Williams of Pembroke, Daniel Spruill of Pleasant Hill, and Beatrice Simmons of 
Pollock Street, all of whom were black, were the first COP board appointees selected by 
representatives of the low-income community councils that were organized through 
Community Development.
85
 Previously, before Monte approved the establishment of the 
Community Development program, poor representatives had been appointed only by 
middle-class members of the board of directors (a standard practice for many CAAs who 
were first getting their feet wet in the concept of “maximum feasible participation”). The 
new method of selection was established within COP after the North Carolina Fund‟s 
April 1966 review of COP, which recommended that the board of directors no longer 
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hand-pick representatives of the poor but instead allow the poor themselves to decide 
who they thought best represented their interests. The COP board of directors‟ 
willingness to agree to let the poor elect their own representatives suggests that they were 
interested in expanding community action efforts and in continuing to receive the 
blessings, financially speaking, of the North Carolina Fund and the OEO.  
The same willingness could be inferred from the COP board‟s consideration of 
Legal Services (a national emphasis program being encouraged by OEO). After Monte‟s 
administrative assistant Ralph Jacobs presented the proposal he had written, with the help 
of a UNC-Chapel Hill law student and a licensed lawyer in Orange County, Robert 
Whitehead and poor black representative Claretta Wordlaw were among the first to ask 
the executive committee, which included black representatives of the poor Elizabeth 
Evans and the newly appointed Daniel Spruill, to study the proposal so that the board 
could vote on it and then send to OEO before the June 30 deadline.
86
 No objection was 
made to this request. Indeed, based on Jacob‟s presentation there was little ground for 
objection; for one, the three lawyers who would be hired via Legal Services to assist the 
poor would not be competing with local lawyers and would focus upon non-criminal 
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matters such as divorce settlements and paternity suits. Best of all, the program would 
only require just over $7,000 in local matching funds.
87
  
In spite of these auspicious conditions, after conferring with a delegation from the 
Craven County Bar Association, the COP executive committee decided that the 
“proposed program on Legal Services should be delayed for further study until a more 
acceptable proposal could be developed.”
88
 With Monte‟s encouragement, the executive 
committee had met with the county bar association on June 27 in hopes of receiving its 
approval for the Legal Services proposal, but instead, they were informed that Jacob‟s 
proposal violated both North Carolina state laws and the canon of ethics of the North 
Carolina State Bar. The county bar was particularly concerned that the proposal, as 
written, would induce attorneys hired by COP to “serve two masters.” As congressman 
and former Duplin County lawyer David N. Henderson later explained in a letter to 
Claretta Wordlaw, which he forwarded to NAACP executive secretary Roy Wilkins, if 
COP “should employ a full-time salaried attorney, his primary loyalty would be to the 
corporate employer—not to individual low-income people referred to him.”
89
 In addition, 
the county bar argued that if persons were allowed free counsel, the program had the 
potential to incite litigation.
90
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Aside from finding fault with the Legal Services proposal‟s inconsistency with 
the law and state bar canon of ethics, members of the county bar were also personally 
offended by some of the proposal‟s stated assumptions, which they claimed were “gross 
exaggerations.”
91
 In the words of Solicitor of the Craven County Recorder‟s Court Robert 
G. Bowers, the document had been drawn up by individuals who had “little or no 
knowledge or understanding of the law” and had slandered “the whole Craven County 
bar” for asserting that “indigents are forced to do without legal services” and “people are 
denied access to legal services merely because of the inability to pay.” As Bowers told 
Monte, “Every lawyer in New Bern has spent countless hours counseling, assisting, and 
actively trying cases in courts for impoverished persons, without charging fees or being 
reimbursed for expenses.”
92
 Bowers also insisted that members of the county bar had 
“attempted to furnish fair and reasonable representation to all people without regard to 
race, color, creed, or financial circumstances.”
93
  
Bowers‟ claims cannot be proven or disproven. However, as COP Board member 
Bishop S. Rivers observed, this was not the main issue for himself and fellow black board 
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members Whitehead and Wordlaw, who were especially supportive of the Legal Services 
program. “I feel that if one of the local lawyers helped me for free he would not do as 
well as if he were paid,” Rivers reasoned with a conservative white COP Board 
member.
94
 For their part, most of the members of the county bar, who seemed primarily 
bothered that they had not been consulted at all about the Legal Services proposal, were 
seemingly most concerned about maintaining the integrity of the law profession, which 
was the mission of all local, state, and national bar associations. After supposedly 
receiving confirmation from the district bar, the state bar, and the state attorney general 
that their objections had been correct, the Craven County bar provided Monte with a 
statement that promised its members would do all they could towards the “restraining of 
any activities under such program” if the Legal Services proposal was sent to OEO as 
proposed.
95
 Representative Henderson, who agreed with the county attorneys that the 
proposal violated what “the legal profession considers to be high standards of legal 
practice,” warned Monte that he would do the same if the program was established and 
operated without the consent and the cooperation of the Craven County Bar Association. 
Outside intervention on the rise 
These negative reactions from the county bar and Rep. Henderson convinced 
Monte, himself no legal expert, that the original Legal Services proposal would have to 
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be scrapped. In order to ensure that such a program could be undertaken legally, and in 
accordance with known standards of the law profession, he decided to ask the Craven 
County Bar to construct its own proposal for the COP board to consider. As Monte 
specifically told North Carolina Fund Field Representative Royce Jordan, he would not 
push the legal aid program from his office unless it had the approval of the county bar.
96
 
Fund staff, including Jordan, were dismayed by this action and believed that Monte was 
surrendering Legal Services to a hostile bar that would write a weak, ineffective proposal. 
“Although [Monte] seems to want this proposal,” Jordan wrote in a field report for July 
27-28, “he still wants it to conform in every way to the wishes of the local bar 
association.” Jordan thought that Monte might be secretly trying to defeat the proposal 
altogether, an opinion that was shared by OEO representative Bob Burns.
97
  
The Fund‟s disagreement with Monte over his handling of the Legal Services 
proposal capped a string of events—including Monte‟s imposition of restrictions on 
ABER volunteers, which had influenced OEO to recall all VISTAs in February, and his 
reprimand of Lee Morgan over the voter registration advertisement in April—that had led 
Fund staff to believe that there was a necessity of increasing their involvement in the 
local affairs of COP. From the perspective of Fund representative Royce Jordan, COP 
“has added nothing new to its program” and “has slowed down on everything.”
98
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Although the first half of this statement was untrue—Community Development, Federal 
Credit Union, ABER, MITCE, and NYC were among those programs either added or 
expanded within eight months of Monte‟s hiring—Monte was undoubtedly running the 
program at a much slower pace than the Fund had preferred when Hearn was in charge. 
Even before the Legal Services conflict, the Fund‟s strategy had been to “run things 
around Monte,” “get rid of [Ralph] Jacobs” who the Fund had believed was placed in 
charge of too many responsibilities, and “try to get [Lee] Morgan to assume some 
responsibility.”
99
 Therefore, Jordan and other Fund staff were not impressed on June 22 
when  at the request of COP Board member T. J. Collier, the COP board of directors 
unanimously stated its confidence in Monte and his administration of COP.
100
 As John 
Miller detailed in a North Carolina Fund report, “As relations between the Fund and COP 
worsened,” due to disagreements over the means of implementing the programs, “COP‟s 
autonomy from the Fund actually decreased because the latter felt a duty to more closely 
scrutinize and attempt to influence activities taking place within the COP 
organization.”
101
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Figure 23. Craven County native and North Carolina Fund Field Representative Royce Jordan, circa 1966. 
Photo courtesy of Royce Jordan.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. North Carolina Fund Field Representative James McDonald, circa 1965, New Bern, 
NC. Billy Barnes Collection.  
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Two related factors help to explain the greater intervention of the North Carolina 
Fund in the direction of COP by the summer of 1966: both a growth in the number of 
liberal Fund staff who were interested in the “conflict model” of change and George 
Esser‟s largely hands-off approach as executive director. Esser himself stated: 
 
I did not anticipate or intend all of the confrontations with which we were 
faced, because this simply is not my style. On the other hand, I recognized 
that I was director of a staff which did become very emotionally involved 
as the advocate of the poor North Carolinian, and particularly the poor 
black North Carolinian. I also gave the staff freedom to hire who they 
wanted. Increasingly, the attitude of the staff toward the community action 
agencies was one of prodding, one of advocacy, or confrontation, of 
encouraging the poor in these communities to confront the system, and 
while I personally did not encourage the conflict model, I defended it, and 
I was increasingly willing to interpret to the state at large the problem of 
poor people in the community.
102
 
 
 
As explained in this quotation, the views of several Fund staff hired by Esser by 1966 
about fairness and the best means of influencing positive change in the lives of the poor 
differed, at times quite widely, from the views held by the majority of people who lived 
in the communities to which the Fund‟s efforts were directed. Specifically, several Fund 
staff acted from a point of view, sometimes valid and sometimes not, that most of the 
poor and/or minorities were victims of decisions purposely made by whites and the 
middle-class to keep them disadvantaged. This point of view meant that advancement for 
the poor and true solutions to their problems could not be achieved through negotiations 
with the people and institutions they deemed were responsible for their poverty. As a 
result, when newly hired Fund staff pushed for democratic participation and local self-
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determination they were more interested in initiatives that directly benefitted poor. In 
short, the belief that local power and influence was a zero-sum game in which one 
person‟s gain was another‟s loss led many Fund staff to advocate for the civil rights and 
preferences of the poor over the civil rights and preferences of members of the wider 
community.  
 Fund staffers Sarah Herbin and Howard Fuller, both black, were two especially 
striking examples of the activist type that Esser was starting to employ. On a visit to 
Nash-Edgecombe Economic Development (NEED) in Rocky Mount in June 1966, 
Herbin supposedly told the Project Director of NEED, R.I. Gould, that “the true function 
of a Project Director and his staff was to organize the poor to enable them to demand 
their rights from the Board of Directors.” “The poor must know how to protest to the 
Board,” Herbin informed Gould, in order “to force the Board to do the will of the poor.” 
As Gould recalled, Herbin went on to state that “white middle class values” were largely 
irrelevant because “the poor did not desire to be improved individually but only 
collectively.” The black poor in particular “do not want to move into the mainstream,” 
she explained, “because it is too polluted.” If NEED was not willing to accept these 
premises, Herbin also told Gould, the organization should “get out of the N.C. Fund.”
103
  
Howard Fuller, a black Northerner who had been first hired as the Community 
Development Coordinator for Operation Breakthrough, Inc. (OBI) in Durham, also saw 
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mainstream society as the root cause of poverty and believed that in order to see 
meaningful change the black poor, in particular, had to confront their “oppressors” rather 
than involve them in the community action planning process. “I just want to see you get 
mad at something” he proclaimed to a group of poor blacks in Northeastern North 
Carolina in July 1966. “It‟s time you realize that the white man, he doesn‟t make a 
distinction between the drunks and the people who are sober. He really doesn‟t make a 
distinction between the rich n*ggers and the poor n*ggers, all y‟all n*ggers, when he get 
down to it…”
104
  
Herbin, Fuller, and other Fund staff such as John Salter and James McDonald (the 
latter of whom was in close contact with COP), were correct in believing that 
conservative whites had acted and continued to act as roadblocks to black economic 
progress; however, their cynical outlook towards American society had arguably resulted 
from extending the behaviors of a minority to the whole.
105
 Whether Herbin and Fuller 
purposely decided to evoke negative stereotypes of whites as a way of provoking an 
emotionally charged response from the poor or in an attempt to shame moderate whites 
into embracing immediate change is not known. Nor is it known whether their uses of 
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disparaging rhetoric were simply based upon a mental oversight on their part. The answer 
made little difference. In any case, Fund staff like Fuller and Herbin supported high-
pressure tactics and increased militancy among the poor that often made mutual 
cooperation between the poor and the non-poor more difficult by its tendency to alienate 
those North Carolinians, most of whom were white and middle-class, who were 
genuinely interested in helping to reduce poverty and even starting to show sympathy for 
ideas of granting the poor greater participation in society and being more responsive to 
their special needs. Many would recoil from being portrayed as inherently incapable of 
doing any of these things.  
 Activist Fund staff were far more successful in influencing the mindset and 
outlook of Esser himself, who claimed that Fuller was the one most responsible for 
convincing him that “the more local your situation, the more difficult it was to get 
change.”
106
 “One of the several naïve hopes with which we entered the Fund experience,” 
Esser would recall years later, “was the idea that a spirit of community dedication and 
cooperation, backed by some grant monies, might bring about a willingness to admit the 
poor, especially the Negro poor, to the community decision-making process. Now, of 
course, we know that it is not in the nature of human beings,” Esser contended, “to share 
power willingly. Representation on school boards, welfare boards, city councils and 
housing authority boards is not likely to be welcomed simply because it is right or 
because it is fair.” No later than mid-1966, Esser had adopted Fuller‟s position that 
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change would only occur if the poor educated and mobilized themselves to demand it.
107
 
Esser no longer believed that taking controversial positions and moving away from 
community consensus were damaging the Fund‟s work in the state but instead that they 
were a primary means to propel it forward. The Fund was also supporting a more activist 
approach because since at least January 1966, as noted by Esser in his memoirs, “we 
ended up getting funded more by OEO than by the foundations,” including the Ford 
Foundation, a circumstance that inevitably “changed the goals and nature of the Fund.”
108
 
Conclusion 
As a result of this switch to a firmer and more narrow focus on the problems of 
poverty, Esser became even more willing than he had been in October 1965, when Monte 
was first hired, to support the involvement of the Fund staff if he and staff members felt 
that Monte was not acting in accordance with the Fund‟s philosophy.
109
 Accordingly, the 
longer Monte continued to seek widespread community support for COP‟s antipoverty 
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projects, the more willing Esser became to question Monte‟s motives.  As early as March 
1966, Fund staffer John Miller, who was among the Fund‟s more politically moderate 
staff members, tried to convince Esser that “it is apparent that Bob Monte is sincerely 
trying his best as Director. He is willing to work with the Fund but has not been getting 
the cooperation from Fund personnel that he should.” Monte had several ideas for new 
programs and, Miller added, “he works closely with his board and staff members, and, in 
general, I think he is trying to do a good job.”
110
 Other Fund staffers obviously disagreed 
and were quick to forget how Monte had often cooperated with the organization‟s 
priorities in the past. For example, although it was less important to him than enhancing 
local opportunities for job training and education, Monte pushed Community 
Development—a favorite program of both the North Carolina Fund and OEO, which 
encouraged the poor to coordinate resources in order to organize around voter 
registration, the building of community centers, and matters having to do with recreation, 
health, sanitation, housing, employment, and education. Nonetheless, despite its close 
proximity to COP, Fund personnel could not always see past their perceptions of Monte; 
they became less and less willing to be patient in seeing changes for the poor. For his 
part, Monte still saw the private organization as needed and remained grateful, at least up 
to the summer of 1966, for the technical advice, staff training, funding, and other 
resources provided by the Fund.
111
 By the summer of 1966, however, Monte would no 
                                                 
110
 Mr. Robert Monte, interview by John Miller, New Bern, NC, March 22-23, 1966, transcript, folder 
7090, NCFR.  
 
111
 Robert R. Monte to James C. McDonald, May 8, 1966, folder 5025, NCFR.  
382 
 
longer hold these views. Largely out of frustration with the Fund‟s increased intervention 
and shift in goals, not to mention that of the OEO, Monte would subsequently step down 
as executive director in October. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DEFENDING LOCAL CONTROL 
 
 
Introduction 
Conflict between COP/CPI and its outside funding agencies would increase 
significantly by the middle of 1966 but was in no way limited to the Monte era and would 
continue well into the executive directorship of his successor, James L. Godwin, formerly 
a Title V coordinator for the Craven County Welfare Department, who would oversee the 
local CAA into the early 1970s. But while Monte would trace his problems to the 
increased intervention of both the Fund and OEO, Godwin‟s problems were primarily 
centered around OEO‟s dramatic shift away from local ideas. Far more so than Monte, 
Godwin would witness a trend in which OEO began funding fewer and fewer projects 
originating from local ideas and instead pushed national emphasis programs, such as 
Head Start, Legal Services, and Upward Bound that were designed by federal bureaucrats 
in Washington, D.C.
1
 This new trend primarily frustrated Godwin because it made his job 
as executive director much more difficult as the poor‟s demands on the programs 
continued to grow. 
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While congressional cuts to OEO‟s budget in 1967 were relevant, the federal 
campaign to standardize the types of programs within the nation‟s CAAs was more in 
response to other factors, including growing congressional disapproval for the radical 
and/or violent direction of some local community action groups, such as Richard Boone‟s 
Citizen‟s Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP), and a continuing belief within OEO that 
national emphasis programs were more effective in reaching those most in need than 
were programs conceived by local people, most of whom were not poor themselves.
1
 
OEO director Sargent Shriver and most OEO officials had always believed to some 
degree that local institutions were culpable in the existence of poverty and, therefore, 
needed altering.
2
 But especially following the summer riots in Detroit and Newark in 
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1967, this view that the poor were primarily victims of society only grew, as evidenced 
by OEO‟s willingness to discuss the idea of heightened welfare payments to individuals 
and families and even a guaranteed income.
3
 Now, with additional pressure from 
Congress, OEO was not only less compelled but less able to fund local initiatives.
4
 
Finally, and also because of the riots of 1967, COP/CPI, like most other rural CAAs, was 
given a back seat to urban poverty and urban concerns. 
5
 
Regardless of the source, as a Wall Street Journal writer reported in late 1967, 
“Each time the OEO or Congress decides a Community Action group should undertake a 
new Washington-devised project, it tends to cut down the funds available for activities 
conceived locally.” “Sure, we need Head Start here,” the Journal quoted an antipoverty 
worker in San Francisco, “but not at the expense of our other programs.”
6
 Congressman 
Walter B. Jones, a conservative Democrat who represented Craven County in the U.S. 
House during the late 1960s, once remarked to James Godwin that even Shriver desired 
more local control of CAAs. Depending on the context and his audience, however, 
Shriver argued for more local control both to support the interests of indigenous poor 
people and for the inclusion of more city elites. Seemingly, then, Shriver‟s vocal defense 
of the latter was primarily done to sustain necessary middle-class support for the War on 
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Poverty. The direction that his agency took with regard to COP/CPI revealed more than 
words alone that Shriver‟s priorities for local control rested with the poor, which was 
often at the expense of CAAs that were not run by the poor. Policies emanating from 
either federal offices in Washington, D.C. and/or the Fund headquarters in Durham that 
aimed to downplay either local control or local ideas, however, were not so overawing as 
to keep those within COP/CPI, most notably Monte and Godwin, from attempting to fight 
back against them.  
The compromise over the legal aid proposal  
When the Craven County Bar Association presented the final draft of its legal 
services proposal to the COP board on August 31, Monte hoped to show the North 
Carolina Fund that, contrary to their notions about him and in spite of his support of the 
Craven County Bar Association in the matter of Legal Services, he was still interested in 
expanding COP‟s programs so that they would more effectively reach the poor. Monte‟s 
ability to do so did not go unchallenged, however. A few days before the presentation, 
thirty-one-year-old black civil rights activist James Gavin, who had recently replaced an 
aging Robert Whitehead as head of the Combined Civic League of New Bern and Craven 
County, addressed the COP board and presented it with a petition in favor of the 
establishment of Legal Services that had been signed by several hundred of Craven 
County‟s poor. It began with a strong declaration: “Too often we have been the unwary 
victims of legal services extended to companies and individuals who are able, by the 
mere fact that they possess more money than we do, to intimidate us….We are 
frightened, made afraid, and overawed when faced with the legal process operating in this 
387 
 
county.” After arguing that the Legal Services program would be in accordance with their 
basic constitutional rights, the petition asked the board members, “who are supposed to 
be voicing the needs of the poor,” to approve the Legal Services proposal “as originally 
presented [which would] raise the level of confidence we have entrusted in you instead of 
lowering it.”
7
  
Although this plea did not lack passion or sincerity, it did lack an understanding 
of the reality at hand. As COP board member and local attorney David S. Henderson (no 
relation to Congressman David N. Henderson) reminded the board on August 31, and as a 
letter from OEO director Sargent Shriver confirmed, any Legal Services program would 
have to conform to the standards and canon of ethics of the state bar in which it operated; 
moreover, such a program should have the cooperation of the local bar association as 
well.
8
 Therefore, if Monte wanted to add a legal aid program, the county bar would have 
to give final approval to the proposal and also play a dominant role in writing the 
application itself. Ralph Jacobs, while vigorously disputing the contention that the 
original proposal he had co-written was “irresponsibly submitted as obviously illegal,” 
also acknowledged that there had been “points of legality about the proposal which were 
honest and legitimate differences of opinion among the licensed attorneys in North 
Carolina.”
9
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Considering the county bar‟s outrage over the original legal services proposal, it 
came as little surprise that the new proposal was markedly different. One major change, 
based on local attorneys‟ belief that the $71,000 of federal funds requested in the original 
proposal was not needed, was a plan for legal services to be supported only by private 
donations. OEO would then have no role at all in the program and there would be no need 
to bring in additional lawyers from outside the area. In addition, the new proposal 
eliminated “arbitrary” income guidelines on the grounds that most recipients “should be 
able to pay a portion of the fee”; instead a committee of three local lawyers would 
determine whose need for near-free legal counsel was genuine. Whitehead, one of the 
most enthusiastic supporters of the original proposal, was the first to object. Quite rightly, 
he recognized that a legal services program enacted according to these criteria would be 
taken out of the hands of COP and placed primarily under the control of the Craven bar 
association.
10
 Whitehead also criticized the fact that, though the proposal would allow 
poor to select their own lawyers, there was no provision for allowing the poor to serve on 
a legal services advisory board or to take any meaningful part in determining the 
program‟s policies.
11
  
Most COP board members, however, were more in agreement with the basic 
position of fellow board member and Craven County Welfare Department Director 
Constance Rabin. Noting that many welfare recipients used their welfare checks to cover 
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fines and attorneys‟ fees, Rabin stated her support for a small fee to be required by the 
poor based on the premise that “people appreciated something more when they had 
something invested in it.” Rabin was in favor of the program and wanted to see it 
established as quickly as possible so that she could inform the poor of its existence. She 
also felt that it should be held in the hands of the county bar association, believing that 
the poor would be treated fairly until demonstrated otherwise.  
Shortly after Rabin‟s remarks, the board voted twelve to three to accept the local 
bar‟s proposal and to allow it to control the legal services program. According to 
Whitehead, who was not pleased with Monte for giving in to the county bar over what 
Whitehead perceived were the rights and needs of the poor, John R. Hill and Willie 
Dawson were the only blacks on the COP board who had cast favorable votes.
12
 But 
Whitehead and the other black board members who had voted against it were not the only 
ones to disapprove of the decisions Monte had made that eventually resulted in the 
transfer of the legal aid program to the county bar association. Whitehead would claim 
that about five white COP board members confided in him after the August 31 meeting 
that they “did not think the proposal was much good either,” a set of confessions that 
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compelled him to ask them why they had voted for it. “That‟s the trouble with so many 
whites in this community, they‟re afraid to speak up,” Whitehead concluded.
13
  
Clearly, the legal services proposal was not considered ideal by everyone. 
However, as Monte and other supporters saw it, even a potentially flawed program was 
more likely to improve the poor‟s access to and standing within the legal process than no 
program at all. In the past, local lawyers had helped the poor inconsistently, and without 
relying on advertising. Now, at least, poor people who could not afford legal counsel or 
assumed that lawyers would only offer it at high prices would have access to a system 
that would provide legal aid for a minimal fee.  In the end, blacks and whites on the COP 
board (though they had disagreed over the two proposals) had at least been able to agree 
that the poor could benefit from and were deserving of affordable legal aid.  
The fight to keep Colonel Evans: COP vs. the U.S. Department of Labor 
During the same August 31 board meeting that the Legal Services proposal was 
accepted, Larry Pate announced that he was resigning as COP board chairman (due to his 
wife‟s recent illness), and Monte caught the group up on the pending investigations 
launched by the U.S. Department of Labor into the administrative activities of NYC 
director W.F. Evans.
14
 Federal officials had extended the program for two weeks while 
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investigations were being concluded; however, Monte was confident that the program 
would be approved for another year because the NYC program had remained fairly 
popular within COP and the community. Rabin, for one, commented on the recent “good 
work” done by the NYC enrollees working in her department, two of whom had obtained 
permanent jobs and one of whom had just entered college.
15
  
Many NYC participants, most of whom were black, were supportive of the 
program as well. A radio public service announcement organized by COP Public 
Information Officer Tillie Knowles that ran from March 23 to April 23, 1966, quoted the 
praises of several enrollees who recounted their positive experiences and said they did 
not know what they would be doing if not for the NYC. As one enrollee stated, “It‟s hard 
for people my age to find jobs if they haven‟t worked before or haven‟t been trained for 
anything.” A female high school drop-out, now employed as a stenographer and 
receptionist for the Craven County Health Department, echoed that “It didn‟t take me 
long to find out how much I need to finish high school…I have learned a lot about 
working and what is expected by people in the business world, [and] would not have 
learned this except for the Youth Corps. That‟s why I am going back to school.”
16
 A 
NYC report from February confirmed the satisfaction of most enrollees. Only 24 of the 
476 enrolled in Craven County had left the program because they did not like the 
work/program; the vast majority who left went on to gain permanent employment, join 
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the military, pursue higher education (as the program had intended), moved from the area 
or became ineligible.
17
  
Despite this positive feedback, in July NYC officials from the U.S. Department of 
Labor suddenly demanded that W.F. Evans, a former U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel and 
veteran of World War II and the Korean War, be removed as director of the Craven 
County NYC programs because of “administrative, personnel, fiscal, and civil rights 
problems.”
18
 NYC officials were perhaps most upset that there were still unfilled 
positions in the Craven area even after Evans had reduced the number of work experience 
positions in order to avoid accumulating unutilized monies again (which occurred during 
NYC‟s first six months of operation in the Craven area). That the persistence of unfilled 
positions were due to many factors unrelated to Evans, including revised income criteria 
issued by the Department of Labor by January 1966, not enough eligible males to fill 
positions, and the requirement that enrollees must attend some form of remedial 
education, was not acknowledged by NYC officials.
19
 If action was not taken to remove 
Evans, NYC official Mike Lorenzo warned Monte over the telephone, federal funds for 
COP‟s NYC program would be terminated.
20
 In addition to the fact that Lorenzo‟s 
ultimatum was delivered without any specific examples of wrongdoing on Evans‟ part, 
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Monte was stunned because he had personally investigated both local and federal 
complaints about Evans that began more than eight months earlier and found no evidence 
that he believed would warrant firing Evans.  
Monte could also not be completely sure that the federal complaints against Evans 
were valid. In November 1965, for instance, Monte was told by federal NYC officials 
who had visited Craven County to conduct a review of the local NYC program, a copy of 
which was promised to Monte but never received, that their investigation showed that 
Colonel Evans was in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The probable source of 
this accusation was Beverly French, a field supervisor in Craven‟s NYC program, who 
had believed that Evans was “at heart a segregationist” after he reportedly said to her that 
he would be opposed to having a black person over to his house and that he supposedly 
had assigned more black than white enrollees to arduous jobs, such as grass cutting in the 
summer.
21
 Not wanting to see COP downgraded from allegations of civil rights non-
compliance, soon after being informed of the NYC officials‟ complaints, Monte directed 
Evans to “immediately proceed with all practical speed the implementation of changes 
necessary to correct any and all areas of possible discrimination.”
22
  
Two days later, Evans sent a letter to Lorenzo that included a detailed list of the 
types of jobs assigned to blacks and whites in Craven, Jones, and Pamlico county NYC 
programs as of January 1966. As Evans wrote Lorenzo, “The alleged unequal distribution 
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does not appear evident, except for the total number of white and non-white being served 
in Craven County,” adding that a “special campaign is being under taken to secure more 
white.” Although Beverly French‟s accusation of personal racism might have been 
correct, the statistics sent to Lorenzo showed no indication that such an attitude had 
negatively effected Evans‟ work as NYC director. Blacks and whites in all three counties 
had been assigned to custodial and landscaping duties and, for several skilled indoor-jobs, 
blacks often enjoyed rates higher than whites. For example, more blacks served as nurses, 
clerical aides, library assistants, hospital tech assistants, messenger drivers, and teacher 
aides than did whites. There were a couple of positions in which there was either one or 
no whites assigned at all such as park development and housekeeping but this was far 
from the norm. Moreover, the racial discrepancy within these positions were not 
necessarily due to Evans‟ personal bias but may have been due to low numbers of white 
enrollees and/or the preference of the enrollee.
23
 In contrast to the charges brought 
against Evans for being in violation of the federal civil rights act, blacks in all three 
counties were enjoying the full range of jobs accessible through NYC; they were neither 
limited to any job category nor were they excluded from any available positions.  
Monte had continued to keep tabs on Evans, however. In response to a signed 
letter from a small group of local blacks complaining about NYC activities under Evans‟ 
leadership, which COP board member Claretta Wordlaw presented to the board in June 
1966, Monte had set up a local committee a month later whose task was to meet with the 
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petitioners and determine the basis of their complaints. 
24
 The committee included 
Wordlaw, who Monte asked to assume the role of chair, as well as Tom Wallace, Ruth 
Becton of the NYC staff, and Monte‟s administrative assistant Ralph Jacobs. Only a few 
of the petitioners attended the July 21 committee meeting, but their number included 
prominent black leaders such as New Bern NAACP Vice President William Vails and 
Duffyfield Community Development organizer Johnny Floyd. Vails, by far, was the most 
outspoken against Evans, but his primary complaint was that he had heard second-hand 
of a black enrollee at Cherry Point being more harshly reprimanded for taking a break 
than white enrollees had been; in addition, he thought that more counseling should be 
given to the NYC enrollees.
25
 Floyd told the committee that he had signed the petition 
after hearing that only about forty-seven NYC enrollees had been accepted for the 
approximately eighty job openings at Cherry Point. As Monte would later explain to 
Wordlaw, however, the reason Evans approved half of the job openings at Cherry Point 
was because only that number were in the “skilled and semi-skilled areas of work.” The 
others, which were mostly “common laboring jobs,” did not comply with NYC‟s 
preference for jobs that provided “a potential for future employment in the competitive 
labor market.” Moreover, “our experience has been,” Monte added, that “the common 
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laboring jobs” are the most difficult to fill because “it was difficult to find and convince 
enrollees who would accept and stay on such a job.”
26
  
In Monte‟s opinion, then, no serious charges were leveled at Evans during the 
committee meeting and no evidence had been provided of mistreatment of enrollees 
based on racial prejudice, which was the primary issue that federal NYC officials were 
interested in investigating.
27
 Not only were the issues seemingly of a minor nature to 
Monte, he also noted that the complaints came from a very small group. Most black 
community members and leaders, many of whom—including Whitehead— had fought to 
convince the City of New Bern to renew its contract with NYC back in February and 
March, had expressed no problems with Evans. In light of these observations, on July 21, 
Monte asked Mike Lorenzo for a written explanation from the Department of Labor 
about its dissatisfaction with Evans.
28
 After almost two weeks went by without a 
response, Monte wrote Lorenzo again on August 1 pleading that “a matter as important, 
and unusual as the proposed dismissal of a responsible officer of this organization 
[should have] merited a reply from you by this time.”
29
  
As he waited for Lorenzo‟s reply, Monte convinced Evans to form an additional 
advisory body, composed of fifteen male and female enrollees, that would help Evans 
and local NYC staff, as a NYC newsletter of August 5 stated, “to develop the kind of 
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program that you enrollees want.” This biracial group would also act as grievance 
committee to take criticisms, suggestions, and questions from enrollees and community 
members.
30
 Monte believed that an advisory board run by enrollees would improve 
Evans‟ reputation and also be an effective way to keep the NYC program running.  
Confident that he had done all he could, in mid-August Monte went on a short 
vacation with his family. Just before leaving, he assigned COP Deputy Director Lee 
Morgan, who Monte hired in 1965 at the request of Whitehead and other black civil 
rights leaders, to visit the Department of Labor during his absence and hand-deliver 
COP‟s NYC proposal for the upcoming fiscal year. By sending Morgan to Washington, 
Monte hoped that federal officials could be influenced to give specific reasons for their 
desire to see Evans removed as NYC director. Upon Monte‟s return to New Bern, 
Morgan had a memo waiting that summarized his conversations with Department of 
Labor officials. Evidently, these officials had merely told Morgan how they believed the 
NYC proposal could be improved for next year; no specific reasons for replacing Evans 
had been discussed. While Monte found the subject of the memo unsatisfactory, he could 
not necessarily blame Morgan. After all, federal officials may have been less cooperative 
than Monte assumed they would be. But after Monte later learned from a conversation 
with Morgan that NYC officials had given COP an ultimatum that Evans must either 
resign or write a letter admitting that he had been guilty of “poor administration, violation 
of the civil rights law, and poor public relations,” Monte became upset and questioned 
Morgan directly about why Morgan had not included this in the memo, copies of which 
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Morgan had also sent to the North Carolina Fund. Morgan defended himself, as he told 
North Carolina Fund Field Representative Royce Jordan, by arguing that “if the NYC 
officials were not going to commit this to paper, then he didn‟t feel he should and that he 
was going to play the same game they did.”
31
 
Monte grows tired; fires Morgan 
Tensions between Morgan and Monte exploded when Monte discovered that 
Morgan had sent a recommendation to the COP executive committee recommending that 
the Day Care Centers be taken away from the Craven County Welfare Department and 
run solely by COP. Not only had this letter been written without Monte‟s approval, while 
he was away on vacation, but Morgan‟s recommendation also appeared hasty because it 
was based on a seemingly minor issue: Constance Rabin‟s insistence that someone with a 
master‟s degree in child development replace the day care director who had recently 
resigned rather than hire one of the other three candidates—two of whom were black but 
one of whom did not have a bachelor‟s degree and the other whose husband was already 
employed on the regular Welfare staff.
32
 Soon after, Monte confided in North Carolina 
Fund Field Representative Royce Jordan that Morgan “would probably have to go.”  
Jordan, who was startled by this possibility and how it might be interpreted by the 
local black community, sought out Whitehead to ask what he thought the chances were 
that Monte would fire Morgan. Monte would not “be that stupid,” Whitehead reportedly 
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told Jordan, who also did not think that Monte would “be foolish enough” to fire 
Morgan.
33
 The prospect was not all that improbable, however. The lack of respect 
between the two men, and their mutually low opinions of the other‟s competence, had 
clearly deteriorated to the point of no return. In fact, Morgan had begun to consider 
leaving COP as early as June because he felt that Ralph Jacobs was still infringing on his 
responsibilities.
 34
 Monte would not give him the option of quitting. On September 1, the 
following termination letter appeared in Morgan‟s mailbox: 
 
It is with regret that I must terminate your services in the best interest of the 
program. You have stated on several occasions that you felt you couldn‟t do the 
job unless additional backing was given to you by me. You have, in spite of 
having received in writing and verbally such backing, hesitated and not done the 
thorough job that you are capable of doing, nor the jobs assigned. You have on 
occasions insisted on speaking out against myself and our methods of operation 
and have stated that you will continue to do so. In lieu of these facts, you have left 
me no alternative but to give you thirty days notice of termination of employment. 
Sincerely, 
Robert R. Monte 
Executive Director
35
 
 
 
When the news spread that Monte was letting go of Lee Morgan, North Carolina Fund 
Field Representative Preston Kennedy sent a wire informing Executive Director George 
Esser: “Bob Monte fired Lee Morgan last night without the consent of the Board…It is 
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anticipated that the Negro community will react violently.”
36
 Fearing a possible adverse 
reaction, Esser and black staffer Nathan Garrett drove to New Bern as soon as they could 
in hopes of convincing Monte to withdraw his letter to Morgan. Esser also called D.S. 
Coltrane of the North Carolina Good Neighbor Council to meet them there. 
Before Esser and Garrett arrived, Whitehead and other black community leaders 
asked Monte to rescind Morgan‟s termination and strongly suggested that he think it over 
for a few days; otherwise, a demonstration would be organized. It was probably 
Whitehead who had informed OEO administrator Harold Bailin of the situation. When 
Bailin subsequently called Monte in anger to confirm that he had fired Morgan, he later 
asked, “did you turn in your resignation?” Monte, of course, responded in the negative 
and added that he did not plan to do so, which angered Bailin even more. Bob Burns, who 
worked under Bailin as the Mid-Atlantic Regional Representative, informed John Miller 
of the North Carolina Fund on September 6 that Bailin was completely dissatisfied with 
Monte and saw him as incompetent. Burns later said that Bailin told him that “a nit wit 
couldn‟t have done a more stupid thing [than firing Morgan]” and predicted that if Monte 
did not immediately resign on his own, Bailin himself would demand it.
37
 
In defiance of the wishes of both Bailin and local black leadership, Monte decided 
to stay on at COP until its funding for the next fiscal year was assured, but he would not 
consider rescinding his letter to Morgan, whom he had felt was fully justified in being 
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fired. He did, however, decide to resign himself by December 1. Knowing that Morgan 
would probably not step down without a fight and that Ralph Jacobs would be the focal 
point in that fight, on August 15 Monte directed Jacobs to prepare a letter of resignation 
that would become effective on January 1, 1967, if Jacobs did not rescind it before that 
date. It is reasonable to assume that Monte did not intend to provide motivation for a 
demonstration; after all, he did not think that his actions had warranted one. Local blacks, 
however, remained upset that a black man had been seemingly fired by a white man 
without demonstrably sufficient cause. Soon after Monte decided not to reinstate Morgan, 
Whitehead warned COP board members D. L. Stallings and Robert Pugh that a large 
demonstration was being planned that would be impossible for him to stop.
38
 Moreover, 
Whitehead promised to endorse the demonstrations and to resign from the COP board, 
along with other black members, if Morgan was not rehired. Before his firing of Morgan, 
most blacks on the board generally had no serious issues with Monte and believed that he 
was doing a good job.
39
 Afterward however, Whitehead claimed that most blacks, 
including himself, had become utterly disillusioned with COP and began to demand, 
along with Rivers and Wordlaw, that Monte resign.  As Whitehead began to see it, the 
COP director was too weak and easy to manipulate and, thus, contrary to his original 
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argument in support of Monte in October 1965, was “never the man for the job.” 
40
 But 
Monte‟s decision to fire Morgan seemed to have been made without consulting anyone 
on the COP board.  
Blacks were the not the only locals frustrated by Monte‟s decision, however. 
Firing Morgan had not only been done without the knowledge of the COP board but had 
also defied Fund policy that required executive directors to consult the Fund before 
terminating local staff. When Royce Jordan first confronted Pugh and Stallings soon after 
Morgan‟s firing, both were surprised and claimed to have had no idea that it had 
happened. Pugh told Jordan that he did not think Monte should have released Morgan, 
especially with the federal refunding of COP due in the next thirty days. According to 
Jordan‟s notes, Pugh told him that “Craven County was up to the guidelines of 
integration that had been suggested by the federal government and that things were 
moving nicely, everything was quiet” and that he, Pugh, “didn‟t want an uproar caused at 
this time.”
41
 Stallings, then in the hospital receiving treatment for back pain, felt the same 
way and may have even been concerned about being blamed for Monte‟s decision to fire 
Morgan. In any case, Stallings boldly told Jordan that from the outset Monte had 
“completely ignored him” in the workings of COP; he must have been quite frustrated by 
Monte‟s impulsive decision to make such an exaggerated statement. COP board chairman 
Reverend L. D. Munn, who had replaced Larry B. Pate on August 31, discussed the 
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situation with Esser, Jordan, and Preston Kennedy and then attempted to convince Monte 
to postpone any official action for sixty days.
42
  
Monte agreed to wait, but for no more than thirty days. During this time, Fund 
representatives and Craven leaders scrambled to broker a resolution between Monte and 
Morgan that would avoid both a local demonstration and the loss of federal funding. 
During the early stages of these negotiations, Esser telephoned Harold Bailin to find out 
how OEO would respond to Morgan‟s firing. As Esser had probably expected, Bailin said 
that he would not approve further funding for COP if Monte remained its executive 
director.  
Bailin‟s plans extended beyond the ones he shared with Esser over the phone, 
however. On September 6, he sent Bob Burns to New Bern with explicit orders to fire 
Monte, even though OEO did not actually have the authority to do so. Possibly because 
he was aware of this limitation, Burns instead sought to “figure out the situation” in 
Craven and talk with those involved before any action was taken. But Burns‟ presence, 
which was in and of itself a manifestation of OEO administrators‟ frustrations with 
Monte, probably went a long way toward convincing the Fund that it would be best for 
everyone if Monte resigned much sooner than December 1. Perhaps because of Bailin‟s 
insistence that Morgan should not have been hired in the first place (because his father-
in-law sat on the COP board), the Fund concluded that it was only fair for Morgan to 
officially resign as well. Morgan agreed to this stipulation but only after Esser made it 
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known that he would use all of the resources of the North Carolina Fund to see that 
Morgan was assured of a new job at equal salary.
43
  
Monte resigns 
As gathered from North Carolina Fund field reports, the eventual agreement that 
was reached between Monte, Morgan and the North Carolina Fund began with Monte 
rescinding his termination letter to Morgan. Afterwards he announced his own 
resignation, citing “pressing business conditions.” Next, Morgan announced that he too 
had resigned. As a result of this agreement, Bailin delayed his decision about COP‟s 
refunding for sixty days and local black leaders called off their planned demonstration. 
Neither Whitehead nor any other black COP board members resigned.
44
  
Around September 14, four days after Reverend Munn chose to step down as 
COP chairman, a press release from Monte informed the public that he was resigning as 
COP executive director as of October 15, 1966.
45
 As promised, Monte stated that 
pressing business responsibilities were the reason for his departure. The truth, of course, 
was that Monte had no other option when faced with the combined power of OEO, the 
North Carolina Fund, and blacks on the COP board, all of whom were calling for him to 
step down.
 46
 For his part, Monte had also grown weary from frequently being caught 
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between the wishes of local black leaders, the broader Craven community, OEO, and the 
North Carolina Fund—which surely motivated him to give in to the calls for his 
resignation. As he would eventually tell John Miller of the North Carolina Fund, the 
sooner he could “turn over the job to someone else, the better…I‟ve had it.” His attempts 
to strike a balance between these groups, although somewhat successful in the beginning, 
had become futile by August 1966 especially with the more hardened positions of the 
North Carolina Fund and OEO.  
Monte was also extremely upset that his firing of Morgan had “become a racial 
issue because the Negroes think that by demanding they can get anything they want.”
47
 
Increased pressure from the North Carolina Fund and OEO on him for swifter action, 
which only emboldened black leaders in Craven, and the recurrent verbal directives and 
local intervention that came with had clearly worn him down. Monte was not opposed to 
all forms of outside “intervention,” such as OEO‟s recommendation that the Adult Basic 
Education Recruitment (ABER) program merge with Community Development to save 
approximately $50,000.
48
 Nor had he minded when the Fund offered advice, technical 
assistance and training for local staff. And, of course, Monte had always understood the 
necessity of accepting both private and federal funds. Still, as he expressed to Rep. David 
N. Henderson on September 13, he could no longer cope with the gap between his goals 
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for poverty reduction in Craven and the goals that he perceived OEO and the North 
Carolina Fund held: 
 
I believe that the programs cannot succeed when they are headed by 
people in OEO who have on numerous occasions stated that what we 
needed in our area were a few more good demonstrations and when the 
North Carolina Fund openly attacks our elected representatives to the 
Congress and Senate plus actively supporting the civil rights groups in a 
so called “drive” for a change in local power structure which is in essence, 
a shield for the so called “black power” struggle….It appears to me that 
they have forgotten what the programs were originally designed for, that 
being to help people help themselves out of poverty. 
 
 
“My only reason for ever accepting the position,” Monte‟s letter continued, “was to try to 
help our area help itself.” But, “I‟m afraid,” Monte lamented, “that the job was bigger 
than the man, although in honesty I did do all I could to serve the community.” 
49
 The 
frustration so evident in this letter had, of course, greatly influenced Monte‟s impulsive 
decision to fire Morgan, who Monte felt was undermining him as COP executive director 
in the same way that the North Carolina Fund and OEO were doing. Regardless of 
whether Monte believed he had not needed any one‟s permission to fire Morgan, this was 
the major mistake that the Fund and OEO ultimately needed to finally justify replacing 
him.  
Monte‟s frustrations were not unique to him or the situation in Craven County. 
Just before Monte announced his resignation, at least four other CAP heads supervised by 
the North Carolina Fund also resigned. As Esser recalled of this first major turnover, 
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“There were definite signs of battle fatigue and tension among the project directors, as 
well as obvious disagreement with Fund policy.” More crucial, however, was their 
feeling that, like Monte, “they were being opposed by Fund staff.”
50
 What is interesting is 
that Fund staff, though they had shifted to a more radical stance shared by those working 
in OEO and mistakenly believed, for instance, that the lack of participation of the poor 
was merely a result of the “haves wanting to keep the have-nots down,” they were willing 
to acknowledge that OEO was causing seemingly unnecessary problems in local 
communities including Craven. As one Fund report stated with regard to COP, the way 
that OEO “hands down directives and the way it carries out its policies” was leading to 
both confusion and tension. Specifically, “Harold Bailin and his antagonistic way in his 
calling down to the CAP has aroused much opposition. His attitude of wanting 
controversy without wanting to get involved in the controversy has caused much concern 
in the area.”
51
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You never quite knew what they wanted. OEO personnel gave contradictory advice.” In giving its 
directives, Greenberg also lamented of OEO: “Why did they choose to attack us instead of advise us?” See 
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The Fund continued to defend OEO in the face of local complaints, largely 
because of the increased funding they were receiving from OEO by mid-1966. On 
September 20, George Esser wrote to Rep. Henderson in response to a critical letter from 
Henderson to OEO director Sargent Shriver, which had been copied to Esser, about 
Monte‟s recent missives: “I would certainly not disagree with you that the Office of 
Economic Opportunity has failed in many ways to establish good, constructive 
relationships with leaders in local communities as well as in Congress.” “Though in 
fairness to Mr. Shriver,” Esser added, “[g]earing up a program so large is immensely 
difficult.”
52
 
OEO’s plans for COP 
For the sake of maintaining some degree of local influence over COP, it was in 
the best interests of both the organization and the local community for Monte to resign 
according to terms set by the Fund. Whether or not they realized it, if Harold Bailin had 
been the one to compel Monte to resign, as Bob Burns of the OEO told John Miller, 
Bailin would have placed someone from the National Association for Community 
Development (NACD) in Craven County, and this person would make COP “a sort of 
federal bureau of OEO.” This new director, who would be hand-picked by federal 
authorities, would, in conjunction with OEO policy, concentrate primarily on “stirring up 
the poor.” Burns was also convinced that Bailin, who did not believe that COP had 
significantly improved the life of Craven‟s poor but rather had “improved the life of the 
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establishment,” planned to radically change the composition of the COP‟s board or 
directors by removing Robert Pugh, Constance Rabin and other “power-structure types” 
and replacing them with “real grassroots representation of the poor,” most of whom they 
hoped would be black.
53
  
Negative views of COP and its local non-poor members within OEO were not 
limited just to Bailin. Several other OEO administrators were critical of “the governing 
group in New Bern,” including at least one staff member who believed COP was 
primarily defined by an “anti-integrationist-John Bircher point of view,” adding that, in 
his perspective, “the board‟s intention [was] merely distributing the COP jobs, and the 
Federal money, among the deserving middle-class and ignoring the real goals of the 
poverty program.” Of course, such conclusions on the part of OEO frequently lacked 
ample or credible evidence.
 54
 Incidentally, after being told by COP board member 
Claretta Wordlaw that she guessed two-thirds of Craven whites “are members of the 
KKK” (a surprisingly serious exaggeration on her part, which would have been 
approximately double the Klan‟s total membership in North Carolina at the time), an 
OEO administrator would be somewhat surprised to learn while on an inspection visit to 
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the county in September that “there [was] at least some open anti-Klan feeling in the 
county.”
55
 Scholars have rightfully argued that OEO‟s activism began to diminish after 
1965 (especially after public approval fell in response to news stories of increased 
radicalism within certain CAAs) yet, as late as 1966, some OEO officials were clearly 
still very involved in monitoring local CAAs and/or imposing their own definition of 
community action, the latter of which defied original promises made by President 
Johnson and Sargent Shriver that there would “be no federal blueprint or magic formula 
worked out in Washington that would be imposed on local problems.”
56
 
Because OEO administrators like Bailin distrusted compromise and believed that 
organizing the poor for absolute control of board power was the surest and fairest method 
to defeat poverty (and that OEO knew better than locals who the best and most qualified 
persons were to lead a CAA), they felt justified to use greater federal authority to 
intervene locally in the interest of creating its version of the ideal situation. Bailin had 
said as much to Burns in early September, when he confided that he was “going to 
require absolute veto power over the next executive director of Craven Operation 
Progress.” Despite field representative Jordan‟s succinct reaction (“I told Burns that I 
didn‟t think Bailin could do this”), Burns agreed but not before declaring that OEO still 
“wanted to be consulted on the hiring of the next executive director of [COP] just as the 
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North Carolina Fund would be.”
57
 The insistence of OEO officials to be heavily involved 
in local affairs to this extreme was not just at odds with the original intention of the War 
on Poverty as a “hometown fight” but also lost real and potential allies, such as Monte, in 
that fight.
58
  
Monte’s final stand 
   Despite his failure to win the favor of federal bureaucrats, Monte used his final 
month as executive director to fight for Colonel Evans to stay on as COP‟s NYC director. 
Monte‟s own experiences with OEO naturally led him to sympathize with Evans and, 
following his own personal defeat, he seemed to want to do all that he could to stand up 
to federal intervention that was, in his opinion, unwarranted. In his personal letter to Rep. 
Henderson of September 13, Monte promised to support Evans against NYC 
administrators in the U.S. Department of Labor in the name of “the principles and 
concepts in which our government was founded, plus individual freedoms and rights.”
59
 
At the September 19 COP board meeting, after reading a telegram from Region II 
Director of NYC William T. Davies stating that Davies would only recommend approval 
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of the NYC program for Coastal Progress (CPI) if Evans was dismissed, Monte read the 
telegram he had sent in response, which had informed Davies that he, Monte, could not 
remove Evans without consulting the CPI board and requested a ten-day extension for the 
NYC program so that the board could properly consider the matter.  
Although Davies‟ telegram had specifically referred to “Clause 28” of the NYC 
agreement, which evoked the Department of Labor‟s right to approve all project directors 
and their successors, Monte did not believe that this clause allowed federal officials, as he 
wrote Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz on September 12, to “arbitrarily and capriciously 
discharge a responsible employee without reasons being brought forward.”
60
 Indeed, as 
Monte told the COP/CPI board on September 19, even though the uproar over NYC 
leadership had been going on for months, he still had not received specifics of the 
allegations against Evans and, based on his own observations, had continued to rate 
Evans‟ job performance as “outstanding.”  
Evans also continued to receive praise from some of the 120 male and female 
NYC enrollees he had helped find permanent employment. Typical sentiments were that 
Evans “has done an excellent job” and “has portrayed his fine character by simply 
devoting his time, energy, and encouragement to the enrollees of this program.”
61
 These 
former enrollees seemed to agree that, in contrast to the persistent allegations from NYC 
officials of his violations of equal opportunity laws, Evans was only cooperating with 
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local agencies that were in conformity with these laws.
62
 This positive feedback 
strengthened Monte‟s belief that pressure from NYC officials for Evans‟ resignation had 
stemmed primarily from a “personality clash” between Evans and Mike Lorenzo; in 
Monte‟s words, Evans had refused to be a “yes man.”
63
 In contrast to Labor Department 
officials, who wanted to expand the number of NYC enrollees across the nation, Evans‟ 
goal was to actually reduce the number of positions to a figure that was “based on the 
number of successful work experience positions that have been filled on a regular basis 
since the project has been in force.”
64
 Monte‟s own ardor for efficacy and efficiency, 
which was perhaps most evident during his conflict with Sandra Fisher over the ABER 
program in early 1966, would, not surprisingly, lead him to believe that Evans‟ approach 
was the most competent way to run the program.
65
 Accordingly, Monte asked the 
COP/CPI board to approve a resolution to request specifics from Washington, D.C. about 
problems with Evans.
66
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Monte made it clear to the board that although he did not know how much power 
they in Craven held, he did not feel that “Washington could dictate the terms to the 
community if it were to be a true Community Action Program.” If federal authorities 
could do this, Monte quipped, the program should be called a “Washington Action 
Program.” Most of the board members agreed that they needed more information before 
they could agree to remove Evans. One of these was black member Willie Dawson who, 
based on his experiences with NYC as well as his encounters with and observations of 
Evans, found him efficient, professional, and “at all times considerate and with a deep 
understanding of the problems of the community.” Dawson, who believed that the NYC 
program had mostly been “a great benefit in Craven County” and surrounding counties, 
argued moreover that the problems between Evans and the NYC had been “badly 
misunderstood” and that “both [Evans] and the program have been mis-judged and 
deserve better treatment than they are receiving at the present time.”
67
  
Lee Morgan, whose resignation would not be official until September 28, 
concurred with Monte in front of the board and recalled that when he had traveled to D.C. 
to hand-deliver the NYC proposal in August, both Davies and Lorenzo had refused to 
give him specifics. White board member Nora Kennel remarked that “if Washington 
expected the Board to act in a responsible manner,” so should Washington. Members of 
the public also spoke out against the federal pressure to remove Evans. A white employer 
at Cherry Point, a supporter of the program who had hired eighteen youths, declared that 
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the relative short-range gains of employing young people would be negated by the danger 
of “allowing our government to act without reason.” The only known local person in 
attendance who defended the decisions made by NYC administrators was board member 
Robert Whitehead who, while admitting that he was not familiar with any evidence that 
would prove the charges against Evans, argued that “surely they were not all made up” 
and that he, Whitehead, was not willing to let the NYC program fall for one man, Evans. 
Most of the other board members, however, were less concerned about the doubtful 
prospect of losing the program than about being disrespected by federal officials and 
losing influence over a program that operated within their community.  
At the end of the September 19 meeting, which was covered by local press, the 
majority of the board agreed to immediately send a wire that would: 
 
…inform the Washington office of Neighborhood Youth Corps of our 
deep concern for the welfare and continuation of the Neighborhood Youth 
Corps program in Craven, Jones, and Pamlico Counties, and that we are 
very much in need of more information concerning the specifics that may 
be included in Mr. Davies‟ reference to Mr. Evans‟ alleged inadequacies, 
we respectfully request a Bill of Particulars to be provided us and that we 
have a meeting with the Washington officials concerned in order that we 
might intelligently act on the request for Mr. Evans‟ release as Director of 
our Neighborhood Youth Corps. 
 
 
In addition, the CPI board would resolve that it would not accept directives from 
Washington without cause and stated its disapproval of what they considered arbitrary 
conduct by federal officials. The board also agreed that neither Monte nor his successor 
would remove Evans before specifics had been provided and the board had been able to 
discuss its decision. Copies of the resolution were sent to officials in the Labor 
416 
 
Department, OEO, members of Congress, and North Carolina Governor Dan K. Moore.
68
 
The two statements appeared to have served their purpose when Davies offered to fly to 
New Bern in early October for the sole purpose of discussing the allegations against 
Evans with the board (after which he would file specific charges). The meeting did occur, 
but, as Monte would tell the local press, it was a “waste of time and taxpayers‟ money” 
because no specific grievances were revealed, nor were any charges filed.
69
 
Perhaps the confusion over Colonel Evans‟ job performance stemmed from 
overworked NYC officials who had too many responsibilities and too little support staff. 
Evans himself claimed that once, at a meeting with Mike Lorenzo in D.C., not only had 
Lorenzo asked him to help open his mail but the pile of letters had also included three 
unopened ones from Evans that had been sitting for more than a month.
70
 Or perhaps 
NYC administrators did not adequately respect local people and shared the belief, 
seemingly common among federal officials at the time, including those who worked for 
OEO, that locals (like the states) were often “disreputable obstructionists rather than 
creative partners” in the War on Poverty.
71
 Perhaps both possibilities played a part. The 
latter, however, seems more likely. The ways that NYC officials took liberties and acted 
more arbitrarily with regard to locals‟ handling of COP/CPI seemed to confirm the 
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observation made by several contemporary scholars of the War on Poverty of the strain 
between its theoretical commitment to “local control over local programs designed for 
local problems” and “the reality of strong federal control.”
72
  
Awareness of this conflict was echoed by North Carolina Fund founder and 
former North Carolina governor Terry Sanford, who maintained that no level of 
government “has a monopoly on solutions” and warned that the “chief danger of failure is 
that the [federal] guideline and policy formulators will forget the lesson that the strength 
and the best hope of success lie in community action, given freedom and flexibility to 
innovate and experiment and work within the limits of broad guidelines, but in their own 
best way with their peculiar requirements.”
73
 Political science professor Richard H. 
Leach concurred, adding that “if, as it seems likely, a virtual revolution in the federal role 
is in the making, [more than] a drive to eliminate poverty is at stake here; the delicate 
balance of the federal system may be involved as well.”
74
 Even the Fund‟s George Esser, 
who had grown more sympathetic to the notion of greater federal control over local 
CAAs, was influenced to ponder by 1966 to “what extent must the federal government 
adopt common restrictions and regulations which limit local initiative but without which 
the intended benefits may not reach those who need to be helped?”
75
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What made the situation particularly frustrating for Craven residents was not that 
the federal government was intervening in local affairs based on fairness or proper cause 
but just the opposite. Local people working for COP/CPI were not seeking to protect a 
man whom they knew to be disobeying equal opportunity laws; they were defending a 
man they believed had tried to follow them and who was serving their community well. 
Making matters worse was that federal officials tended to bow to local control when 
CAAs were run by minorities or powerful Democrats. Craven locals who kept up with 
national news were well aware that, for example, members of a CAA in Harlem had 
funneled $40,000 in federal funds to New York City‟s Black Arts Theater, which then 
used the money for the production of controversial “anti-white” plays and the purchase of 
weapons including crossbows, knives, and pistols. In Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley 
used his influence in the Democratic Party to convince President Johnson and OEO into 
relaxing the “maximum feasible participation” requirements. In both examples, the CAA 
programs were treated with great leniency and received relatively little supervision.
76
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As David Zarefsky argued about the War on Poverty in general, “„flexibility‟ was 
not a device to match programs to local needs but a means to avoid local political 
conflict.”
77
 In contrast, CAAs such as COP/CPI that were not controlled by minorities or 
well-financed and influential figures in the Democratic Party would arguably undergo the 
greatest amount of federal intervention. Of course, during COP‟s first eighteen months, 
when Hearn was in charge of its programs, federal intervention was muted because of 
Hearn‟s previous ties to Washington, D.C.—a connection that influenced his aggressive 
style of leadership. In fact, OEO considered COP a showplace during these months 
primarily because of the way Hearn ran it: “the original very active, very competent 
director,” as Hearn was described by OEO staff, regularly challenged local board 
members, continuously pushed for rapid social change, almost exclusively targeted the 
black population, and applied for a considerable amount of federal money for a wide 
range of programs; OEO especially touted the fact that COP included programs under all 
six titles of the Economic Opportunity Act.
78
 With Hearn serving as, in essence, a local 
arm of OEO, additional federal influence was not needed. Under Monte, however, who 
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took a more gradual approach as he sought to maintain the support of the board and the 
local community, all of this changed.  
The conflict over the firing of Evans would not be settled between COP/CPI and 
federal administrators until after Monte stepped down on October 15.
79
 The day before, 
Monte wrote a letter to the board of directors wishing them “and your paid staff all the 
success possible in your attempt to alleviate causes and conditions of poverty in our 
community and area.” Monte was not leaving, he told them, because “of any difference 
between your goals and mine.” To the contrary, Monte wrote, “I have always to the best 
of my ability attempted to implement the desires of you, my employers.” Even though he 
was “now assuming the identity of a private citizen,” Monte promised to remain involved 
in the happenings of the program and would be open to offering his help anytime he was 
asked to assist Coastal Progress.  
As Monte had made clear in an earlier letter, he was proud of the degree of 
“community-wide support” that had been achieved and believed that the “organization 
should survive,” for it “can be the most effective orderly forum for the expression of 
diverse viewpoints [that is] essential to community progress.”
80
 As you know,” he 
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reminded them, “there are many views as to how these causes and conditions can be best 
alleviated.” Before concluding his October 14 letter, Monte felt it necessary to give his 
opinions on two related matters. For one, he strongly recommended that the board 
“maintain their own integrity, their own beliefs, and their own concepts” of what was best 
for the community and the community action agency with regard to next year‟s NYC 
proposal. “The other item I feel all of you should closely examine,” Monte wrote, “is the 
possibility that your present relationship with the North Carolina Fund is causing 
considerable confusion in your efforts to work for the deprived of the area.” Monte 
suggested that the board examine this relationship and determine for themselves “if the 
North Carolina Fund significantly shares your viewpoints, goals, and methods and if the 
North Carolina Fund, through its staff, is now in fact attempting to exert an inappropriate 
amount of the directional power over this organization which properly should be exerted 
by yourselves.”
81
  
Monte shared these views about the Fund with more than his board of directors. 
Two weeks earlier he had also told North Carolina Fund executive director George Esser 
that, in his opinion, the Fund staff‟s political leanings and interference in local affairs 
merited a statewide investigation. Even though Monte had expressed his concerns “on 
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many occasions” to members of the Fund staff “about things they were doing,” he also 
felt a “certain sense of loyalty to the Fund” as long as he was being paid by the 
organization. After he agreed to resign, however, Monte felt that “my loyalty should 
revert entirely back to the people of my community.” Monte sent a copy of this letter to 
Governor Moore, who Monte hoped would order an investigation into the Fund‟s 
political activities.
82
 Although Esser claimed to be surprised by Monte‟s complaints about 
Fund staff and the degree of interference he noted, the reality was that frustration 
between the Fund staff and Monte had been mutual for several months.
83
 By the time of 
his resignation, numerous Fund staff believed that COP‟s goal of ending the cycle of 
poverty in Craven was not being effectively achieved under Monte. An internal staff 
paper that summarized Monte‟s directorship noted that Monte had: “vetoed COP support 
for voter registration, vetoed a program for volunteers to teach basic education classes, 
ordered staff members to stay out of housing projects where protest against housing 
authorities was coming to a head, resisted integration of the day care centers,” in addition 
to cutting “COP activities so much that 160,000 dollars were left over in the 1965-1966 
fiscal budget.” Fund staff also ascribed blame to Monte for the fact that the poor were not 
“effectively” involved in COP program planning despite “OEO‟s guidelines about 
involving the poor, [and] for all the Fund‟s urging to involve the poor.”
84
 However, based 
on the historical record, (much of which is located in the surviving files of the North 
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Carolina Fund), most of these charges were either exaggerations or based upon 
misunderstandings of the complexities of the local situation. The surplus referred to 
above, for example, had come about largely as a result of unanticipated voids in the 
numbers of NYC enrollees and ABER recruits despite heavy campaigning in the 
community to attract as many low-income persons as possible. Nor was the low level of 
integration within the day care centers a result of Monte‟s resistance; in fact, he gave his 
Deputy Director Lee Morgan the go-ahead to investigate the situation, which proved to 
be due to the lower rates of poverty within the white community, the proximity of the day 
care centers to people‟s homes, and, as even Whitehead acknowledged, the fact that 
parents, black and white, could not be forced to integrate their children.
85
 
The power of moderation  
The Fund staff‟s major issues with Monte did not prevent them from 
acknowledging some of Monte‟s attributes, however. For instance, unlike Hearn, who 
had “dominated the Board,” Monte “went to pains not to antagonize the members. He 
asked their advice in numerous matters, let the members take the initiative in decision-
making, and acquiesced to their wishes.” “The Board now played a real policy-making 
role,” the Fund reported, which “has reasserted itself as an equal partner in the total COP 
organization.” This aspect of Monte‟s style, which may have been due to his experience 
as a board member, actually explains much about the greater influence enjoyed in 1966 
by the black members of the board, both the poor and the middle-class. Black influence 
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within the COP board not only led to Monte‟s resignation, which Monte surely did not 
foresee, but also kept local whites accountable to equal employment and desegregation 
guidelines of both the North Carolina Fund and the federal government.  
The presence of blacks and their growing influence meant that Monte and other 
board members were better informed about the attitudes and desires of the black poor. 
Under Monte, neighborhood groups were electing low-income people to the board for the 
first time, a development he seemed to support.
86
 This attitude may seem surprising to 
some since even though Monte, much like many white COP board members, including D. 
L. Stallings and Larry Pate, understood that “the overwhelming majority of the persons in 
this area of North Carolina who were intended to be benefited by the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964 are negro,” he did not think the primary purpose of the COP 
program was for “social integration.”
87
 Nevertheless, while social integration may not 
have been the primary goal, it was a sizeable outcome. When Monte left the directorship, 
all COP programs had a biracial staff, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission found that 
Craven County‟s Headstart programs had the highest average  integration rates of all the 
programs in the seven states under the study, and Sargent Shriver confirmed that thirteen 
black members out of twenty-seven on the COP board was “fair representation for the 
area” and concluded that OEO still considered North Carolina “a leading example of our 
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Nation‟s fight to eliminate poverty.”
88
 Moreover, as Fund staff member Royce Jordan 
observed at the time, if they did not before, “the majority of whites that worked on the 
COP board came to see blacks as human beings.” Jordan, who himself claims to be a 
“prime example of someone who broadened his views on race” during the 1960s, recalls 
that when he was growing up in Eastern North Carolina during the 1930s “the races acted 
civil toward one another but didn‟t work together.”
89
 
Until his resignation, Monte‟s supervision did not prevent social progress between 
the races but arguably made it more attainable. His style, which involved gradual change, 
keeping the board and the community informed, and selling the programs to the 
community by helping them understand how lower poverty and unemployment rates for 
both blacks and whites was beneficial to everyone in Craven County, made social 
progress more acceptable at the local level than it had been under Hearn. Monte was 
among a growing number who are, as he put it, “now aware that people, well educated, 
well fed and housed, and well versed in their Government are the best resources a nation 
could have.” Yet, too many times, he believed, “[we] have overlooked the simple 
methods of education along basic self-help lines as the most effective and quickest 
manner to help combat ignorance and poverty among our people”—a solution that he, 
incidentally, believed was more compassionate because of its greater effectiveness.
90
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“Of course, different people do things different ways,” Monte had told the COP 
board of directors on one of his first days as executive director. “Some people like to 
fly—some like to take a train to go to the same place.”
91
 For Monte, whose mindset was 
similar to that of many other businessmen and engineers, fighting to reduce poverty was 
largely a question of efficiency and getting the most “bang for your buck.” Thus, not 
surprisingly, under his leadership, pro-business and pro-economic growth conservatives 
were able to see the good in poverty programs and increased education to, if nothing else, 
improve the labor supply, a reality that surely existed in numerous communities besides 
Craven County. Along with MITCE, one of the programs that Monte was most proud of 
was the Small Business Development Center which, in his opinion, “has created jobs and 
opportunities never before available to men with potential and leadership…[its] services 
rendered…[have] more than paid for the cost of the program” and had also provided 
helpful advice for “existing businesses” in “continuing their successful operations.”
92
 
Monte understood very well that middle-class people in Craven County, like 
many smaller conservative communities, were willing to go along with social progress as 
long as it occurred gradually and could be shown to benefit them and the community as a 
whole. In order to maintain their support, he had to help white conservative board 
members and community members begin “to see that COP helped whites as well as 
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blacks.”
93
 Accordingly, he slowed the pace of COP so that he could improve its image 
and expand it later, with the good faith of the people. This tactic seemed to have worked 
quite well. In spite of the multitude of complaints from the Fund and OEO, there is no 
proof that Monte‟s methods reduced the ability of COP to reach the poor or the 
effectiveness of its efforts to do so. In fact, COP programs reached more poor—both 
black and white—than they ever had during Hearn‟s tenure. More programs were 
administered under COP than under Hearn, one of which included the Dental Mobile 
Services Unit, which was begun within days of Monte‟s resignation. The size of most 
programs had also grown, and the majority of these programs were backed by greater 
community support.
94
  
During Monte‟s term as executive director, even some of the most conservative 
whites in Craven were willing to support programs preferred by the poor, including 
Community Development. Pro-segregationist Cedric Boyd, who in November 1965 had 
reportedly told black COP board member Claretta Wordlaw that “all you colored people 
want is a hand-out from this [COP] program,” was openly commending the Community 
Development program by February 1966 as one of the best in COP for the job it did in 
showing what people “can do to help themselves improve the environment and 
community in which they live.” Boyd‟s praise was even more remarkable because the 
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program was almost exclusive to black neighborhoods.
95
 With its emphases on voter 
registration, sanitation, beautification, and other issues that did not directly impact the 
local economy, Community Development may not have been added if not for the North 
Carolina Fund‟s recommendation. Yet many of the middle-class within COP, including 
Monte, saw its focus on self-help as helping to strengthen other programs, such as 
MITCE and ABER, (especially after seeing it in action) and as guaranteeing Fund 
support of COP altogether. Interestingly, Community Development funding for the 
predominately black community of Pembroke was held up in August 1966—not because 
of lack of support among the community but due to slowness of OEO approval.
96
  
Just prior to Monte‟s resignation, most of the complaints leveled at COP seemed 
to be coming from the fringe of the white community, namely members of the John Birch 
Society and the local editor of the New Bern Mirror, who had a small but loyal following 
of conservative whites. A far larger segment seemed to agree that the programs should 
stay, despite controversies that had arisen in the past. Congressman David Henderson 
continued to vote for reapportionments of federal funding for the War on Poverty into 
1966 from a belief that “The only way we will ever be able to get the low economic 
groups in our society up to a decent level is through education and training.” Henderson 
also felt the COP “has done a lot of good despite the criticism which has been leveled at 
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it…”
97
 Even New Bern Mayor Mack Lupton, who had not wanted to be on the COP 
board when he was appointed in 1964 and who had stated that “advertising Craven as a 
poverty county was detrimental to our community,” would come to see that COP needed 
to stay if for no other reason than because poor people‟s hopes had been raised.
98
 A North 
Carolina Fund-sponsored review of COP conducted in mid-October by an outside team 
that included the executive director of United Progress Inc. (UPI), a CAA located in 
Trenton, New Jersey, was impressed by the fact that “among the leaders of the churches 
and business community along with the pastors of the middle-class churches…there was 
feeling that the program was a good one for the COP area” for both the “social 
improvement of the lot of the poor” and the “economic boost that the program brought to 
the local area.”
99
 
There is no denying, however, that Monte‟s handling of COP slowed progress to a 
rate below what some local poor blacks desired, for example those who had joined Leon 
Nixon‟s SCLC committee. One of the most common complaints among this segment of 
the Craven community was that “those who had already had good jobs were the ones who 
got hired at COP.”
100
 Nixon, himself, who claimed that COP had a “false representation 
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of Negroes from [Robert M.] Whitehead, [Bishop S.] Rivers, and [Willie] Dawson,” was 
so frustrated with the pace of change that in September 1966 he argued that their 
presence was “not doing the community any good.” From his outside observation, 
Whitehead, Rivers, and Dawson too often followed the wishes of influential whites. As 
Nixon reasoned, these men, who he called “Uncle Toms,” live in “nice houses while 
other blacks starve,” so “How can they be leaders?” he asked.
101
 Many poor blacks 
disagreed with Nixon, however. COP board member Claretta Wordlaw, who was still 
living at Craven Terrace, argued that Whitehead, in particular, was “a fine and hard 
working man who wants to represent all the poor people of Craven County, not just the 
Negroes.”
102
 Several North Carolina Fund staff also disagreed with Nixon‟s assessment. 
One North Carolina Fund staffer argued at the time that Nixon‟s methods “to date had 
accomplished absolutely nothing” while “the accomplishments of Robert Whitehead,” 
who was more willing to negotiate with influential whites, “have led to the establishment 
of working relations with members of the power structure and local agency heads.”
103
  
Indeed, the more “working relations” were formed between whites and blacks, the 
more progress became imbedded in day-to-day interactions at the local level. The review 
team that evaluated COP in mid-October, all of whom were from outside the South, 
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recorded being surprised by the degree of integration they found among COP staff.
104
 
While they gave most of the credit to Hearn, rather than to a commitment by the board 
members, the final report included contradictory praise of strong support of community 
action among board members, who were described as having “an awareness of social 
change (integration), and the necessity for it.”
105
 The review team also cited the fact that 
“most interest groups are represented” on the COP board and awarded COP six points on 
a scale of seven in that category.
106
 As interactions between blacks and whites became 
more frequent, the two groups were learning how to collaborate in a just manner with 
regard to solving local issues. The review team also rated COP four out of seven in 
regards to the extent that “membership representative of the target area population and 
minority groups share in policy making” and noted that although poor whites participated 
the least, the “[a]bility of the Negro poor and other Negro representation to influence 
policy and specific actions of the organization seems to be increasing.” Examples 
included blacks‟ ability to influence Monte to hire Lee Morgan and how blacks and 
whites “caucus before meetings to organize for specific purposes, and negroes at least, 
feel this has brought some specific gains.”
107
  
The biracial nature of COP staff was highly influential as well in creating little 
revolutions every day in the ways that blacks and whites worked side by side in jobs that 
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had long been reserved exclusively for whites. COP programs, especially NYC and 
MITCE, also provided similar opportunities for program participants. Not only did 
growing numbers of whites deal with blacks on an equal footing, but several were even 
being supervised by blacks for the first time. Such practical experiences helped to change 
numerous attitudes among whites as they began to consider blacks on their merits rather 
than as members of a particular race.
108
 COP‟s presence built upon earlier commitments 
to racial fairness and also spawned new ones. Largely because of COP, the community as 
a whole was more dedicated to investing in education, job training, and self-improvement 
for all—initiatives that they had never been able or willing to seriously consider before—
and these new developments went right back into strengthening COP. It was not a 
coincidence then that integration within COP staff and the board began to mirror greater 
racial harmony in Craven‟s workplaces, schools and public departments and vice versa.  
As records from the U.S. Equal Employment Office confirm, in 1966 several New 
Bern businesses, including Maola Milk and Ice Cream Company, Barbour Boats, and 
Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company, hired dozens of black workers for positions 
reserved not long ago for whites only, including middle management positions as well as 
clerical, sales, and skilled and/or semi-skilled jobs.
109
 The ways in which fairer hiring 
practices and job training programs increased black employment opportunities over time 
will be discussed further in Chapter VII and the conclusion. The schools also saw 
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tremendous change during Monte‟s tenure as head of COP. In addition to a near-100 
percent increase in pupil integration between the 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 school years, 
in the fall of 1966 black teachers began to work for the first time in Craven County‟s 
previously all-white elementary, middle, and high schools.
110
 In addition, the Craven 
County Welfare Department, which was directed by COP board member Constance 
Rabin, began assigning caseloads on an integrated basis by early 1966.
111
 Craven 
County‟s hospitals, after being criticized in February 1966 for having a few segregated 
wards in existence, became fully integrated soon thereafter and were approved by the 
federal government for Medicare funding in July.
112
 
The increase in black voting in the area after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 also 
was responsible for the greater commitment to racial fairness shown by both COP and the 
larger community. Between October 1965 and May 1966, of the 1,725 newly registered 
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voters, more than 650 were blacks (close to 40 percent).
113
 By May 1966, black 
registered voters in Craven increased by 400, bringing the number to 3,473 black. Black 
voters would also grow to a total of 35 percent of Craven‟s sixteen thousand voters that 
year. 
114
 James Gavin commented at the time that white politicians were more likely to 
make concessions to blacks since they formed a significant voting bloc. “The white 
politicians listen to us now,” said Gavin.
115
  
Amid these positive developments within Craven County, Monte‟s resignation 
struck a temporary sour note. Maggie Blow, the black director of Community 
Development, would argue that Monte‟s greatest weakness was that he worked “too hard 
to try to please everyone” and was often “walking a tightrope” between the poor and the 
COP board.
116
 One key example, discussed in Chapter VI, was with regard to the original 
Legal Services proposal that had been supported by Craven‟s poor but not the majority of 
COP board members. Even though Monte later told Esser that “One of the facts of life 
about being a director of a poverty program is that you cannot please all the people,” he 
had in fact tried to do so to the best of his ability.
117
 However, Monte‟s attempts to please 
all factions as much as possible was not the primary cause of his downfall; in fact, his 
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ability to keep COP programs going through negotiations between both groups arguably 
secured him more time as executive director. Monte‟s downfall was instead rooted more 
in his decision to go it alone by firing Morgan without consulting the board or members 
of the community.  
The new executive director 
Because Fund staff believed that Monte had tried “to lead the Community Action 
Program down a path of right-wing philosophy,” they were quite excited about his 
replacement, forty-one-year-old Havelock resident James L. Godwin, who was originally 
recommended by COP board member Constance Rabin and approved by the COP/CPI 
board on September 28. Godwin would officially take over the administration of COP on 
October 15.
 118
 As the North Carolina Fund staff saw it, Godwin was a good choice 
because his views fell between those of Monte and Hearn. His previous experience in the 
military, as an entrepreneur, and as a community leader were in line with Monte‟s 
background, but the care he took to please Fund staff and OEO officials was more similar 
to Hearn‟s leadership style.  
A native of South Carolina, Godwin completed his bachelor‟s degree in 
Economics at the University of North Carolina in 1949 after a three-year tour of duty 
with the U.S. Marines. A few months after graduation, Godwin moved to Craven County 
where he operated a drive-in theatre, restaurant, and laundry business with his brother in 
the city of Havelock. By 1953 he decided to begin selling life insurance, a career move 
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that took him as far as Greenville, Tennessee, where he landed a job as vice president of 
the Franklin Life Insurance Company. In Tennessee he became involved in the 
community by serving as a county chairman for the United Fund campaign, a church 
elder, and a Bible class teacher. Nonetheless, career dissatisfaction caused him to resign 
from Franklin Life in 1965. He then returned to Havelock, in August of that year, and 
opened a retail shoe business in the spring of 1966. A few months later he accepted the 
position of Title V Work-Training Coordinator with the Craven County Welfare 
Department, whose goal it was to match heads of households receiving welfare with local 
training opportunities (in hopes of lifting them to financial self-reliance) and turned over 
the shoe business to his wife. 
119
 Thus, Godwin had at least some familiarity with 
COP/CPI and the local War on Poverty before stepping into the role of executive 
director.  
Soon into his administration, Godwin began making efforts to abide by the North 
Carolina Fund staff recommendations for COP/CPI about increased participation of the 
poor in program planning and policy making, better coordination among programs, 
specific attempts to involve more poor whites, and enhanced training of COP/CPI board 
and staff about the objectives of the CAA and their role in it.
120
 As Royce Jordan 
described him, Godwin was “an appeaser” and was “good with working with both sides” 
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in the event of a conflict.
121
After lauding the program‟s past results, Godwin expressed 
confidence to the COP board on October 26 that “we will make progress during the 
coming year and you will be proud of your contribution and role in what we do for this 
community.”
122
 These early actions indicate that Godwin was largely on board with the 
Fund and did not want to upset its staff or lead them to lose faith in his abilities. “We now 
have a CAP director in Jim Godwin and feel the relationship will be one of closeness and 
togetherness, one of trying to get the problems to the poor” read a Fund strategy paper of 
November 1966.
123
 Nor did Godwin want to do anything that might upset OEO 
administrators. In fact, one of his first tasks as executive director was to dismiss Ralph 
Jacobs, who had been hired by Monte in February 1966, and eliminate the position of 
administrative assistant. Jacobs would protest that his dismissal had been engineered by 
Fund field representative Royce Jordan and SCLC leader Leon Nixon, both of whom he 
believed had complained to Godwin about him. Godwin admitted that Nixon had strongly 
suggested that Jacobs be removed because he saw him as an “obstructionist”; however, 
Godwin maintained that the Fund had played no role in pressuring him to release Jacobs 
and that, he, Godwin, had given Jacobs the opportunity to resign before firing him.
124
 
According to Godwin, pressure to discharge Jacobs had been communicated by Bob 
Burns of OEO, who informed him that “if Jacobs remained on the payroll OEO money 
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would be hard to come by.” In response to Jacobs‟ contention that the North Carolina 
Fund‟s goals and methods were destructive and “dictatorial,” Godwin tactfully stated that 
the Fund acted only as an advisory group and that he planned to work with every possible 
advisory agency. 
125
  
Godwin‟s willingness to accommodate major funders, which was greater than 
Monte‟s had been even before he fired Lee Morgan, went a long way with both the Fund 
and OEO. Neither would they intervene in the administrative matters of COP as they had 
when Monte was executive director. Indeed, when Godwin removed Ralph Jacobs 
without COP/CPI board approval, neither Esser, Fund staff, nor OEO made any protest 
which was in stark contrast to the harsh stance they took when Monte let Lee Morgan go 
before consulting the board. That Jacobs was white and that no community group was 
willing to demonstrate on his behalf certainly explained a good deal about why both 
situations were handled so differently by the two organizations.  
In addition to Godwin‟s discretion and flexibility, the growing criticism that 
surrounded the North Carolina Fund as a result of its controversial activities (namely its 
support of black community activist Howard Fuller) may have also led the Fund to seek 
to improve its working relationships with local executive directors by 1967. Although 
tensions between the Fund and COP/CPI almost disappeared after Godwin was hired, 
issues of local control between the CAA and OEO grew. The source of the problem, 
however, was new: OEO‟s promotion of national emphasis programs in place of local 
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ideas.
126
 This trend, which grew in response to conservative and moderate 
Congressmen‟s disdain for the radicalism that the War on Poverty had incited among the 
black poor in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and other large urban centers, had been 
in evidence during Monte‟s directorship but became paramount during Godwin‟s 
tenure.
127
 
OEO’s new funding priorities 
The new OEO funding priorities came at an inopportune time for COP/CPI. In 
part because few in the community knew the actual details of Monte‟s resignation, the 
community was still widely supportive of the CAA, or at least willing to grant it the 
benefit of the doubt, based on the results of the November 1966 election. In a record off-
year voting turnout, incumbent Democrats (including D. L. Stallings) swept the entire 
election in Craven despite the appearance of more than a half-dozen Republican 
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challengers on the ballot (many of whom were members of the John Birch Society), who 
ran for local office for the first time in order to limit the antipoverty programs, if not 
eliminate them entirely.
128
 The electability of Stallings and other incumbent county 
commissioners was undoubtedly assisted by their efforts to maintain the local tax rate, 
which had not budged in three years.
129
 But as some within the North Carolina Fund had 
predicted, COP/CPI was too large a political liability to overcome for Stallings and other 
Democrats who had either served on the COP board or sponsored it.
130
  
These Fund staff observers were wrong, however, not least because they 
underestimated the degree of black political strength in Craven. Indeed, Stallings‟ 
reelection could not have been accomplished without the black voters who appreciated 
his efforts to prop up COP/CPI as well as to bring higher-wage industries to the area.
131
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Fund staff also overestimated the size of the Republican opposition. Even with the 
majority of the black vote, Stallings could not have won reelection without sizeable 
support from Craven‟s white voters. Many whites supported him from a view that, 
though COP had its problems, the organization‟s effects were more positive than 
negative. Unlike the beating that Democrats took in the national races—forty-five OEO 
sympathizers were defeated in November 1966—those at the local level could often more 
easily see the benefits of the War on Poverty first-hand and the progress taking place in 
their communities. In September 1966, 59 percent of Americans rated President 
Johnson‟s handling of the War on Poverty as “only fair/poor.”
132
 Many of those defeated 
at the national level were also in districts where political activity was more radical and 
only continued to grow into the urban riots of 1967.
133
 Arguably, white support for 
COP/CPI stayed high for far longer than in many other urban areas due to a lack of 
protest among blacks, partially inspired by the example of the liberal to moderate black 
leadership of Whitehead, Rivers, Dawson, and Gavin.  
The timing of the decline in OEO funding for local ideas was also unfortunate 
because Godwin was just beginning to implement the official expansion of Coastal 
Progress, which had been planned during Monte‟s tenure, by combining COP with the 
CAAs of Pamlico and Jones counties into a single board of directors. OEO was still 
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helping to fund local initiatives such as the Neuse-Trent Diversified Marketing 
Association but funding was temporary; for long-term financial security, the association 
would have to rely predominately on the help of state and county leaders such as Craven 
County Agriculture Extension Chairman A.T. Jackson, who helped get an FHA loan for a 
new warehouse, as well as the North Carolina Fund which provided working capital and 
repayment assistance.
134
 In general, OEO‟s tighter rules about local funding meant that 
Godwin would often have to rely on the community support department of the North 
Carolina Fund for several local program initiatives such as training funds and facilities 
for Community Development and additional revenue to expand the Manpower 
program.
135
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Figure 25. Dedication of Neuse-Trent Diversified Marketing Association, 1967. From left to right: George 
Esser, COP/CPI executive director Jim Godwin, Congressman Walter B. Jones, and Association Chairman 
Robert Ipock. News & Observer, 1967 
 
 
Although he told Sargent Shriver that he was “in complete agreement with the 
priority system now used for funding by OEO,” North Carolina Fund executive director 
George Esser was clearly sympathetic to Godwin‟s situation and would try to persuade 
the OEO director at least once to continue funding for local initiatives. The earliest 
known instance occurred in February 1967 when Esser requested that neither the Rural 
Environmental Sanitation program nor Home Management Program be cut from COP‟s 
budget of approved programs as scheduled for March 1, 1967.  Asking for a minimum of 
a seven-month extension for both projects (so that they could eventually be phased into 
the Community Development program), Esser explained to Shriver that “these programs 
in Craven deserve this extension based on past performance and local conditions. The 
tangible nature of their benefits to the poor can be readily seen and accepted by the total 
community, making involvement of the poor more readily accessible.” A handout 
444 
 
enclosed with Esser‟s letter showed that, since the two programs began, forty-six local 
home management groups had been set up and were serving more than 650 families and 
that over 1,500 county residents in need of rural environmental sanitation had been 
assisted through either rodent and insect control, sewage disposal, water supply, house 
repair, and rubbage/refuse control. “I have been assured by Jim Godwin,” Esser 
continued in his February 1967 letter to Shriver, “that [the extension] will enable him to 
set up the machinery to operate the parts of these programs needed by the poor, through 
his multi-purpose centers. I believe this can be done and that this will enable Coastal 
Progress, Inc. to become the all encompassing model rural community action program 
that it was originally intended to be.”
136
    
However, even the influence of someone like George Esser, who had helped to 
craft the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, would not be able to halt the decline in 
OEO funding of local projects. The need for local leadership in the fight against poverty 
would therefore become all the more important. As a North Carolina Fund internal report 
observed, “New proposals and changes in existing components are at this time almost an 
impossibility. The present staff of OEO feels that this is a period to stand pat and not 
make too many innovative changes. This hampers the efforts of a community action 
agency such as Coastal [Progress].” With this being the case, the report also 
acknowledged that “It would be very easy to sit back and take the existing dictates from 
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Washington, but Godwin and his staff, do not want to play the game this way.”
137
 Far 
from opposing community action, CPI did all it could to keep it alive when OEO funding 
for local ideas was at an all-time low. Because of its financial resources and its almost 
five-year investment in CPI, between 1967 and 1969 the North Carolina Fund was a 
crucial partner in the endeavor to maintain the “community” in community action.   
North Carolina Fund stands up for local ideas 
During this two-year period, the local ideas for which Godwin sought Fund 
support revolved around ways to increase the availability of well-paying job 
opportunities for the area‟s low-income residents. Helping to bring these ideas to life was 
a new funding provision, known as Plan B. As the Fund envisioned this grant, it would 
implement innovative, meaningful programs that could not be accomplished through 
other sources of funding such as staff training, citizenship education, leadership training, 
or economic and manpower development. On March 22, 1967, the Board of Directors of 
the North Carolina Fund reserved $600,000 to enable ten Fund sites to apply for up to 
$60,000 of Plan B funds. CPI was first approved for $15,000 of Plan B money in July (to 
be matched by local funds of $2,500 and OEO funds of $10,000 for a total of $27,500). 
The bulk of this total, $25,000, was given to the Craven County Commissioners to hire a 
professional firm that was to “make a comprehensive study of the human and physical 
resources of the County [and] use this information to search for industry suitable to the 
purposes of proper economic development.”  
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This joint venture between CPI and the commissioners would serve the interests 
of both groups in the Craven community. For the commissioners, who under Stallings‟ 
guidance, had recently established a county planning board and approved participation in 
the state‟s Economic Development Commission program in early February 1967 as part 
of a state-federal effort to provide basic facilities necessary for its growth, the 
comprehensive study would begin to address their growing concerns about the 
relationship between an expanding population, a lack of higher-wage industries, and 
unemployment and poverty.
138
 CPI, which desired more direct involvement of the 
business community and the middle-class in the activities of Coastal Progress, would find 
its aims were best served by attracting a type of industry (ideally a sewing factory) for 
low-skilled female heads of households. This plan had been first envisioned by Craven 
Industries, Inc., a biracial group founded in 1965, whose members included D. L. 
Stallings, Robert M. Whitehead, and B.S. Rivers, the latter of whom had recently been 
named the first non-white chairman of COP/CPI. As the Plan B grant application read, 
“Our worst poverty situations are those surrounding female heads of households, 
receiving Welfare Assistance. COP, Inc. would look forward to training these females 
toward gainful employment in this type of industry, thereby curing the economic aspect 
of this poverty circumstance.”
139
 One such industry, the New Bern Garment Company, 
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was eventually established in New Bern by 1974 and employed thirty females in its first 
year of operation.
140
 
As it related to increasing the availability of well-paying jobs for the poor, 
Godwin also received assistance from the North Carolina Fund in 1967 to finalize plans 
to fully integrate the North Carolina Fund‟s Manpower demonstration project, MITCE, 
within Coastal Progress, which included folding some of the seventeen manpower field 
staff already stationed in Craven into the CPI staff.
141
 At this time, the MITCE was still in 
its experimental phase; the recruitment, counseling, and training remained under the 
authority of the North Carolina Fund. However, the program‟s importance continued to 
remain abundantly clear. At the end of the year, in addition to high unemployment and an 
approximately 20 percent poverty rate, there were over one thousand projected job 
openings in Craven, Jones, Pamlico, Beaufort, Carteret, and Lenoir counties. 
142
 
MITCE‟s success in the area also continued to be observable. In December 1967, more 
than 215 local people (204 of whom were black) had been directly placed or were 
receiving either on-the-job or institutional training (of these, the vast majority had been 
enrolled in institutional training). 
143
 With these successes in mind, the Fund agreed that 
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the manpower program could benefit from an expansion and decided it would be easiest 
to achieve at the local level.  
Coastal Progress narrowly avoids a shutdown 
But before plans were fully underway to integrate the MITCE program into 
COP/CPI, and thereby expand the size of the CAA, in November 1967 congressional 
disagreements about the direction and purposes of the War on Poverty almost led to the 
shutdown of CPI. During this time, Godwin received several visits and phone calls from 
members of the community, most of whom were poor or who represented the poor, about 
their fears that the House of Representatives might cut funding to OEO and thereby close 
most of the centers that provided adult basic education, Head Start, daycare, and other 
popular and widely used programs. Because federal funding for CPI was only scheduled 
through December 1967, CPI would have had to close its doors without an extension. In 
addition to noting that at least three thousand people had been impacted by Coastal 
Progress between August and September 1967 alone, Godwin expressed to the local press 
his primary concern was about the abruption that the withdrawal of $1.25 million in 
federal funding would cause with regard to the ongoing development of the poor. “The 
poor people have not had enough time to develop the leadership needed to keep their 
centers in continuous operation,” Godwin said. “Of course, developing leadership among 
the poor—showing them how they can help themselves attain the things they want and 
need, is all a part of the job that certainly isn‟t finished yet.” He added with pride that 
community residents were raising money themselves for equipment and furnishings and 
that parents of kindergarten classes paid teachers out of their own pockets and argued 
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that, for many of these people, the community centers provided their first opportunity to 
participate in community life. In addition to the poor‟s development, Godwin also 
worried about the impact that shutting down CPI would have on unemployment in the 
community, arguing that at least five hundred local people, including current NYC 
enrollees, would be left without jobs. 
144
 
Fortunately for Godwin and supporters of CPI, in early December Congress 
reached a compromise on a two-year extension for OEO by way of the Green 
Amendment, introduced by Rep. Edith Green (D-Oregon). In an effort to draw the line 
between “acceptable boat-rocking and forbidden rabble-rousing,” the amendment 
essentially turned over control of independent community action programs to local 
governments.
145
 Specifically, it required that all local CAA funds be channeled through 
elected public officials in the city, county or state governments, one of which would have 
to approve fund allocations.
146
 Even though he was not personally in favor of “rabble 
rousing” on the part of CAA staff or the poor, President Johnson was aware that “our 
tacit acceptance of [the Green Amendment] would be considered a sellout by the 
ultraliberals.” But he also knew “for a fact that in many cases locally elected officials 
were already participating and, where they were, community action got the best results.” 
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Even more important, “we knew that with this amendment we could win the support of 
several Southern Democrats and solidify the support of Democrats from big cities who 
were under pressure for tighter local control.”
147
  
Almost a week later, Godwin was informed that Coastal Progress would indeed 
remain in operation. According to Godwin, the OEO grant came only after North 
Carolina Governor Dan Moore voiced his approval for the funds. The good news stopped 
there, however. CPI would only be awarded $683,052 (slightly more than half of the 
previous year‟s budget), set to expire in October 1968.
148
 Although the smaller federal 
budget would force Godwin to lay off several dozen staff members and thereby 
temporarily reduce the size of several of the antipoverty programs, Godwin was 
determined to attract additional Fund money to at least partially offset the smaller size of 
the programs that had benefitted the poor. Indeed, in the Craven area, in contrast to critics 
of the Green amendment who argued that the new rule betrayed the poor and would 
reduce their influence, CPI did not turn into a mayor-run or county commissioner-run 
CAA. Like the majority of the nation‟s CAAs, CPI essentially remained in the hands of 
private citizens of a local community, many of whom were acutely aware of the need for 
and benefits of the poor‟s participation in the planning and functioning of the CAA. “The 
concept of participation in program operation and decision-making by the residents of 
target areas,” social worker Sanford Kravitz observed, “thought by many to be 
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completely unworkable, has become an accomplished fact.”
149
 In fact, within CPI, the 
influence of the poor only grew after 1967.  
Of course, the poor‟s influence on the COP/CPI board and staff had been growing 
for years. In September 1964, there had been no board members elected from the ranks of 
the poor, but by September 1967, there were eleven, more than half of whom were black, 
which was slightly more than the 33 percent minimum required by OEO. By September 
1967, the number of poor people on the CPI staff payroll had also risen to approximately 
thirty-four, or 27 percent of all staff, though the number did not include NYC staff, 
clerical staff, or Head Start employees. Counting these employees would have likely 
amounted to a higher percentage.
150
 The poor were also becoming more involved in 
making their interests known and becoming more involved in the political process more 
generally. This growth was true more for the black poor (as previously discussed, the 
white poor were not as organized and were less motivated, not having directly suffered 
the effects of Jim Crow). In response to a group of black Duffyfield residents who asked 
for better services from city leaders in April 1967, North Carolina Fund staff Bill Flowers 
wrote to Nathan Garrett that, “Several years ago, this would not have happened. Any 
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member of the minority group would have been reluctant to speak for himself of his 
neighbors unless he was well known and financially secure….Democracy is beginning to 
work, however, painfully slow.”
151
 Several months later, William Vails, speaking for 
three hundred blacks in New Bern, and Janice Williams, speaking for black youth, 
petitioned the board of aldermen to renew the city‟s contract with NYC that had been 
allowed to expire more than a year before. Following the moderate leadership of Mayor 
Ethridge Ricks, the aldermen would agree to reinstate the NYC program in July 1967.
152
  
Growing partnership between CPI and Craven community 
The fact that the poor were becoming more willing to speak out for their interests 
was not the only remarkable development; the larger community, seeing the benefits to 
the community that were resulting from greater participation and productivity, was also 
becoming more willing to listen. It did not hurt that most of the poor‟s participation was 
accomplished peacefully and usually without demonstrations. Indeed, most of the poor 
appeared to be far from radical and merely wanted greater economic opportunities. Black 
New Bern citizen Alphonso Morris, who addressed the U.S. Senate in March 1967, along 
with several other poor people, came to speak out against the growing liberal idea that 
government should institute a guaranteed income for low-income individuals. “I believe 
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in giving a man an opportunity,” Morris shared with the Senate, thinking it would be 
“bad to give [income] that way.”
153
  
In mid-August, New Bern Mayor Ethridge H. Ricks wrote James Godwin that 
“the city of New Bern has enjoyed a splendid relationship with Coastal Progress, Inc. and 
has benefited greatly by having had the opportunity to work [with] members of the youth 
corps”; he also praised CPI for “work[ing] diligently and accomplish[ing] much in 
combating the poverty problems in New Bern [and for] maintaining communication 
between the underprivileged and those in authority.” In addition, he credited the poor for 
contributing “many worthwhile suggestions to help relieve the deplorable conditions in 
housing and other areas.” The result of one of these suggestions, a low-income housing 
corporation, would eventually be established. As Ricks summarized in his letter to 
Godwin, CPI “has not only benefited the poor, but has greatly benefited the entire 
citizenry of New Bern,” adding that he looked forward to “continued good working 
relations in order that we may be better understood and help those in need.”
154
 Godwin 
also received a praise-filled letter that summer from Mary Gatlin, secretary of the Craven 
County Good Neighbor Council, that thanked him and the Coastal Progress staff for 
“your successful efforts in improving the relationships between the people of our 
community” and “outstanding contribution to a „Cool Summer‟ in Craven County.”
155
 As 
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Royce Jordan recalls, there was “no major conflict” between whites and blacks in the 
area “while [Godwin] was the leader.”
156
 
The greater racial cooperation in Craven, specifically in New Bern, extended to 
urban renewal plans as well. By 1967, because they better understood that no mass 
relocation of urban residents would be required, blacks were largely supportive of the 
city‟s proposed $3 million waterfront revitalization. Just a few years earlier, led by B.S. 
Rivers and the New Bern Civic League, the black community had been the main 
stumbling block of this project.
157
 What had led to success the second time around was 
whites‟ recognition that progress could not be accomplished without wide black support 
and, thus, they had made a greater effort to include them in the discussion.  
Therefore, when Godwin made the decision to apply for North Carolina Fund 
Plan B grants for FY 1968 that would include new and innovative antipoverty programs 
including Public Health Nursing and Education, Community Involvement and 
Recruitment, Leadership Training, and Citizenship Education, he was counting not only 
upon the growing involvement of the poor who sat on the board of directors or were 
engaging in the community but also upon greater receptivity within the community to 
such programs. In fact, the community involvement component was based on the active 
participation of those in city and county government. Similarly to Monte, Godwin was 
seeking to build community consensus around the CAA and understood the importance 
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of doing so. Even Rep. Walter B. Jones, who was generally no fan of community action 
programs and was particularly opposed to the teachings and ideology of North Carolina 
Fund staff member Howard Fuller, expressed his support for Godwin by saying that if 
more people like Godwin were in the OEO “there would be fewer problems.”
158
  
Perhaps more than Monte, Godwin saw the increase in black voting as a positive 
indirect cause of community action. That CPI was encouraging community participation 
and citizenship responsibility was “a good thing.”
159
 Accordingly, Godwin also applied 
for several North Carolina Fund Incentive Grants, whose objective was to “create within 
the target areas, groups that would organize to conduct a community project resulting 
from the perception of their needs in relation to each citizen of the community and how to 
satisfy this common need.” In 1968, incentive grants of $1,500 were given in two 
segments to thirteen different target area community groups in the Craven area, including 
the Craven Terrace Community Council, to assist the low-income groups in starting their 
projects while encouraging them to carry the remaining expenses through voluntary 
services, in-kind contributions, and fund-raising activities. Because a group would only 
receive grant money by showing that the agreed-upon project could not be achieved 
through the services of any other existing agency in the community, CPI staff would only 
act in an advisory way.  
Godwin‟s championing of more self-sufficient community leadership among the 
poor did not mean, however, that he believed in confrontation or that all of the poor‟s 
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requests could or should be pursued. In June 1967, Nathan Garrett, the North Carolina 
Fund‟s deputy director who would later help found the all-black Fund-offshoot known as 
Foundation for Community Development (FDC), suggested to Godwin that the poor 
demand that plans for either improved or new government housing be added to New 
Bern‟s waterfront renewal project. Disagreeing with Garrett‟s suggested strategy, 
Godwin responded that “blocking or delaying the downtown project does not fit the 
„positive force pattern‟ which is developing among our Neighborhood groups.”
160
 
Godwin’s frustrations with OEO; the North Carolina Fund ends its five-year 
experiment 
 
As time passed and OEO became significantly more rigid in its funding priorities 
and seemingly more interested in self-preservation, Godwin viewed the Fund‟s assistance 
in supporting the continuation of local projects for the poor as all the more valuable. By 
January 1968, conflicts between CPI and OEO were even beginning to brew over projects 
that OEO had had previously claimed to enthusiastically support. On a visit to 
Washington to discuss the Manpower proposal with Bob Gardner of OEO, Godwin was 
told that CPI‟s proposal would have to be reworked because of new OEO guidelines, as 
outlined in a new CAP memo, stating that a project component could not be changed 
more than 20 percent in one year. After hearing about this new policy from Godwin, 
Fund field representative Royce Jordan predicted that it “is going to create quite a 
problem in trying to re-distribute the funds from existing components to the Manpower 
Component” and added that “Gardner also told Godwin that OEO was overspent in North 
                                                 
160
 James L. Godwin to Mr. Nathan T. Garrett, June 22, 1967, folder 5043, NCFR; Esser, My Years at the 
North Carolina Fund, 229-234.  
457 
 
Carolina approximately one quarter of a million dollars and this money had to be made 
up. As a result he (Gardner) didn‟t see any new money in the foreseeable future.” Jordan 
lamented that “Bob Gardner, the analyst, is playing the Bureaucratic Game, he uses every 
OEO regulation, CAP memo and anything else at hand to keep from being flexible in any 
way concerning component changes or additional funding…I find that this is not only 
true with Craven but with all his CAPs. This is going to make the funding of a Manpower 
Component in Craven very difficult.”  
Jordan would consequently help former ABER director Tom Wallace rewrite the 
proposal to send back to Washington “for Gardner‟s critique.”
161
 Perhaps what made the 
issue over CPI‟s Manpower program startling to Jordan was that Manpower had been the 
one area consistently supported by OEO during its slow-down phase. In June 1967, OEO 
had supplied the North Carolina Fund with a $1.8 million grant to finance, through the 
non-profit North Carolina Manpower Corporation, a statewide experimental program 
supported by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) to speed up the process 
of linking North Carolina‟s seventy thousand unemployed with available jobs. One of the 
newest methods that the corporation hoped to launch was the use of computers to match 
workers and their skills to open jobs.
162
 “It is becoming clear that all of us engaged in the 
War on Poverty must place increasing emphasis in employment oriented programs if we 
are to continue to be responsive to the mandate of Congress and the real needs of the 
                                                 
161
 Royce Jordan, Field Report, January 22-26, 1968, folder 5039, NCFR.  
 
162
 “Manpower Development Corporation,” folder 5394, NCFR.  
 
458 
 
poor,” read a letter from an OEO administrator to CAA executive directors in North 
Carolina, adding that CAAs “are expected to play a major role in both planning and 
operation of manpower programs for the poor.”
163
 Arguably, the Manpower 
Corporation‟s goal of preparing the “manpower potential” of the state for the 
opportunities quality industrialization could bring was no different than the goals of the 
Manpower program designed by CPI, but the priority that the latter received within OEO 
suggested otherwise.
164
 A year prior Jordan had written that “the inconsistency of [the 
OEO] in its directives is hard to understand.”
165
  
Godwin‟s frustrating visit to OEO headquarters to discuss the Manpower proposal 
for CPI was compounded by his disappointment that the North Carolina Fund was ending 
its five-year experiment. The official beginning of the phase-out period had been 
announced in early January, by a letter from Esser to all Fund-supported community 
action programs. At the Fund‟s inception in 1963, Governor Sanford had stated it would 
be in operation only five years. Esser expressed his desire to stay true to the program‟s 
experimental nature in his letter. Other events and realities might have informed the 
decision to phase out the Fund, however, such as the political controversy surrounding 
Howard Fuller‟s activities in Durham in 1967 (which resulted both in Fuller‟s suspension 
by Sargent Shriver and the increase of Republican Congressman James C. Gardner‟s 
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political capital).
166
 Moreover, according to some political observers, the campaign of 
Sanford himself for the U.S. Senate in 1968 probably would have floundered if the North 
Carolina Fund, which had become controversial in the state by 1966, was continued. All 
three reasons probably played some role in the dissolution of the organization.  
Regardless of the reason, the Fund‟s closing was terribly upsetting to Jim 
Godwin. On January 15, 1968, Godwin expressed to Esser his utmost regret that after 
October 1 Coastal Progress would no longer have the technical assistance and resources 
of the Fund. As Godwin argued, the loss of the Fund could not come at a worse time, 
especially in light of the direction that OEO had recently taken: “Federal and State 
agencies cannot offer the guidance and the know-how provided by the Fund staff” and 
“OEO is entering tragic days. Words like „innovation‟ and „flexibility‟ will be seldom 
heard. OEO‟s effectiveness will diminish in direct proportion to the increase of its 
political acceptability.” Godwin added that, “We are getting community involvement [in 
the Craven area], but we are not past the necessity for a „buy-in,‟” while arguing that 
“flexible funds were necessary in helping to attain this degree of community 
respectability.” “With so much promise for the future, how can the N.C. Fund leave at 
this most important time?” Godwin asked rhetorically.
167
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Godwin was not alone in his frustrations with OEO. In February 1968, the 
executive director of the Elk and Duck Rivers Community Association in Tennessee 
wrote Sargent Shriver complaining that “OEO seems to be running like a 230 pound 
fullback that realizes he can‟t score and is content to duck his head and settle for three 
yards and a cloud of dust,” which is “exciting neither to the players or the paying 
customers.” In order to keep “Community Action in the game” the director suggested that 
CAAs be “invited in and allowed to make some input at the highest administrative level 
in the Brown Building.” He further expressed that “the time has come for „maximum 
feasible participation‟ by CAP directors in planning programs and policy. If OEO expects 
us to involve those at the lowest level in planning, then OEO should be consistent and not 
make policy without asking those of us at the lowest level what we need.” The director 
pledged to want to be a part of a discussion of “new, bold, and innovative approaches to 
the War on Poverty.”
168
 
In Godwin‟s last known letter to Esser, he lamented—much like the executive 
director from Tennessee—that “OEO is beginning to behave like a traditional 
Government bureau” and predicted that “OEO will become much like the proverbial 
„toothless tiger with a T-bone steak.‟” “I agonize,” Godwin wrote “in anticipation of 
being Executive Director of this program next year, paid by OEO funds. The autonomy is 
important when I can say, „I am paid out of North Carolina Fund money.‟” Godwin was 
grateful for the North Carolina Fund‟s administrative grant for helping CPI become better 
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equipped to request larger grants from OEO, but, ultimately, he found private funds more 
useful for launching and supporting innovative programs. “Private funds have meant 
plans for incentive grants toward low-income neighborhood construction of decent 
community meeting facilities. These same facilities will be used by the community to 
operate self-help kindergartens,” Godwin was proud to report. “Citizenship education and 
leadership training can [also] best be done with private money,” he added, noting that 
“Leadership development for low-income areas is an absolute must for the future success 
of community organization efforts.”  
Godwin‟s preference for private funds was not necessarily based on a 
conservative philosophy that was critical of the largesse of the federal government but, as 
illustrated above, he recognized the primary fact that private money allowed for more 
flexibility. “Private money does not set political respectability as a number one priority” 
and, thus, “can give us the freedom to search for new ideas and techniques. Godwin also 
gave other examples of private money that had been especially helpful to the Craven 
community:  
 
A joint planning effort between City and County Planning Boards will 
occur as a result of the stimulation of private money. This will be the first 
significant joint venture between City and County in the long history of 
this community. Human resource planning will be the result. An 
Economic Development grant will result in two very important 
community activities. A concerted effort to locate a plant to hire females 
with entry-level skills, and a county-wide citizen‟s committee (70 
members) selected by the County Planning Board under the direction of 
the County Commissioners, will conduct an involvement type evaluation 
of Craven Operation Progress, Inc. Private money provides the flexibility 
with which to make this community action possible. Quick action in the 
form of an emergency operating capital grant has saved our Marketing 
Association from going bankrupt…OEO could not have reacted in time to 
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even promise, much less produce the hard cash. Given a few thousand 
dollars each year with flexible application from a private source, we can 
stimulate very significant community action…Also, the use of 
transportation paid by North Carolina Fund money is very important since 
OEO has become highly restrictive in the use of tax money for 
transportation.  
 
 
Godwin summarized his lengthy and passionate letter to Esser by congratulating the 
North Carolina Fund “for having the vision and the know-how needed to introduce 
Community Action to the citizens of Craven County. This community will forever be in 
your debt.” 
169
  
Godwin was right. The North Carolina Fund‟s introduction of community action 
in Craven County had made a major impact by 1968. Not only would many CPI board 
members and staff (including Godwin) remain in the program through the 1970s but they 
would do so even though funding from the North Carolina Fund had disappeared and 
OEO funding had gone on a sizeable decline. Even more notable was the fact that 
middle-class community leaders in Craven would also continue supporting antipoverty 
initiatives, both inside and outside CPI, that addressed the problems of the poor and 
provided more opportunity in order to bring the disadvantaged directly into participation 
in the benefits of the economic system. As these leaders, most of whom were white, had 
seen firsthand, programs catered to improve the education, employability, and self-
sufficiency of the poor had either shown or were beginning to show meaningful results 
that they would be seen as largely worth the investment. And for a community that was 
very much interested in moving forward industrially and improving its economic fortune, 
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it was widely known that it could not move forward without confronting the poverty in its 
midst. The strength of this reality was made apparent just a few days after the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968.  
A high water-mark for community cooperation  
On the evening of King‟s murder, approximately two hundred local black youth, 
most of whom were under twenty-one years of age, convened at the Craven Terrance 
Housing Project in New Bern, from where they dispersed into groups and marched 
downtown. Out of grief and resentment, the youth vandalized and looted over fifteen 
businesses on Broad Street and within the Five Points area, where predominately black 
businesses were located. While marching, many also began to throw bricks, bottles, and 
other objects at cars parked alongside the streets. Dozens of law enforcement officers 
from both the local police force and the North Carolina Highway Patrol were called in to 
halt the civil uprising. Armed with riot guns, nightclubs, and helmets, they forcefully 
broke up the protest march, arresting five of the demonstrators in the process. No injuries 
were reported, however, and peaceful order was restored by 3:00am. But just to be safe, 
Mayor Ethridge Ricks issued a public statement to the community requesting that 
“everyone stay at home unless absolutely necessary to be outside after sunset” and that 
“all citizens remain calm, and assist us in every way to maintain good relations among all 
the people.” Mayor Ricks made plans that afternoon to meet with the New Bern board of 
aldermen and the local Good Neighbor Council to discuss the troubling events of the 
previous night. While meeting with the Good Neighbor Council, Ricks approved a list of 
thirty respected individuals from the black community that he thought he could count on 
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to help ease tensions and maintain peace.
170
 The list of names included several current or 
former COP/CPI board members or staff such as Claretta Wordlaw, Johnnie Sampson, 
Seth Williams, Lee Morgan, and Tom Wallace. Local civil rights leaders Willie Vails of 
the NAACP and James Gavin, chairman of the Combined Civic Organizations of New 
Bern and Craven County were also listed.
171
 
The biracial Craven County Good Neighbor Council, which was then headed by 
S.L. Pittman, Jr. and the aforementioned James Gavin, also swiftly convened during this 
time in order to discuss ways to avoid more instances of black unrest that were occurring 
in over one hundred of the nation‟s cities in response to King‟s death. During one of the 
meetings, Pittman, who was white, would express personal thanks to black leadership for 
the role they were playing in averting what could have been a disastrous situation for 
New Bern.
172
 “Their actions,” Pittman said, “gave good reason to believe that it is 
possible to solve problems by both races working toward common goals.” D. L. Stallings 
concurred, remarking that “We have just seen a real outstanding reason for the existence 
of a Good Neighbor Council.” Lee Morgan also commented that the recent addition of 
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two black policemen to the city‟s force was having a great psychological effect on black 
youth, many of whom, according to Morgan, believed they had little share in the 
community. “Negroes, too, want to enjoy the privilege of living in a community; to share 
some of the responsibilities of the community,” he emphasized.  
Efforts to secure greater job opportunities for blacks were also discussed at the 
meeting. Several black attendees expressed that a “summer job,” such as one obtained 
through the NYC, was not enough without adequate opportunities for a full-time 
employment. (Incidentally, a group of black youth would complain to CPI executive 
director Jim Godwin in May 1968 that there were not enough summer jobs for them, not 
knowing then that the U.S. Department of Labor had set the maximum number at 250.
173
) 
Other blacks at the meeting concluded that “an open attitude” on the part of the 
community was needed to increase black employment. Discussion ended with a 
suggestion that the council meet with the local Chamber of Commerce and Merchants 
Association to see if business firms could be persuaded to give employment to at least 
150 presently unemployed black persons in the near future.
174
  
The extent to which the New Bern Chamber of Commerce and Merchants 
Association cooperated with this latter request is not fully known. Of course, numerous 
local businesses, some of which were members of one or both of these two organizations, 
were still cooperating with the Manpower program and would inevitably fill positions 
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with unemployed blacks after April 1968. Well aware of the recent Newark and Detroit 
riots that shocked the nation, many were becoming more interested in stepping up their 
previous efforts. Statistics taken from the Employment Security Commission (ESC) 
office in New Bern in 1970 provides a snapshot of this growing reality. Of the 672 local 
men and women who were placed in local non-agricultural jobs that year, over half (359) 
were black, many of whom were also designated as “disadvantaged.” In that year New 
Bern ESC office staff also visited 294 non-agricultural employers in their effort to pair 
applicants with jobs and enrolled another 94 disadvantaged persons for whom an 
employer match could not yet be made in the Manpower program.
175
 Throughout the 
country, including Southern cities and towns, increasing jobs for black youth and adults 
were a major focus of most private and public groups by 1968, if for no other reason than 
to avoid racial tension, violence, and disruption of society and business.  
Employment would become an even more important focus of the state Good 
Neighbor Council, as well, starting with Governor Dan K. Moore. In May 1968, 
Governor Moore introduced his special employment program to find private businesses 
willing to assist in his goal of hiring up to one hundred thousand unemployed high school 
and college students for gainful employment over the summer, which would provide 
money to help them continue their studies in the fall.
176
 The state Good Neighbor Council 
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also traveled to Eastern North Carolina and other parts of the state to talk with over one 
hundred business firms about doubling down on their efforts to hire qualified non-whites; 
in 1967 and 1968, over nine hundred were placed in about six months.
177
 During the 
same period the council, in conjunction with the EEOC-sponsored Plans for Progress, a 
voluntary equal employment program of American business and industry, established 
four Vocational Guidance Institutes, one of which was located at East Carolina 
University in Greenville, that served to better acquaint high school counselors with the 
rapidly changing job market in the areas and its needs.
178
 Finally, the council published a 
booklet that showcased forty-eight case reports of black North Carolinians who were 
employed or preparing themselves for employment in order to provide examples for 
employers, “which demonstrate that merit hiring in this State is practicable and 
profitable,” and to show students proof that “your own future depends decreasingly on 
our society‟s whims and prejudices, and increasingly on your determination and 
ability.”
179
 As will be discussed in the conclusion, growing numbers of black and white 
citizens in Craven would come to see the truth in both of these statements. 
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Figure 26. Location of Human Relations (Good Neighbor) Councils in North Carolina, October 1968. Dots 
represent city-based councils whereas shaded areas signify county-based councils. (Source: Good 
Neighbors At Work in North Carolina 2 (October 1968): 3, Folder 586, North Carolina Council on Human 
Relations, Southern Historical Collection.  
 
 
 
Figure 27. Congressmen Walter B. Jones at desk in Washington D.C., 1967. Photographs, 1967, Box 377, 
Walter Beaman Jones Papers (#285), Special Collections Department, J.Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina 
University, Greenville, North Carolina.   
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Figure 28. Coastal Progress Manpower retreat at Quail‟s Roost and Conference Center, Durham, NC, circa 
1968. Seated from left to right: Emma Turnage, Claretta Wordlaw, Tillie Knowles, Thelma Chadwick, 
Janie Watts, Betty George, Frances Sampson, Barbara Lee, Pearl Moore. Standing from left to right: 
George Eglesby, Carl Laughinghouse, Dewey Strayhorn, Jerry Harper, Alvin Hill, Royce Jordan, Johnny 
Bryant, unknown, Billy Rich, Executive Director Jim Godwin, Tom Wallace. Photo courtesy of Ms. 
Thelma Chadwick.  
 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has highlighted, OEO‟s neglect of local initiatives reflected how 
federal policy was becoming more about meeting national goals and avoiding political 
risks rather than the needs of local communities. The attempts of Monte, and later 
Godwin, to fight for local control were oftentimes unsuccessful. OEO‟s lack of support 
for local innovation and direction between 1966 and 1968 was temporarily overcome by 
Coastal Progress during Godwin‟s tenure because the North Carolina Fund continued to 
fund innovative programs while OEO pushed national emphasis programs. With the 
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Fund‟s official disappearance by 1969, however, the ability of Coastal Progress to 
continue forward in this direction was made difficult. All grants to Fund-sponsored 
community action programs ceased in June 1968.
180
 Not long thereafter, as attested by 
Royce Jordan, Godwin would become so disillusioned and frustrated by “the kind of 
control that [OEO] tried to take away from local people” that he would step down as 
executive director of CPI and head west to Chapel Hill to work for the North Carolina 
Manpower Corporation.
181
  
As in the past, however, local people in Craven did not await federal action in 
seeking to solve the problems of poverty in their midst. In fact, other ongoing 
developments at the local level spurred by black and white community leaders both 
inside and outside of CPI were most effective in overcoming the imbalance between local 
and federal ideas to fight the War on Poverty. The most notable of these was a historic 
rise in economic development and industrial growth in Craven beginning in 1968, which 
incidentally helped strengthen the War on Poverty by providing the bulk of justice, 
namely steady and well-paying jobs, that the poor were most interested in attaining.
182
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In 1966, the North Carolina Fund Committee on Manpower and Economic 
Development argued that “a faster rate of economic growth will not of itself solve the 
problems of the poor [but neither] will current anti-poverty programs….Both approaches 
must be pursued.” The same held true for the local war on poverty in Craven County, 
which would not be won solely on the basis of the antipoverty programs of COP/CPI. 
Although the successes of Rural Environmental Sanitation, Manpower Training, 
Neighborhood Youth Corps, Strawberry Marketing, Day Care Centers, Head Start, 
Dental Services, Adult Basic Education, Home Management, the Federal Credit Union 
and other antipoverty programs improved the education, skills, and standard of living for 
many of those in poverty, they were not enough.
1
 The problem of a low income, which 
was the biggest contributor to poverty in the area, would continue to exist for a sizeable 
number of the poor without the addition of more higher-skilled jobs in the county. 
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economic development. Even in locales with less local interest and success than Craven County in 
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Between 1964 and 1967, Craven County leaders had added only one major high-
wage industry, Stanley Power Tools. But, partly due to heavier investment in education, 
which led to a larger trainable work base—48 percent of Craven residents twenty-five 
years and older graduated high school by 1970 compared to less than 20 percent in 
1960—four new high-skilled industries would move to Craven County between 1968 and 
1972: Hatteras Yachts (1968), Weyerhaeuser (1969), Clark Boat Company (1970), and 
Texifi Industries (1972). 
1
 According to former Craven County commissioner Grover 
Lancaster, who was first elected in 1962 along with D. L. Stallings, at least one of the 
companies, Weyerhaeuser (a multinational paper company headquartered in Washington 
State), approached the county commissioners first about possibly opening a pulp mill in 
the area. In addition to the generous supply of southern pine and mixed hardwoods in 
Craven County, Weyerhaeuser was undoubtedly attracted to the area‟s growing supply of 
trainable workers.
2
  
The arrival of these four industries contributed to a promising trend for Eastern 
North Carolina. By the early 1970s, the region “fared better than the Piedmont and 
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Mountain regions in attracting new plants that were high-wage, high value-added, capital 
intensive, big establishments.”
3
 Up to 1979, most of the manufacturing employment to be 
found in the state was in non-durable goods (such as textiles, which tended to pay lower 
wages due to low profit margins and greater foreign competition) but beginning in 1968 a 
good number of Craven‟s new industries would be different; they centered around the 
production of durable goods which were generally more profitable and allowed higher 
wages for employees.
4
 In 1970, for instance, the average weekly earning for 
manufacturing employees in Craven was $116.55, approximately five dollars higher than 
the state average.
5
 Such an industrial surge in a fairly rural area may would have 
surprised some, but as Deputy Under Secretary of Labor Millard Cass affirmed in 1967, 
“Our experience has been this: Despite everything we are told, industry does go most 
often where a work force is available, and a trained rural work force will attract 
industry.”
6
 A survey that tracked the influence of location factors to new or expanded 
manufacturing firms in the South between 1965 and 1974 confirmed that productivity of 
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labor was considered more “essential” to a greater number of industrialists than labor 
costs.
7
  
A community‟s industrial climate, or receptiveness to and welcoming of new 
industry, was also an important consideration for many industrialists. This understanding 
at least partially inspired the establishment of the Neuse River Economic Development 
Council in 1968, which sought to bring the “maximum benefit in terms of new jobs and 
increased incomes to the people” of a nine-county district in Eastern North Carolina.
8
 
Headquartered on Tryon Palace Drive in New Bern, the council consisted of a thirty-six-
member board of directors of elected officials or representatives of elected officials 
appointed by boards of the county commissioners. Four members from each of the nine 
counties, including Craven County, were represented. In 1970, former COP board 
member and county commissioner D. L. Stallings was elected president of the council 
who, based on his experience in attracting the Stanley Plant in 1964, well understood the 
need to convince potential businessmen that a community was interested in prioritizing 
industrial development. Under Stallings‟ leadership, the council began to progressively 
counteract several negative economic realities in Eastern North Carolina from high 
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poverty levels, relatively high unemployment, low manufacturing employment, below 
average local support funds for education, and high out-migration by compiling economic 
data for potential industrialists, encouraging and carrying out the expansion of existing 
community colleges and technical institutes in the area, gaining more participation of 
private companies to provide job training, and attracting industry by constructing 
speculative industrial buildings in several of the counties.
9
 Of course, because Craven 
County was considered a “growth center,” the council‟s primary focus was on the other 
eight counties in Eastern North Carolina whose poverty rates, unemployment, out-
migration, and low-wages were dramatically more prevalent than those in Craven. But 
aside from the enhanced industrial prestige that likely arose from leading such a council, 
Craven County‟s elected officials would see through the implementation of several of the 
council‟s goals, such as the transformation of the county Industrial Education Center to a 
community college, which also likely played a role in enticing many of the four new 
industries that located in Craven between 1968 and 1972.
10
 
By 1972, these four industries, Hatteras, Clark, Weyerhaeuser, and Texifi, had 
brought a total of 1,366 new jobs for local men and women. The largest was Texifi 
Industries, which opened one of the nation‟s first combined polyester fiber manufacturing 
and texturing plants and supplied approximately five hundred new jobs in its first year of 
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operation.
11
 The impact of these four high-skilled industries was not limited to jobs, 
however; they also increased the area‟s wages, consumer spending, and tax base. These 
improvements raised the standard of living and dramatically reduced the incidence of 
poverty for residents of Craven as well commuters from the neighboring counties of 
Jones, Pamlico, Lenoir, and Carteret. And in addition to providing the needed revenue for 
Craven County to improve and add infrastructure, expand the local hospital, provide 
additional recreational facilities, and invest more into education, the arrival of these 
industries helped Craven became the economic growth center of Eastern North Carolina‟s 
forty-two counties. By the early 1980s, Craven County was considered the industrial 
“jewel of the East”: in 1989 its economic growth was second only to Wake County, home 
of the state capital Raleigh.
12
  
Indeed, an important reason that North Carolina could boast from the late 1960s 
through the 1980s that it was one of the nation‟s leading states in terms of its number of 
manufacturing employees was the industrial growth that occurred in the East, particularly 
in Craven County.
13
  In 1978, North Carolina Commerce Secretary Lauch Faircloth 
announced that the state had had a record year of industrial growth and acknowledged 
that “Industries themselves are showing more interest in our smaller communities…Since 
                                                 
11
 Texifi Industries, Inc., Annual Report, 1969-1984, North Carolina Collection.  
 
12
 The Craven County Committee of 100 Newsletter, April 1989, p. 6, Vertical File, Kellenberger Room, 
New Bern-Craven County Public Library.  
 
13
 According to Fortune Magazine, by 1967, more than half of the nation‟s largest one hundred firms 
operated industrial facilities in North Carolina. See “North Carolina Industry on Parade,” Durham  
Morning Herald, November 24, 1967. The number of firms operating in North Carolina would continue 
 to grow into the 1970s and 1980s. 
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1970, the fastest growing job market has been in Eastern North Carolina.” In fact, 
“during 1977 the amount of investment dollars in industrial growth in the East was 31 
percent of the total $1.45 billion.” Faircloth was also proud to note that the new industries 
tend “to be of a higher-technology than our current industrial base and that it is more 
diversified in content.”
 14
 While lower tax rates and the state‟s right-to-work laws both 
attracted companies from the North and West to North Carolina and tended to keep 
manufacturing wages lower than in states with a heavier union presence and higher cost-
of-living, North Carolina‟s increase in manufacturing wage earnings between 1964 and 
1970 was one of the highest in the country—higher even than New York and 
California.
15
  
The benefits of new higher-skilled industries and the elevated wages that came 
with them were not limited, in either the state as a whole or Eastern North Carolina 
specifically, to whites or the elites who played the largest roles in attracting them. The 
presence of more manufacturing job opportunities in the Craven area was especially 
helpful in providing local blacks with unprecedented avenues into the middle class. 
Because all of the new industries that arrived in the county between 1968 and 1972 had a 
need to fill hundreds of high-skilled jobs, they could not afford to limit their searches to 
white workers to the exclusion of blacks, who made up almost 40 percent of the county‟s 
                                                 
14
 D.M. (Lauch) Faircloth, “Balanced growth keyed on dispersal of industry,” News & Observer, July 30, 
1978.  
 
15
 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, Hours, and Earnings, States and 
Areas, 1939-1982, Statewide Manufacturing, Vol. 1: Alabama-Nevada and Vol. 2: New Hampshire-
Wyoming (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984). 
 
478 
 
population. This reality was especially true for Hatteras Yachts and Clark Boats which 
had to compete with Barbour Boats and New Bern Shipyards to find and hire the most 
skilled, reliable, and productive workforce; for them, the cost of any type of racial 
discrimination in hiring would be, in the words of economist Thomas Sowell, 
“prohibitive.”
16
 Although the median levels of black education, high school graduation 
rates, and jobs skills were lower than whites, black achievement steadily rose in all three 
categories during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1960, only 9 percent of blacks in Craven aged 
twenty-five years and older had completed four years of high school. By 1970, because of 
the ABER program, greater local investment in education, local school desegregation 
efforts, and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (all of which improved black 
confidence that greater education led to better-paying jobs), at least 21 percent had done 
so, which raised the median for school years completed among blacks from 6.7 to more 
than eight.
17
 Blacks twenty-five years and older living in New Bern boasted even better 
                                                 
16
 Thomas Sowell, Markets and Minorities (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 26, 32, 39-40. 
 
17
 Table 87, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Volume 1, Characteristics  
of the Population, Part 35, North Carolina (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963),  
U.S. Census Bureau, accessed September 4, 2011, 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/06586188v1p35.pdf; Table 125, U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1970, Volume I, Characteristics of the Population, Part 35, North 
Carolina (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), U.S. Census Bureau, accessed 
September 4, 2001, http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1970a_nc-05.pdf. In terms of 
school desegregation, by the 1970-1971 school year, racial composition of most schools in the Craven 
County school system (thus, excluding New Bern Schools) approximately matched the percentage of  
black and white students in the system, as had been ordered by District Judge John D. Larkins, Jr..  
Most of the Craven County schools were located in the western part of the county which was 
predominately rural and had had the largest Klan following during the 1960s (i.e., Bridgeton, Vanceboro, 
and Jasper). During the 1970-1971 school year, 3,023 (or 34%) of the 8,861 students enrolled in the  
Craven County schools, all of which were desegregated, were black. Ten out of thirteen of these west 
Craven schools had at least a 22 percent black enrollment and of these ten only three were more than 50 
percent black (the highest black enrollment rate was 74 percent at Fort Barnwell School). As late as the 
1967-1968 school year, which was still during Craven‟s freedom of choice plan phase, only 45 percent  
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numbers in 1970; 25 percent of males and 26 percent of females had completed four 
years of high school.
18
 Black employability was also increasing because of the offerings 
of the Craven Industrial Education Center (IEC) and the Manpower program, which 
enhanced black residents‟ skill sets through industrial education classes and on-the-job 
training.  
The continuing expansion of the Craven IEC to a technical institute in 1968 and 
then to a community college in the early 1970s widened such opportunities for local 
blacks. In December 1967, the community revealed its favor for greater educational 
investment by voting for a $5.5 bond referendum that included $500,000 for the Craven 
County Technical Institute. $230,000 in state funds (46 percent of the new facilities‟ total 
cost) and $180,000 in federal funds (36 percent) matched this total. In addition to 
providing “individual guidance to assist all students in making wise choices of both 
vocation and avocation to better equip them as effective members of a democratic 
society,” the institute, which opened in 1968, offered vocational education classes and 
diploma/certificate programs in drafting, electronic data processing, physics, machinist, 
business administration, nursing, accounting, applied science, executive secretarial, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Craven‟s schools were desegregated. As for the racial composition of teachers hired to work in the 
desegregated Craven County schools during the 1970-1971 school year, 22 percent were black and most 
schools had between five and ten black teachers on staf. Havelock Junior High employed 16 black  
teachers. See J. LeVonne Chambers to Honorable John D. Larkins, Jr., April 30, 1969; “Exhibit B”  
Craven County Schools, New Bern, North Carolina, 1970-1971, Racial Composition of Students and 
Faculty, folder: U.S. District Court Case, Hickman, Erving et. al. vs. Craven County Board of Education, 
Larkins Papers.  
 
18
  Table 108, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1970, Volume I, Characteristics of 
the Population, Part 35, North Carolina (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), U.S. 
Census Bureau, accessed September 4, 2011, 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1970a_nc-05.pdf. 
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psychology, cosmetology, and welding as well as adult education for grades one through 
eight and high school diploma and equivalency programs.
19
  
By 1972, as the industrial landscape continued to broaden in the area, the institute 
applied to become a community college so that it could provide residents two years of 
college transfer education; this change would better help local citizens compete in 
Eastern North Carolina‟s job market, whose manufacturing sector had grown 39.4 
percent between 1962 and 1970. According to the application, “College transfer work is a 
pre-requisite for positions of leadership, as well as for many of the so-called „skilled‟ 
positions.” The expense of education outside the area (especially at four-year 
universities) emphasized the need for college transfer options that were financially 
“within the grasp of the average citizen” and within commuting distance of their homes.
20
 
Of course, whites in Craven would also benefit from the establishment of a local 
community college, but previous lack of equal access to education seemed to have a 
greater effect upon the enthusiasm of blacks as well as upon their desire to take 
advantage of opportunities that would help them acquire better-paying jobs.
21
 For the 
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 Craven County Technical Institute, 1969-1971 Catalog, p. 8-9, State Library of North Carolina.  
 
20
 Craven Technical Institute, Request for Community College Status, Spring 1972, State Library of North 
Carolina, Raleigh, NC. 
 
21
 In January 1967, for instance, Congressman Walter B. Jones received several letters from local black 
citizens enrolled in Adult Basic Education who asked him to vote for continued funding for the program 
based on the improvement in their reading, writing and arithmetic skills. In the words of one of the  
females, “I want at this time to tell you how much I appreciate [adult basic education]. I wish the program 
could be extended to all. It is a wonderful thing in our county. Something we have never had offered 
before.” Viola White to Mr. Walter B. Jones, January 25, 1967, folder: Legislative Correspondence, Adult 
Education Appropriations, January 1967, Jones Papers. Another constituent explained to the congressman 
how important the classes were in the potential for improving one‟s income. “All of us in Wednesday and 
Thursday class feel that this Basic Education class will help us a great deal in making a higher 
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1972-1973 academic year, total enrollment had grown to 9,060 day and evening students 
(up from 6,957 in 1971-1972) of which 30 percent were black. During the 1971-1972 
academic year, 26 percent of enrolled students were black. Clearly, local understanding 
of the importance of education was on the rise for whites and blacks alike. This 
understanding, of course, was largely made possible by the growth in the local economy 
and the simultaneous rise in local job opportunities. Approximately 95 percent of all 
students who graduated from the school between 1968 and 1973 (88 percent of whom 
were Craven residents) were placed in jobs in Craven County. 
22
  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
income…”See Mr. William Ward to Hon. Walter Jones, no date, Legislative Correspondence, Adult 
Education Appropriations, January 1967, Jones Papers. After indicating his “interest in this and other 
educational programs,” Congressman Jones would later assure each constituent that NC Department of 
Community Colleges will be “able to continue all existing classes through this fiscal year.” See 
Congressman Walter B. Jones to___, January 26, 1967, folder: Legislative Correspondence, Adult 
Education Appropriations, January 1967, Jones Papers.  
 
22
 North Carolina Department of Natural and Economic Resources, Community Facilities Plan and Public 
Improvement Program, Craven County, North Carolina, May 1973, Government and Heritage Library, 
State Library of North Carolina.  
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Figure 29. Library and Learning Laboratory located at Tryon Palace Drive, New Bern, one of 
three temporary facilities of the Craven County Technical Institute, circa 1969. Craven County 
Technical Institute, 1969-1971 Catalog, State Library of North Carolina. 
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Figure 30. Sketches for new facilities that would be built as part of Craven County Community 
College, 1971. Craven County Technical Institute, 1969-1971 Catalog, State Library of North 
Carolina. 
 
 
Indeed, because of their general desire to land the new better-paying jobs in the 
area, productivity among the blacks who were eventually hired for them proved to be just 
as good, if not better, than that of some whites. Bernard White, currently one of New 
Bern‟s three black city aldermen, is a prime example. After working for Hatteras Yachts 
in the late 1960s (where he helped build seven boats including one for actor Pernell 
Roberts of the TV series “Bonanza”), White was tested at the local employment security 
office in the early 1970s for a possible job at Texifi (whose facilities were still under 
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construction). White, who had recently received training as an electrician in Lenoir 
County, received near-perfect test scores and was hired as soon as the Texifi facilities 
were completed. During his 9 ½ years operating a knitting machine at Texifi, where he 
continued to earn high wages on a graduated pay scale, White was considered one of the 
top electricians and was promoted by management to the position of Lead Man in which 
he oversaw black as well as white employees.
23
 Other industries in Craven also 
recognized and benefitted from black productivity during this time. For example, 
between August and September 1973, employees at the Weyerhaeuser pulp mill, at least 
16 percent of whom were black, broke production records four times while also 
maintaining a perfect safety record (no lost time or accidents).
24
 
With the exception of Hatteras Yachts, all of the new industries that arrived in the 
Craven area between 1968 and 1972 hailed from outside the former Jim Crow South. 
Although the mores of racial segregation had convinced numerous local businessmen in 
the past to believe that blacks were either not capable of learning required job skills or 
that white employees and/or customers would not accept blacks as equals, these kind of 
considerations were extremely rare by the early 1970s. In addition, business owners could 
not ignore the fact that profits in this new era of greater black employability would suffer 
if more than 30 percent of the available labor force continued to be excluded. Of course, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as the presence of a county-wide manpower program 
had helped dissipate the area‟s institutional racism. Thus, even before the arrival of each 
                                                 
23
 Bernard White, phone interview by author, September 14, 2011, transcript in author‟s possession.  
 
24
 “Weyerhaeuser Marks Production Records,” Sun Journal, September 20, 1973. 
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of the new industries, dozens of local employers both inside and outside manufacturing 
had come to the realization that blacks could learn just as easily as whites and that the 
races could work together peacefully and productively. Between 1960 and 1970, for 
instance, the percentage of employed blacks in New Bern who were hired for skilled 
positions (including health workers, teachers, technicians, managers, administrators, and 
craftsmen) rose from 16.5 percent to 26.3 percent.
25
 
National and state affirmative action programs such as Plans for Progress and Job 
Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS), which received the cooperation of the 
National Alliance of Businessmen and the National Association of Manufacturers, also 
helped to build a larger consensus against racial discrimination among large nationwide 
employers, which included Texifi and Weyerhauser, by providing incentives for them to 
train and hire more blacks, in part to prevent the kind of black disillusionment and 
unemployment that seemed to underlie the rising rates of urban riots and crime.
26
 Tables 
                                                 
25
 Table 78, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Volume I, Characteristics of the 
Population, Part 35, North Carolina (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), U.S. 
Census Bureau, accessed September 4, 2011, 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/06586188v1p35_TOC.pdf; Table 110, U.S. Bureau  
of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1970, Volume I, Characteristics of the Population, Part 35, 
North Carolina (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), U.S. Census Bureau, 
 accessed September 4, 2011, http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1970a_nc-05.pdf.  
 
26
 Charles A. Myers, The Role of the Private Sector in Manpower Development (Baltimore, MD: The John 
Hopkins Press, 1971), 27; Alfonso J. Cervantes, “To prevent a chain of super-Watts,” Harvard Business 
Review 45, (September-October 1967): 55-61; Roscoe Drummond, “Private Way Yields Results on 
Poverty,” Washington Post, November 27, 1968; John P. Condon, “The National Alliance of Businessmen 
JOBS Program: A Critical Appraisal, 1968-1974” (Ph.D. diss., University of California-Irvine, 1976); 
Delton, Racial Integration in Corporate America, 206-238; “Job Training Plan Here is Approved,” New 
York Times, June 30, 1968; G.E. Morse, “How Honeywell took the JOBS Program to heart,” Manpower, 
February-March 1969, 22-25; John L. Iacobelli, “A survey of employer attitudes toward training the 
disadvantaged,” Monthly Labor Review, June 1970, 51-55; North Carolina Department of Justice, Crime  
in North Carolina, January-December 1973, Robert Morgan Papers, Special Collections, J.Y. Joyner 
Library, East Carolina University.  
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2-4, which are based on the annual EEO-1 form that employers of twenty-five or more 
workers were required to submit to the U.S. Equal Opportunity Office, detail how three 
industries in Craven County (Stanley Tools, whose plant had opened in 1964, and 
Hatteras and Weyerhaeuser) were notable providers of on-the-job training and 
employment for local blacks.
27
 In all three companies, black employment rose from 92 
percent to 99 percent between 1966, the first year data was available, and 1980. 
Moreover, within most specific job categories, including officials/managers, 
office/clerical, skilled craftsmen, and semi-skilled operatives, the numbers of black 
employees similarly increased. Although racial discrimination still lingered in the private 
sector, many blacks such as former Texifi employee Bernard White believed that 
beginning in the late 1960s blacks could practically “go as high as [they] wanted to go as 
long as [they] applied [themselves.],” an observation supported by Time magazine‟s 
devotion of an entire June 1974 issue to the rise of the black middle class, which grew 
from 12 percent of the black population in 1960 to 30 percent by 1974.
28
 Locally, the 
June 1973 establishment of the joint Human Relations Council for New Bern and Craven 
County, which like the Good Neighbor Council discussed ways to increase black 
employment with local employers, helped to legitimize this development and move it 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
27
 Employment data from six other major industries in Craven between 1966 and 1980 as well as tables  
that detail the rise in number black officials/ managers, office/clerical workers, sales workers, and  
skilled and semi-skilled workers during this period can be found in the Appendix.  
 
28
 Bernard White, phone interview by author, September 14, 2011, transcript in author‟s possession; 
“America‟s Rising Black Middle Class,” Time, June 17, 1974. Leah M. Wright, “The Loneliness of 
 the Black Conservative: Black Republicans and the Grand Old Party, 1964-1980” (Ph.D. diss.,  
Princeton University, 2009), 220.  
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forward. As the graphs below suggest, however, it could take years for an individual—
black or white—to acquire the skills, educational attainments, and experience needed for 
the better paying jobs in the area (particularly within the most skilled positions). Yet 
despite the gradual pace of change with regard to better black employment, the graphs 
below do highlight a major development over the past in which, prior to the 1960s, most 
blacks in Craven worked in neither skilled nor semi-skilled positions but mostly in those 
that were unskilled. Both assisting and reflecting this development were the New Bern 
ESC office employees, many if not most of whom were white. These staff workers, who 
would rank in 1965 among the top five offices in the state in terms of the number of 
promotional telephone contacts and staff visits to nonagricultural employees per month, 
found matches for thousands of black and/or disadvantaged applicants with dozens of 
local cooperating employers who were in need of skilled workers.
29
 Between 1970 and 
1980, for instance, even though the vast majority of the new applicants who registered 
with the New Bern ESC were white, between 42 percent and 53 percent of the local 
residents who were placed in non-agricultural job openings were actually nonwhite.
30
 The 
availability of federal tax credits through the Work Incentive Program (WIN), created in 
                                                 
29
 Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, Local Office Operations, Annual Report: 1965 
(Raleigh, NC: Bureau of Employment Security Research, 1966), Table VIII, Table IX, Government and 
Heritage Library, State Library of NC.  
 
30
 Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, Local Office Operations, Annual Report: 1970 
(Raleigh, NC: Bureau of Employment Security Research, 1971), Table V; Employment Security 
Commission of North Carolina, Local Office Operations, Annual Report: 1975 (Raleigh, NC: Bureau of 
Employment Security Research, 1976), Table IV; Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, 
Local Office Operations, Annual Report: 1980 (Raleigh, NC: Bureau of Employment Security Research, 
1981), Table IV, Government and Heritage Library, State Library of NC.  
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1967, and the Revenue Act of 1978 also influenced employers to cooperate with the New 
Bern ESC and hire and train more readily available disadvantaged persons, such as black 
male AFDC recipients. “Help yourself by helping someone receive training who 
presently is unable to find employment,” read a local advertisement from 1976.
 31
 For a 
detailed breakdown of the activities of the New Bern ESC office, see Table 5.  
 
Table 2. Black employment (male and female) at Stanley Works, New Bern, NC, 1966-1980. * When 
applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job (OTJ) trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offic-
ials/ 
Man-
agers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Techni-
cals 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cleri- 
cal 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees* 
 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ- 
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1966  145 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 3 
[2%] 
1 (0) 
1968 200 0 0 2 0 3 25 23 30 
[15%] 
5 (3) 
1970 346 0 0 3 5 2 49 38 59 
[17%] 
11 (3) 
1972 289 0 0 3 5 3 25 48 36 
[12%] 
7 (8) 
1974 269 1 0 4 5 5 37 45 52 
[19%] 
12 (12) 
1975 257 1 0 3 6 3 35 52 48 
[18%] 
12 (12) 
1980 268 2 0 2 5 4 43 59 57 
[21%] 
18 (19) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 New Bern Area Labor Market Newsletter (Craven and Pamlico Counties), November 1976; New Bern 
Area Labor Market Newsletter (Craven and Pamlico Counties), January 1979; New Bern Area Labor 
Market Newsletter (Craven, Carteret, and Pamlico Counties), May 1981, Government and Heritage 
Library, State Library of NC.  
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Table 3. Black employment (male and female) at Hatteras Yachts, New Bern, NC, 1968-1980.  
* When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job (OTJ) 
trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offici-
als/ 
Mana-
gers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Technic
-als 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cleri-
cal 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees* 
 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1968  38 0 0 n/a 0 1 0 0 1 
[3%] 
0 (0) 
1969 164 0 0 1 0 6 20 45 39 
[24%] 
6 (0) 
1970 314 0 0 8 0 7 60 55 90 
[29%] 
12 (6) 
1972 397 3 0 0 0 38 67 0 108 
[27%] 
11 (7) 
1974 515 1 0 0 1 68 109 0 179 
[35%] 
44 (0) 
1975 231 0 0 n/a 0 1 28 0 48 
[21%] 
14 (0) 
1980 794 3 0 0 0 108 89 0 223 
[28%] 
n/a 
 
 
Table 4. Black employment (male and female) at Weyerhaeuser Company, New Bern, NC, 1970-1980.  
* When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job (OTJ) 
trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offici-
als/ 
Mana-
gers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Technic
-als 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cleri-
cal 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees* 
 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1970 224 0 2 n/a 3 2 26 0 33 
[15%] 
3 (0) 
1971 265 0 1 n/a 3 1 32 33 37 
[14%] 
3 (3) 
1972 309 0 1 n/a 1 2 40 34 44 
[14%] 
3 (3) 
1973 393 0 2 n/a 3 3 55 51 63 
[16%] 
3 (3) 
1974 398 1 1 n/a 1 12 84 63 119 
[30%] 
15 (3) 
1975 310 0 1 0 1 8 43 0 53 
[17%] 
2 (0) 
1980 763 5 3 0 28 26 64 0 156 
[20%] 
38 (0) 
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Table 5. Job Placement Activities, New Bern Employment Security Commission Office, 1970-1980.  
* After 1968, available data was not organized to reflect the number of female applicants nor the number of 
females placed in open jobs. Between 1970 and 1980, available data was also not organized and therefore 
does not exist on the number of black female applicants or the number of black females placed in jobs in 
the years above.  
 
Year No. of 
New 
Applic-
ants 
(white 
and 
black) 
No. of 
New 
Black 
Applic-
ants 
No. of 
Applicants 
Placed in a 
Job (white 
and black) 
No. of Black  
Applicants 
Placed in a 
Job 
No. of 
Dis-
advantaged 
Applicants 
Placed in a 
Job 
No. of 
Female 
Applic-
ants 
(white 
and 
black) 
No. of 
Female 
Applicants 
Placed in a 
Job (white 
and black) 
1970 3,692 1,382 672 359 100 n/a n/a 
1975 5,430 2,026 1,377 573 259 n/a n/a 
1980 8,795 3,857 2,404 1,073 582 n/a n/a 
 
 
As historian Raymond Gavins argued, if racial prejudice and segregation “were 
methods of keeping blacks in economic captivity,” it was also true that “tolerance and 
desegregation could facilitate their making a decent living.”
32
 In Craven, however, the 
number of black skilled and semi-skilled workers would not continue to rise through the 
1980s simply because employers had instituted more open hiring policies; the draw of 
high-wages that provided upward mobility was also responsible. In fact, because of the 
high skill requirements of most manufacturing jobs by the 1960s, manufacturing wages 
supplied some of the highest wages for blacks across the nation during the 1960s and 
1970s, including the South.
33
 In Craven County, the average manufacturing wages were 
                                                 
32
 Raymond Gavins, The Perils and Prospects of Southern Black Leadership: Gordon Blaine Hancock, 
1884-1970 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), 172.  
 
33 Wayne Vroman, “Industrial Change and Black Men‟s Relative Earnings,” Research in Labor Economics 
12 (1991): 221, 225, 226, 242; Because manufacturing wages had been so critical to black American 
advancement in the post-World War II period, when manufacturing plants in Northern cities (most notably 
Detroit) began to leave for the Sun Belt during the 1970s and 1980s, historic rises in black poverty were 
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second to government jobs only.
34
 According to the 1970 U.S. census, black males in 
New Bern who were employed as skilled craftsmen or semi-skilled operatives had 
median annual earnings of $5,129 and $4,708 respectively; both of these salaries were 
well above the median income of $4,364 for black males in New Bern over the age of 
sixteen. Black laborers, on the other hand, who were considered non-skilled, had a 
median annual income of just $3,359.
35
 A similar discrepancy of income based on skill 
level was also seen among Craven whites, as well.  
The reason for these differences in wages is clear if one understands the value of a 
skilled and semi-skilled worker to an employer. As defined by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Office, craftsmen were “manual workers of relatively high skill level having 
a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the processes involved in their work [who] 
exercise considerable independent judgment and usually receive an extensive period of 
training.” These would include mechanics, repairmen, typesetters, electricians, tailors, 
and stationary engineers. Operatives, who also had considerable responsibility, were 
defined as “workers who operate machine or processing equipment or perform other 
factory-type duties of intermediate skill level which can be mastered in a few weeks and 
                                                                                                                                                 
seen in the abandoned areas. See William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and 
Changing American Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1978. 
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require only limited training” and would include bricklayers, carpenters, painters, 
welders, and delivery men. Laborers were defined as “workers in manual operations 
which generally require no special training [who] perform elementary duties that may be 
learned in a few days and require the application of little to no independent judgment.” 
These would include lumbermen, groundskeepers, and longshoremen. 
36
  
As these definitions affirm, workers in skilled craftsman and semi-skilled 
operative positions required extensive training and education. The time and effort spent 
by black individuals to acquire training and education, however, greatly improved their 
earning capacity and helped to bridge the gap between black and white income (see Table 
18 in Appendix A). Black wages and opportunities for upward mobility would continue 
to grow into the 1980s as the push for industrial development continued in Eastern North 
Carolina.  
The arrival of Hatteras, Clark, Weyerhauser, and Texifi only increased the urge of 
local people and businessmen for additional industries; in 1975, the Craven County 
Industrial Development Commission and the Committee of 100 were formed to attract 
them.
37
 The support of Craven‟s county commissioners, who eagerly approved the use of 
county money to hire an industrial development professional to lead the commission, was 
partially driven by the wish to keep more of their best and brightest in the area by 
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guaranteeing profitable jobs for recent high school and college graduates. Much like 
other southern leaders in military base communities, the jobs provided by Cherry Point, 
though profound, were not sufficient and thus could not ensure regional development.
38
 
The commissioners were equally driven to attract more industry from a desire to improve 
infrastructure, build new schools, and add on to the hospital. Increasing the local tax base 
with an influx of new industry would provide the revenue to accomplish these goals. 
39
 
Said Tom Thompson, executive director of the county industrial development 
commission, “[W]e are seeking high paying, low-polluting industry to improve the 
standard of living in Craven County.”
40
  
But, by the early 1970s, competition between the state‟s cities and counties over 
industrial development had intensified; even nearby cities like Greenville were 
successfully attracting prominent companies such as Proctor and Gamble. Incentives 
were seemingly becoming all the more necessary to attract additional industries to be 
lured to Craven. Many such industries, not only “want workers who will be available and 
willing to work” but also incentives such as “buildings ready to use,” according to NC 
Commerce Secretary Faircloth.
41
  
The leading force for improving the attractiveness of Craven County was the 
private, non-profit Committee of 100 (which was originally a group of approximately one 
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hundred local businessmen) that included former COP board members Frank Efird and 
D. L. Stallings (then a North Carolina state senator).
42
 The primary activity of the 
committee was the use of membership dues to entertain potential industrial candidates 
and the purchase of a $1.8 million 510-acre tract of land in Craven in 1979 to establish a 
twenty-one-site industrial park whose eventual construction would increase private 
employment 50.5 percent during the 1980s.
43
 The committee also financed the 
construction of a 5,800 sq.-ft. industrial training center, rented by Craven County 
Community College, that was available to any new or existing industry that had 
“legitimate training needs.”
44
 According to one of the original committee members, 
“Local governments were not allowed to perform that kind of economic development at 
the time.”
45
 The committee understood, however, that even with these added incentives, 
industries would be reluctant to build in Craven unless utilities were connected to the 
park. With support from the committee and other locals, the county agreed to pay 
approximately $220,000 of the cost of a $500,000 water and sewer extension project to 
the site; federal funds through the Economic Development Administration (EDA) 
covered the other 60 percent. 
46
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Most of the funding and incentives for industrial development, however, would 
come from local sources instead of federal or even state coffers.
47
 Speaking on the 
subject, former County Commissioner Grover Lancaster observed that “[we] had no idea 
that support from the citizens would be as strong as it was.”
48
 In 1977, just before plans 
for the industrial park were finalized, citizens widely agreed that the arrival of new 
industries in the park would do much more than pay back the initial investments. In fact, 
it was estimated that a fully occupied park would add $105 million to the county‟s $500 
million tax base.
49
 The black community seemed to generally share the belief as well that 
local investments were worth the initial costs. New Bern‟s first black mayor, Lee 
Morgan, formerly deputy director of COP/CPI under Bob Monte, whose elections in 
1977 and 1979 had depended on a sizeable black turnout, was especially supportive of 
economic development. During the late 1970s, he frequently met with the Committee of 
100 and the Craven County Industrial Development Commission to discuss ways to 
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attract industry to the area as a means of increasing employment for all, including 
blacks.
50
  
According to the 1977 U.S. Census of Manufactures, Craven comprised 97 
businesses, 3,400 employees, $36 million in payroll, and $97.7 million in value-added—a 
great improvement in just five years, most notably in terms of value-added, which in 
1972 had been $46 million.
51
  These improvements continued with the arrival of more 
large employers attracted by the county‟s new industrial park; these included Moen, a 
nation-leading manufacturer of faucets and kitchen/bathroom fixtures, and Power 
Projects, Inc., a wood-fired power plant that produced electric energy for Carolina Power 
and Light (now Progress Energy). Many of the original industries that located in the park 
are still in the area.
52
 Craven‟s business-friendly atmosphere also attracted companies to 
settle outside of the park including German-based Robert Bosch Tools which bought 
Stanley Tools in 1980 and is now known as B/S/H Home Appliances.
53
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In the same way that investment in education assisted in drawing industry to the 
Craven area, the existence of industry also helped to keep the area investing in its 
workers so that they could compete in the modern labor market. Besides contributing to 
the higher tax revenues that, in turn, helped the county invest more in public education, 
industries including Robert Bosch, Texasgulf, and Weyerhaeuser provided financial 
assistance for employees to further their education at either Cherry Point, Craven County 
Community College, or another nearby accredited school such as North Carolina State 
University whose pulp and paper science engineering program, for instance, was and 
continues to be nationally renowned.
54
 During the 1980s, Weyerhaeuser also donated 
$25,000 to the East Carolina University School of Business to establish courses for 
executive education and training programs for Eastern North Carolina‟s managers and 
small business owners.
55
 Workforce development was naturally favored by these high-
skilled industries that depended on a well-educated workforce; the success of this 
partnership of industrial and educational leaders for employers and employees alike 
continues in Craven to this day.
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Figure 31. Advertisement for the BSH and Craven Community College partnership in enhancing 
economic and workforce development. (Source: Sun Journal, July 21, 2005.) 
 
 
As a result of these industrial and educational developments, wages, the range of 
job choices, and occupational mobility notably expanded in Craven County well into the 
1980s and beyond. Based solely on the industries who reported to the EEO office 
between 1966 and 1980, the number of skilled craftsmen positions grew from 294 to 
1,030.
56
 This number would continue to increase significantly over time. More so than 
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most economic sectors, manufacturing creates additional jobs in both the supply chain 
and labor market. The presence of manufacturing jobs, in other words, tends to beget 
additional jobs. Power Projects, Inc., for instance, asked for permission to open a plant in 
the Craven area specifically because of the presence of Weyerhaeuser whose wood chip 
waste the former used to produce electricity. Not surprisingly, the presence of 
manufacturing (especially high-skilled manufacturing which often requires large numbers 
of employees) played a large role in reducing unemployment which fell to as low as 2.7 
percent (in the late 1980s) as the number of employed grew from 22,474 in 1976 to 
30,880 in 1989.
57
 The growth of high-skilled manufacturing also played an immense role 
in increasing the wage rates for the Craven area. According to the 1980 census, per capita 
income in Craven grew to 92 percent of the state‟s average (which was up to 20 percent 
higher than numerous other Eastern North Carolina counties), and helps to explain the 2 
to 3 percent rate of in-migration in Craven during the 1980s.
58
  In-migrants, many of 
whom were well-educated and were attracted to the higher wage jobs that were added to 
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the area, would certainly help to dilute the instance of poverty in Craven County, 
however, because large employers prefer to hire the workforce already living in the 
communities they locate to, there is no reason to suspect that plants only hired a minority 
of local people. Even the Stanley factory employed a majority of local people, albeit a 
slight one, when it first arrived in 1964 (when the area‟s number of high school graduates 
were a far smaller percentage of the population than by the 1980s). 
As economic historian Gavin Wright argued, “„business climate‟” during this 
period was not just “a euphemism for low wages and anti-unionism” and neither did 
“boosterism”…largely serve to “tighten the grip of the old cheap-labor economy.” 
59
 To 
boot, in contrast to the arguments of one of the War on Poverty‟s premier historians, 
James T. Patterson, Craven‟s experience shows that the “potential for rehabilitating the 
poor by opening up opportunity” was not as limited across the nation as it has been 
presumed.
60
 By 1999, the Craven County poverty rate for families fell to an all-time low 
of 9.9 percent, almost the same as the average state rate of 9.0 percent. The poverty rate 
for black families also fell to an all-time low that year to 23 percent; like the overall 
county rate, this decrease halved the figures from 1969 (18.7 percent and 41.2 percent 
respectively).
61
 Because government jobs, whether federal (i.e., Cherry Point Naval Air 
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Base), state, or local, provided no more than 30 percent of the jobs for local blacks during 
this period, the emergence of an industrially strong Craven County was crucial in 
providing long-term ways for blacks to escape poverty. 
62
 
Unfortunately, the historic rise in industrial development for the Craven area from 
1968 through the late 1990s and onward did not bring financial stability for all area 
residents. As late as 1990, only 57.8 percent of blacks more than twenty-five years old 
had earned a high school degree in Craven compared to 81.7 percent of whites; in New 
Bern, the percentage of black high school graduates (53.1 percent) correlated almost 
directly with those who worked fifty to fifty-two weeks/year (58 percent).
63
 In that same 
year, 43 percent of black families who were below the poverty line in Craven had no 
householder working year-round and/or full time.
64
 By this time, there was also a rise in 
the number of welfare cases and single mothers, particularly within the black community. 
Between 1960 and 1990, fewer blacks in Craven under the age of eighteen were living 
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with two parents. In New Bern alone, the rate dropped from 53 percent in 1960 to 40 
percent in 1970; this trend continued due in part to the strength of the national welfare 
rights movement which, by the 1970s, influenced the federal government to make it 
increasingly possible for those who had difficulty finding steady employment, especially 
single mothers of young children, to receive more generous cash support.
65
 Between 1960 
and 1972, the number of American families on the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) rolls increased from 745,000 to three million; the amount of payments 
they received grew at a similar rate from less than $1 billion to $6 billion.
66
  
In 1980, 65 percent of black households in New Bern were receiving at least one 
form of government assistance, and more than half of these funds came from AFDC. But 
in spite of the exponential growth of the welfare rolls, 45 percent of black families living 
in the city had incomes below the poverty line (an increase of 2.1 percent since 1970). In 
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Craven County the rate of black households receiving government assistance also rose, 
from 44 percent in 1970 to 46 percent in 1980. As seen in New Bern, the number of black 
families under the poverty line in Craven also increased during this period from 1,331 to 
1,474.
67
 For reasons including the broadening availability of welfare and a 9.6 percent 
unemployment rate among black males, by 1980, approximately 30 percent of black 
families in Craven reported no wage or salary earnings. Many of these households were 
headed by single mothers who had often been unable to find low-skilled and/or full-time 
work that also allowed them the time to look after their children. Among female-headed 
households, including both black and white, 28 percent had no workers present in 1980.
68
 
Many of these households were headed by single mothers who had often been unable to 
find low-skilled and/or part-time work that also allowed them the time to look after their 
children. Part of the problem was that there had been fewer jobs and training 
opportunities available to unemployed and/or low-income women through COP/CPI, 
which staff members of MITCE in particular were aware of, as compared to unemployed 
and/or low-income men. Yet, at the same time, few AFDC recipients participated in job 
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training since it was still considered appropriate both at the local and federal level for 
mothers of young children to remain at home and care for them. Under the the Work 
Incentive Program (WIN), for instance, which was based on the theory that adults on 
welfare should make “good-faith efforts to become economically self-sufficient,” the 
federal government mandated welfare recipients‟ participation in employment and 
training programs in 1971 but excluded those who had special responsibilities at home or 
who had preschool age children.
69
 The New Bern ESC office was proud to note in 1978 
that as a result of a coordinated effort between it and the Craven County Department of 
Social Services, Craven County saved $68,236 in welfare grant reductions in helping to 
“put employable welfare recipients in jobs.” Of course, the most “employable” were 
rarely mothers with young children at home.
70
 
For a significant number of poor local mothers in and around Craven, most of 
whom were single, black, lived in New Bern, and had a lack of affordable daycare 
options, their primary available opportunity to provide for themselves and their families 
into the 1980s involved becoming a recipient of public welfare (which usually did not 
raise them above the poverty line and, thus, was rarely their first choice). Regardless of 
the reason, unemployed or part-time working women without a husband as a second 
“breadwinner” kept poverty rates inflated. In 1980, a female householder living in Craven 
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(irrespective of race) with no husband had a $6,250 median annual income compared to 
$16,657 for a married couple. For a black female in New Bern with at least one child 
under eighteen years old in the home, the median annual income was $3, 679, which was 
well below the poverty rate at the time for a family of just two persons.
71
  
 
Table 6. Percentage of black and white Craven families on public assistance (P.A.) and percentage of black 
and white families with female head of household and no husband present (FHOH). (Source: U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1970, 1980). 
 
Year % of 
Craven 
Families 
with 
FHOH 
% of 
Craven  
Familie
s on 
P.A. 
Mean 
P.A. 
income 
for 
Craven 
Families 
% of 
Black 
Craven 
Families 
on 
P.A. 
% of 
Black 
Craven 
Families 
with 
FHOH 
% of 
Black 
New 
Bern 
Families 
with 
FHOH 
% of 
Black 
New 
Bern 
Families 
on 
P.A. 
Mean 
P.A. 
Income 
for 
Black 
New 
Bern 
families 
U.S. 
Poverty 
Thresh-
old for 
Non-
farm 
Family 
of Four 
1970 11% 6% $1,041 19% 18% 30% 28% $1,247 $3,968 
1980 15% 9% $2,090 24% 32% 51% 34% 
(of 
house-
holds) 
$2,379 $8,414 
 
 
Despite realities that prevented local efforts from more fully stamping out the 
sources of poverty in Craven, industrial development played an important role in raising 
both white and black economic fortunes, including those who were not directly hired by 
the new industries. As economists have shown, a community‟s economic growth can 
raise the standard of living and “earning capacities of the populations at large—even of 
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the less educated, less motivated, and less healthy.”
72
 To name a few, the expansion of 
the Craven County hospital, the building of additional schools, and the construction and 
repaving of local roads, all of which were largely made possible by private investment, 
helped to reduce the severity of poverty for the low-income residents in the area. The 
growth of industry would also contribute to Craven County‟s shift in status from 
predominately rural to predominately urban by the mid-1970s thereby reducing the 
degree of isolation for low-income individuals. For a sizeable number of the poor, 
however, they would directly benefit from the expansion of industry in providing 
opportunities for higher wages and career advancements that had not been possible in the 
past. In 1960, only 56 percent of all adults employed in Craven County could find work 
fifty to fifty-two weeks/year.
73
 By 1990, 65 percent could.
74
 But while local awareness of 
poverty, the desire to cure it, and the knowledge of how to do so had grown as a result of 
Craven‟s involvement in the War on Poverty, if COP/CPI had relied only upon federal 
programs, especially after OEO began decreased funding local initiatives in rural areas, 
much less poverty reduction would have occurred. After all, even though OEO had 
established agencies and programs in most sections in the country, it had reached no 
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more than 6 percent of the poor in the United States by 1968.
75
 Local initiatives (namely 
private and public funding for economic development) were, thus, crucial to the reduction 
of poverty.  
Discussions of how economic development and industrial growth helped reduce 
poverty in the South in the 1970s and 1980s are essentially absent from histories of local 
community action agencies or the War on Poverty in general. Even President Johnson 
admitted that economic growth, and not the War on Poverty alone, played a key role in 
reducing the number of the nation‟s poor between 1964 and 1968.
76
  Yet a sizeable 
number of scholars who have written about the War on Poverty have promoted the 
argument that, especially with regard to urban blacks, a weak connection existed between 
educational and training programs and earning capacity.
77
 Instead, many scholars have 
concluded that a massive redistribution of wealth and/or political power demanded by the 
poor and directed by the federal government was the only means to fairly and effectively 
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improve the lot of the poor.
78
 This theory continues to be espoused despite the fact that 
there is inconclusive evidence that a direct link exists between political participation and 
individual economic advancement. In fact, depending on the degree of intensity, political 
activism among the poor and their advocates could and often did have the opposite effect 
by alienating and making enemies out of those in influential positions, many of who 
seemed genuinely interested in providing avenues out of poverty for indigents.
79
  
In direct contradiction to the assumption that efforts to bring the poor into the 
economic mainstream did not effectively reduce poverty rates, the story of Craven 
County‟s war on poverty shows that doing so could indeed make significant and lasting 
headway. This result was especially true for black citizens who, prior to 1964, had 
generally not been afforded equal job or training opportunities and therefore did not have 
compelling reasons to graduate from high school. Providing training for the unskilled, 
educating youth and illiterate adults, and attracting higher-wage industries to improve job 
opportunities took time (and some poor were either unable or unwilling to take 
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advantage) but the historic increase of such efforts by local community leaders was not 
only well received in the black community but was also crucial to eliminating several of 
Craven‟s largest sources of past poverty.
80
  
The notion that smaller Southern communities consisted of white middle-class 
leaders and elites who were willing and capable of enlarging opportunities for the 
disadvantaged also does not fit within the historiography of the War on Poverty.
81
  
Related to the belief that self-seeking white politicians and middle-class leaders stood as 
the primary obstructions to the empowerment of the poor living within their 
communities, too few historians have grasped that it was possible for individual leaders, 
such as Craven County Commissioner D. L. Stallings, to work for their own self-interest 
as well as the interests and benefits of the community by raising the educational and 
economic opportunities for all, including those at the bottom of the economic ladder. No 
later than 1963, such leaders knew that if they wanted their communities to move forward 
industrially and  economically they could neither ignore poverty nor disregard the voices 
                                                 
80
 A few months after Johnson declared war on poverty, social scientists from the Yale Law Journal  
warned that “Poverty in America is not just a lack of material goods, education, and jobs; it is also a sense 
of helplessness, a defeatism, a lack of dignity and self-respect all of which are externally confirmed in 
varying degrees. It is exceedingly difficult to have dignity without food or clothing or a job. But it by no 
means follows that the provision of services and the supplying of material wants will yield a sense of self-
respect. And the elimination of want will not necessarily produce the kind of alert and concerned citizenry 
on which our democratic process relies.” Other social scientists agreed that poverty was not just a lack of 
income. Future sociologist Michael Harrington wrote in The Other America (1962) that “There is, in a 
sense, a personality of poverty, a type of human being produced by the grinding, wearing life of the slums. 
The other Americans feel differently than the rest of the nation. They tend to be hopeless and passive, yet 
prone to bursts of violence; they are lonely and isolated, often rigid and hostile. To be poor is not simply to 
be deprived of the material things of this world. It is to enter a fatal, futile universe, an America within 
America, with a twisted spirit.” See Edgar S. Cahn and Jean C. Cahn, “The War on Poverty: A Civilian 
Perspective,” The Yale Law Journal 73, no. 8 (July 1964):1321; Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement, 
49, 74. 
 
81
 See Orleck and Hazirjian, The War on Poverty.  
 
510 
 
of the poor—including those in the black community. In Craven, community leaders both 
white and black well understood that the greater the labor market potential, the more 
likely high value-added and skilled industries, such as Hatteras Yachts, Weyerhauser, 
Texifi, Moen, and Robert Bosch, would be induced to locate there.
82
 North Carolina 
Commissioner of Labor John C. Brooks argued in 1979 that “If there is no immediate 
benefit to most North Carolina workers from recruiting high-skill industry to the state, 
because they cannot claim the jobs which are created, there is also little potential long-
range benefit to the state unless we begin to educate and train our unemployed and 
underemployed.”
83
 The time and effort with which Craven leaders spent advocating a 
local community college was a later example of their sincere desire to replace low-wage 
industries. After all, as many county leaders saw it, reaching and developing wasted 
human resources was crucial to improving the future of the county as a whole and they 
knew that anything outside of improving the education and economic status of the poor 
were but temporary solutions.  
County leaders were aware, however, that providing enhanced educational 
opportunities for the disadvantaged was more than a means to attract industry; it was 
among one of the best ways to create a safe, harmonious community atmosphere. 
Undoubtedly, this realization was a timely one in light of events both afar (the Newark 
and Detroit riots of 1967) and nearby (the post-Martin Luther King, Jr. assassination 
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protests led by black youth in New Bern). Of course, enhanced job training, educational, 
and economic options would have meant little without the cooperation of local 
businessmen. Recognizing their responsibility to the community which they operated 
within, between 1966 and 1980 both new and established businessmen agreed to train and 
hire black youth and members of the poor in unprecedented numbers, and many did so 
through MITCE. Their decision, like those of county leaders, were partially motivated by 
the need to cooperate with federal equal opportunity laws but were also rooted in the 
financial advantages of securing qualified, pre-screened, reliable workers. As David 
Zarefsky argued about the War on Poverty in general, since the poor made up a minority 
of population, “By asking the nonpoor to sacrifice on behalf of the poor, it depended 
ultimately upon a moral appeal…The middle class could not be expected permanently to 
support a program from which its members not only did not stand to benefit but 
eventually lost relative status or advantage.”
84
 
Craven County‟s success in reducing poverty to historic lows was largely enabled 
by a relatively early commitment among local leaders to confront the sources of a low 
income within their environs. As discussed in Chapter II, the North Carolina Fund‟s 
statewide call in October 1963 for community antipoverty proposals stirred local leaders 
and interested citizens in Craven, who had lacked the financial resources to combat 
poverty prior, to begin to take meaningful action for the long term. Although federal 
money became crucial to financing the programs and paying the staff of Craven 
Operation Progress/Coastal Progress, it must be remembered that interest and practice in 
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community action in Craven County began at the grassroots level before President 
Johnson announced his intentions to ask Congress for funding for a national War on 
Poverty. As they explained in their original proposal to the North Carolina Fund, Craven 
County leaders understood that new, coordinated approaches that would tackle all known 
sources of poverty were necessary in order for disadvantaged residents, including blacks, 
to be assimilated into the larger society‟s social, economic and cultural aspects.  
In addition to improving the poor‟s health, education, and housing, other long-
range goals in Craven County‟s proposal to the North Carolina Fund included convincing 
“the population of poverty that they can live with competency and satisfaction in our 
society of free enterprise, that a full life is worth the effort it requires, and that there are 
willing hands to lift them up to where they can stand firmly in their own strength.” As 
discussed in Chapter II, Craven County leaders did not see themselves as part of a remote 
community with exceptional problems but belonging to a bigger movement to defeat the 
ideology of communism amid the ongoing Cold War between the United States and the 
former Soviet Union. County leaders also wanted to reduce poverty to improve the lives 
and outlook of the greater community as well, expressed as the hope of making “the 
entire community fully aware of its unceasing responsibility to the whole society,” 
accomplishing “adequate employment capacities and suitable job placement for the 
employables of families,” and, in recognition of the inherent problems of an undiversified 
agricultural economy, promoting “a better balance among the elements of the 
community‟s economy.” Local leaders also hoped that their efforts to combat poverty 
would become a part of a bigger process “to determine by experimentation the pilot 
513 
 
projects of the campaign which are worth perpetuating for continuing community welfare 
and effective enough to be recommended to other communities of the state.”
85
 These 
statements show that the majority of Craven‟s original program ideas, several of which 
would receive financial support from the North Carolina Fund, focused on ways to 
provide better-paying jobs for poor people including an adult high school equivalency 
program, basic education for functional illiterates, vocational training/education for 
secondary and post-secondary youth, a youth work camp project, and a job-
finding/counseling/referral program.
86
  
Several members of the “power structure,” including Stallings, county welfare 
department director Constance Rabin, county schools superintendent Robert L. Pugh, 
assistant superintendent T. J. Collier, and county public health department director Dr. 
W. A. Browne, to name a few, were not only involved in the brainstorming, researching, 
and writing of Craven County‟s proposal to the North Carolina Fund but would serve on 
the COP board of directors from its inception through the mid-to-late 1960s. As this 
dissertation has argued, most middle-class whites who served on the COP board did not 
oppose social and economic progress but instead were partners in that progress by 
advocating moderation. In addition to being very familiar with the area‟s problems and 
resources, they became some of the most committed to solutions. For many of these local 
leaders, their closeness to the problems of poverty made them that much more inspired to 
correct them, precisely because they had to live with them. This desire to improve their 
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communities, however, does not fully explain their commitment to community progress. 
The time and energy they invested, and their willingness to put their own reputations on 
the line, kept Craven‟s antipoverty initiatives moving forward during episodes of 
controversy such as following the KKK shooting of the North Carolina Volunteers in the 
summer of 1965 or even when outside funding dropped off by 1968 as a result of the 
official closing of the North Carolina Fund and OEO‟s shift away from funding local 
initiatives, especially in rural areas.  
North Carolina Fund research director Michael Brooks, who holds a degree from 
UNC-Chapel Hill in research planning, recalls his naïveté in believing that he could 
“rationally plan poverty out of existence in the state of North Carolina.” As he learned, 
local people who were involved in the antipoverty programs were largely responsible for 
the programs‟ success.  
 
We ended up with 11 studies of the ways in which the communities 
reacted to these new programs in their midst and the kinds of political and 
social changes that ultimately came about and so forth…There were some 
problems with the research, one, there was a problem based on the very 
assumption that the Ford Foundation had, this notion that, that you can, 
you can try innovative programs and then evaluate them, and if they work 
then you can kind of wholesale them around the state to other 
communities, or around the nation for that matter.  And the flaw, there 
were a couple of flaws there, one is that so much of what makes a person, 
or a program, successful is the people who are involved in it and the 
dedication and the skill and so forth that they bring to it.  And when you‟re 
doing a program experimentally, and it‟s getting a lot of attention, you 
tend to draw to it people who are, are well trained and excited about it and 
so forth.  So then it‟s successful and you say, Ah hah, that program 
works.  And then you, you distribute it to other communities, and it‟s 
taken over by bureaucrats who don‟t have much investment in it, and all of 
a sudden it‟s not working any more.  So I came to the conclusion 
eventually that what makes these programs successful or not is people, the 
people who are running them, and that it‟s not so much the program idea 
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as it is the dedication and the resources and the skill, including the 
political skill, with which, with which these programs are run.
87
  
 
 
Just after COP had been awarded OEO funds in 1964, the News & Observer similarly 
agreed that local commitment was crucial to the fight against poverty. “No swift 
improvements in Craven or anywhere else are going to come as a result of federal grants 
to combat poverty. The federal grants are greatly needed,” the N&O acknowledged, but 
“once in hand they become the least important element in this ambitious program.”
88
 
Similar conclusions were found in a 1968 Senate staff report on the War on Poverty 
nationwide. “Nearly all CAAs doing an effective job,” the report cited, “are located in 
areas where important groups in the local community are committed to program 
objectives. In communities where the governing coalition provides CAA leadership, there 
are very complete poverty programs, with a broad array of services, planning and 
coordination, and resident participation.” The Senate staff study also encountered “more 
harmony than disharmony” between CAAs and local communities and found that “most 
power struggles were resolved through social bargaining and compromise.”
89
 
The COP board, of course, was prodded early on by the North Carolina Fund staff 
and members of the black community to involve more local residents approved by the 
black and poor populations. But the willingness of the mostly-white COP board to agree 
to meet the OEO guidelines of “maximum feasible participation” and facilitate greater 
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participatory democracy with regard to local antipoverty plans and programs was 
reflective not just of their need for outside funding but also of their greater commitment, 
albeit partially out of self-interest, to fairness and justice. As discussed in chapters II and 
III, whites‟ experiences during early days of the local civil rights movement provided 
transformative opportunities for them to negotiate and interact with members of the black 
community as well as to sympathize with black calls for more equal opportunity. Several 
whites who would later join the COP board had actually participated in the talks between 
the white and black communities after civil rights demonstrations. As a result, the 
prospect of federal money with strings attached (i.e. an increase in minority 
representation) was not a particularly hard sell as it would have been just twenty years 
prior.
90
 Whites‟ willingness to “follow the rules” did not mean that racial prejudices 
disappeared but it does demonstrate that such prejudices were becoming a less-definitive 
feature of their lives.  
As this dissertation has argued, white obstructionism played a minimal role in the 
local antipoverty efforts in Craven. Only three North Carolina Fund CAPs had their 
federal monies temporarily suspended by OEO due to a lack of participation of blacks 
and/or the poor on their boards or within their programs. COP/CPI, of course, was not 
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among these.
91
 Not only did COP/CPI meet the overwhelming majority of the conditions 
set by OEO and the North Carolina Fund, no evidence suggests that this cooperation was 
mere window dressing. Most of the black members of the COP/CPI board from 1964 into 
the early 1970s were moderate to liberal (at least in comparison to SCLC leader Leon 
Nixon) and were also financially solvent members of the black community. Also, most, 
like Combined Civic Organizations of New Bern and Craven County president Robert M. 
Whitehead, had been deeply involved in the local civil rights movement before joining 
the board. As a group, they were not “Uncle Toms” who “rubber stamped” all white 
initiatives, but instead, they regularly maintained their independence by challenging 
racial inequality when it reared its head and kept white board members accountable when 
they felt their interests were being overlooked.   
The majority of the black COP/CPI board members during the 1960s did, 
however, understand the importance of working within the formal frameworks of 
institutionalized politics. In part because of their willingness to negotiate with whites, 
black influence on the board and within the staff, both poor and non-poor, only grew over 
time and included the naming of Bishop S. Rivers as the first non-white chairman of 
COP/CPI in August 1967. By 1971, the number of black staff supervisors within 
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COP/CPI had increased to ten (of fourteen).
92
 Moreover, in contrast to sociologist Jill 
Quadagno‟s argument that black antipoverty leaders were frequently “unable to capitalize 
on their newly won power,” several former black COP/CPI board members and staff won 
local political office between 1971 and 1989. The most well-known of these, Lee 
Morgan, used his power as an aldermen and later as New Bern mayor to improve street 
maintenance, garbage collection, drainage, and recreation in black communities and to 
bring in industries that offered better wages and jobs to black people.
93
  
Too much had changed, both locally and nationally, by early 1965 for white 
obstructionism to be fully successful. In an annual report issued by the liberal Southern 
Regional Council, executive director Leslie W. Dunbar confidently asserted that there 
was fundamentally one South, which was then “seeking escape from its common history 
of racism, poverty, and political absurdity.”
94
 Indeed, growing numbers of whites 
recognized that their own advancement was tied to the advancement of blacks. No longer 
was there a question of whether whites should compromise with black demands. In 
Craven County, in particular, achievements early in the civil rights era that had stamped 
out segregation and led to a larger, more influential black electorate not only helped to 
better inform whites of black interests but also compelled growing numbers of white 
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leaders, including most of the ones who served on the COP board, to try to accommodate 
these interests out of both basic humanity and self-interest. In line with historian Michael 
R. Deaderick‟s conclusion from his study of moderate whites‟ handling of racial tension 
in 1960s Forrest City, Arkansas, while white moderates in Craven felt pressure from the 
federal government to appease black grievances, the pressure applied to them by local 
black leaders played one of the most important roles in determining the successful 
outcome of greater black influence.
95
 The same became true specifically with regard to 
the black poor as well, who grew more vocal between 1966 and 1968.  
Three particularly illustrative examples of these changes between 1967 and 1968 
were New Bern officials‟ approval of the city‟s low-income housing corporation, their 
agreement to renew its NYC contract, and their encouragement of businessmen to hire 
more black youth. The ways that influential whites thought about poverty were clearly 
expanding; black disadvantage was no longer being ignored but instead was becoming 
more central to local efforts to improve the entire area‟s economic health. As a 
Washington Post editorial broadly observed about the War on Poverty in late 1966, 
“Strong new lines of communication are now open between the slums and the men who, 
from another world, govern them.”
96
  
Of course, agreeing to demands made by the black community and/or the black 
poor also went a long way toward enhancing whites‟ political initiatives and interests, 
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specifically industrial development. Indeed, because so many leading whites in Craven 
were behind economic development and attracting industry to the area (a desire that only 
seemed to grow from year to year beginning in 1963) and understood that improved 
training and education was important if this desire was to be fulfilled, only a minority 
between 1964 and 1968 expressed interest in the CAA‟s termination.
97
 In other words, 
white middle-class support for industrial development did not threaten to curb the 
strength of the antipoverty programs between 1964 and 1968 but just the opposite: it 
strengthened them.  
The fact that most of the whites who served on the COP/CPI board or supported 
its programs were not liberal but were moderate to conservative challenges established 
scholarly conclusions that those of “the middle”—who were most interested in gradual 
change, avoiding conflict, and maintaining social harmony—were merely supporters of 
the status quo and, thus, stumbling blocks to needed changes.
98
 Perhaps most importantly, 
this fact challenges the notion that consensus was antithetical to progress and particularly 
to progress related to racial equality and economic advancements within the black 
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community.
 99
 The war on poverty in Eastern North Carolina led to improvements for 
many black citizens due to a combination of factors including demonstrations (or the 
threat of demonstrations) such as boycotts and picketing. But while Martin Luther King, 
Jr. was right to argue that direct-action could “open the door to negotiation,” the record of 
SCLC leader Leon C. Nixon clearly demonstrates the limits of what such tactics could 
accomplish.
100
 Confrontation, whether initiated by the poor, black civil rights groups, 
VISTAs, or Fund staff, could and did alienate moderates whose numbers were large and 
whose good will and support were crucial to the continuation of the antipoverty 
programs. White moderates‟ willingness to sympathize with the programs‟ goals did not 
translate into full approval of any and all means of expanding them.  
As in dozens of other Southern communities during the 1960s and beyond, 
positive racial change in Eastern North Carolina occurred at least as much, if not more so, 
because of biracial negotiations and the art of appealing to the moral consciences and 
economic self-interests of all residents as attempts at coercion and threats of force. As 
this study has sought to demonstrate, the story of interracial cooperation, which is also 
the story of white accommodation to national civil rights laws and local black demands, 
was as much a part of the truth and reality of the modern South as the rise of Alabama 
Governor George Wallace and the revival of the Ku Klux Klan. Moderate white leaders 
in Craven would not stop wanting to maintain racial harmony and avoid conflict, 
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however, these desires did not weaken black influence either inside or outside COP/CPI. 
By the 1960s, the search for consensus was enough of an incentive for white moderates to 
include black leaders and citizens in community affairs to a greater extent than ever 
before and also to seek more of their cooperation than had ever been thought necessary 
(for example New Bern‟s urban renewal plans in 1967). Moreover, the presence and 
influence of white moderates in Craven prevented the forces of extremist whites from 
defeating such progress.  
These efforts to include more local black voices and to heed more of their input 
was based on a recognition, especially among New Bern aldermen, county 
commissioners, the Craven County Good Neighbor Council, and COP/CPI executive 
directors Robert Monte and James Godwin, that the entire community would move 
forward together or not at all. And because most blacks‟ believed it helped deliver 
meaningful and lasting results, biracial negotiation and cooperation continued to be a 
standard feature in Craven County well into the 1970s. To borrow another quote from 
Michael Brooks of the North Carolina Fund: during the 1960s, “Some people were 
beginning to argue that only through conflict can you achieve social change, that people 
are not gonna change until they‟re in situations of conflict…I think probably one of the 
errors we were making at that time by the way was to think in terms of cooperation and 
consensus building, or conflict, that it had to be one or the other. And I think what we 
have learned over time,” Brooks recalled, “is that both are needed.”
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 The social change 
that “situations of conflict” brought to the South has already been very well documented 
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but negotiation fueled by mutual interest between the races is a primary source of social 
change that has markedly been underappreciated by historians.  
To say that there was a historic amount of interracial cooperation in Craven 
County is not to argue that there were never disagreements or tension between blacks and 
whites. Neither does it mean that the achievement of black citizens‟ goals was always 
dependent on local white favor. But although blacks and whites did not always agree on 
all aspects of how the Craven antipoverty programs should be administered (for example, 
whether Jim Hearn should be removed as executive director, whether Legal Services 
should be run by the county bar, or whether Colonel W.F. Evans should remain as NYC 
director), they did agree about the most crucial thrusts of the local war on poverty: 
increased job training, education, and economic development for greater job 
opportunities. A poll conducted by Oliver Quayle for the North Carolina Fund in 1968 
showed that blacks and whites shared common ground on these issues throughout the 
state. While only about 10 percent of blacks (compared to 64 percent of whites) agreed 
that “whites and Negroes have equal opportunities in this state,” when asked “Why do 
you think poor people in N.C. are poor?” both the majority of black and white 
respondents agreed that “lack of education,” “job training,” or “no jobs available” were 
the three largest reasons. Also, 86 percent of blacks, compared to 56 percent of whites, 
answered that job training was “very important.” Interestingly, both a small minority of 
blacks and whites believed that poverty was rooted in “no say in public affairs.” Within 
the same poll, the vast majority of both races answered that “new industry” and “schools 
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and education” were “the public necessities [they] would most like to see tax dollars 
spent on.”
102
 
The disagreements that blacks and whites had in Craven did not appear to have 
significantly limited black influence or delayed improvements to the earning capacities of 
the poor. Instead of proving to be a region of the country too racially backwards to 
receive federal funding, as was once thought by many including North Carolina Fund 
executive director George Esser, Craven County in fact serves as a model of how a 
mutual interest in reducing local poverty provided historic opportunities for blacks and 
whites in a southern community to overcome their Jim Crow past.  
Largely because of the use of underutilized primary sources—1960s- and 1970s-
era oral interviews of antipoverty workers and local citizens (including middle-class 
whites), records from the U.S. Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, and written 
communications between COP and the North Carolina Fund as well as the Office of 
Economic Opportunity—new questions have been asked, new conclusions have been 
drawn, and a fuller history of community action and antipoverty efforts at the local level 
has been unearthed. The North Carolina Fund Records, which are housed at the Southern 
Historical Collection at UNC-Chapel Hill, have been especially indispensable in 
providing the intricate details that are necessary to tell the broader story included in this 
dissertation. The North Carolina Fund staff kept diligent records comprising 143 folders 
that contain internal memos, correspondence, transcripts of interviews, and financial 
records with regard to COP alone; still more folders are dedicated to the Fund 
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administration and the other ten North Carolina Fund sites. Because few other CAAs had 
their records kept in such a meticulous manner, it is unlikely then that historians will be 
able to evaluate other CAAs in comparable detail as those supported by the North 
Carolina Fund. Nonetheless, this dissertation may inspire other efforts to reappraise the 
War on Poverty through the rigorous search of previously unexamined sources.   
Arguably, the ability to draw fully applicable lessons from War on Poverty 
scholarship is limited by disproportionate reliance on contemporary individual 
testimonies of poor people with whom historians have understandably tended to 
sympathize with most. As a result, historians, and especially those who study the South, 
have tended to associate the failures of the War on Poverty with the shortcomings of 
white and black middle-class leaders while they have granted most of the credit for its 
success to the poor as well as funding support from Washington. As this dissertation has 
sought to demonstrate, such narratives are incomplete. At least within Craven County, 
reality was that the poor as well as the middle class whites and blacks alike all stood to 
profit from the improved economic health of the area. Moreover, all contributed, in 
varying degrees, depending on the situation and context, to the successes of the local war 
on poverty in terms of both antipoverty programs and economic development. 
Determining where and why efforts to curb poverty worked is just as crucial, if not more 
so, than studying the places where and reasons that such efforts were less successful.  
Because this dissertation focuses on the first four years of COP/CPI, it is not 
intended to address how CAAs were administered after Richard Nixon won the 
presidency in 1968 and carried through his campaign promise to dismantle OEO. (In spite 
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of Nixon‟s efforts, Coastal Progress would last until 1979; its vast change in direction 
during the 1970s would make an interesting subject of future scholarship.) Moreover, 
because it traces the administration, accomplishments, and fortunes of one CAA among 
approximately a half-dozen in Eastern North Carolina alone, this dissertation does not 
seek to represent the variety of experiences throughout the rural South during the Great 
Society years. By the same token, however, the mere fact that an entity such as COP/CPI 
existed at all in a region that at one time housed one of the largest slave populations in the 
nation during the nineteenth century raises the question of whether similar successes in 
biracial cooperation and similar returns on greater investments in education, job training, 
and economic development can be found in other parts of the South—a region that  
historians have broadly painted as uninterested in finding ways to reduce poverty for all 
of its citizens primarily because wide federal wealth redistribution or a guaranteed 
income was not championed.
103
 
This dissertation has focused most intently on the roles of local people; however, 
both the North Carolina Fund and OEO—notwithstanding instances in which both 
organizations actually intentionally and unintentionally complicated local efforts in 
battling poverty—were inarguably important partners in Craven County‟s fight to reduce 
local and area poverty. Not only did the North Carolina Fund inspire the launching of 
numerous community action initiatives in 1963, its expertise, technical assistance, and 
private funding meant that the Craven area could enjoy a notable amount of freedom and 
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practice in the ways it utilized new techniques to fight poverty. At least in its first few 
months of operation, the Fund‟s private nature surely helped to persuade conservatives to 
accept the notion of community action amid a period of racial and social change.
104
 Also, 
due to the Fund‟s close proximity and degree of knowledge of the area, its representatives 
and staff visited Coastal Progress much more frequently than OEO officials were able to 
do; these visits were often paramount in helping to ease and moderate community issues. 
OEO‟s most crucial contribution was the millions of funding dollars supplied for 
COP/CPI‟s antipoverty programs; however, in combination with the North Carolina 
Fund, OEO also helped local people stay accountable to standards concerning the fair and 
equitable inclusion of the poor and minorities. Nonetheless, although COP/CPI relied on 
outside funding, technical assistance, and guidance, the various kinds of outside help it 
received were not the defining features of successful poverty reduction in the Craven 
area: local commitment, cooperation, and the knowledge and experience gained from 
experimental antipoverty programs that the lives of a substantial number of the poor 
could be improved through self-help were instead the most important features.  
In February 1965, Craven Community Action Technician David Entin, who 
helped COP executive director Jim Hearn compose applications for OEO funding, touted 
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the early promise of Craven Operation Progress in an article for The County Officer. 
Entin closed the piece by prescribing that achievement of the goals of the War on Poverty 
would be dependent upon three things: “the response of the disadvantaged people to the 
new opportunities and challenges presented to them, the continued support and interest of 
all Craven‟s citizens, and the effective and judicious operation of the various programs. 
On the success of these tasks history will judge Craven County.”
105
 This dissertation 
provides ample evidence that Craven County, though far from totally victorious in the 
war, ultimately deserves to be judged generously among the nation‟s most successful 
antipoverty efforts both during and after the Great Society. Yet, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, judging the degree of success of a program or community based on its 
reduction of poverty is arguably less important than the exploration into the full range of 
individuals, motivations, methods, and influences that made that success possible.
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLES 
 
 
Table 7. Black employment (male and female) at Craven County Hospital, New Bern, NC, 1966-1980. 
Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1966-1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration. *When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job (OTJ) 
trainees/apprentices.  
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offici-
als/ 
Mana- 
gers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Techni- 
cals 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cleri- 
cal 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1966  307 3 14 63 4 1 17 0 102 
[39%] 
73 
(0) 
1968 303 3 19 75 3 1 6 136 107 
[35%] 
81 
(102) 
1970 339 4 26 71 4 0 8 0 113 
[33%] 
85 
(0) 
1972 436 4 25 86 5 0 19 106 139 
[32%] 
95 
(86) 
1974 480 2 20 103 6 0 3 119 134 
[28%] 
109 
(86) 
1975 579 0 15 70 8 0 84 135 184 
[32%] 
147 
(109) 
1980 922 11 56 155 31 0 0 221 253 
[27%] 
216 
(176) 
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Table 8. Black employment (male and female) at Montgomery Ward Company, New Bern, NC, 1968-
1980.  Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1968-1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration. * When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job 
(OTJ) trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offici-
als/ 
Mana-
gers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Techni-
cals 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cleri- 
cal 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1968  88 0 n/a 1 0 0 4 0 5 
[6%] 
0 (0) 
1970 103 1 n/a 3 0 0 1 9 7 
[7%] 
0 (2) 
1971 103 1 n/a 3 0 0 1 7 7 
[7%] 
0 (0) 
1972 123 2 n/a 5 0 0 0 7 8 
[7%] 
2 (0) 
1974 148 2 n/a 5 0 1 3 13 13 
[9%] 
3 (5) 
1980 117 6 n/a 12 0 0 2 19 14 
[12%] 
10 (9) 
 
 
Table 9. Black employment (male and female) at Coastal Progress, New Bern, NC, 1970-1973.  Employer 
Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1970-1973, Craven County, Records of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.  
* When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job (OTJ) 
trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total No. 
of 
Employees 
(white and 
black) 
 
Officials/ 
Managers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Technic
-als 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Clerical 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
No. and % 
Black 
Employees 
 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees 
1970 114 6 6 70 9 n/a n/a 91 
[80%] 
71 
 
1971 113 10 6 72 9 n/a n/a 97 
[86%] 
79 
 
1972 102 8 6 48 5 n/a n/a 67 
[66%] 
50 
 
1973 104 9 6 48 6 n/a n/a 69 
[66%] 
51 
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Table 10. Black employment (male and female) at Texifi Industries, Inc., New Bern, NC, 1972-1980.  
Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1972-1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration. * When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job 
(OTJ) trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offici-
als/ 
Mana-
gers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Technic-
als 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work- 
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cler- 
ical 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees* 
 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1972  488 0 1 10 3 7 76 10 97 
[20%] 
31 
(6) 
1973 587 2 0 11 2 5 62 66 82 
[14%] 
88 
(39) 
1975 790 4 5 15 3 13 241 315 281 
[35%] 
135 
(159) 
1980 484 2 0 7 4 0 107 188 194 
[40%] 
98 
(85) 
 
 
Table 11. Black employment (male and female) at Maysville Garment, Inc., Maysville, NC (Jones County), 
1968-1980. Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1968-1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration. * When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job 
(OTJ) trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offici-
als/ 
Mana-
gers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Techni- 
cals 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cleri-
cal 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees 
 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1968  133 0 0 0 0 22 n/a 0 22 
[17%] 
22 
(0) 
1970 181 0 0 0 0 41 n/a 0 41 
[23%] 
41 
(0) 
1972 158 0 0 0 0 38 n/a 34 38 
[24%] 
38 
(34) 
1974 166 0 0 0 0 54 n/a 38 54 
[33%] 
54 
(38) 
1975 169 0 0 0 0 54 n/a 0 54 
[32%] 
54 
(0) 
1978 167 0 0 0 0 39 n/a 40 39 
[23%] 
39 
(40) 
1980 164 0 0 0 0 42 n/a 57 42 
[26%] 
42 
(57) 
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Table 12. Black employment (male and female) at Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Co., New Bern, NC, 
1966-1980. Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1966-1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration. * When applicable, total includes laborers (unskilled) but does not include on-the-job 
(OTJ) trainees/apprentices. 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
No. of 
Employ-
ees 
(white 
and 
black) 
 
Offici-
als/ 
Mana-
gers 
 
Profess-
ionals/ 
Techni- 
cals 
 
Sales/ 
Service 
Work-
ers 
 
Office/ 
Cleri-
cal 
 
Crafts-
men 
(skilled) 
 
Opera-
tives 
(semi-
skilled) 
 
OTJ 
Train- 
ees 
 
No. and 
% 
Black 
Employ-
ees 
 
No. of 
Black 
Female 
Employ-
ees/ 
(OTJ 
trainees) 
1966  212 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 9 
[4%] 
1 
(0) 
1968 250 0 0 0 0 0 2 15 16 
[6%] 
2 
(1) 
1970 359 0 0 6 21 3 0 12 33 
[9%] 
21 
(3) 
1972 308 0 0 8 17 3 3 27 31 
[10%] 
18 
(17) 
1974 311 0 0 7 28 3 3 36 41 
[13%] 
29 
(24) 
1975 318 1 0 7 36 2 3 36 49 
[15%] 
36 
(24) 
1980 406 3 0 6 60 5 3 72 77 
[19%] 
62 
(58) 
 
 
Table 13. Number of male and female black office/clerical workers employed in Craven County (based on 
businesses who reported to EEO office), 1966-1980. Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1966-
1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), 
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
Year Total Number No. of Black Females 
1966 7 6 
1970 45 43 
1974 57 57 
1980 144 126 
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Table 14. Number of male and female black sales workers employed in Craven County (based on 
businesses who reported to EEO office), 1966-1980. Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1966-
1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), 
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
Year Total Number No. of Black Females 
1966 12 2 
1970 22 15 
1974 66 28 
1980 67 43 
 
 
Table 15. Number of male and female black officials/managers employed in Craven County (based on 
businesses who reported to EEO office), 1966-1980. Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1966-
1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), 
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
Year Total Number No. of Black Females 
1966 4 0 
1970 14 0 
1974 15 5 
1980 40 18 
 
 
Table 16. Number of male and female black skilled workers employed in Craven County (based on 
businesses who reported to EEO office), 1966-1980. Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1966-
1980, Craven County, Records of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), 
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. 
 
Year Total Number No. of Black Females 
1966 19 0 
1970 72 42 
1974 165 60 
1980 220 68 
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Table 17. Number of skilled worker positions available in Craven and Jones County (based on businesses 
who reported to EEO office), 1966-1980. Employer Information Report Files (EEO-1), 1966-1980, Craven 
County, Records of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Record Group 403), U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration. 
 
Year Total Number No. of Positions Filled by 
Women 
 
1966 294 6 
1970 590 173 
1974 765 169 
1980 1030 237 
 
 
Table 18. Median black income as a percentage of median income among families in Craven County, 1969-
1999. U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. 
 
Year Craven County Median 
Family Income 
Median Black Family 
Income 
Median Black Family 
Income as a Percentage 
of Median Family 
Income in Craven 
 
1969 $7,046 $3,314 47% 
1979 $13,060 $8,051 61% 
1989 $29,109 $19, 816 68% 
1999 $42,574 $27, 362 64% 
 
 
Table 19. Percentage of Poverty and Black Poverty among families in Craven County, 1969-1999. U.S. 
Census Bureau, Census of Population, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000.  
 
Year Percentage of Craven 
Families with Income Less 
than Poverty Level 
Percentage of Black Craven 
Families with Income Less 
than Poverty Level 
 
1969 18.7% 41.2% 
1979 15.5% 34% 
1989 10.5% 26.7% 
1999 9.9% 23% 
 
